{ "id": 4276559, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANDRE ROLLINS, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rollins", "decision_date": "2008-05-19", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201403\u20140538", "first_page": "833", "last_page": "844", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 833" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "743 N.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567", "parenthetical": "incarcerated defendant's murder conviction was reversed and a new trial was ordered; the defendant never demanded trial until 24 months had passed; dismissal of charges was too severe a remedy in light of the defendant's inaction and the seriousness of charges" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725333 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62", "parenthetical": "incarcerated defendant's murder conviction was reversed and a new trial was ordered; the defendant never demanded trial until 24 months had passed; dismissal of charges was too severe a remedy in light of the defendant's inaction and the seriousness of charges" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 U.S. 514", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9139028 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "2188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/407/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 U.S. 302", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204451 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" }, { "page": "655" }, { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/474/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 U.S. 434", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173133 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436", "parenthetical": "in determining whether the sixth amendment was violated, delay caused by understaffed prosecutors weighs less heavily than intentional delay calculated to hamper defense" }, { "page": "60", "parenthetical": "in determining whether the sixth amendment was violated, delay caused by understaffed prosecutors weighs less heavily than intentional delay calculated to hamper defense" }, { "page": "2262", "parenthetical": "in determining whether the sixth amendment was violated, delay caused by understaffed prosecutors weighs less heavily than intentional delay calculated to hamper defense" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/412/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996 Ill. Legis. Serv. 3527", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Legis. Serv.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "721 N.E.2d 1172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1178-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 1008", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261306 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1016" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/1008-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 N.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156912 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 N.E.2d 419", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2656354 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 N.E.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662", "parenthetical": "criminal defendant \"speaks and acts through his attorney\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 979", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2548536 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "981", "parenthetical": "criminal defendant \"speaks and acts through his attorney\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/208/0979-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 N.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" }, { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576392 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" }, { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 N.E.2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781318 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 N.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3351923 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/60/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "705 N.E.2d 850", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868" }, { "page": "870" }, { "page": "869", "parenthetical": "delay caused by continuances either requested or agreed to by defense is attributable to the defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 122017 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" }, { "page": "117" }, { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "880 N.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "377 Ill. 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Police officers conducted a stop of defendant\u2019s vehicle in response to a tip from an anonymous caller to the police emergency dispatch that alleged an unidentified male was selling drugs out of a described vehicle. The court held the anonymous tip was insufficient to provide police with the required articulable suspicion to perform a traffic stop. We disagree, reverse, and remand.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn December 2, 2002, the State charged defendant with unlawful possession of between 1 and 15 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2000)). On January 22, 2003, defendant filed a motion to suppress, claiming the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain and arrest defendant during the traffic stop.\nOn April 24, 2003, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion. Danville police officers Michael Cox and Richard Lee Dicken testified to the events of November 29, 2002, as follows. Cox was on routine patrol when he received a telephone call from Patricia Stuebe, a 9-1-1 dispatcher, who told Cox she had received a telephone call from an anonymous caller informing her that a brown four-door Chevrolet without hubcaps and driven by a black male from Chicago was on Fowler Street in front of Green Meadows apartment complex (Edgewood Street) selling drugs from the trunk of the vehicle. No other information regarding the call or the caller was relayed to Cox.\nCox notified Dicken via his patrol car\u2019s onboard computer. Dicken arrived in the area first and notified Cox via radio that a green Cadillac, not one matching the reported description, had pulled into Green Meadows\u2019 parking lot. Cox and Dicken approached the vehicle and discovered four females inside. The officers explained to the women why they had approached the car and told the women they were free to go. As the officers returned to their patrol cars, a vehicle matching the reported description, a brown four-door Chevrolet with no hubcaps, turned from Fowler onto Edgewood. The officers noticed that the occupants of the brown Chevrolet were black males. Dicken initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle on the basis of the tip.\nDicken approached the driver (defendant), and Cox approached the passenger. When asked, defendant told Dicken that he was from Chicago, and he produced a driver\u2019s license with a Chicago address. A driver\u2019s license check on defendant and his passenger revealed no outstanding warrants; however, the officers then began to \u201chear criminal histories\u201d on both, which included reported gang affiliation, weapons charges, and prior drug arrests. Dicken told defendant he had information that there were drugs in the vehicle. Defendant denied that information and gave Dicken permission to search. Dicken searched defendant and found \u201ca large amount of money\u201d while Cox received permission to search the passenger.\nDicken began searching the vehicle and immediately gave Cox \u201csome kind of indication that something was there.\u201d Cox placed the passenger in handcuffs, sat him in his patrol car, and assisted with the search of the vehicle. Dicken found a plastic bag containing four or five smaller bags of cannabis under the driver\u2019s seat. The officers then found cocaine in the trunk in a large garbage bag among clothes. Cox asked defendant if anything in the vehicle belonged to the passenger. Defendant said it did not \u2014 everything was his. Cox estimated that five or six minutes had passed from the time the vehicle was stopped until the drugs were discovered.\nOn June 9, 2003, the trial court entered an order suppressing the evidence, finding that defendant was detained and searched unlawfully. Citing this court\u2019s decision in People v. Ledesma, 327 Ill. App. 3d 805, 763 N.E.2d 806 (2002), the court found that the anonymous tip was an insufficient basis for the officer\u2019s stop. This appeal followed. On October 31, 2007, the Fifth District office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) filed a motion to dismiss the appeal because of appellate delay. This court denied that motion on November 9, 2007. OSAD filed its brief on November 27, 2007. On December 4, 2007, this court denied OSAD\u2019s motion to reconsider the denial of its motion to dismiss. We reverse and remand.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. The Trial Court Erred in Granting the Motion To Suppress\nWhen reviewing a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress, we give deference to the court\u2019s findings of fact and will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Roberson, 367 Ill. App. 3d 193, 195, 854 N.E.2d 317, 320 (2006). However, we decide, without any deference to the trial court, the ultimate legal question of whether the evidence should be suppressed by applying a de novo standard of review. Roberson, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 195, 854 N.E.2d at 320. The court\u2019s suppression was both manifestly erroneous and error as a matter of law.\nIn Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-80 (1968), the United States Supreme Court created a limited exception in the context of brief investigatory police stops to the standard requirement that police seizures be supported by probable cause. According to the standards set forth in Terry, a police officer may briefly detain and question individuals to investigate possible criminal behavior if \u201cspecific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion\u201d are present. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. Our Supreme Court of Illinois has explained that to justify a Terry stop, the police must point to specific, articulable facts that make the intrusion reasonable. People v. Ledesma, 206 Ill. 2d 571, 583, 795 N.E.2d 253, 262 (2003), overruled on other grounds by People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 513, 813 N.E.2d 93, 101 (2004). \u201cAn officer may initiate a Terry stop based on information provided by a third party if the information is reliable and \u2018allows an officer to reasonably infer that a person was involved in criminal activity.\u2019 \u201d People v. Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1049, 868 N.E.2d 359, 362-63 (2007), quoting People v. Jackson, 348 Ill. App. 3d 719, 729, 810 N.E.2d 542, 553 (2004).\nOur supreme court has discussed the use of telephone tips as the basis for a Terry stop, stating as follows: \u201cWhere an informant\u2019s tip is received by telephone, it may form the basis for a lawful Terry stop, but the information must bear some indicia of reliability, and the information upon which the police act must establish the requisite quantum of suspicion.\u201d Ledesma, 206 Ill. 2d at 583, 795 N.E.2d at 262. Anonymous calls made to police emergency dispatch carry a greater indicia of reliability than a tip provided by a confidential informant because (1) the caller\u2019s identity may at some point become known based on the fact that the 9-1-1 system provides police with enough information so that users are not truly anonymous, and (2) the caller subjects himself to a criminal charge if the report is false or misleading. Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1050-51, 868 N.E.2d at 364.\nDefendant relies on People v. Starks, 315 Ill. App. 3d 786, 734 N.E.2d 216 (2000), to support his argument that the trial court correctly granted his motion to suppress because the anonymous tip, which was the sole basis for the stop, lacked any indicia of reliability. However, Sparks is distinguishable from the case sub judice.\nIn Sparks, the police arrested the two defendants for drug-related offenses after a search of their vehicle uncovered cannabis. Police conducted a Terry stop of the vehicle based solely upon a tip from a confidential source that the two defendants would be traveling south on Interstate 55 with contraband in the car. The source, a known police informant, gave the police the defendants\u2019 names, their races, their ages, a detailed description of the vehicle, and the approximate time at which they would be traveling through the area. A surveillance team was positioned on the interstate at the expected time, and upon spotting the vehicle, they initiated a stop. The officers asked both of the defendants if they could search the vehicle, but they refused. Canine units arrived within minutes, performed a sniff of the vehicle, and alerted to the trunk of the car where the drugs were found. Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 788-89, 734 N.E.2d at 218-19.\nThe trial court suppressed the evidence, finding that the informant\u2019s tip failed to establish the informant\u2019s basis of his knowledge. The State appealed. In analyzing the constitutionality of the stop, this court, citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 308, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2415 (1990), noted that the informant\u2019s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge should be considered. Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 792, 734 N.E.2d at 221. Realizing that it is often difficult to ascertain these things from an anonymous tip, the Supreme Court in White held that the tip must provide some indicia of reliability. Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 734 N.E.2d at 222; White, 496 U.S. at 329, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 308, 110 S. Ct. at 2416. Distinguishing White (where the Court held that the anonymous tip was sufficiently rehable where the officers corroborated the information contained in the tip before stopping the vehicle (see White, 496 U.S. at 326-27, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 306-07, 110 S. Ct. at 2414-15)), this court held that the informant\u2019s tip was insufficient in providing the required level of reliability because the informant provided only \u201cinnocent\u201d details regarding the defendants. Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 795, 734 N.E.2d at 223.\nIn Sparks, this court found the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000), controlling. Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 794, 734 N.E.2d at 223. There, the Court held that an anonymous telephone tip reporting that a man wearing a plaid shirt and standing at a bus stop had a gun was insufficient to justify a Terry stop. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 258, 120 S. Ct. at 1377. The Supreme Court stressed that \u201c[t]he reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.\u201d J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 261, 120 S. Ct. at 1379. Therefore, in Sparks, the informant\u2019s tip was found insufficient to justify the Terry stop:\n\u201cThe informant did not indicate that he had witnessed any criminal activity by [the] defendants or that he had participated in previous criminal activity with them, which would have lent some credibility to his story. [Citation.] Simply because the information about the drugs turned out to be correct does not mean that it provided officers, prior to stopping [the] defendants, with a reasonable basis for suspecting them of unlawful conduct.\u201d Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 794-95, 734 N.E.2d at 223, citing J.L., 529 U.S. at 270-71, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 260, 120 S. Ct. at 1378-79.\nHowever, the anonymous 9-1-1 tip here, unlike the types in J.L. and Sparks, provided the officers with a reasonable basis for suspecting that defendant was involved in criminal activity. The tip here was corroborated by a physical description of the driver (black male), the vehicle (brown four-door Chevrolet without hubcaps), the location (Fowler Street in front of Green Meadows apartments on Edgewood Street), the driver\u2019s origin (Chicago), and the viewed criminal activity (selling drugs from the trunk of the car).\nThis information was sufficiently reliable to allow \u201c \u2018an officer to reasonably infer that a person was involved in criminal activity.\u2019 \u201d Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1049, 868 N.E.2d at 362-63 (2007), quoting People v. Jackson, 348 Ill. App. 3d 719, 729, 810 N.E.2d 542, 553 (2004). Moreover, this anonymous tip to police emergency dispatch carries a greater indicia of reliability than a confidential informant.\n\u201cAn informant tip received by telephone may form the basis of a Terry stop if the tip is reliable and the tip allows the officer to reasonably infer that a person was involved in criminal activity. See Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1049, 868 N.E.2d at 362-63. The factors to consider include (1) the quantity and detail of the information such that the officer may be certain that the vehicle stopped is the one identified by the caller; (2) the time interval between the tip and the police locating the vehicle; (3) whether the tip is based on contemporaneous eyewitness observations; and (4) whether the tip has sufficient detail to permit the reasonable inference that the tipster actually witnessed what she described. Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1050, 868 N.E.2d at 363, quoting [State v.] Sousa, 151 N.H. [297,] 303-04, 855 A.2d [1284,] 1290 [(2004)].\u201d People v. Ewing, 377 Ill. App. 3d 585, 595, 880 N.E.2d 587, 596 (2007).\nThose factors have been established here. Again, the officers knew the vehicle was a brown four-door Chevy with no hubcaps, driven by a black male selling drugs from the trunk, and on Fowler Street in front of Green Meadows apartments on Edgewood Street. Only a short time passed between the tip and the stop in question. The dispatcher called the officer with the information from the anonymous 9-1-1 call around 11 a.m. The officers arrived at the scene 1 to 11/2 minutes later and had briefly questioned occupants of an illegally parked green Cadillac when defendant drove up. The police report was apparently completed following the stop at 11:12 a.m. The anonymous caller had witnessed the original activity \u2014 selling drugs \u2014 and the tip had sufficient detail to permit the reasonable inference that the anonymous caller actually witnessed what he described. Unlike Sparks, the informant in our case did indicate he witnessed criminal activity, which lent credibility to his story.\nThis case is no different than Ledesma, 327 Ill. App. 3d 805, 763 N.E.2d 806, except that the anonymous caller there had intercepted on his scanner a cellular telephone conversation. That call indicated criminal activity was about to take place, just as the 9-1-1 call here indicated criminal activity was occurring. The corroborating details\u2014 the particular car, driver, time, and location \u2014 were the same in Ledesma as the case sub judice. Certainly here, where the caller witnessed drugs being sold out of the car, rather than overhearing an intercepted phone call about future drug activity, the circumstances afford greater reliability. Ongoing sales of drugs from a trunk must provide as much reliability and predictive information as criminal activity that is yet to come. The officers are simply not required to witness a drug transaction to stop under these circumstances.\nFurther, the 9-1-1 tip is unlike that in J.L., 529 U.S. at 276, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 263-64, 120 S. Ct. at 1381 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.), where the bare report that a black male in a plaid shirt at a particular bus stop was carrying a gun did not establish reasonable suspicion. That caller had not explained how he knew about the gun or any basis for believing he had inside information. The caller here was a witness to drug sales with corroborating information. Nonetheless, the dissent insists that this tip is not an eyewitness account of criminal activity and that this majority infers from the tip that the caller actually witnessed defendant selling drugs from the car. Again, the officer (Cox) stated he was on routine patrol when he received a telephone call from Patricia Stuebe, a 9-1-1 dispatcher, who told Cox she had received a telephone call from an anonymous caller informing her that a brown four-door Chevrolet without hubcaps driven by a black male from Chicago was on Fowler Street in front of Green Meadows apartment complex (Edgewood Street) selling drugs from the trunk of the vehicle. The tipster clearly said the black man from Chicago in the brown Chevy without hubcaps was selling drugs from the trunk on Fowler Street in front of Green Meadows apartment complex. Unlike in J.L., this tipster had knowledge of ongoing public criminal activity, not concealed criminal activity. The tipster explained how he knew about that criminal activity \u2014 he saw it and gave detailed specifics about it.\nThe dissent quotes J.L.: \u201c \u2018[a]ll the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J.L.\u2019 (Emphasis added.) J.L., 529 U.S. at 271, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 260-61, 120 S. Ct. at 1379.\u201d 382 Ill. App. 3d at 844. The dissent goes on to state: \u201cIf we substituted the word \u2018gun\u2019 for \u2018drugs\u2019 in the preceding sentence, this case and J.L. would be identical. The caller\u2019s report was not sufficient in J.L., and it is not sufficient here.\u201d 382 Ill. App. 3d at 844. However, substituting the word \u201cdrugs\u201d for \u201cgun\u201d does not make this case identical to J.L. The tipster in the case sub judice did explain how he knew about the drugs and provided specific descriptions of the car, location, driver, and criminal activity.\nMoreover, the courts have repeatedly recognized the improvement in reliability of our 9-1-1 systems. See Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1050-51, 868 N.E.2d at 364-65. No longer are 9-1-1 calls considered anonymous and unreliable. Clearly, the officers had a reasonable basis for the Terry stop.\nB. Appellate Delay Has Not Deprived Defendant of His Due-Process Rights\nDefendant argues this appeal should be dismissed because the excessive delay has deprived him of his due-process right to a speedy appeal and, consequently, a speedy trial. Specifically, defendant argues that (1) OSAD\u2019s Fourth District office failed to file a timely brief because that office did nothing with the case for nearly four years, (2) the State failed to complain in a timely manner to this court about OSAD\u2019s failure to file a brief, and (3) this court failed in its responsibility to oversee the orderly and timely disposition of this appeal in the appellate process.\nOn November 9, 2007, this court denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the appeal because of appellate delay. On December 4, 2007, this court also denied defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. No delay in the case was caused by the State or this court. All the delay has been caused by defense counsel. The current but discouraged practice in this court is for OSAD not to make a motion for continuance, but is instead for the State to rely upon OSAD\u2019s filing its briefs in as timely a fashion as its backlog permits. If defendant had been required to file motions for continuance throughout the pendency of the appeal, the elapsed time would have no doubt been attributable to defendant, not the State. The outcome should be no different where the practice does not call for motions for continuance.\nDelay will be attributable to the defense where the defendant\u2019s actions in fact caused or contributed to the postponement of the trial. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 114, 705 N.E.2d 850, 868 (1998). In this regard, the accused is bound by the actions or omissions of his defense counsel (People v. Brimmer, 60 Ill. App. 3d 214, 219, 376 N.E.2d 337, 341 (1978); Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 117, 705 N.E.2d at 870; People v. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419, 433, 639 N.E.2d 550, 557 (1994)), since an attorney in criminal proceedings is authorized to act on behalf of his client and to determine for him \u201cprocedural matters and decisions involving trial strategy and tactics.\u201d People v. Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d 131, 141, 561 N.E.2d 633, 638 (1990). Accordingly, the acts of defense counsel cannot be separated from the defendant\u2019s own actions. Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d at 141, 561 N.E.2d at 638.\nIn this case, the defense either caused or contributed to nearly all the delay at issue. The State filed its brief instanter about two weeks after its due date. Defendant\u2019s brief was then due to be filed November 11, 2003. Defendant is bound by his attorney\u2019s implicit request for a continuance by following district practice. People v. Steiger, 208 Ill. App. 3d 979, 981, 567 N.E.2d 660, 662 (1991) (criminal defendant \u201cspeaks and acts through his attorney\u201d). The delay resulting from requests for continuances and agreements with the prosecution are generally chargeable to the defendant. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 115, 705 N.E.2d at 869 (delay caused by continuances either requested or agreed to by defense is attributable to the defendant). While a neutral reason for delay has been weighed against the State rather than the defendant (People v. Belcher, 186 Ill. App. 3d 202, 206, 542 N.E.2d 419, 422 (1989); People v. Singleton, 278 Ill. App. 3d 296, 300, 662 N.E.2d 580, 583 (1996)), such is not the case here where defendant implicitly requested the delay through his attorney.\nFurther, as noted in the State\u2019s objection to defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss on the grounds of appellate delay, the State has relied upon the representation by OSAD that it operated on a first-in, first-out basis. Unfortunately, in this case, the \u201cfile was lost.\u201d Furthermore, the backlog of cases in OSAD\u2019s office is well documented. This backlog is in spite of section 95 of Public Act 89 \u2014 689, effective December 31, 1996, which amended the State Appellate Defender Act (725 ILCS 105/1 through 11 (West 1994)) to address the backlog of indigent criminal appeals. People v. Dixon, 308 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1016, 721 N.E.2d 1172, 1178-79 (1999), citing Pub. Act 89 \u2014 689, \u00a795, eff. December 31, 1996 (1996 Ill. Legis. Serv. 3527, 3541 (West)). The backlog also may explain the transfer of this case from the Fourth District of OSAD to the Fifth District of OSAD. See also, e.g., Strunck v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 436, 37 L. Ed. 2d 56, 60, 93 S. Ct. 2260, 2262 (1973) (in determining whether the sixth amendment was violated, delay caused by understaffed prosecutors weighs less heavily than intentional delay calculated to hamper defense).\nFinally, the delay asserted by defendant does not justify \u201cthe severe remedy of dismissing the indictment.\u201d United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 317, 88 L. Ed. 2d 640, 655, 106 S. Ct. 648, 657 (1986); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 112, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2188 (1972); People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 62, 743 N.E.2d 555, 567 (2001) (incarcerated defendant\u2019s murder conviction was reversed and a new trial was ordered; the defendant never demanded trial until 24 months had passed; dismissal of charges was too severe a remedy in light of the defendant\u2019s inaction and the seriousness of charges).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order granting the motion to suppress and remand.\nReversed and remanded.\nMcCullough, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE APPLETON,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent and would affirm the trial court\u2019s order suppressing the evidence. The majority\u2019s opinion thwarts the rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment. In factually similar cases, both this court and the United States Supreme Court have held that an anonymous tip, without corroboration, is insufficient to justify a stop and search. Nevertheless, the majority holds otherwise. The majority relies on the creation of a material fact to distinguish this case from this court\u2019s decision in Sparks and the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in J.L.\nIn Sparks, a known informant told police that the defendant was going to be arriving in Springfield from Texas in a car with contraband. The informant provided the following information to the police: (1) the defendant\u2019s name, race, and age; (2) the make, model, color, and license-plate number of the car; and (3) the date and approximate time that the car would be arriving in Springfield from Texas on Interstate 55. Compared to the facts of this case, the officers in Sparks had a tremendous amount of detail that could be used to assure them that the informant had \u201cinside information\u201d (see J.L., 529 U.S. at 271, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 260-61, 120 S. Ct. at 1379). Yet, we held it was not enough. Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 795, 734 N.E.2d at 223. In our opinion, the tip did not provide the officers with the required reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop because \u201c[t]he informant did not indicate that he had witnessed any criminal activity by defendants or that he had participated in previous criminal activity with them, which would have lent some credibility to his story.\u201d Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 794, 734 N.E.2d at 223.\nThe majority skirts the precedential effect of Sparks by blindly asserting that the anonymous caller \u201cwitnessed the original activity\u2014 selling drugs \u2014 and the tip had sufficient detail to permit the reasonable inference that the anonymous caller actually witnessed what he described. Unlike Sparks, the informant in our case did indicate he witnessed criminal activity, which lent credibility to his story.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) 382 Ill. App. 3d at 839.\nAttempting to add credence to the tipster\u2019s description of defendant, his vehicle, his location, and his purported criminal activity, the majority insists that the caller\u2019s statement that defendant was selling drugs from the trunk of the vehicle equates to an eyewitness account of the same. The Supreme Court has emphatically held otherwise. J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 261, 120 S. Ct. at 1379. In J.L., the anonymous caller told police that \u201ca young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.\u201d J.L., 529 U.S. at 268, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 259, 120 S. Ct. at 1377. The Court held that \u201c[s]uch a tip, however, does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal acitivity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.\u201d J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 261, 120 S. Ct. at 1379. The Court did not infer from the information contained in the tip that the caller actually witnessed the defendant carrying a gun at the bus stop, nor should this court impute from the information contained in the tip that the caller actually witnessed defendant selling drugs from his car. As the Court noted in J.L., \u201c[a]ll the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J.L.\u201d (Emphasis added.) J.L., 529 U.S. at 271, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 260-61, 120 S. Ct. at 1379. If we substituted the word \u201cgun\u201d for \u201cdrugs\u201d in the preceding sentence, this case and J.L. would be identical. The caller\u2019s report was not sufficient in J.L., and it is not sufficient here.\nThe majority relies on an uncorroborated telephone call to evade the fourth amendment. For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court.", "type": "dissent", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE APPLETON," } ], "attorneys": [ "Frank Young, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Daniel M. Kirwan and Dan W. Evers, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANDRE ROLLINS, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201403\u20140538\nOpinion filed May 19, 2008.\nAPPLETON, P.J., dissenting.\nFrank Young, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Dan W. Evers, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0833-01", "first_page_order": 851, "last_page_order": 862 }