{ "id": 4276724, "name": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. TAMMI SUSSEN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THOMAS G. KELLER, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Sussen v. Keller", "decision_date": "2008-05-07", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201407\u20140704", "first_page": "872", "last_page": "884", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 872" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 950", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "954" }, { "page": "954" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5541971 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" }, { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 N.E.2d 1355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1361" }, { "page": "1362-63" }, { "page": "1361" }, { "page": "1363" }, { "page": "1362-63" }, { "page": "1363", "parenthetical": "wherein the \"trial court then was able to draw the conclusion there was no advantage shown to make [the father] pay more than the state[-]school costs, particularly in view of his financial situation\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725068 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" }, { "page": "239-40" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "240" }, { "page": "239-40" }, { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 N.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681", "parenthetical": "section 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 513) is applicable to a proceeding brought under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Parentage Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 2501 et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 931", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5085925 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "933", "parenthetical": "section 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 513) is applicable to a proceeding brought under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Parentage Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/172/0931-01" ] }, { "cite": "843 N.E.2d 478", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 Ill. App. 3d 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5766749 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699-700" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/363/0696-01" ] }, { "cite": "848 N.E.2d 645", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 Ill. App. 3d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4264195 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/365/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 N.E.2d 1274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1275" }, { "page": "1277" }, { "page": "1277" }, { "page": "1277" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166520 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" }, { "page": "551-52" }, { "page": "552" }, { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 N.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402", "parenthetical": "Fourth District reviewing for an abuse of discretion" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2580359 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618", "parenthetical": "Fourth District reviewing for an abuse of discretion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/203/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "613 N.E.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360", "parenthetical": "Fourth District reviewing for an abuse of discretion" }, { "page": "360" }, { "page": "361", "parenthetical": "noting that the affidavit from a school administrator would have been more helpful had it stated the employment rate for graduating students rather than that the school had \"more requests from employers\" than could be filled" }, { "page": "361", "parenthetical": "finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the request for contribution to pay college expenses at a nonaccredited Bible college" }, { "page": "360", "parenthetical": "rejecting the petitioning mother's argument that the trial court interfered with her authority as the custodial parent to direct her child's education" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 Ill. App. 3d 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5100886 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629", "parenthetical": "Fourth District reviewing for an abuse of discretion" }, { "page": "630" }, { "page": "630" }, { "page": "631" }, { "page": "631" }, { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/244/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 N.E.2d 1355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1362-63" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725068 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239-40" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0229-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1085, "char_count": 30609, "ocr_confidence": 0.839, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.436057418262789e-08, "percentile": 0.2781592672005202 }, "sha256": "420378e64bc658a69c2dd81c5381b69a8cb7efc3b62483d836ca5f043bcb3db4", "simhash": "1:aebce436a79f9fc4", "word_count": 4891 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:01.752924+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE ex rel. TAMMI SUSSEN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THOMAS G. KELLER, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner, Tammi Sussen, and respondent, Thomas G. Keller, are the parents of David, born December 17, 1987. In July 2007, the trial court entered an order directing Keller to pay one-third of the cost of tuition, books, registration, rent, and food for David to attend Lincoln College of Technology (Lincoln College) in Indianapolis, Indiana. Keller appeals. Because the court abused its discretion by finding the cost to attend Lincoln College was reasonable, we reverse and remand with directions.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn January 1990, the Illinois Department of Public Aid filed a paternity complaint against Keller on Sussen\u2019s behalf. In December 1990, the trial court entered a judgment of parentage and order for support. Keller was in arrears on his child-support obligation several times over the years and support was abated once due to Keller\u2019s unemployment.\nIn August 2004, after Keller inherited $50,000, Keller consented to $25,000 of the funds being deposited in a bank account until further hearing could be held on Sussen\u2019s motion to establish a trust for support and educational expenses. In October 2004, the trial court ordered that the $25,000 in the bank account was to be used to support David and provide for educational expenses should David decide to attend postsecondary education and should the court order payment of such expenses. Any funds remaining after such time would be returned to Keller. The court also directed that $300 a month be distributed from the bank account to Sussen as continuing child support for David. In January 2005, the court ordered $5,000 be distributed from the account to Sussen as child support from the inheritance (20% of $25,000) and $418 be distributed from the account to Sussen for payment of a certain amount of David\u2019s orthodontic expenses.\nIn June 2007, Sussen filed a petition for support for educational expenses. The petition alleged that David had been accepted into a 15-month program at Lincoln College. The petition sought contribution from Keller for the expenses of attending Lincoln College, including tuition, books, and fees ($26,753), rent ($4,125), living expenses, health and medical insurance, and dental expenses. According to the petition, David obtained grants totaling $8,100, David and Sussen had applied for loans, and David intended to work part-time.\nOn June 28, 2007, the trial court held a hearing on the petition.\nA. Testimony Pertaining to Lincoln College, Shawnee Community College, and Living Expenses\nThe testimony established that David had graduated high school where he had earned As and Bs. David had focused on automotive classes in high school and wanted to continue his studies in that area. David wanted to attend Lincoln College, which offered a 15-month automotive-technology program that would teach David how to service and repair motor vehicles. When asked why he was interested in Lincoln College, David stated, \u201cIt\u2019s away from home. I have heard really good stories about them.\u201d David further explained that at Lincoln College, he did not have to take any general-education classes, which explained why the program took only 15 months \u2014 consisting of two terms or sequences \u2014 to complete. David met with a recruiter, who explained that NASCAR and Mercedes-Benz hired graduates from Lincoln College. David did not know if he wanted to work for either of those two companies. David testified that when he graduated, he would be \u201cASC\u201d certified (the record does not indicate what \u201cASC\u201d certified means) and be fully trained in high-performance automotive technology. David did not know if graduates from Shawnee were ASC certified. The Lincoln College materials admitted into evidence demonstrate that upon completion of the program, students are awarded an associate-of-applied-science degree.\nDavid intended to rent an apartment with two other students. The total rent per month was $799, of which David would pay one-third. The rent did not include gas and electric costs. Sussen estimated gas and electric costs would total approximately $180 per month, of which David would pay one-third. Sussen estimated David\u2019s food costs would total approximately $200 per month.\nKeller provided information about Shawnee Community College (Shawnee), which also offered an automotive-technology program. The Shawnee campus was located approximately 20 to 25 miles south of where Sussen and David lived. Excerpts from the Shawnee course catalog, admitted into evidence, demonstrated the Shawnee program was a 67-hour program \u2014 approximately 21 months of schooling \u2014 at a cost of $65 per credit hour, which totaled $4,355. Service fees totaled $402.\nAccording to the Shawnee materials, students in the program receive an associate-of-applied-science degree upon completion. The Shawnee program is ASE certified (\u201cASE\u201d apparently stands for \u201cautomotive service excellence\u201d), and Shawnee is accredited by the North Central Association Commission on Accreditation and School Improvement. The Lincoln College materials provide no information about accreditation.\nSussen testified she did not look into the Shawnee program \u201ctoo much\u201d because it did not offer what Lincoln College offered and was a different program. Sussen claimed the automotive-technology course at Shawnee was not the same course as offered by Lincoln College. Sussen explained that Shawnee \u201cprobably\u201d offered a two- to four-year program while Lincoln College offered a 15-month, high-performance maintenance program, which is what David wanted. The Lincoln College materials indicate the program has a \u201c[six]-[c]ourse [h]igh[-] [performance add-on program,\u201d but the record otherwise contains no information about \u201chigh-performance maintenance.\u201d\nDavid testified Shawnee Community College did not seem as good to him as Lincoln College. David thought Lincoln College was a \u201cbetter fit\u201d for him. Sussen testified it would save money and time if David attended Lincoln College because he would become gainfully employed once he finished the program.\nKeller\u2019s objections to David attending Lincoln College included the cost, the lack of accreditation, and the distance from home. Keller assumed David would live with Sussen if he attended Shawnee.\nB. Testimony Regarding the Parents\u2019 Financial Circumstances\nSussen testified that at the time of the hearing, she earned $500 per week and expected to earn that sum through the summer. By late fall, Sussen would earn approximately $400 a week. Sussen testified she earned $14,000 to $18,000 in 2006. Sussen\u2019s financial affidavit, contained in the record, indicated Sussen had income of approximately $2,300 per month (excluding the $300 a month in child support she had been receiving from Keller) and received an additional $720 from \u201cboarders.\u201d Sussen has a 12-year-old daughter for whom she received no child support. Sussen\u2019s stated expenses totaled approximately $2,501.38, and she had no assets.\nAccording to Keller\u2019s testimony and financial affidavit, Keller lived with his girlfriend, Laura Bower, in a house Bower owned. Keller paid Bower $360 a month toward her house payment. Keller was currently unemployed and on temporary medical light duty following a \u201cknee scope\u201d to remove two-thirds of the meniscus. He last worked in May or June 2007 for Dash Management, a maintenance-management company. Keller testified his previous job had \u201ca lot of knee work, working on fryers and grills and crawling around on [his] knees and climbing ladders.\u201d He did not expect to be able to return to that type of work but was currently looking for employment. He planned on building a deck for a former employer to make money. Keller had also applied for unemployment and expected to receive $300 per week.\nKeller testified he earned $29,000 in 2006 and $22,000 in 2005. Keller testified he averaged earnings of $22,000 a year the past five or six years. He confirmed that for 2005 and 2006, child support was taken directly from the bank account established for David.\nKeller\u2019s monthly expenses totaled approximately $1,900 (including car payments for his and Bower\u2019s vehicles). His assets included a 2001 Dodge Dakota (for which he was still making payments) and a 1969 Harley Davidson motorcycle worth $10,000.\nKeller testified he used the portion of the inheritance not deposited in the bank account for David ($25,000) to pay bills and living expenses and make repairs on the house. Keller also purchased a truck (which he no longer owned), shop equipment, a car-hauling trailer, and a hot tub. Keller gave $8,000 to $10,000 of the inheritance to his girlfriend for money he owed to her.\nBower testified she had lived with respondent for four years. They shared living expenses. She used the money he gave her from the inheritance to pay bills because Keller had been \u201coff work\u201d for six months and had gotten behind on his bills and living expenses. Bower testified that because Keller was currently unemployed, he was not paying one-half of the living expenses.\nC. Testimony Regarding Funds Taken From Account\nKeller testified that the State of Illinois took $4,098.51 from the bank account established for David to pay a child-support arrearage for Betty Stockwill. (In a document contained in the record, Keller asserted he had consented to adopt Betty years earlier.) Keller testified he did not have the funds to pay the arrearage and did not think he had any means of stopping the State from taking the funds from the bank account. Keller testified that when he spent the money from the inheritance, he was not aware of the obligation owed to Stockwill. When the court held the hearing on the petition for educational expenses, the bank account contained approximately $5,000.\nD. Trial Court\u2019s Ruling\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that whether Lincoln College was an accredited school did not matter much given that David\u2019s goal was to be an automotive mechanic and not to seek further education. After examining all the relevant factors, the court stated it \u201cboils down to the *** parties\u2019 abilities to pay for a very expensive school.\u201d The court characterized Lincoln College as a \u201cproprietary school,\u201d a for-profit business that provides training. The court noted it did not have information about any other proprietary school that would cost substantially less than Lincoln College. The court concluded Lincoln College was an appropriate school for David\u2019s interests and aptitude.\nThe trial court then examined the parties\u2019 ability to pay. The court noted the bank account established for David would have had an additional $4,000 available for David\u2019s education had the State not taken the arrearage for Betty. The court also noted Keller had a motorcycle valued at $10,000. The court recognized that respondent was currently unemployed but noted Keller admitted he was employable. The court did not determine the amount Keller could expect to earn in 2007, except to state that it was not appropriate to find that Keller would continue to earn $22,000 a year when in 2006 he earned $29,000. The court ordered respondent to pay one-third of the cost of attending Lincoln College, including living expenses.\nIn July 2007, the trial court entered a written order. The court calculated the total cost to attend Lincoln College, including tuition, books, registration, rent, and food, was $35,273. The court ordered Keller to pay one-third ($11,757.67) at a rate of $6,000 within 21 days and the remainder ($5,757.67) 30 days prior to the start of the second term at Lincoln College. The court directed that the balance of the bank account (approximately $5,000) be transferred to Sussen.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nKeller appeals the trial court\u2019s order, arguing that the cost to attend Lincoln College was not reasonable and Keller did not have the means to pay those costs.\nA. Standard of Review\nThe parties assert appellate courts are split regarding the appropriate standard of review. We agree that the appropriate standard of review is unclear. This court has routinely reviewed a trial court\u2019s decision to award educational expenses for an abuse of discretion. See In re Marriage of Spear, 244 Ill. App. 3d 626, 629, 613 N.E.2d 358, 360 (1993) (Fourth District reviewing for an abuse of discretion); In re Marriage of Alltop, 203 Ill. App. 3d 606, 618, 561 N.E.2d 394, 402 (1990) (Fourth District reviewing for an abuse of discretion). However, in In re Support of Pearson, 111 Ill. 2d 545, 547, 490 N.E.2d 1274, 1275 (1986), the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed an order for educational expenses under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard.\nWhen a party challenges a trial court\u2019s findings of fact, the appellate court will affirm unless the court\u2019s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, e.g., In re Estate of Lower, 365 Ill. App. 3d 469, 477, 848 N.E.2d 645, 652 (2006). However, the ultimate decision whether to award educational expenses should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hubbs, 363 Ill. App. 3d 696, 699-700, 843 N.E.2d 478, 482-83 (2006) (finding that a trial court\u2019s determinations on dissipation and the valuation of marital property should be reviewed under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review and that the review of the trial court\u2019s determination on the ultimate division of marital property should be conducted under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review; the court noted that \u201cdissipation and the valuation of marital assets are generally factual determinations\u201d while \u201cthe circuit court\u2019s decision on the ultimate division of marital property depends upon a circuit court\u2019s view of the facts *** [and] statutory factors, and so the circuit court is accorded more discretion\u201d). Therefore, this court will review the trial court\u2019s factual findings under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, but we review the court\u2019s ultimate determination for an abuse of discretion.\nB. Trial Court\u2019s Determination That the Cost To Attend Lincoln College Was Reasonable Was Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence and the Court Abused Its Discretion by Ordering Keller To Pay One-Third of That Cost\nKeller argues nothing in the record shows that Lincoln College was superior in any way or even equal to Shawnee. We agree.\n\u201cA child does not have an absolute right to a college education.\u201d Spear, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 630, 613 N.E.2d at 360. However, a trial court may order the payment of postsecondary educational expenses, including college, professional, or other training. 750 ILCS 5/513(a)(2) (West 2006); see also Rawles v. Hartman, 172 Ill. App. 3d 931, 933, 527 N.E.2d 680, 681 (1988) (section 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 513) is applicable to a proceeding brought under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Parentage Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 2501 et seq.), and a court may provide for the education and maintenance of a nonminor child born to unmarried parents). The payable expenses include, but are not limited to, room, board, dues, tuition, transportation, books, fees, registration and application costs, medical insurance, dental expenses, and living expenses during the school year and periods of recess. 750 ILCS 5/513(a)(2) (West 2006).\nWhen deciding whether to require the payment of postsecondary education expenses and the amount thereof, the trial court should consider \u201call relevant factors that appear reasonable and necessary.\u201d 750 ILCS 5/513(b) (West 2006). The statutory factors include (1) the financial resources of both parents; (2) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved; (3) the child\u2019s financial resources; and (4) the child\u2019s academic performance. 750 ILCS 5/513(b) (West 2006). Other relevant factors include the cost of the school, the programs offered at the school, how the school meets the child\u2019s goals, the benefits the child will receive from attending the school, and whether the parent needs to pay for a private school education when adequate public schools are available. See Spear, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 630, 613 N.E.2d at 360-61 (citing cases); In re Marriage of Schmidt, 292 Ill. App. 3d 229, 237, 684 N.E.2d 1355, 1361 (1997).\nThe petitioner bears the burden of proving that the respondent should contribute toward the college expenses of their child and the burden of showing how much the respondent should contribute. See In re Marriage of Taylor, 89 Ill. App. 3d 278, 283, 411 N.E.2d 950, 954 (1980). After the petitioner presents her evidence, the respondent has the burden of going forward with evidence that would \u201cequally balance\u201d the petitioner\u2019s evidence. Taylor, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 283, 411 N.E.2d at 954; see also Schmidt, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 239-40, 684 N.E.2d at 1362-63 (finding the respondent did not need to present his own evidence to meet his burden of proof when the parties\u2019 child did not provide any meaningful reasons for her choice of an out-of-state school over the state schools; in such circumstances, the respondent need only show the costs of the state schools and his own financial situation).\nIn this case, the record does not support the conclusion that Keller should be ordered to pay one-third the cost to attend Lincoln College when (1) Sussen and David did not present sufficient reasons for David\u2019s choice of Lincoln College over in-state schools and (2) Keller presented evidence that an adequate, less-expensive public school was available. In determining whether to order contribution to the educational expenses for a particular school, a court may consider whether the child has access to a less-expensive public institution. Schmidt, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 237, 684 N.E.2d at 1361; Pearson, 111 Ill. 2d at 551-52, 490 N.E.2d at 1277 (affirming the trial court\u2019s order requiring the father to pay $100 per month toward his son\u2019s education and reversing the appellate court order directing the father to pay over $5,000 per year for his son to attend an out-of-state technical school; the trial court did not err by emphasizing the huge difference between the cost of the technical school compared to the Illinois junior college that offered a similar program). Here, the trial court noted that the parties did not present evidence of another proprietary school that cost less than Lincoln College. That analysis was wrong as a matter of law. The proper determination in this instance was whether David had access to a less-expensive school, proprietary or nonproprietary. In this case, David had access to Shawnee, which was considerably less expensive, and the record does not support the conclusion that Shawnee was not a comparable program.\nThe record indicated that Shawnee, an Illinois public community college, also offered an automotive-technology program that was ASE certified and awarded an associate-of-applied-science degree. The trial court concluded that the Shawnee program \u201cwould not necessarily be directly equivalent even of the Lincoln College\u201d program. However, nothing in the record supports that conclusion. No evidence was offered to demonstrate the relative merits of Lincoln College versus Shawnee, such as placement rates upon graduation or reputation in the industry. See, e.g., Spear, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 631, 613 N.E.2d at 361 (noting that the affidavit from a school administrator would have been more helpful had it stated the employment rate for graduating students rather than that the school had \u201cmore requests from employers\u201d than could be filled). Moreover, while David and Sussen testified that NASCAR and Mercedes-Benz recruited from Lincoln College, David was unsure whether he wanted to pursue a job with either of those companies.\nIn examining the exhibits tendered to the trial court, this court notes that both programs apparently award an associate-of-applied-science degree and certification upon completion of the program. David expressed a desire to avoid general-education classes, which were not required at Lincoln College. However, the actual courses required by the Lincoln College program are not contained in the record. The general-education classes to which David referred for the Shawnee program appear to include a one-semester college orientation class, six hours of technical communication, three hours of technical math, and three hours of practical psychology. Without any indication of the actual courses required by the Lincoln College program, the trial court had no basis on which to conclude that the programs were not substantially equivalent, other than the difference between a 15-month program and a 21-month program.\nEven though the Shawnee program is longer, and even assuming David stayed in an apartment near Shawnee (rather than live at home) and had living expenses similar to those in Indianapolis, the cost of attending Lincoln College far exceeds the cost of attending Shawnee. Using the trial court\u2019s calculation of David\u2019s living expenses for 15 months at Lincoln College ($8,520), David\u2019s living expenses to attend Shawnee would be $11,928 for 21 months. Adding that amount to the tuition cost at Shawnee ($4,757) results in a total cost of $16,685 to attend Shawnee. In contrast, the cost to attend Lincoln College (excluding the cost of books because the record contains no evidence of the cost of books at Shawnee) totals $34,030.\nNothing in the record indicates the reason for the huge difference in cost. David testified that Lincoln College offered a \u201chigh[-] performance\u201d program, but the record does not indicate whether the high-performance course is included in the program for which David enrolled. The Lincoln College materials suggest it is an \u201cadd-on program\u201d which requires additional cost and time. Specifically, the Lincoln College materials noted: \u201c[Lincoln College] boasts *** a [six][c]ourse [h]igh[-][performance add-on program.\u201d Moreover, nothing in the record indicates what a high-performance course is or whether Shawnee offered such a course as well. Therefore, the trial court\u2019s conclusion that Shawnee was not a comparable school was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the court abused its discretion by ordering Keller to pay one-third of the cost of attending Lincoln College. See, e.g., Spear, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 631, 613 N.E.2d at 361 (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the request for contribution to pay college expenses at a nonaccredited Bible college); Schmidt, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 240, 684 N.E.2d at 1363 (finding the trial court did not err by ordering the father to pay one-half of the cost of attending a state school instead of one-half of the cost of attending the out-of-state school of his daughter\u2019s choice in light of the father\u2019s financial circumstances and the fact that no evidence was presented indicating why it was necessary or appropriate for the daughter to attend the out-of-state school).\nThis does not mean a child and custodial parent may never choose a private or expensive school when other less-expensive choices are available. However, when a child wants to attend an expensive school, the petitioner must present evidence that (1) special programs or attributes of the school make the additional costs reasonable under the circumstances or (2) the more expensive school was necessary or more appropriate for the child. See, e.g., Schmidt, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 239-40, 684 N.E.2d at 1362-63. The next issue the trial court must address is whether the parents can afford such school. See, e.g., Schmidt, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 240, 684 N.E.2d at 1363 (wherein the \u201ctrial court then was able to draw the conclusion there was no advantage shown to make [the father] pay more than the state[-]school costs, particularly in view of his financial situation\u201d).\nMoreover, this conclusion does not interfere with the custodial parent\u2019s authority to direct a child\u2019s education. Here, David may attend whichever school Sussen and he choose. Nonetheless, the courts must decide whether the noncustodial parent must contribute to that education and in what amount. See, e.g., Spear, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 629, 613 N.E.2d at 360 (rejecting the petitioning mother\u2019s argument that the trial court interfered with her authority as the custodial parent to direct her child\u2019s education).\nKeller also argues the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that Keller had the ability to pay the educational expenses. \u201cThe court should not order a party to pay more for educational expenses than he or she can afford.\u201d Pearson, 111 Ill. 2d at 552, 490 N.E.2d at 1277. The ability to pay is determined based on the party\u2019s resources at the time of the hearing. Pearson, 111 Ill. 2d at 552, 490 N.E.2d at 1277. A court may award sums of money out of the property and income of either parent. 750 ILCS 5/513(a) (West 2006).\nThe record discloses the bank account established for David contained approximately $5,000. In addition, Keller owned a motorcycle valued at $10,000. Further, at oral argument, Keller\u2019s counsel informed this court that Keller borrowed the money to pay the educational expenses ordered by the trial court. Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Keller had the ability to pay for David\u2019s educational expenses.\nTo conclude, the trial court abused its discretion by directing Keller to pay the cost for David to attend Lincoln College when an adequate public school was available. On remand, the trial court shall direct Keller to pay one-third of the total cost to attend Shawnee for the completion of an associate-of-applied-science degree in automotive technology. Morever, the court shall order Keller to pay one-third of the reasonable living and transportation expenses David would have incurred by attending that school (i.e., the cost to live at home with Sussen and commute or to obtain an apartment near Shawnee). If the record is inadequate to make that determination, the court shall hold a hearing for that purpose. In addition, because the court did not make any provision in its original order for medical and dental expenses, the court may do so on remand.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment and remand with directions.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nTURNER, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH" }, { "text": "JUSTICE COOK,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Keller had the ability to pay for David\u2019s educational expenses but did abuse its discretion by directing Keller to pay for the school of David\u2019s choice when an adequate public school was available. Reevaluating the evidence, the majority concludes that Sussen did not present evidence that the extra $17,345 it would cost for David to go to Lincoln was reasonable, necessary, or appropriate. I disagree.\nSussen presented evidence that the Lincoln program lasted only 15 months and focused solely on David\u2019s area of interest, high-performance automotive technology, and that two well-known companies recruited from Lincoln. On the other hand, Shawnee would take at least 24 months to complete and would involve taking general-education courses, and no evidence suggested that Shawnee offered a high-performance program or that top automotive companies recruited Shawnee graduates.\nCustodial parents are not free to choose a more expensive school without reason. As the majority noted, choosing a more expensive school is only appropriate if the custodial parent shows that \u201c(1) special programs or attributes of the school make the additional costs reasonable under the circumstances or (2) the more expensive school was necessary or more appropriate for the child.\u201d 382 Ill. App. 3d at 881, citing Schmidt, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 239-40, 684 N.E.2d at 1362-63. Such restrictions are necessary to prevent cases where a custodial parent may abuse his or her position of decision-making authority by allowing a child to choose a more expensive school without good reason and then stick the noncustodial parent with a larger bill.\nThis does not appear to be a case where the child is ambivalent about where he wants to go to college, so the custodial parent picks the more expensive school to stick the noncustodial parent with a larger bill. First, Sussen and David together are paying two-thirds of the more expensive school. Sussen, a single mother who also cares for a 12-year-old daughter for whom she receives no child support and who clearly does not make more than $26,000 a year, is not financially able to pick an expensive school just to spite Keller. David found a school that fit his career choice and presented the court with a reasonable explanation as to why the more expensive school was more appropriate for him.\nSecond, Sussen and David are not asking that Keller pay a great amount more. According to the majority\u2019s figure, they are asking for Keller to pitch in $5,781 more (one-third of the extra $17,345 it would cost for David to go to Lincoln), so that David may go to the school more tailored to his aspirations.\nFinally, the evidence shows that David wants to be an automotive mechanic who works with high-performance automotive technology. If he were forced to go to Shawnee, he would have to take nonautomotive courses and attend for nine more months, and he could not focus on high-performance technology. The trial court concluded that the evidence showed that Lincoln offers special programs or has attributes that made the additional costs reasonable or at least that the school was more appropriate for David\u2019s chosen career path, justifying the added costs. This decision was not an abuse of discretion.\nWhile Sussen and David could have aided their case had they presented more evidence regarding the special traits of Lincoln\u2019s program and how it was more appropriate given David\u2019s ambitions, their failure to do so should not be fatal. Sussen and David presented enough evidence to find that it was necessary or appropriate for David to attend Lincoln. When some evidence is present to support a trial court\u2019s decision, this court should not reweigh that evidence in order to reverse.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE COOK," } ], "attorneys": [ "Frederic M. Grosser (argued), of Champaign, for appellant.", "Ruth E. Wyman (argued), of Robert G. Kirchner Law Office, of Cham-paign, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. TAMMI SUSSEN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THOMAS G. KELLER, Respondent-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201407\u20140704\nArgued March 20, 2008.\nOpinion filed May 7, 2008.\nCOOK, J., dissenting.\nFrederic M. Grosser (argued), of Champaign, for appellant.\nRuth E. Wyman (argued), of Robert G. Kirchner Law Office, of Cham-paign, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0872-01", "first_page_order": 890, "last_page_order": 902 }