{ "id": 4276694, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY TUCKER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Tucker", "decision_date": "2008-05-27", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201406\u20142816", "first_page": "916", "last_page": "924", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 916" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "781 N.E.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637084 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" }, { "page": "582" }, { "page": "582" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 N.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the defendant, who had been continuously incarcerated, believed and represented to the court that his family or friends were obtaining private counsel; there were no facts showing the defendant's purpose was dilatory; the conviction was reversed" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 2d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5291587 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418", "parenthetical": "the defendant, who had been continuously incarcerated, believed and represented to the court that his family or friends were obtaining private counsel; there were no facts showing the defendant's purpose was dilatory; the conviction was reversed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/66/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "740 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "conviction reversed because trial court failed to ask the defendant if she had a specific attorney in mind or inquire into the reasons for the request" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963702 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "conviction reversed because trial court failed to ask the defendant if she had a specific attorney in mind or inquire into the reasons for the request" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 N.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 564651 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/304/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 N.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 2d 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2846753 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 N.E.2d 1067", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. App. 3d 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2492485 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523-24" }, { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/195/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "847 N.E.2d 903", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4263272 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644" }, { "page": "645" }, { "page": "645" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 N.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. App. 3d 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2553088 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724" }, { "page": "727" }, { "page": "727" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/207/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 N.E.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 Ill. App. 3d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5221341 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "143" }, { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/228/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 N.E.2d 1180", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927637 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" }, { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "876 N.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4272657 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" }, { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/376/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 U.S. 24", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3605132 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1898, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" }, { "page": "353" }, { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/172/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 U.S. 153", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6212318 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" }, { "page": "148-49" }, { "page": "1697" }, { "page": "159" }, { "page": "149" }, { "page": "1697" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/486/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 U.S. 140", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3500367 ], "weight": 15, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147-48" }, { "page": "419" }, { "page": "2563" }, { "page": "148" }, { "page": "419" }, { "page": "2563" }, { "page": "150" }, { "page": "420" }, { "page": "2564-65" }, { "page": "146" }, { "page": "418" }, { "page": "2562" }, { "page": "147-148" }, { "page": "419" }, { "page": "2563" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/548/0140-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 785, "char_count": 17786, "ocr_confidence": 0.839, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.207615598611598e-08, "percentile": 0.38431873827393026 }, "sha256": "b66befbe1e9ab351a421997878da5a160ac63dc1aff334d0bcf03dad7057e36e", "simhash": "1:aab8b032f7cb4db1", "word_count": 3038 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:01.752924+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY TUCKER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case concerns a constitutional right so highly valued that harmless error analysis will not be applied to its violation. We refer to a criminal defendant\u2019s right to retained counsel of his choice.\nDefendant Larry Tucker was convicted by a jury of two counts of criminal sexual assault. He was sentenced to two consecutive four-year terms in prison.\nThe main issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance to substitute counsel after a brief inquiry about the circumstances of the request. Defendant also contends the trial court erroneously instructed the jury pursuant to Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.11 (4th ed. 2000) (IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11), and the trial judge\u2019s instructions to the jury unduly pressured a minority juror. We reverse and remand.\nFACTS\nAt trial, defendant\u2019s daughter, L.B., testified defendant sexually assaulted her on December 18 or 19, 2004, and twice a week for several months afterward. The last assault occurred on April 16, 2005, L.B.\u2019s 14th birthday. On May 15, 2005, L.B. told her mother defendant had raped her. LJB.\u2019s friend and cousin testified L.B. told them her father had raped her. Two detectives testified defendant made unmemorial-ized, incriminating statements about an incident that occurred in January 2005. The defendant told detectives L.B. had asked him about sex, and he \u201cshowed\u201d her by touching his penis to her vagina.\nThe defense presented evidence that on August 3, 2005, L.B. told a defense investigator she had fabricated the allegations. She signed a typed version of her statement. L.B. returned to her original statement at trial. She testified she had lied to the investigator because her father\u2019s friends had threatened her.\nDECISION\nDefendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request to change counsel. He contends the court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into the circumstances surrounding his request.\nOn the date scheduled for defendant\u2019s jury trial, Mark Gottreich, defendant\u2019s privately retained attorney, told the trial judge he had \u201clost contact with [his] client\u201d since the last court date, approximately three months earlier. He told the court defendant did not want him as his attorney and had hired a new attorney. The judge replied, \u201cOh, well, what can I tell you? It may be a basis for some further review. No, you\u2019re going to trial today, sir.\u201d\nWhen the case was recalled later that day, the following colloquy took place:\n\u201cTHE COURT: *** Mr. Tucker, you said that when this case was originally called \u2014 I don\u2019t know if it was you or counsel who indicated that you had retained another attorney.\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: Who is that?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Jerry Lipschultz (phonetic spelling) I believe. My brother know who he is out there.\nTHE COURT: Have you ever talked to that person?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: Okay. Where did you talk to that person? Wdiere were you when you had that conversation?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Over the phone. My family talked to him.\nTHE COURT: You\u2019ve not talked to him?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes. He told me to call him today after court.\nTHE COURT: Okay. So, to the best of your knowledge, he has not been given any money?\nTHE DEFENDANT: No. He told me to call him after the Court today.\nTHE COURT: Okay. He was not here today?\nTHE DEFENDANT: No.\nTHE COURT: Do you know what he looks like?\nTHE DEFENDANT: No.\nTHE COURT: Okay. Well, I know a Lipschultz, who\u2019s not present. And it should also be indicated that no one other than counsel of record has stepped up on behalf of Mr. Tucker here today. All right.\nMR. GOTTREICH [Defense Attorney]: Judge, just for the record, what my client indicated to me today was that he wanted a different attorney. That was also indicated by his family who\u2019s here today. And I made that apparent to the Court earlier and asked to withdraw based on that.\nTHE COURT: I understand. This matter has been set for trial on at least two other occasions.\u201d\nFollowing the above discussion, the parties proceeded to the jury trial.\nThe sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: \u201c[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right *** to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.\u201d U.S. Const., amend. VI. The right to retained counsel of one\u2019s choice \u201chas been regarded as the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee\u201d in the sixth amendment. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147-48, 165 L. Ed. 2d 409, 419, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2563 (2006), citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140, 148-49, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1697 (1988); Andersen v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24, 30, 43 L. Ed. 351, 353, 19 S. Ct. 67, 70 (1898).\nThe right does not depend on whether defendant received a fair trial or was prejudiced by the representation he received. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 419, 126 S. Ct. at 2563. Deprivation of the right is a \u201cstructural error\u201d not subject to harmless error review. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 420, 126 S. Ct. at 2564-65. That is:\n\u201cIn sum, the right at stake here is the right to counsel of choice, not the right to a fair trial; and that right was violated because the deprivation of counsel was erroneous. No additional showing of prejudice is required to make the violation \u2018complete.\u2019 \u201d Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 418, 126 S. Ct. at 2562.\nThe right to counsel of choice, while fundamental, may be limited in some cases. A criminal defendant has no right to select an attorney he cannot afford or one who is not a member of the bar, has a conflict of interest, or declines to represent him. People v. Howard, 376 Ill. App. 3d 322, 335, 876 N.E.2d 36 (2007), citing Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 149, 108 S. Ct. at 1697. A defendant who abuses the sixth amendment in an attempt to delay trial and thwart the effective administration of justice may forfeit his right to counsel of choice. Howard, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 335; People v. Childress, 276 Ill. App. 3d 402, 413, 657 N.E.2d 1180 (1995).\nIt is within the trial court\u2019s discretion to determine whether the defendant\u2019s right to selection of counsel unduly interferes with the orderly process of judicial administration. People v. Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d 133, 142, 592 N.E.2d 453 (1992). A determination of the issue turns on the particular facts of each case. People v. Little, 207 Ill. App. 3d 720, 724, 566 N.E.2d 365 (1990).\n\u201cIn balancing the judicial interest of trying the case with due diligence and the defendant\u2019s constitutional right to counsel of choice, the court must inquire into the actual request to determine whether it is being used merely as a delaying tactic.\u201d Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 142. Factors to be considered include: whether defendant articulates an acceptable reason for desiring new counsel; whether the defendant has continuously been in custody; whether he has informed the trial court of his efforts to obtain counsel; whether he has cooperated with current counsel; and the length of time defendant has been represented by current counsel. Childress, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 411; Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 142. The court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion if new counsel is not specifically identified or does not \u201cstand ready, willing, and able\u201d to make an appearance on defendant\u2019s behalf. Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 142.\nDefendant contends there is no evidence he requested new counsel in order to delay the proceedings. Defendant informed the court he had hired new counsel. He identified the new attorney by name. Defendant had been in continuous custody and had not requested any trial continuances prior to the motion for new counsel. The case had been set twice for a bench trial. On both dates, the case was continued because one of the State\u2019s witnesses was unavailable. On the last date before trial, the parties participated in a Rule 402 (134 Ill. 2d R. 402) conference, after which a date was set for jury trial. All other continuances in the case were by order of court or by agreement of the parties.\nThe State contends defendant\u2019s request, made on the day of trial and nine months after the case had been placed on the docket, threatened the efficient administration of justice. The trial court\u2019s inquiry revealed: no new counsel stood ready and able to make an appearance on defendant\u2019s behalf; defendant had not met with or paid his newly \u201chired\u201d attorney; and defendant\u2019s case had been set for trial on at least two separate occasions.\nThe State contends defendant failed to articulate a reason why he wanted new counsel and never filed a motion for a continuance or specified a length of time for a continuance. The defendant had been represented by Gottreich\u2019s firm for eight months before defendant requested new counsel. The State suggests defendant may have wished to delay his trial in hopes that L.B. would refuse to testify against him.\nSeveral decisions have held a trial court erroneously denied the defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance to substitute counsel by failing to conduct an adequate inquiry into the request.\nIn People v. Bingham, 364 Ill. App. 3d 642, 644, 847 N.E.2d 903 (2006), the defendant told the trial court he wished to be represented by Earl Washington, who was representing defendant in other pending cases. The record showed Washington had contacted the assistant State\u2019s Attorney the previous day, although the subject matter of the message was unclear. The case had been pending only three months. No prior continuances or prior motions had been filed. The court held the trial court \u201cshould have conducted an inquiry into the circumstances and the purposes of the motion before making its ruling.\u201d Bingham, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 645. The conviction was reversed.\nIn People v. Little, 207 Ill. App. 3d 720, 566 N.E.2d 365 (1990), the defendant moved for a continuance on the date of trial because the private counsel retained by his family was misinformed of the trial date and was not present in court. He told the court the attorney had been paid for his services. The defendant was in custody during the period between his arrest and the date of trial and therefore was compelled to rely on his family to retain private counsel. Little, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 727. None of the previous continuances was requested by the defendant. The trial court conducted no inquiry into the truth or falsity of defendant\u2019s assertions, nor did the court ask how long a continuance would be necessary to secure retained counsel\u2019s appearance. Little, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 727. The conviction was reversed.\nIn People v. Washington, 195 Ill. App. 3d 520, 523-24, 552 N.E.2d 1067 (1990), the public defender informed the trial court on the day of trial that the defendant\u2019s family had retained an attorney for the defendant, who asked for a week-long continuance. The appellate court held, \u201c[i]f the trial court suspected that defendant\u2019s representation that a private attorney had been hired was being used as a delaying tactic, it very easily could have confirmed or dispelled its suspicion by inquiring further into the employment of the attorney.\u201d Washington, 195 Ill. App. 3d at 526. The conviction was reversed.\nIn People v. Green, 42 Ill. 2d 555, 248 N.E.2d 116 (1969), the defendant told the trial court his privately retained attorney was in Washington on a case. He said the attorney had been paid by his church. The supreme court held the trial court erred in failing to inquire into defendant\u2019s assertions. The court said, \u201c[i]t would have been a simple matter to verify defendant\u2019s statement.\u201d Green, 42 Ill. 2d at 557. The conviction was reversed.\nSee also People v. Basler, 304 Ill. App. 3d 230, 232, 710 N.E.2d 431 (1999) , aff\u2019d as modified & remanded, 193 Ill. 2d 545, 740 N.E.2d 1 (2000) (conviction reversed because trial court failed to ask the defendant if she had a specific attorney in mind or inquire into the reasons for the request); People v. Ritchie, 66 Ill. App. 2d 417, 418, 213 N.E.2d 306 (1966) (the defendant, who had been continuously incarcerated, believed and represented to the court that his family or friends were obtaining private counsel; there were no facts showing the defendant\u2019s purpose was dilatory; the conviction was reversed).\nIn this case, as in Green, Little, and Washington, defendant claimed someone else hired a private attorney to represent him; the private attorney had not filed an appearance; and the court did not attempt to verify the employment of the private attorney. As in Bingham and Washington, the defendant identified the new attorney by name. As in Ritchie, the defendant was continuously incarcerated and relied on his family to retain an attorney for him. There is no evidence in the record that defendant did anything to delay the court proceedings prior to the trial day. Defendant had not requested any continuances prior to his request to substitute counsel. There is no indication the defendant or his family could not afford to hire new private counsel. Nor is there any explanation of how a lawyer can \u201close contact\u201d for the three months before trial with a client who is in jail across from the courthouse.\nWe recognize the presence of factors that apparently led the trial court to insist that trial proceed with Gottreich as defense counsel. The case had been pending nine months. It was set for trial on the day defendant requested a change of lawyer. The defendant told the trial court the new lawyer had not been paid. The new lawyer had not filed an appearance and had not appeared in court. Some of these factors turn up in decisions that find no violation of the right to counsel.\nIn Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 143, the defendant had asked for a new attorney four months before the trial date. The trial court informed him the only way he would get another attorney was if he retained private counsel, which defendant did not do. On the day of trial, defendant told the trial court he had just met a private attorney who was willing to take his case. The attorney did not file an appearance or inform the court of his involvement with the case. The attorney was in court that morning and said nothing about representing the defendant. The appellate court affirmed the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion. The court held, \u201c[although defendant was in continuous custody for eleven months, he had ample time to retain private counsel.\u201d Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 143.\nIn People v. Antoine, 335 Ill. App. 3d 562, 577, 781 N.E.2d 444 (2002), at the hearing on his motion for a new trial, the defendant told the court he wanted to fire his attorney, expressing dissatisfaction with her performance. Defendant first told the court he was \u201cgoing to retain\u201d another attorney, then said he was \u201chiring an attorney,\u201d then said he had \u201calready retained an attorney.\u201d He identified the attorney as Robert Willis and said Willis asked him to get a continuance. He said he had paid Willis $6,000. The trial court noted Willis had not filed an appearance in the case and was not present in court. The appellate court held it was \u201ctroubled by the fact that the trial court did not attempt to verify Antoine\u2019s final contention that he had already retained an attorney.\u201d Antoine, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 582. Nevertheless, given the defendant\u2019s changing versions about whether he had retained counsel, and the complete lack of evidence that Willis was ready, willing, or able to take Antoine\u2019s case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a continuance. Antoine, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 582.\nHere, we focus on the trial court\u2019s failure to inquire more thoroughly into defendant\u2019s request. Among other things, the trial judge did not ask the defendant why he wanted another lawyer, what he meant when he said he \u201chired\u201d Jerry Lipschultz, or whether he could afford to hire Lipschultz. Nor did he ask defendant\u2019s family members, who were present in the courtroom, about any arrangements to hire Lipschultz. The judge made no attempt to contact Lipschultz or Lipschultz\u2019s office to learn whether he was willing and able to represent the defendant. He failed to ask Gottreich why he had lost contact with the defendant during the three months leading up to the trial date, a time when defendant was in custody. The trial court made no finding that defendant\u2019s attempt to hire a new lawyer was a delaying tactic and not in good faith.\nGiven the failure of the trial court to inquire into the \u201ccircumstances and the purposes\u201d of the defendant\u2019s desire to change lawyers (Bingham, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 645), viewed in light of the right to retained counsel of one\u2019s choice being \u201cregarded as the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee\u201d in the sixth amendment (Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147-148, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 419, 126 S. Ct. at 2563), we conclude reversible error was committed and a new trial is required.\nThe other issues raised by the defendant are unlikely to recur in a retrial of this case and need not be considered.\nFor the reasons set forth, the convictions against the defendant are reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nCAHILL, P.J., and R. GORDON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Terry L. Campos, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Peter Fisher, and Karisa F. Flores, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY TUCKER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201406\u20142816\nOpinion filed May 27, 2008.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Terry L. Campos, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Peter Fisher, and Karisa F. Flores, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0916-01", "first_page_order": 934, "last_page_order": 942 }