{ "id": 4277203, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANDREW WESLEY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Wesley", "decision_date": "2008-05-12", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201406\u20143172", "first_page": "588", "last_page": "594", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 588" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "843 N.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5736011 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "752 N.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351267 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 N.E.2d 1119", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295651 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "817 N.E.2d 968", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defense counsel's failure to challenge the admissibility of the various hearsay statements prejudiced the defendant and deprived him of a fair trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 1080", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5458108 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1093-94", "parenthetical": "defense counsel's failure to challenge the admissibility of the various hearsay statements prejudiced the defendant and deprived him of a fair trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/1080-01" ] }, { "cite": "830 N.E.2d 467", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060336 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 U.S. 406", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3553902 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "1183" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/549/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 824", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 349583 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "827" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/309/0824-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 N.E.2d 1215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57334 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "739 N.E.2d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963678 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "693 N.E.2d 1247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 1037", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 45738 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1049" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/295/1037-01" ] }, { "cite": "818 N.E.2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444253 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0274-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 698, "char_count": 14231, "ocr_confidence": 0.837, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.513407924023407e-08, "percentile": 0.4468484456043576 }, "sha256": "f928586f462e14867c825220275860c19dcaa48a0b5d3efe835053943ad02bf4", "simhash": "1:f230797eaf479e00", "word_count": 2259 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:01.752924+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANDREW WESLEY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant Andrew Wesley was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to a 55-year prison term. On appeal, he contends: (1) the State failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) his constitutional right to confrontation was violated; and (3) one of his convictions for first-degree murder must be vacated under the one-act, one-crime rule. We affirm, but amend the mittimus to reflect only one conviction of first-degree murder.\nFACTS\nOn May 15, 2005, Leroy Graham and the victim, Malik Jones, began arguing over whether Jones could continue to sell marijuana at the parking lot of the Three Stooges liquor store. While the two men argued, a group of people gathered around them. When Jones turned and started to walk away, a black man wearing a black \u201choodie\u201d with braids in his hair stepped out of the crowd and shot Jones five to six times. Jones died as a result of the gunshot wounds. Four eyewitnesses subsequently identified defendant as the shooter.\nOn July 11, 2005, defendant was arrested for Jones\u2019 murder. Detective Patrick Golden interviewed defendant on July 12, 2005. After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant told Detective Golden that he was not Graham\u2019s friend and that he was not at the Three Stooges liquor store when Jones was shot. During his second interview, defendant again denied any knowledge regarding Jones\u2019 shooting. Following Deborah Johnson\u2019s and Gregory Jenkins\u2019 lineup identification of defendant as the shooter, Detective Golden reinterviewed defendant. Detective Golden testified that during the third interview, he \u201cadvised [defendant] that several individuals had identified him as the shooter.\u201d At that point, defendant admitted he was untruthful in his first two initial statements.\nDefendant admitted to Detective Golden that he was present at the Three Stooges liquor store and witnessed the fight between Graham and Jones. Defendant was standing next to Graham until he went into the liquor store twice. When defendant came out of the liquor store for the second time, he saw Deborah Johnson attempting to get Jones to leave the crowd \u201cwhen an unknown individual approached out of the crowd who had a black hoodie sweatshirt on, raised his arm, produced a handgun, and shot [the victim] five to six times.\u201d Defendant told everyone to leave the parking lot before the police arrived. Defendant denied he shot Jones. Defendant admitted he wore braids in his hair at the time of the murder.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney (ASA) Bryan Hofeld also interviewed defendant. Defendant told ASA Hofeld that he was at the Three Stooges liquor store when the shooting occurred. Defendant was unable to see who the shooter was. When ASA Hofeld asked why defendant would lie to the police if he was not involved in the shooting, and why people would identify defendant as the shooter if he was not the shooter, defendant was unable to offer an explanation.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of murder. He was sentenced to a 55-year prison term.\nDECISION\nI. Reasonable Doubt\nDefendant contends the State failed to prove him guilty of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, defendant contends the State\u2019s eyewitnesses were incredible and provided inconsistent and contradictory testimony regarding the events surrounding the shooting.\nOn review, the relevant question is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278, 818 N.E.2d 304 (2004); People v. Ornelas, 295 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1049, 693 N.E.2d 1247 (1998). It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 338, 739 N.E.2d 455 (2000). A criminal conviction will not be reversed unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt is justified. People v. Moore, 171 Ill. 2d 74, 94, 662 N.E.2d 1215 (1996).\nAt trial, Deborah Johnson, the victim\u2019s girlfriend, testified she heard Graham say to defendant, \u201cgun that [expletive] down.\u201d Defendant was standing next to Graham. After Graham made the statement, Johnson saw defendant pull a gun from his waistband and shoot Jones six times. Johnson testified that after defendant shot Jones, she heard Graham say to him, \u201ckill the rest of these [expletive].\u201d Defendant did not shoot anyone else. Johnson denied Graham made any sort of gesture indicating defendant should shoot Jones and denied that Graham pointed the gun. On cross-examination, however, Johnson said Graham \u201cguided [defendant\u2019s] hand to the level where Malik Jones was walking\u201d but by the time defendant fired, Graham\u2019s hand was no longer on the gun. Johnson also admitted on cross-examination that she had initially told the police that her eight-year-old son was present when the shooting occurred and that she lied to police when she told them she did not know what Graham and Jones were arguing about. Johnson did not hear Graham ask defendant whether defendant had his gun.\nDemetrius Clair, a friend of the victim, testified he was standing next to Jones during Jones\u2019 argument with Graham. During the argument, \u201cLeroy had his head down, and he looked at the guy with the black hoodie on, and he did a hand motion.\u201d Clair then saw defendant fade off into the crowd. Clair told Jones the defendant was \u201cfittin\u2019 to go get a gun.\u201d Clair turned around, walked three steps, and then heard four to five gunshots.\nGregory Jenkins testified that on May 28, 2005, he was arrested for possession of a controlled substance. Following his arrest, he was interviewed by Detective Kevin Bor and ASA Hofeld. Jenkins said he gave the police information regarding the victim\u2019s murder so the charge would be dismissed. Although Jenkins acknowledged he gave a written statement regarding the murder, he said the statements contained in his handwritten statement were not true.\nThe State was allowed to read Jenkins\u2019 prior statement into evidence. According to his statement, Jenkins was in Marcus Scott\u2019s car drinking when he saw Jones and Graham arguing across the parking lot. Jenkins heard Graham turn to defendant and say, \u201cGo get that.\u201d Jenkins saw defendant walk toward the liquor store while Jones and Graham continued to argue. When Jones turned and began walking away, defendant walked out of the liquor store and Graham pointed at Jones. Defendant then pulled a gun out of his waistband and shot Jones six to seven times. Jenkins testified to the same facts before the grand jury. During his grand jury testimony, Jenkins also testified that \u201c[Jones] told Andrew to do something, and he did so by making a hand movement and that\u2019s when Drew walked somewhere around the liquor store.\u201d Jenkins was serving a two-year sentence for delivery of a controlled substance at the time of his testimony.\nMarcus Scott testified that he was arrested for drug conspiracy on September 14, 2005. Following his arrest, Scott met with the police and Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Kim Ward. Although Scott denied he was present at the shooting during defendant\u2019s trial, he admitted he signed each page of the statement he made to the police.\nThe State was allowed to read Scott\u2019s prior statement into evidence. According to his statement, Scott saw defendant come out of the liquor store and shoot Jones numerous times. Marcus admitted he testified to the same facts before the grand jury. Marcus said that Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Shelly Keane told him to testify to these facts and if he did, his drug conspiracy charge would be dismissed.\nContrary to defendant\u2019s contention, we find the eyewitnesses\u2019 testimony presented by the State identifying defendant as the shooter, mixed with defendant\u2019s acknowledgment that he was present when the murder occurred, could establish defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the witnesses\u2019 accounts of the location of the shooter and what Graham said prior to the shooting varied slightly, the witnesses were consistent in identifying defendant as the shooter. \u201cMinor inconsistencies in testimony do not, by themselves, create a reasonable doubt.\u201d People v. Cunningham, 309 Ill. App. 3d 824, 827 (1999). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we cannot say the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt remains as a matter of law.\nII. Right to Confrontation\nDefendant contends his conviction must be reversed and remanded for a new trial because the State introduced inadmissible hearsay evidence, in violation of his sixth amendment right to confrontation. Specifically, defendant contends Marcus Scott\u2019s, Detective Golden\u2019s, and ASA Hofeld\u2019s testimony that \u201cseveral individuals\u201d identified defendant as the shooter amounted to inadmissible hearsay evidence in violation of his right to confrontation.\nDefendant does not contend the allegedly inappropriate hearsay statements admitted at trial violated Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). Instead, he contends the hearsay statements simply violated his right of confrontation. Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court clarified that the rule delineated in Crawford is the only rule governing confrontation clause protection. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1, 13, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1183 (2007) (\u201cBut whatever improvement in reliability Crawford produced in this respect must be considered together with Crawford\u2019s elimination of Confrontation Clause protection against the admission of unreliable out-of-court nontestimonial statements. Under Roberts, an out-of-court nontesti-monial statement not subject to prior cross-examination could not be admitted without a judicial determination regarding reliabibty. Under Crawford, on the other hand, the Confrontation Clause has no application to such statements and therefore permits their admission even if they lack indicia of reliability\u201d). Because defendant chose not to challenge the statements under Crawford, we find the confrontation clause has no application to the statements challenged in this case.\nWe also find defendant forfeited his contention that the witnesses\u2019 testimony regarding \u201cseveral individuals\u201d identifying defendant as the shooter amounted to inadmissible hearsay. Defendant admits he did not object to the witnesses\u2019 complained-of testimony at trial, and he did not raise the issue in his posttrial motion.\nDefendant attempts to circumvent forfeiture by contending the inadmissible hearsay testimony admitted in this case amounted to plain error. The plain error doctrine allows a court to address a forfeited error affecting substantial rights in two instances: (1) where the evidence in the case is so closely balanced that the jury\u2019s guilty verdict may have resulted from the error, and not the evidence; or (2) where the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, and thus a fair trial. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178-79, 830 N.E.2d 467 (2005). The evidence in this case was not closely balanced, however. Four eyewitnesses identified defendant as the shooter, and defendant admitted he was present when the murder occurred. Moreover, the alleged evidentiary errors were not so serious as to deny defendant a right to a fair trial.\nAlternatively, defendant contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly preserve the alleged errors. See People v. Jura, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1093-94, 817 N.E.2d 968 (2004) (defense counsel\u2019s failure to challenge the admissibility of the various hearsay statements prejudiced the defendant and deprived him of a fair trial).\nThe only complained-of testimony we take issue with in this case is the allegedly improper hearsay statement contained in Marcus Scott\u2019s handwritten statement. In the handwritten statement, Scott said Brandon Foster, who was Graham\u2019s \u201cright hand man,\u201d approached him and said that three people had identified defendant as the shooter and that \u201cthey better hope that [Graham] doe[sn\u2019t] find out\u201d who identified defendant. The complained-of portion of Scott\u2019s statement is inadmissible hearsay. The trial court, however, decided to allow that portion of the statement into evidence with a limiting instruction informing the jurors that they were to consider it only \u201cfor the limited purpose of what was on [sic] the witness\u2019s state of mind and his motive for testifying and any interest or bias he has for the testimony that he has in the courtroom,\u201d and \u201cnot to take it as fact that Graham set these things in motion, but only the limited purpose of the witnesses [sic] credibility on the stand.\u201d We find any prejudice caused by the statement was cured by the trial court\u2019s limiting instruction. People v. Sims, 285 Ill. App. 3d 598, 609, 673 N.E.2d 1119 (1996).\nIII. Mittimus\nDefendant contends, and the State agrees, his mittimus should be corrected to reflect only one conviction for first-degree murder. Pursuant to the one-act, one-crime rule, defendant could only be convicted once for the murder of Malik Jones. See People v. Kuntu, 196 Ill. 2d 105, 130, 752 N.E.2d 380 (2001). Accordingly, we amend the mittimus to reflect only one conviction for first-degree murder. People v. Bishop, 218 Ill. 2d 232, 249, 843 N.E.2d 365 (2006).\nCONCLUSION\nWe affirm the circuit court\u2019s judgment, but amend the mittimus to reflect only one conviction of murder.\nAffirmed; mittimus amended.\nCAHILL, P.J., and GARCIA, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia Unsinn and Emily R Atwood, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Tasha-Marie Kelly, and Cristin Duffy, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANDREW WESLEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201406\u20143172\nOpinion filed May 12, 2008.\nPatricia Unsinn and Emily R Atwood, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Tasha-Marie Kelly, and Cristin Duffy, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0588-01", "first_page_order": 606, "last_page_order": 612 }