{ "id": 4277667, "name": "ROBERT DesPAIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF COLLINSVILLE et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "DesPain v. City of Collinsville", "decision_date": "2008-05-09", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201407\u20140300", "first_page": "572", "last_page": "581", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 572" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "184 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2639643 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/184/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5703048 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349", "parenthetical": "\"It is a basic tenet of justiciability that reviewing courts will not decide moot or abstract questions or render advisory opinions\"" }, { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778585 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2930703 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" }, { "page": "29" }, { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/247/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3254735 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 913", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4262301 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "918" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0913-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588617 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" }, { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450836 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" }, { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3606828 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609706 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" }, { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 714", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599140 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0714-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3827961 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451324 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0251-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 798, "char_count": 20385, "ocr_confidence": 0.84, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.553285487460147e-08, "percentile": 0.40170314948863817 }, "sha256": "8e464c1e03e8e2a3573a70afc3f8258faa349009c8fca5458e7a14bf36d5fc57", "simhash": "1:3abcd5ab8d064ec0", "word_count": 3472 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:01.752924+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ROBERT DesPAIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF COLLINSVILLE et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WEXSTTEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Robert DesPain, appeals from the order of the circuit court of Madison County granting a partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the City of Collinsville, Collinsville Mayor Stan Schaeffer, and Collinsville city council members Fred Dalton, Diane Meyer, and Michael Bartsch. For the reasons that follow, we reverse in part and affirm in part.\nBACKGROUND\nThe present appeal stems from three written requests that the plaintiff submitted to the City of Collinsville (the city) pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (the Act) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2000)). The facts relevant to the case are not in dispute.\nIn March 2001, the plaintiff filed a single-count pro se complaint for a declaratory judgment against the defendants. The complaint alleged a violation of the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 2000)).\nIn April 2001, the plaintiff requested that, pursuant to the Act, the city allow him to inspect \u201cand listen to\u201d the audiotapes of the city council meetings of \u201c1/29/01\u201d and \u201c2/12/01.\u201d In a response letter, John Swindle, the city\u2019s \u201cFreedom of Information Officer\u201d (FOIO) advised the plaintiff that the records he had requested were \u201cavailable for inspection, immediately.\u201d The letter further stated, however, that the city did \u201cnot have the facilities for the public to listen to audiotapes,\u201d that the city had to \u201cmaintain possession of the originals,\u201d and that the plaintiff could obtain copies of the tapes for a fee. The plaintiff subsequently appealed the response to his request in a letter to Mayor Schaeffer. See 5 ILCS 140/10(a) (West 2000). In his appeal letter, the plaintiff maintained that the Act permitted him to inspect the requested audiotapes and that it was \u201cunreasonable to take the position that an audiotape can be inspected without listening to it.\u201d In a response letter, stating that he believed that the plaintiff had not \u201cbeen denied access to a public record,\u201d Mayor Schaeffer denied the plaintiffs appeal. Citing the city\u2019s need to \u201cpreserve its original public records,\u201d the mayor\u2019s letter explained that \u201cin order to inspect an audiotape, a copy must be made.\u201d The mayor\u2019s letter advised that copies of the tapes were available for a fee. The letter further stated that \u201ca [c]ity employee could be provided for the purpose of operating the audiotape machine as you inspect [copies of the audiotapes],\u201d but the mayor intimated that the plaintiff would still have to pay for the copies.\nIn May 2001, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint for a declaratory judgment, adding counts II and III. Count II of the amended complaint alleged that the city had violated section 3 of the Act (5 ILCS 140/3 (West 2000)) by denying his request to listen to the audiotapes that he had asked to inspect. The plaintiff requested an order directing the defendants to allow him to listen to the original audiotapes, as opposed to copies. Count III alleged that the city had violated section 9(a) of the Act (5 ILCS 140/9(a) (West 2000)) because the city\u2019s responses to his request failed to conform to the statutory requirements set forth therein.\nIn August 2001, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, again alleging counts I, II, and III. No new counts were added, and no substantive changes were made to the existing counts.\nIn February 2002, the plaintiff requested that the city allow him to inspect and listen to a portion of the \u201coriginal\u201d audiotape of the city council meeting of \u201c12/26/01.\u201d In a response letter, the city\u2019s FOIO advised the plaintiff that the city did \u201cnot have the facilities that would enable the public to listen to audiotapes,\u201d that the city had to \u201cmaintain possession of all originals,\u201d and that a copy of the tape was available for a fee.\nIn March 2002, the plaintiff requested that the city allow him to inspect and listen to a portion of the audiotape of the city council meeting of \u201c3/25/02.\u201d In a response letter, the FOIO again informed the plaintiff that the city did \u201cnot have the facilities for the public to listen to audiotapes,\u201d that the city had to \u201cmaintain possession of the originals,\u201d and that a copy of the tape was available for a fee.\nIn April 2002, the plaintiff filed a third amended complaint, adding counts TV, V, VI, and VII. Counts IV and V mirrored count II of the plaintiff\u2019s first and second amended complaints but referenced his February and March inspection requests, respectively. Counts VI and VII alleged that the city had violated the Act with respect to an inspection request unrelated to the present appeal.\nIn November 2002, the plaintiff filed a fourth amended pro se complaint for a declaratory judgment, adding counts VIII, IX, X, and XI. Counts VIII and XI alleged further violations of the Open Meetings Act. Counts IX and X alleged violations of the Act with respect to inspection requests unrelated to the present appeal.\nIn June 2006, the defendants moved for a summary judgment on counts I through X of the plaintiff\u2019s fourth amended complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 1005 (West 2006)). With respect to counts II, IV and V the defendants maintained that \u201cnothing in [the Act] states that an original public record must be provided to a requestor\u201d and that \u201cnothing in [the Act] states that a public body must provide the means or facilities to a requestor for the purpose of listening to an original or a copy of an audiotape.\u201d With respect to count III, the defendants argued that because the plaintiff had not been denied access to the public records referred to in count II, there was no need to comply with section 9(a) of the Act.\nIn March 2007, the circuit court entered an order granting the defendants\u2019 motion for a summary judgment on counts II, III, IY and V of the plaintiff\u2019s fourth amended complaint and denying a summary judgment on the remaining counts. As to counts II, IV and V the court held that the plaintiff had no right under the Act to listen to the original audiotapes in question, \u201cnor were [the] defendants obligated to provide a method or procedure for him to do so.\u201d The circuit court granted a summary judgment on count III \u201cbecause [the plaintiff] was not denied the \u2018inspection\u2019 or \u2018copying\u2019 of the subject audiotapes.\u201d\nIn April 2007, the plaintiff filed a timely motion to reconsider the granting of a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on counts II, III, IV and V The circuit court denied the motion to reconsider and stated that pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), there was no just reason for delaying the enforcement or appeal of its previous order or its order denying the motion to reconsider.\nIn May 2007, the circuit court dismissed the remainder of the plaintiff\u2019s complaint for a want of prosecution. The plaintiff subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal from the circuit court\u2019s order denying his motion to reconsider the granting of a summary judgment on counts II, III, IV and V.\nANALYSIS\nThe parties agree that the primary issue on appeal is whether the plaintiff was entitled to listen to the original audiotapes that he asked to inspect or whether the city complied with the Act by providing him the opportunity to obtain and inspect copies of the tapes. Because we conclude that the plaintiff was entitled to inspect the original audiotapes, we reverse the circuit court\u2019s judgment granting a summary judgment on counts II, IV and V in favor of the defendants and enter a summary judgment on the same in favor of the plaintiff. We affirm the circuit court\u2019s granting of a summary judgment on count III but do so on grounds other than the court\u2019s stated reason.\n\u201cSummary judgment is proper where the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, reveal that there is no issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Abrams v. City of Chicago, 211 Ill. 2d 251, 257 (2004). The interpretation of a statute is a matter of law and is thus appropriate for a summary judgment. Village of Chatham v. County of Sangamon, 216 Ill. 2d 402, 433 (2005). Statutory interpretation issues and summary judgment rulings are both reviewed de novo. City of Warrenville v. Novak, 355 Ill. App. 3d 714, 717 (2005).\nCounts II, W, and V\nSection 3 of the Act states, \u201cEach public body shall make available to any person for inspection or copying all public records, except as otherwise provided in Section 7 of this Act.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/3(a) (West 2000). Section 7(1) of the Act lists numerous categories of public records that are \u201cexempt from inspection and copying.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/ 7(1) (West 2000). Under the Act, \u201cpublic records are presumed to be open and accessible.\u201d Illinois Education Ass\u2019n v. Illinois State Board of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 462 (2003). \u201cThus, when a public body receives a proper request for information, it must comply with that request unless one of the narrow statutory exemptions set forth in section 7 of the Act applies.\u201d Illinois Education Ass\u2019n, 204 Ill. 2d at 463.\nThe plaintiff insists that he is entitled to listen to the original audiotapes that he asked to inspect. Stating that it \u201cis willing to allow the [pjlaintiff to inspect, listen to, or be given accurate copies of the audiotapes requested,\u201d the city maintains that it is not required to allow the public to access its original public records. The city supports its claim that \u201cit may use accurate copies of original public records for the purpose of inspections\u201d by noting that the Act neither prohibits the use of copies, as opposed to originals, nor mentions \u201coriginal\u201d public records anywhere in its text.\nWhen interpreting a statute, the \u201cprimary objective is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent, the surest and most reliable indicator of which is the statutory language itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning.\u201d People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 323 (2007). When determining the plain meaning of a statute\u2019s terms, a court must consider the statute in its entirety, bearing in mind the subject that it addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d at 323. Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, a court must apply it as written, without resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d at 323. In addition, \u201c[t]he statute should be read as a whole and construed so that no part of it is rendered meaningless or superfluous.\u201d People v. Jones, 214 Ill. 2d 187, 193 (2005). \u201cA court should consider each part or section of a legislative act in connection with every other part or section, and not each part alone, in determining the purpose or intent of the legislature.\u201d Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 318 (1989).\nPursuant to the Act, \u201c \u2018[plublic records\u2019 means all records, reports, forms, writings, letters, memoranda, books, papers, maps, photographs, microfilms, cards, tapes, recordings, electronic data processing records, recorded information^] and all other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, having been prepared, or having been or being used, received, possessed[,] or under the control of any public body.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/2(c) (West 2000). The Act sets forth several examples of what the term \u201c \u2018[plublic records\u2019 includes\u201d (5 ILCS 140/2(c) (West 2000)), but, as the defendants correctly note, nowhere does the Act refer to \u201coriginal\u201d records, nor does the Act expressly prohibit the use of copies for public inspection. Nevertheless, we must read the Act as a whole and interpret it so that none of its provisions are rendered meaningless. Jones, 214 Ill. 2d at 193. We must also read each part of the Act \u201cin connection with every other part.\u201d Castaneda, 132 Ill. 2d at 318.\nPursuant to the Act, \u201c \u2018[cjopying\u2019 means the reproduction of any public record by means of any photographic, electronic, mechanical[,] or other process, device[,] or means.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/2(d) (West 2000). Because to copy a \u201cpublic record\u201d means to reproduce it, it follows that the term \u201cpublic record\u201d as used in the Act necessarily refers to a public body\u2019s original record. Thus, by only allowing the plaintiff to inspect copies of the requested \u201cpublic records,\u201d the city did not make available to the plaintiff for inspection the \u201cpublic records\u201d as required by section 3(a) of the Act.\nAlthough we understand the city\u2019s concern regarding the preservation of its original records, we cannot ignore the intent of the legislature as evinced by the plain language of the statute. Rita v. Mayden, 364 Ill. App. 3d 913, 918 (2006). We also note that although a public body may determine when and where a requested inspection will take place (see 5 ILCS 140/3(g)(i) (West 2000)), that a public body lacks the facilities for the public to listen to audiotapes is not a valid basis upon which to deny a request to inspect a tape-recorded public record. \u201cThe Act states that public bodies must make public records available for inspection and copying, unless they can avoid doing so by invoking an exception that is provided in the Act.\u201d American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. County of Cook, 136 Ill. 2d 334, 343 (1990).\nLastly, contrary to the defendants\u2019 suggestion on appeal, the Act does not allow for the charging of fees associated with the inspection of a public record. Section 6 of the Act is entitled \u201cAuthority to charge fees,\u201d and subsection (a) provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201c(a) Each public body may charge fees reasonably calculated to reimburse its actual cost for reproducing and certifying public records and for the use, by any person, of the equipment of the public body to copy records. Such fees shall exclude the costs of any search for and review of the record[ ] and shall not exceed the actual cost of reproduction and certification, unless otherwise provided by State statute.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/6(a) (West 2000).\nThus, under the plain language of the Act, a public body may only charge fees associated with the \u201ccost for reproducing and certifying public records\u201d or the \u201cuse, by any person, of the equipment of the public body to copy records.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/6(a) (West 2000); see also 2005 Ill. Att\u2019y Gen. Op. No. 05 \u2014 002, at 5 (noting that \u201c[u]nder the plain language of subsection 6(a), a public body is ordinarily limited to charging a fee for furnishing copies of public records that is calculated \u2018to reimburse its actual cost for reproducing *** public records\u2019 \u201d). Moreover, the Act further states that the assessment of a fee \u201cnot consistent\u201d with subsection 6(a) \u201cshall be considered a denial of access to public records for the purposes of judicial review.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/ 6(c) (West 2000). Clearly, the Act does not authorize the imposition of inspection fees.\nThe plaintiff was entitled to inspect the original audiotapes that he requested pursuant to the Act. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court\u2019s order granting the defendants\u2019 motion for a summary judgment on counts II, iy and V of the plaintiffs fourth amended complaint, and pursuant to our authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (155 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)(5)), we hereby grant a summary judgment on those counts in favor of the plaintiff.\nCount III\nSection 9(a) of the Act states:\n\u201c(a) Each public body or head of a public body denying a request for public records shall notify by letter the person making the request of the decision to deny such, the reasons for the denial, and the names and titles or positions of each person responsible for the denial. Each notice of denial by a public body shall also inform such person of his right to appeal to the head of the public body. Each notice of denial of an appeal by the head of a public body shall inform such person of his right to judicial review under Section 11 of this Act.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/9(a) (West 2000).\nCount III of the plaintiffs fourth amended complaint for a declaratory judgment alleged that the city had violated the Act because the city\u2019s responses to his request to inspect the audiotapes referred to in count II failed to fully conform to section 9(a)\u2019s requirements. The plaintiff asked that the circuit court enter an order directing the city to comply with section 9(a) \u201cin the future.\u201d The plaintiff now asks that we reverse the court\u2019s order granting a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on count III.\n\u201cA plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment must show that such relief would be based on an actual justiciable controversy.\u201d SBL Associates v. Village of Elk Grove, 247 Ill. App. 3d 25, 29 (1993). \u201cActual controversy has been interpreted to mean a concrete dispute admitting of an immediate and definitive determination of the parties\u2019 rights, the resolution of which will aid in the termination of the controversy or some part thereof.\u201d Village of Elk Grove, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 29. The requirement of actual controversy \u201crequires a showing that the underlying facts and issues of the case are not moot or premature with the result that a court passes judgment upon mere abstract propositions of law, renders an advisory opinion, or gives legal advice concerning future events.\u201d Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162, 170 (1993); see also In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d 338, 349 (2006) (\u201cIt is a basic tenet of justiciability that reviewing courts will not decide moot or abstract questions or render advisory opinions\u201d). \u201cIf a plaintiff\u2019s rights would be infringed, and thereby be adversely affected, only if some future possibility in fact occurs or does not occur, then the right in question is speculative and a court cannot enter a declaratory judgment.\u201d Township High School District 203 (New Trier) v. Village of Northfield, 184 Ill. App. 3d 367, 373 (1989).\nIt is undisputed that the city\u2019s responses to the plaintiffs April 2001 request to inspect the audiotapes referred to in count II did not fully conform to section 9(a) of the Act. Adopting the city\u2019s subjective belief that it was not required to comply with section 9(a)\u2019s notice requirements because it had not denied the plaintiffs request to inspect the audiotapes, the circuit court granted the defendants\u2019 motion for a summary judgment on count III, finding that the plaintiff had not been \u201cdenied the \u2018inspection\u2019 or \u2018copying\u2019 of the subject audiotapes.\u201d Although, for the reasons discussed above, we disagree with the circuit court\u2019s finding that the plaintiff was not denied his requested inspection of the subject audiotapes, the plaintiff suffered no discernable prejudice by the city\u2019s failure to comply with section 9(a). The plaintiff was obviously aware that he had the right to appeal the FOIO\u2019s response to his April 2001 request and that he had the right to judicial review under section 11 of the Act (5 ILCS 140/11 (West 2000)). In no way were these rights adversely affected by the city\u2019s failure to comply with section 9(a), and the issue is now moot because it \u201cpresents no actual controversy\u201d (In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d at 349). Moreover, it is speculation to assume that letters from the city denying requests for public records will not conform to section 9(a) \u201cin the future.\u201d \u201cSince a reviewing court can affirm a lower court\u2019s decision on any grounds which are based upon the record, *** we uphold the circuit court\u2019s dismissal of the declaratory action based on the fact that no controversy currently exists.\u201d Village of Elk Grove, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 30. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s order granting a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on count III.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court\u2019s order granting a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on counts II, IV and V; we grant a summary judgment on those counts in favor of the plaintiff; and we affirm the circuit court\u2019s order granting a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on count III.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part; judgment entered.\nCHAPMAN and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WEXSTTEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Curtis L. Blood, of Collinsville, for appellant.", "Steven C. Giacoletto, of Giacoletto Law Office, EC., of Collinsville, for ap-pellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROBERT DesPAIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF COLLINSVILLE et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201407\u20140300\nOpinion filed May 9, 2008.\nCurtis L. Blood, of Collinsville, for appellant.\nSteven C. Giacoletto, of Giacoletto Law Office, EC., of Collinsville, for ap-pellees." }, "file_name": "0572-01", "first_page_order": 590, "last_page_order": 599 }