{ "id": 4277064, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TED GODFREY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Godfrey", "decision_date": "2008-05-23", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201406\u20140819", "first_page": "511", "last_page": "519", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 511" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "883 N.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5705844 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/227/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1255" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "572 N.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591083 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "685 N.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. 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App. 3d 1048", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499621 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1051-52" }, { "page": "1052" }, { "page": "1051-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/181/1048-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 N.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461", "parenthetical": "reversible error not required" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 3d 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5288573 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" }, { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0787-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 N.E.2d 1153", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1154" }, { "page": "1156-57" }, { "page": "1156-57" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5538801 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59-60" }, { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 N.E.2d 1335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1338" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 777", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544478 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781-82" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0777-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 971, "char_count": 19197, "ocr_confidence": 0.846, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.5828155114230504e-08, "percentile": 0.2873607689096932 }, "sha256": "f2c9e51c5edcc36e7678f62b0f37d685a2f38159c4cd55276801c86fef004552", "simhash": "1:837d3f972346edc5", "word_count": 3184 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:01.752924+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TED GODFREY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LYTTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Ted Godfrey, was convicted of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11(a)(2) (West 2004)), criminal trespass to a residence (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 4(a)(2) (West 2004)) and domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 3.2(a)(1) (West 2004)). The trial court sentenced him to a statutory minimum term of six years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, defendant asks us to (1) reduce his conviction and sentence under Supreme Court Rule 615 (134 Ill. 2d R. 615), and (2) remand the case for additional proceedings on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.\nOn April 28, 2005, defendant\u2019s ex-girlfriend, Erion Lovingood, invited defendant over to her house after he finished playing basketball. Lovingood had been pregnant with defendant\u2019s child, but that day discovered she had miscarried. Defendant finished his basketball game but did not go to Lovingood\u2019s house right away. After waiting several hours for defendant, Lovingood decided that she no longer wanted to see him, so she locked the front door and went upstairs. Around midnight, defendant arrived at Lovingood\u2019s home. He saw that the lights were on and her car was in the driveway.\nAfter ringing the doorbell and receiving no response, defendant tried the front door and found it was locked. Defendant then called Lovingood on her cell phone. When Lovingood did not answer her phone, defendant kicked the door three times, breaking it open, and went searching for Lovingood. Defendant found Lovingood talking on the phone in her upstairs bathroom. Defendant became angry, snatched the phone from Lovingood and threw it down the stairs. Defendant and Lovingood then proceeded down the stairs, arguing along the way Once downstairs, defendant threw another phone and fought with Lovingood. According to Lovingood, defendant pushed her, held her arms and threw something at her. When he became tired of fighting with Lovingood, defendant left.\nLovingood called the police. When police arrived at Lovingood\u2019s home, they found damage to the front door, spilled milk on the kitchen floor, blood spatters on the wall and floor and a television turned over on the floor. Police also saw a blood spot on Lovingood\u2019s shirt, a pink mark on her arm and a cut on her lip. Defendant testified that the blood on Lovingood\u2019s shirt was his.\nDefendant was charged with home invasion, criminal trespass to a residence and domestic battery. After a bench trial, he was convicted on all three counts. Prior to sentencing, defendant sent a letter to the court, claiming that his attorneys were ineffective because they never told him his options or the amount of time he would have to serve if convicted. The trial court found that the letter did not contain sufficient allegations to establish incompetency of counsel.\nThe trial court sentenced defendant to six years in prison, the mandatory minimum sentence for a conviction of home invasion. See 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11(c) (West 2004); 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(3) (West 2004).\nI\nDefendant asks us to reduce his conviction from home invasion to the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass to a residence and then remand for sentencing on the reduced offense. He contends that we have the power and duty to do this under Supreme Court Rule 615.\nRule 615 states, in relevant part, \u201cOn appeal the reviewing court may *** reduce the degree of the offense of which the appellant was convicted ***.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(3). Courts using the power granted by this rule must do so with \u201ccaution and circumspection\u201d (People v. Coleman, 78 Ill. App. 3d 989, 992 (1979)) and not \u201cpurely out of merciful benevolence\u201d (People v. Mau, 88 Ill. App. 3d 924, 925 (1980)). People v. Jones, 286 Ill. App. 3d 777, 783, 676 N.E.2d 1335, 1339-40 (1997).\nWhen a trial court\u2019s judgment is tainted by reversible error but a conviction for a lesser-included offense would not be, we may employ Rule 615 to remand the case for sentencing on the lesser-included offense. See People v. Davis, 112 Ill. 2d 55, 61, 491 N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (1986). However, there is a difference of opinion within the appellate court about whether there must be reversible error to invoke Rule 615. Compare People v. Kick, 216 Ill. App. 3d 787, 793, 576 N.E.2d 395, 399 (1991) (reversible error required), with People v. Plewka, 27 Ill. App. 3d 553, 558-59, 327 N.E.2d 457, 461 (1975) (reversible error not required). We need not reach this issue because even under the more lenient standard applied by appellate courts, the facts in this case do not trigger the application of Rule 615.\nUnder the more lenient standard, reversible error is not necessary when there is (1) an evidentiary weakness in the State\u2019s case, (2) a mandatory minimum sentence that is unsatisfactorily harsh, and (3) a conviction for a lesser-included offense. People v. Jackson, 181 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1051-52, 537 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (1989). \u201cEvidentiaiy weakness\u201d means something that causes the appellate court to have grave concern about the reliability of the guilty verdict. See Jones, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 784, 676 N.E.2d at 1340.\nTo sustain a conviction for home invasion, the State must prove the following:\n\u201cA person *** commits home invasion when without authority he or she knowingly enters the dwelling of another when he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present *** and\n***\n[intentionally causes any injury *** to any person or persons within such dwelling placet.]\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11 (West 2004).\nDefendant claims that there were several evidentiary weaknesses in the State\u2019s case that justify invocation of Supreme Court Rule 615. First, he argues that there is a factual question regarding whether his presence in Lovingood\u2019s home was authorized. We find no evidentiary weakness regarding this element. Lovingood testified that although she invited defendant over to her house earlier that evening, she did not want to see him when he finally came to her home. This is why she locked her door, did not open the door for defendant when he rang her doorbell and did not answer her cell phone when defendant called. Based on Lovingood\u2019s undisputed testimony, the trial court properly concluded that defendant\u2019s presence in the home was unauthorized.\nDefendant also claims that his entry was authorized because he entered Lovingood\u2019s home out of concern for her safety. He cites case law on the limited authority doctrine, which deals with the limited nature of an invited person\u2019s authority to be in a dwelling. See People v. Bush, 157 Ill. 2d 248, 253, 623 N.E.2d 1361, 1364 (1993). The limited authority doctrine applies only after a defendant is invited into or granted access to a dwelling. People v. Priest, 297 Ill. App. 3d 797, 805, 698 N.E.2d 223, 229 (1998). Here, the evidence established that although Lovingood asked defendant to come to her house earlier that evening, she did not invite him into her home or grant him entry into the home when he arrived at midnight. Because defendant entered Lovingood\u2019s home by force, the limited authority doctrine does not apply.\nFinally, defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence that he injured Lovingood. Lovingood testified that defendant physically injured her by pushing her, holding her arm and throwing something at her. A police officer testified that he saw a mark on Lovingood\u2019s arm and a cut on her lip when he arrived on the scene. Defendant testified that he did not hurt Lovingood and that his own wounds accounted for the blood on Lovingood\u2019s shirt. The trial court chose to believe the testimony of Lovingood and the police officer over defendant\u2019s. This does not create an evidentiary weakness. See Jack son, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 1052, 537 N.E.2d at 1057 (a conviction does not suffer from evidentiary weakness when the trial court finds testimony from a defense witness less credible than consistent testimony from prosecution witnesses).\nSince there is no evidentiary weakness, we cannot invoke Rule 615 to reduce defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence. See Jackson, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 1051-52, 537 N.E.2d at 1057.\nII\nDefendant also asks us to remand this case so that the trial court may inquire into the adequacy of his trial counsel. He claims that if his attorneys told him that he faced a mandatory six-year prison sentence upon a conviction for home invasion, he would have sought a plea deal on the lesser charges.\nWhen a defendant presents a pro se motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the court may dismiss it if the claim is spurious or pertains only to trial tactics. People v. Baltimore, 292 Ill. App. 3d 159, 165, 685 N.E.2d 627, 631 (1997). If, however, the defendant\u2019s allegations of incompetence have merit, the court should appoint new counsel to argue defendant\u2019s claim of ineffective assistance. People v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82, 134-35, 572 N.E.2d 895, 919 (1991).\nTo sustain an allegation of ineffective assistance, the defendant must present evidence of deficient performance and evidence that if counsel\u2019s performance had been adequate the outcome might have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525, 473 N.E.2d 1246, 1255 (1984).\nHowever, even if defendant\u2019s public defender and later his retained counsel did not tell him about the sentence he faced if convicted of home invasion, defendant still has no claim of ineffective assistance because there was no prejudice. See People v. Manning, 227 Ill. 2d 403, 422, 883 N.E.2d 492, 504 (2008). The trial court itself informed defendant that he faced a mandatory six-year prison sentence during one of the last pretrial conferences, and defendant said he understood the court\u2019s warning:\n\u201cTHE COURT: And Mr. Godfrey, you understand the charges against you and the possible sentences you face if convicted on these charges?\nDEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: I want to make sure you do. A Class X felony, the potential penalties of 6 to 30 years in the Department of Corrections. Is the Defendant qualified for extended term?\nPROSECUTOR: No, Judge.\nTHE COURT: The period in the Department of Corrections would be followed by 3 years mandatory supervised release. It\u2019s not probationable.\nTHE COURT: Do you understand the penalties you face?\nDEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: Do you have any questions regarding the charges against you or the possible penalties you face?\nDEFENDANT: No.\u201d\nIn light of this exchange, the trial court was correct to conclude that defendant\u2019s allegation of ineffective assistance was without merit and to refuse appointing independent counsel to pursue an ineffective assistance claim at the trial level.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCARTER, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LYTTON" }, { "text": "JUSTICE SCHMIDT,\nspecially concurring:\nI agree with the majority\u2019s decision to affirm the circuit court, but I disagree with its approach to both of defendant\u2019s claims of error.\nI. Relief Under Supreme Court Rule 615\nThe problem with the majority opinion is apparent. The majority, citing People v. Jackson, 181 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 537 N.E.2d 1054 (1989), holds \u201c[sjince there is no evidentiary weakness, we cannot invoke Rule 615 to reduce defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence.\u201d 382 Ill. App. 3d at 515. This opinion not only fails to provide guidance to practitioners, but also misleads them. The holding clearly implies that had the majority found an evidentiary weakness, it could have invoked Rule 615 to reduce defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence in the absence of reversible error. I submit it could not. If multiple errors below are harmless in isolation but are cumulatively prejudicial to a defendant, we can and will grant relief. People v. Scott, 108 Ill. App. 3d 607, 615, 439 N.E.2d 130, 136 (1982); People v. Patterson, 44 Ill. App. 3d 894, 900, 358 N.E.2d 1164, 1169 (1976). But the Jackson standard would have us countermand trial court judgments that were admittedly not erroneous at all.\nThe majority applies a portion of the standard this court announced in People v. Jackson, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 1051-52, 537 N.E.2d at 1057. I believe Jackson was wrongly decided and that any analysis under Rule 615(b)(3) must depend on the presence or absence of reversible error. See People v. Thomas, 266 Ill. App. 3d 914, 926, 641 N.E.2d 867, 876 (1994); People v. Rodriguez, 258 Ill. App. 3d 579, 587, 631 N.E.2d 427, 433 (1994); People v. Sims, 245 Ill. App. 3d 221, 225, 614 N.E.2d 893, 896-97 (1993); People v. Kick, 216 Ill. App. 3d 787, 793, 576 N.E.2d 395, 399 (1991).\nIn discussing the Jackson standard, the majority omits the fourth element of that standard, which is that the trial court expressed dissatisfaction with imposing the mandatory sentence. 382 Ill. App. 3d at 513; Jackson, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 1051, 537 N.E.2d at 1056. The majority also ignores defendant\u2019s arguments and reliance upon this aspect of the Jackson standard.\nThe Jackson line of cases would have us grant relief when, in the opinion of two or more judges, a mandatory minimum sentence imposed below is unduly harsh. People v. Plewka, 27 Ill. App. 3d 553, 559, 327 N.E.2d 457, 461 (1975). Jackson holds that we have authority to intervene after the trial judge \u201cexpressed] dissatisfaction\u201d with imposing a mandatory minimum sentence. Jackson, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 1051, 537 N.E.2d at 1056. This element of Jackson makes it incompatible with our constitution\u2019s separation of powers requirement. Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, \u00a71. The majority simply ignores both this aspect of Jackson and defendant\u2019s arguments in reliance on it.\nIt is well settled that \u201c[t]he legislature has authority to *** establish the nature and extent of criminal penalties, and a court exceeds its authority if it orders a lesser sentence than is mandated by statute, unless \u2018the [mandated] penalty shocks the conscience of reasonable men.\u2019 \u201d People v. Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1, 6, 506 N.E.2d 954, 956 (1987), quoting People ex rel. Ward v. Salter, 28 Ill. 2d 612, 615 (1963). Accord People v. Landers, 329 Ill. 453, 457,160 N.E. 836 (1927). We can substitute our judgment for a trial court\u2019s when the trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4); People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 211, 737 N.E.2d 626, 630 (2000). But we may not substitute our judgment for the legislature\u2019s unless a sentence is constitutionally infirm. People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d 537, 542, 416 N.E.2d 259, 262 (1981) (mandamus appropriate if a sentence less than the mandatory minimum is imposed); Kick, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 576 N.E.2d at 399.\nThe sentencing provision of a criminal statute is unconstitutional when it violates the proportionate penalties clause of our constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a711. A statute violates the proportionate penalties clause if the punishment is so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community or if different sentences can be imposed for crimes with identical elements. People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 487, 839 N.E.2d 492, 498 (2005). Defendant does not argue that the statutory minimum sentence is constitutionally infirm.\nThe defendant argues on appeal that while the trial court is bound by statutory minimum sentences, the appellate court is not. Surely, in crafting Rule 615, the supreme court did not intend to give the appellate court the discretion to nullify mandatory minimum sentences while disapproving of that practice in trial courts. See People ex rel. Daley v. Suria, 112 Ill. 2d 26, 33-34, 490 N.E.2d 1288, 1290-91 (1986); People ex rel. Daley v. Limperis, 86 Ill. 2d 459, 468-69, 427 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (1981). If we read Rule 615(b)(3) to give an appellate court the discretion to ignore statutory minimum sentences, then the rule itself would violate our separation of powers clause. Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, \u00a71. I see nothing in any supreme court case which leads me to believe that the court intends the rule to be read in such a way.\nCourts siding with Jackson have argued that if we only employed our power to reduce the degree of a conviction in the presence of reversible error, that power would be redundant because of our reversal power. People v. Jones, 286 Ill. App. 3d 777, 781-82, 676 N.E.2d 1335, 1338 (1997). This is not so, as the supreme court demonstrated in People v. Davis, 112 Ill. 2d 55, 491 N.E.2d 1153 (1986). Larry Davis, recently released from prison, solicited bribes from his former fellow inmates, offering to get them to the top of early release lists. Word of Davis\u2019s scheme reached investigators, who set up a sting operation. He was then tried and convicted of theft by deception. To prove this crime, the State must prove that the victim relied on the thief\u2019s representations. Davis, 112 Ill. 2d at 59-60, 491 N.E.2d at 1154. Trial witnesses testified that the reason they contacted investigators was that they disbelieved Davis\u2019s promises. The supreme court reversed Davis\u2019s conviction because the State failed to prove the necessary element of the victim\u2019s reliance (reversible error), and entered a conviction for attempted theft by deception pursuant to Rule 615(b)(3). Davis, 112 Ill. 2d at 63, 491 N.E.2d at 1156-57.\nTherefore, the one time our supreme court has granted relief under Rule 615(b)(3), it did so after finding reversible error, without regard to any mandatory minimum sentence, and entered a conviction for a lesser-included offense that was not charged below. Davis, 112 Ill. 2d at 63, 491 N.E.2d at 1156-57. Though it did not comment on the Jackson line of cases, the Davis court\u2019s analysis contradicts each element of the Jackson standard. Jackson is simply not good law.\nAccordingly, I would examine defendant\u2019s claim for reversible error. He concedes the State proved the elements of home invasion beyond a reasonable doubt. I would, therefore, affirm.\nII. Claim of Inadequate Assistance\nDefendant\u2019s allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel argues that had he been informed he was not eligible for probation, he would have sought a favorable plea deal. As the majority notes, this allegation was contradicted by discussions between defendant and the trial court on the record. But the substance of defendant\u2019s allegation also asks us to speculate about what plea negotiations would have taken place between himself and the prosecution, the State\u2019s ultimate offer, and his decision to accept or reject it. Our supreme court\u2019s recent guidance indicates defendant\u2019s allegation is so speculative, we should not entertain it at all. People v. Bew, 228 Ill. 2d 122, 135 (2008). Accordingly, that is the basis on which I would affirm the trial court.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE SCHMIDT," } ], "attorneys": [ "Melissa Maye (argued), of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Kevin W. Lyons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (Terry A. Mertel, Gary F. Gnidovec (argued), and Lawrence M. Bauer, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TED GODFREY, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201406\u20140819\nOpinion filed May 23, 2008.\nSCHMIDT, J., specially concurring.\nMelissa Maye (argued), of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nKevin W. Lyons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (Terry A. Mertel, Gary F. Gnidovec (argued), and Lawrence M. Bauer, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0511-01", "first_page_order": 529, "last_page_order": 537 }