{ "id": 4277555, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES M. SITKOWSKI, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Sitkowski", "decision_date": "2008-06-09", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201407\u20140305", "first_page": "1072", "last_page": "1077", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 1072" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096628 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717" }, { "page": "718" }, { "page": "718" }, { "page": "718" }, { "page": "719" }, { "page": "719" }, { "page": "719" }, { "page": "719" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3597995 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" }, { "page": "172" }, { "page": "171" }, { "page": "181" }, { "page": "179" }, { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/219/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265141 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" }, { "page": "554" }, { "page": "354-55" }, { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/366/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 Ill. App. 3d 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 7328072 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" }, { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/374/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781318 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" }, { "page": "426" }, { "page": "426" }, { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0419-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 504, "char_count": 11092, "ocr_confidence": 0.835, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.207966869300525e-08, "percentile": 0.3279426715611605 }, "sha256": "b9da6a3762ab764ac0bce4397926fd433defd93a0eb2576c56556d35446fdfa5", "simhash": "1:282299fe6a65ccc5", "word_count": 1855 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:01.752924+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES M. SITKOWSKI, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HUTCHINSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals the trial court\u2019s order in which a charge against Charles M. Sitkowski was dismissed for violation of his speedy-trial right under section 3 \u2014 8\u201410 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (the intrastate detainers statute) (730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 8\u201410 (West 2004)). The State argues that Sitkowski\u2019s speedy-trial demand was not effective after he was released from incarceration. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn October 3, 2003, Sitkowski was arrested in Du Page County for driving while his license was revoked (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303(a) (West 2002)). Sitkowski failed to appear in court, a judgment was entered forfeiting his bond, and a bench warrant was issued. On December 16, 2004, Sitkowski was arrested under the warrant. He posted bond and then failed to appear for his March 14, 2005, court date. Another judgment was entered forfeiting his bond, and another bench warrant was issued.\nOn June 3, 2005, Sitkowski was arrested in another county on a separate charge of driving while his license was revoked. For unknown reasons, he was not served with the Du Page County warrant. Sit-kowski was convicted and sentenced to two years\u2019 incarceration in a Department of Corrections (DOC) facility. On October 14, 2005, while he was incarcerated, Sitkowski filed a speedy-trial demand in the present case, under the intrastate detainers statute. Although the speedy-trial demand does not appear in the record on appeal, the State does not dispute that a speedy-trial demand was mailed on October 14, 2005.\nOn December 2, 2005, Sitkowski was released from incarceration on mandatory supervised release. Sitkowski still was not served with the Du Page County warrant and, on March 20, 2006, the State dismissed the charge by nolle prosequi. On May 2, 2006, Sitkowski was indicted in Du Page County for aggravated driving while his license was revoked (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303(a), (d) (West 2002)), based on the same facts as the initial charge.\nThe State did not serve Sitkowski until November 20, 2006. That same day, Sitkowski made a second speedy-trial demand. He was arraigned on December 18, 2006, and on January 25, 2007, he moved to dismiss the charge for failure to bring him to trial within the statutory speedy-trial period.\nA hearing was held and the State argued that the speedy-trial period was tolled after Sitkowski was released from incarceration. The trial court observed that the State failed to provide a reason for why Sitkowski was not served until November 2006. The court also observed that Sitkowski was on supervised release and that the State should have been able to locate him. The court determined that the time was not tolled and it dismissed the indictment. The State appeals.\nII. ANALYSIS\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether Sitkowski\u2019s release from incarceration tolled the speedy-trial period. The State argues that, once Sitkowski was released, he was no longer subject to the intrastate detainers statute. Thus, the State contends that, until Sitkowski made a new demand under section 103 \u2014 5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/103 \u2014 5(b) (West 2006)), the time was tolled. Sitkowski argues that his demand under the intrastate detainers statute was effective and that the speedy-trial period was not tolled during the time between his release and the dismissal by nolle prosequi because he was on mandatory supervised release, which is a DOC program. The parties do not dispute that the speedy-trial period was tolled during the time between the dismissal and when the charges were refiled.\n\u201cThe right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Federal and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a78).\u201d People v. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419, 426 (1994). A criminal defendant in Illinois has a statutory right to a speedy trial. 725 ILCS 5/103 \u2014 5 et seq. (West 2004). The speedy-trial statute enforces the constitutional right to a speedy trial, and its protections are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant. People v. Buford, 374 Ill. App. 3d 369, 372 (2007). \u201c[T]he statutory right to a speedy trial is not the precise equivalent of the constitutional right.\u201d Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 426. \u201cProof of a violation of the statutory right requires only that the defendant has not been tried within the period set by statute and that [the] defendant has not caused or contributed to the delays.\u201d Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 426. Because this appeal presents purely legal questions, the standard of review is de novo. People v. King, 366 Ill. App. 3d 552, 554 (2006).\n\u201c[T]he Illinois legislature has enacted three principal speedy-trial statutes.\u201d King, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 554; see People v. Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d 166, 174 (2006). Section 103 \u2014 5(a) of the Code provides an automatic 120-day speedy-trial right for a person held in custody on the pending charge and does not require a speedy-trial demand to exercise that right. 725 ILCS 5/103 \u2014 5(a) (West 2004). Section 103\u2014 5(b) of the Code contains a 160-day speedy-trial right for a person released on bond or recognizance, and the period begins to run only when the accused files a written demand for a speedy trial. Finally, the intrastate detainers statute applies the speedy-trial period contained in section 103 \u2014 5(b) to a person \u201ccommitted to any institution or facility or program of the [DOC]\u201d who has charges pending, provided that he or she serves a written demand. 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 8\u201410 (West 2004); see King, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 354-55; People v. Penrod, 316 Ill. App. 3d 713, 717 (2000). \u201cThus, under the intrastate detainers statute, a person already incarcerated on an unrelated charge enjoys the exact same speedy-trial right as someone released on bond or recognizance\u2014 that is, a \u2018statutory right to be tried within 160 days.\u2019 \u201d Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d at 172, quoting Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 428.\nIt is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that, when interpreting a statute, a court must give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent, and the best indication of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Buford, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 373. When the statute\u2019s language is clear and unambiguous, a court must apply the statute without resort to further statutory-construction aids. Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d at 171. \u201cThough both the speedy trial act [(section 103 \u2014 5 of the Code)] and the intrastate detainers statute deal with the accused\u2019s right to a speedy trial, the intrastate detainers statute is a particular enactment that only applies to persons committed to the custody of the [DOC].\u201d Penrod, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 718. Statutes relating to the same subject matter must be construed together so that effect may be given to all the provisions of each statute if it can be done by a fair and reasonable construction, and we presume that all statutes relating to one subject are governed by one policy and that the legislature intended them to be operative and harmonious. Penrod, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 718. The intrastate detainers statute \u201cdoes not conflict with but, rather, qualifies the speedy trial act.\u201d Penrod, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 718.\nSection 3 \u2014 1\u20142(b) of the Unified Code defines \u201c \u2018[c]ommitment\u2019 \u201d as \u201ca judicially determined placement in the custody of the [DOC] on the basis of delinquency or conviction.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 1\u20142(b) (West 2004). Under section 3 \u2014 14\u20142(a) of the Unified Code, the DOC retains custody of all persons placed on parole or mandatory supervised release. 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 14\u20142(a) (West 2004). Further, section 3 \u2014 1\u2014 2(g) of the Unified Code states that \u201c \u2018[discharge\u2019 \u201d is \u201cthe final termination of a commitment to the [DOC].\u201d 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 1\u20142(g) (West 2004). A mandatory supervised release is not a \u201cdischarge.\u201d See Penrod, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 719, citing 730 ILCS Ann. 5/3 \u2014 1\u20142(g), Council Commentary \u2014 1973, at 11 (Smith-Hurd 1997).\nIn Wooddell, the supreme court held that a speedy-trial demand filed under the intrastate detainers statute while the defendant was in DOC custody survived the defendant\u2019s release from prison. Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d at 181. The defendant did not need to refile a demand under the speedy-trial act, and the 160-day period continued to run. Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d at 179. The court observed that to hold otherwise would convert the speedy-trial period from one of 160 days to one of at least 320 days. See Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d at 179.\nFurther, in Penrod, the Fifth District held that a defendant was committed to the continuous custody of the DOC during the entire period of his mandatory supervised release. Penrod, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 719. Thus, the court held that the defendant was required to make a speedy-trial demand under the intrastate detainers statute instead of the speedy-trial act. Penrod, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 719; see also King, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 554.\nHere, under Wooddell, Sitkowski\u2019s speedy-trial demand, made while he was in custody under the intrastate detainers act, remained effective after he was released. The State attempts to distinguish Wooddell on the basis that Sitkowski was not released on bail. But the logic of Wooddell still applies. Sitkowski was released on mandatory supervised release, and thus he was still in DOC custody under the plain language of the statutes. See Penrod, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 719. Thus, even though Sitkowski was not released on bail, he was still committed to the DOC, meaning that his demand filed under the intrastate detainers statute was still effective. Accordingly, Sitkowski\u2019s release from incarceration did not toll the speedy-trial period.\nThe State argues that Sitkowski waived his speedy-trial right by failing to appear, observing that, under the speedy-trial act, the failure to appear will waive a speedy-trial demand. 725 ILCS 5/103 \u2014 5(b) (West 2004). But Sitkowski failed to appear before he made a speedy-trial demand, and he does not argue that we should count any periods before he made his demand. There is nothing in the record to show that Sitkowski failed to appear after he made his demand under the intrastate detainers statute, nor is there legal support for the conclusion that a failure to appear waives all future speedy-trial demands. Instead, Sitkowski demanded a speedy trial, and the State failed to bring him to trial within the 160-day period and did not show that Sit-kowski was responsible for the delay. Accordingly, the trial court correctly dismissed the indictment.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGROMETER and ZENOFF, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HUTCHINSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Stephen E. Norris and Sharon Shanahan, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Thomas A. Lilien and Steven E. Wiltgen, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES M. SITKOWSKI, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201407\u20140305\nOpinion filed June 9, 2008.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Stephen E. Norris and Sharon Shanahan, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nThomas A. Lilien and Steven E. Wiltgen, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1072-01", "first_page_order": 1090, "last_page_order": 1095 }