{ "id": 4277637, "name": "FARMERS AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEPHEN WROBLEWSKI et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Farmers Automobile Insurance v. Wroblewski", "decision_date": "2008-05-02", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201406\u20143604", "first_page": "688", "last_page": "701", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 688" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "48 L 3863", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Lans. Ch.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273675 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/376/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4262163 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5594776 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717", "parenthetical": "generally, a court will not review moot issues, and an issue is moot if no actual controversy exists" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/359/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 Ill. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2621096 ], "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/403/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. App. 3d 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2668780 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456-57", "parenthetical": "unnamed employee of cab company was properly released under a covenant not to sue the cab company or \"any of its agents, servants, or employees\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/187/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 Ill. App. 3d 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5409755 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323", "parenthetical": "concluding that \"Alsup permits identification [of joint tortfeasors] by means other than actual naming (such as designation by class of persons)\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/249/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 847508 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422", "parenthetical": "concluding that the class designation \"agents\" satisfies Alsup and releases individuals who belong to that class" }, { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/293/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 Ill. App. 3d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4269671 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" }, { "page": "413", "parenthetical": "\"parol evidence rule\" bars consideration of extrinsic evidence to modify the unambiguous provisions of a written contract" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/373/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146414 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" }, { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 Ill. App. 3d 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4268641 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/371/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610710 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610449 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592225 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442055 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448779 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3778457 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160472 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200-02" }, { "page": "200-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 1032", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1527765 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1037-39" }, { "page": "1039" }, { "page": "1044" }, { "page": "1045" }, { "page": "1044-46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/319/1032-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 L 3863", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Lans. Ch.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 963, "char_count": 30706, "ocr_confidence": 0.845, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.779584459315256e-08, "percentile": 0.36081775423972595 }, "sha256": "5e66a20f1857e3a500e7f9eb95c4799401d2d21fbeefc23ceda8c560167620fe", "simhash": "1:db3d5ee6b95b326e", "word_count": 4756 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:01.752924+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "FARMERS AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEPHEN WROBLEWSKI et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (Farmers) filed a declaratory judgment action against its insureds Stephen and Gloria Wroblewski (Wroblewski), seeking a judgment that Farmers was not obligated to provide uninsured motorist coverage to Wroblewski in connection with a traffic accident involving Wroblewski and Sharon Drolet, who was an uninsured motorist. On appeal, Farmers challenges (1) the circuit court\u2019s finding that Wroblewski\u2019s settlement with Drolet\u2019s employer, which expressly released from liability the employer\u2019s \u201cagents\u201d and \u201cemployees,\u201d did not release Wroblewski\u2019s claims against Drolet; (2) and the court\u2019s finding that Wroblewski\u2019s settlement with Drolet\u2019s employer for $1.25 million should be offset against Wroblewski\u2019s total damages ($1.85 million). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Farmers.\nBACKGROUND\nA. Wroblewski\u2019s Personal Injury Action (Case No. 98 L 3863)\nInitially, in order to clarify the parties\u2019 respective arguments on appeal, we briefly recount certain uncontested facts contained in the parties\u2019 respective pleadings regarding a separate action initiated by Wroblewski in connection with a 1997 automobile accident.\nOn August 26, 1997, Wroblewski sustained serious physical injuries after the vehicle that she was driving was involved in a collision with a vehicle driven by Sherri Drolet, who died from injuries that she sustained in that collision. Thereafter, Wroblewski filed a personal injury action (No. 98 L 3863) against decedent Drolet\u2019s estate and Drolet\u2019s employer, namely, Walgreen Company (hereinafter Walgreens) under the theory of respondeat superior.\nUltimately, Wroblewski settled her claims against Walgreens for $1.25 million and settled her claims against Drolet\u2019s estate for $10,000.\nIn regard to the Walgreens settlement, Wroblewski executed a release of liability against Walgreens in exchange for a payment of $1.25 million. That release, in relevant part, released Walgreens and its \u201cagents\u201d and \u201cemployees\u201d from any and all liability arising out of the accident between Wroblewski and Drolet.\nIn regard to the settlement with Drolet\u2019s estate, Wroblewski executed a release of claims against Drolet\u2019s estate and Drolet\u2019s insurer, namely, Gallant Insurance Company, in exchange for a payment of $10,000.\nIn March 2002, as a result of the settlements, the circuit court dismissed Wroblewski\u2019s action against both Walgreens and Drolet\u2019s estate. According to the parties, Walgreens paid Wroblewski $1.25 million pursuant to the terms of the settlement with Wroblewski.\nHowever, as represented by the parties, Gallant Insurance Company (Drolet\u2019s insurer) became insolvent at some point subsequent to the settlement and did not pay Wroblewski $10,000 on behalf of Drolet. Following this failure to pay, Wroblewski filed a claim with Farmers seeking uninsured motorist coverage.\nB. Farmers Files Declaratory Judgment Action (Case No. 02 CH 14288)\nIn August 2002, Farmers filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Wroblewski was not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage, which is the action that forms the subject of this appeal. Farmers attached to its complaint a copy of Wroblewski\u2019s insurance policy, which provided uninsured motorist coverage up to $100,000 and defined an uninsured motorist as a motorist whose insurer \u201cis or becomes insolvent.\u201d\nIn pertinent part, Farmers argued in its complaint that the limit of liability clause in Wroblewski\u2019s policy entitled Farmers to offset the policy\u2019s limit ($100,000) for uninsured motorist coverage against the proceeds Wroblewski had previously obtained from her Walgreens settlement ($1.25 million). Farmers also noted that Wroblewski had signed a release in connection with the Walgreens settlement, which released Walgreens and \u201call other persons, firms, and corporations\u201d from any claims arising from the vehicle collision with Drolet.\nIn October 2002, Wroblewski answered Farmers\u2019 complaint for declaratory judgment, arguing that Farmers had wrongfully denied her claim for uninsured motorist coverage. In regard to the release in the Walgreens settlement, Wroblewski admitted that she had executed a release in favor of Walgreens, but denied that Farmers had accurately detailed the terms and conditions of that release.\nIn December 2002, Farmers filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the circuit court converted to a motion for summary judgment.\nIn April 2003, the circuit court denied Farmers\u2019 motion for summary judgment without prejudice.\nIn July 2003, Wroblewski filed a motion to dismiss Farmers\u2019 action based on lack of ripeness or, alternatively, for an order compelling arbitration. In relevant part, Wroblewski noted that her actual damages had never been adjudicated through trial or arbitration because her action against decedent Drolet\u2019s estate remained pending. In regard to the Walgreens settlement and release, Wroblewski argued that it was \u201cnonsensical\u201d to hold that the Walgreens settlement extinguished any liability for uninsured motorist coverage with respect to Drolet\u2019s estate because the action against Drolet\u2019s estate remained pending and Illinois law did not hold that a settlement with an employer extinguishes the employee\u2019s liability.\nIn August 2003, Farmers filed a combined response to Wroblew-ski\u2019s motion to dismiss and a renewed motion for summary judgment. In its motion to dismiss, Farmers again noted that Wroblewski had signed a release in the Walgreens settlement that had released Wal-greens and its \u201cagents\u201d and \u201cemployees.\u201d Further, in relevant part, Farmers argued that Wroblewski was not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage because Wroblewski had already received $1.25 million from Walgreens \u201con behalf of Drolet.\u201d According to Farmers, a calculation of Wroblewski\u2019s total damages was unnecessary because Farmers was entitled to setoff the $100,000 limit for uninsured motorist coverage against the $1.25 million Wroblewski received from the Walgreens settlement.\nIn October 2003, the circuit court (1) denied without prejudice Wroblewski\u2019s motion for dismissal or order compelling arbitration without prejudice and (2) denied without prejudice Farmers\u2019 motion for summary judgment.\nIn December 2003, Wroblewski filed a renewed motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness. In that pleading, Wroblewski explained that the trial court had previously denied her first motion to dismiss because it was \u201cunclear\u201d as to whether the release in the Walgreens settlement also released Drolet\u2019s estate from liability. Wroblewski further explained that the court had instructed the parties that it would reconsider the issue of the Walgreens release \u201cin light of the case law presented by the parties on the issue of whether extrinsic evidence could be considered by the court in determining the intent of the parties in executing the Walgreens [r]elease.\u201d\nIn relevant part, Wroblewski argued that a determination of the scope of the Walgreens release was controlled by the parties\u2019 intentions and that those intentions should be \u201cdiscerned from the release\u2019s express language as well as the circumstances surrounding the agreement,\u201d citing this court\u2019s decision in Doctor\u2019s Associates, Inc. v. Duree, 319 Ill. App. 3d 1032 (2001).\nWroblewski attached to her pleading an affidavit from Sheldon Brenner, who was the attorney that represented Wroblewski in the settlement with Walgreens. Wroblewski also attached an affidavit from Tom Andrews, who was the attorney that represented Walgreens in that settlement. In those affidavits, both Brenner and Andrews attested that the intention of the parties was to release only Walgreens from any liability and not to release Drolet\u2019s estate. Wroblewski further noted that a separate settlement was reached with Drolet, which also evidenced an intention by the parties that the Walgreens settlement did not release Drolet.\nOn January 7, 2004, Farmers filed a combined response to Wroblewski\u2019s motion to dismiss and a renewed motion for summary judgment. In that pleading, Farmers reasserted its claim that Wroblewski was not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage because Wroblewski had already been fully compensated as a result of the Wal-greens settlement. In regard to the Walgreens release, Farmers maintained that Wroblewski could not rely upon parol evidence, namely, the affidavits of Brenner and Andrews, because the Walgreens release was \u201ccomprehensive, precise, and unambiguous.\u201d According to Farmers, the Walgreens release constituted a release by Wroblewski from all claims of liability against Walgreens and its agents and employees, which is a class that included Drolet, who was an employee of Walgreens.\nOn January 12, 2004, Wroblewski responded to Farmers\u2019 renewed motion for summary judgment, repeating her prior assertion that the controversy was not ripe for adjudication until her total damages had been calculated and her lawsuit against Drolet\u2019s estate remained pending.\nIn regard to the impact of the Walgreens release, Wroblewski maintained that \u201cno Illinois case holds that a settlement with the employer extinguishes the employee\u2019s direct liability.\u201d Wroblewski also noted that she entered into a separate settlement with Drolet\u2019s estate and that her separate action against Drolet\u2019s estate remained pending. Wroblewski further maintained that the Walgreens release contained \u201cboilerplate language\u201d that \u201ccannot reasonably be construed to have released [Wroblewski\u2019s] claims against the Estate of Drolet.\u201d Wroblewski argued that the Walgreens release did not specifically identify Drolet by name, and that a release which contained language releasing both a named party \u201cand all other persons\u201d did not operate to release other tortfeasors who are not specifically identified in the release, citing Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 101 Ill. 2d 196, 200-02 (1984).\nOn January 22, 2004, the circuit court entered an order referencing Wroblewski\u2019s renewed motion to dismiss and Farmers\u2019 cross-motion for summary judgment, but did not enter a ruling on either motion. Instead, the court (1) found that the Walgreens release executed by Wroblewski did not release Wroblewski\u2019s claims against Drolet\u2019s estate or the uninsured motorist claim against Farmers \u201cunder the circumstances presented\u201d; (2) further found that an adjudication of Wroblewski\u2019s damages through trial or arbitration was required before the court could determine whether and to what extent\nthose damages exceed the amount of the Walgreens settlement and whether uninsured motorist coverage was available under Wroblew-ski\u2019s Farmers policy; and (3) continued the case for a determination of whether Wroblewski\u2019s damages should be adjudicated through trial or arbitration, \u201cto be discussed by the parties.\u201d\nOn January 26, 2004, Farmers filed a motion for a Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) finding that there was no just reason to delay an appeal of the court\u2019s January 22, 2004, order. Also on January 26, 2004, Farmers filed a motion to stay further proceedings pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 305(b) (210 Ill. 2d R. 305(b)).\nOn January 29, 2004, the circuit court denied Farmers\u2019 motion seeking a Rule 304(a) finding and denied Farmers\u2019 motion seeking a stay pursuant to Rule 305(b). Also in that order, the court directed Wroblewski to file a motion requesting arbitration.\nOn March 3, 2004, the circuit court entered an order establishing a filing scheduling to permit Farmers to file a motion for Rule 308 certification for interlocutory appeal (210 Ill. 2d R. 308). In addition, that order also set a status hearing for the scheduling of arbitration and noted, in relevant part, that the \u201cparties agree to arbitration.\u201d\nOn March 10, 2004, Farmers filed a motion to certify a question for interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 308, arguing that such review was warranted to determine whether the release executed in favor of vicariously liable Walgreens also released Drolet and whether consideration of parol evidence to determine that issue was permissible.\nOn March 12, 2004, Wroblewski filed a response to Farmers\u2019 motion seeking Rule 308 certification, arguing that Farmers\u2019 request should be denied because Farmers did not raise a question of law and that such certification would delay the resolution of the controversy. Wroblewski also observed that Farmers had agreed on March 3, 2004, to submit Wroblewski\u2019s damages claim to arbitration.\nOn March 24, 2004, the circuit court denied Farmers\u2019 motion seeking Rule 308 certification. Subsequently, as represented by the parties, Wroblewski and Farmers proceeded to arbitration on the issue of Wroblewski\u2019s total damages in connection with the accident.\nFollowing arbitration in October 2006, an arbitration panel found in favor of Wroblewski and assessed damages totaling $1,850,000. The panel further found that the damages were subject to all the terms of the uninsured motorist provision of Wroblewski\u2019s insurance policy.\nOn November 28, 2006, the circuit court entered an order confirming the arbitration award and entered judgment in favor of Wroblewski and against Farmers in the amount of $100,000, which represented the maximum amount of uninsured motorist coverage available to Wroblewski under her Farmers\u2019 insurance policy.\nOn December 13, 2006, Farmers appealed from the circuit court\u2019s November 28, 2006, order and the court\u2019s January 22, 2004, order.\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, Farmers challenges (1) the circuit court\u2019s January 22, 2004, order finding that the Walgreens release, which released from liability Walgreens\u2019 agents and employees, did not release Wroblewski\u2019s claims against Drolet, who was an employee of Walgreens; and (2) the court\u2019s November 28, 2006, order finding that Wroblewski\u2019s $1.25 million settlement should be offset against Wroblewski\u2019s total damages, as opposed to a complete offset against the $100,000 limit for uninsured motorist coverage under her Farmers insurance policy.\nA. Waiver\nAs a preliminary matter, we must address Wroblewski\u2019s contention that Farmers has \u201cwaived all claims of error in this appeal.\u201d Specifically, Wroblewski asserts that (1) Farmers cannot obtain review of the circuit court\u2019s January 22, 2004, order because that order was a nonappealable interlocutory order; (2) Farmers failed to \u201cobject\u201d to the entry of the court\u2019s November 28, 2006, order which Wroblewski characterizes as the \u201conly final and appealable order in this case\u201d; and (3) Farmers agreed to arbitration and abandoned its motion for summary judgment by not renewing it or requesting a ruling on it after the arbitration award was entered in Wroblewski\u2019s favor. After carefully reviewing the record, we disagree.\nFirst, the law is settled that an appeal from a final judgment permits review of all preceding nonfinal orders that produced that final judgment. See, e.g., Pekin Insurance Co. v. Pulte Home Corp., 344 Ill. App. 3d 64, 67-68 (2003). Here, the record establishes that the circuit court\u2019s nonfinal order on January 22, 2004, produced the court\u2019s final November 28, 2006, order. Thus, our review on appeal includes both the circuit court\u2019s nonfinal January 22, 2004, and the court\u2019s final November 28, 2006, orders.\nSecond, waiver is comprised of a litigant\u2019s intentional relinquishment of a known right and it stems from a consensual and affirmative act by that litigant. Home Insurance Co. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d 307, 326 (2004). Here, the record demonstrates that Farmers did not commit any act that can reasonably be construed as a relinquishment by Farmers of its argument that Wroblewski was not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage or that the Walgreens release effectively released Wroblewski\u2019s claims against Drolet. Instead, Farmers consistently maintained its respective positions before the circuit court. Notably, before the circuit court, Farmers unsuccessfully requested a Rule 304(a) finding of the court\u2019s January 22, 2004, order in order to appeal that decision to this court and, also unsuccessfully, sought Rule 308 certification to this court for determination of the issue of whether the Walgreens release constituted a release of Wroblewski\u2019s claims against Drolet\u2019s estate.\nThird, to the extent that Wroblewski challenges Farmers\u2019 agreement to arbitration and failure to object to the entry of the circuit court\u2019s November 28, 2006, order, our supreme court has explained that a formal objection is unnecessary \u201cwhen it is apparent that objection would be futile.\u201d People ex rel. Klaeren v. Village of Lisle, 202 Ill. 2d 164, 178 (2002). Based on our review of the record, it is apparent that any objection by Farmers to arbitration or the entry of the November 28, 2006, order would have been futile, especially where the circuit court had essentially rejected all of Farmers\u2019 pertinent arguments prior to arbitration and the entry of the November 28, 2006, order.\nAccordingly, we reject Wroblewski\u2019s argument that Farmers has waived its claims of error in this appeal arising from the court\u2019s orders on January 22, 2004, and November 28, 2006. We now address the merits of those claims.\nB. Walgreens Release\nWe first address Farmers\u2019 challenge to the circuit court\u2019s order on January 22, 2004, which found that the Walgreens release, wherein Wroblewski expressly released Walgreens\u2019 \u201cagents\u201d and \u201cemployees,\u201d did not operate to release Wroblewski\u2019s claims against Drolet, who was an employee of Walgreens. Specifically, Farmers contends that (1) the Walgreens release was unambiguous on its face and that consideration of parol evidence regarding the parties\u2019 intentions was impermissible and (2) the reference in the Walgreens release to Walgreens\u2019 \u201cagents\u201d and \u201cemployees\u201d was sufficiently specific to release Drolet from any liability because Drolet was an employee of Walgreens.\nA release is a contract and is therefore governed by contract law. Farm Credit Bank v. Whitlock, 144 Ill. 2d 440, 447 (1991). We review de novo questions of law involving the construction or interpretation of a contract. Dowling v. Chicago Options Associates, Inc., 226 Ill. 2d 277, 285 (2007).\nThe cardinal rule of contract interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the parties. Gallagher v. Lenart, 226 Ill. 2d 208, 232 (2007). When determining the intentions of the parties, a reviewing court should first consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the contractual language, which is the best indication of the parties\u2019 intentions. Gallagher, 226 Ill. 2d at 233. In addition, it is important to construe a contract as a whole and view each part in light of the others. Gallagher, 226 Ill. 2d at 233.\nWhere the terms of a contractual release are clear and explicit, a reviewing court must enforce them as written. Fuller Family Holdings, LLC v. Northern Trust Co., 371 Ill. App. 3d 605, 614 (2007), citing Rakowski v. Lucente, 104 Ill. 2d 317, 323 (1984). Under the \u201cparol evidence rule,\u201d extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to vary or modify the unambiguous provisions of a written contract. Evans v. Lima Lima Flight Team, Inc., 373 Ill. App. 3d 407, 413 (2007).\nOur supreme court, in discussing section 2(c) of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, has concluded that in order for a general release to release the liability of joint tortfeasors who did not bargain for that release, those remaining tortfeasors must be specifically identified in the release. Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 101 Ill. 2d 196, 200-02 (1984), citing Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 12 U.L.A. 57, 59-62 (1975). Subsequently, this court has interpreted Alsup and found that its requirement of specific identification can be satisfied by the designation of a class of persons. Polsky v. BDO Seidman, 293 Ill. App. 3d 414, 422 (1997) (concluding that the class designation \u201cagents\u201d satisfies Alsup and releases individuals who belong to that class). See also Cummings v. Beaton & Associates, Inc., 249 Ill. App. 3d 287, 323 (1992) (concluding that \u201cAlsup permits identification [of joint tortfeasors] by means other than actual naming (such as designation by class of persons)\u201d); Christmas v. Hughes, 187 Ill. App. 3d 453, 456-57 (1989) (unnamed employee of cab company was properly released under a covenant not to sue the cab company or \u201cany of its agents, servants, or employees\u201d).\nIn the case sub judice, the release at issue provided, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cGloria and Stephen Wroblewski *** for the sole consideration of one million two hundred and fifty thousand dollars *** hereby forever release, acquit, discharge, and covenant to hold harmless Walgreen Co. and its *** agents, employees *** from any and all accounts!,] actions, causes of action, claims, debts, demands, damages, liens, costs, suits, loss of services, expenses and compensation, of whatsoever kind of nature, in law or in equity, arising from, or in any way growing out of, any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries, damage to property, and the consequences therefore, resulting or to result from a certain incident, which occurred on or about the 26th day of August, 1997, and which is more specifically described in the lawsuit *** entitled Gloria and Stephen Wroblewski v. Victoria Reidl, as Special Administrator of Sherri Drolet, Deceased, Individually [sic] Agent or Employee of Walgreen Co. ***, for which we, Gloria and Stephen Wroblewski have claimed the said Walgreen Co. to be legally liable, which liability is expressly denied.\u201d\nThe terms contained in this release clearly and explicitly release Wal-greens and its \u201cagents\u201d and \u201cemployees\u201d from any and all claims of liability advanced by Wroblewski in connection with the .underlying traffic accident between Wroblewski and Drolet.\nNotably, in the context of the facts of this case, the terms \u201cagents\u201d and \u201cemployees\u201d are classes that sufficiently identify Drolet because she is a member of those classes. See, e.g., Polsky, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 422. Furthermore, the language of the release expressly refers to Drolet by name and identifies her as an agent or employee of Walgreens in its reference to the underlying litigation. Specifically, in pertinent part, the language of the release refers to the August 26, 1997, \u201cincident\u201d and explains that the incident \u201cis more specifically described in the lawsuit *** entitled *** Wroblewski v. Victoria Reidl, as Special Administrator of Sherri Drolet, Deceased, Individually [sic] Agent or Employee of Walgreen Co.\u201d\nAfter construing the plain and ordinary meaning of these unambiguous terms as a whole, we conclude that Wroblewski effectively released any and all of her claims against Drolet by executing the release with Walgreens and its agents and employees in exchange for $1.25 million. Consequently, we find that the circuit court erred when it reached the opposite conclusion.\nWroblewski\u2019s reliance on our decision in Doctor\u2019s Associates, Inc. v. Duree, 319 Ill. App. 3d 1032 (2001), does not alter our conclusion because of the particular factual circumstances presented in that case. We note that Wroblewski also relied on Duree as support for her position before the circuit court.\nIn particular, in Duree, the plaintiff received an award of sanctions from a Kansas court against the defendant, who was an attorney and represented individuals that the plaintiff had sued in Kansas. Duree, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 1037-39. The plaintiff then sought and received an order from an Illinois court enforcing that Kansas award as an Illinois judgment. Duree, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 1039. On appeal from enforcement of the Kansas award as an Illinois judgment, the defendant argued, inter alia, that a release executed by the plaintiff and a third party in an unrelated matter operated to release the defendant from the Kansas judgment because that release included the third party\u2019s \u201cattorneys\u201d and the defendant claimed that he was the third party\u2019s attorney in that unrelated matter. Duree, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 1044.\nThe Duree court rejected the defendant\u2019s arguments and noted that the intention of the parties controlled the scope and effect of the release and that the parties\u2019 intentions could be discerned from the language of the release and the \u201ccircumstances surrounding the agreement.\u201d Duree, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 1045. In reaching that conclusion, the Duree court found that (1) the record contained no evidence that the defendant was the attorney for the third party; (2) the release did not identify the defendant by name and was limited to the individuals \u201cexpressly set forth\u201d; (3) the language of the agreement clearly and unambiguously was limited to resolving the matters between the plaintiff and the third party; (4) and there was nothing in the record to suggest that the third party was even aware of the Kansas judgment when it executed the release with the plaintiff. Duree, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 1044-46.\nHere, Drolet is an undisputed employee of Walgreens and is specifically referred to as such in the language of the Walgreens release. However, in Duree, in stark contrast to this case, it was not clear whether the attorney was the attorney of the third party and the attorney was not identified by name in the release. Moreover, again unlike this case, in Duree, this court had to consider the impact of a foreign judgment. Based on these distinctions, we conclude that Duree is not dispositive of the controversy in this case.\nEssentially, Wroblewski urges this court to focus on parol evidence and conclude that the parties did not intend for the Walgreens release to release her claims against Drolet\u2019s estate. Wroblewski characterizes the language in the release as \u201cboilerplate,\u201d but does not argue that the language is in any way ambiguous. In fact, Wroblewski fails to respond to Farmers\u2019 contention that the language of the Walgreens release was clear and unambiguous.\nMost significantly, Wroblewski\u2019s entire argument regarding the parties\u2019 intentions in the Walgreens release is based on parol evidence, as opposed to the language of the contract. Specifically, Wroblewski relies exclusively upon (1) the affidavits from her attorney and Wal-greens\u2019 attorney, who both attested that the parties did not intend the Walgreens release to release her claims against Drolet; and (2) a separate action wherein the circuit court reinstated Wroblewski\u2019s action against Drolet\u2019s estate.\nHowever, because we have found that the language of the Walgreens release is unambiguous and Wroblewski fails to argue otherwise, we decline to consider the parol evidence upon which she relies to ascertain the parties\u2019 intentions. Evans, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 413 (\u201cparol evidence rule\u201d bars consideration of extrinsic evidence to modify the unambiguous provisions of a written contract). As our supreme court has explained:\n\u201c \u2018What the parties to a written contract may have understood as to the meaning of the language used is not admissible in evidence. The intention or understanding of the parties, when there is a written contract in evidence, must be determined not from what the parties thought but from the language of the contract itself. [Citation.]\u2019 \u201d Rakowski, 104 Ill. 2d at 323, quoting Saddler v. National Bank, 403 Ill. 218, 228 (1949).\nThus, where we have found that the contractual terms in the Wal-greens release are unambiguous, we are constrained to the language contained in that release itself and cannot consider the parol evidence advanced by Wroblewski.\nC. Insurance Coverage Under Wroblewski\u2019s Farmers Insurance Policy\nBecause we have determined that Wroblewski released her claims against Drolet by operation of the Walgreens release, Wroblewski is not entitled to seek uninsured motorist coverage from Farmers on behalf of Drolet. Therefore, we do not address the coverage issue because it has been rendered moot by our interpretation of the Walgreens release. See In re Marriage of Michaelson, 359 Ill. App. 3d 706, 717 (2005) (generally, a court will not review moot issues, and an issue is moot if no actual controversy exists).\nFurthermore, in accordance with our finding that the circuit court erred when it determined that Wroblewski was entitled to uninsured motorist coverage and submitted that coverage issue to arbitration, we necessarily conclude that the resulting arbitration award in Wroblew-ski\u2019s favor must be vacated because that award constitutes a gross error of law.\nAs this court has previously determined, while we cannot vacate an arbitration award based on errors in judgment or mistakes of fact or law, we have authority to vacate an arbitration award where, as occurred here, the arbitration award contains a gross error of law apparent on its face. Galasso v. KNS Cos., 364 Ill. App. 3d 124, 131 (2006). To vacate an award based on a gross error of law, a reviewing court must be able to conclude from the face of the award that the arbitrators were so mistaken as to the law that, if apprised of the mistake, they would have ruled differently. TruServ Corp. v. Ernst & Young LLP, 376 Ill. App. 3d 218, 224-25 (2007). In the case sub judice, after reviewing the face of the arbitration award, we conclude that the arbitrators would have ruled differently had they properly been apprised that Wroblewski was not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage as a result of the Walgreens settlement and release.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Farmers that is consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nJOSEPH GORDON and McNULTY, JJ, concur.\nAccording to defense counsel, Stephen Wroblewski died during the pendency of the underlying action and this appeal is brought solely on behalf of Gloria Wroblewski, who was Stephen\u2019s wife.\nWalgreen Company is referred to in the record by Walgreen(s) Company and Walgreen(s). For purposes of clarity, we will refer to that corporate entity as Walgreens.\nOn March 10, 2003, in response to a motion by Wroblewski, the circuit court vacated its previous dismissal order as to Drolet\u2019s estate and reinstated Wroblewski\u2019s personal injury action solely against Drolet\u2019s estate (case No. 48 L 3863).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Marc Chemers and David S. Osborne, both of Pretzel & Stouffer, Chtrd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Stephen A. Kolodziej, Scott R. Britton, and Sheldon A. Brenner, all of Brenner, Ford, Monroe & Scott, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FARMERS AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEPHEN WROBLEWSKI et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201406\u20143604\nOpinion filed May 2, 2008.\nRobert Marc Chemers and David S. Osborne, both of Pretzel & Stouffer, Chtrd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nStephen A. Kolodziej, Scott R. Britton, and Sheldon A. Brenner, all of Brenner, Ford, Monroe & Scott, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0688-01", "first_page_order": 706, "last_page_order": 719 }