{ "id": 4277541, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEON PALMER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Palmer", "decision_date": "2008-05-23", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201407\u20140620", "first_page": "1151", "last_page": "1163", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 1151" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "374 N.E.2d 194", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448796 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 N.E.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3528495 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 N.E.2d 642", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647-48" }, { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 1073", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2548979 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1081-82" }, { "page": "1082" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/208/1073-01" ] }, { "cite": "703 N.E.2d 49", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926986 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "833 N.E.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 1098", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5731827 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1105" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/1098-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 N.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3098736 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "872 N.E.2d 403", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "373 Ill. App. 3d 1104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4270041 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/373/1104-01" ] }, { "cite": "871 N.E.2d 728", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" }, { "page": "744" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610581 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" }, { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 N.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569773 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "737 N.E.2d 230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245", "parenthetical": "\"Before invoking the plain[-]error exception, however, 'it is appropriate to determine whether error occurred at all.' People v. Wade, 131 Ill. 2d 370, 376[, 546 N.E.2d 553, 555] (1989)\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963704 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27", "parenthetical": "\"Before invoking the plain[-]error exception, however, 'it is appropriate to determine whether error occurred at all.' People v. Wade, 131 Ill. 2d 370, 376[, 546 N.E.2d 553, 555] (1989)\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 N.E.2d 899", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902" }, { "page": "903" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 3d 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3305422 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312" }, { "page": "314-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/68/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 Cal. Rptr. 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "220 Cal. App. 3d 1165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2302136 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1169-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/220/1165-01" ] }, { "cite": "661 N.E.2d 1186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1190" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 Ill. App. 3d 1053", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1172422 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1058" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/277/1053-01" ] }, { "cite": "670 N.E.2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" }, { "page": "595", "parenthetical": "noting that the defendant's numerous and voluminous motions and his imprecision in expressing himself as an attorney did not demonstrate that he lacked the mental capacity to waive counsel" }, { "page": "594", "parenthetical": "\"Defendant's ability to articulate his case and to precisely motion the court are merely measures of his proficiency or lack thereof as a lawyer. His ability to represent himself is not indicative of his competence to choose self-representation\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147581 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" }, { "page": "24" }, { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 806", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9431 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "794 N.E.2d 294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578261 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 N.E.2d 1032", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1033" }, { "page": "1033" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223619 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" }, { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0379-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1266, "char_count": 30133, "ocr_confidence": 0.84, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.752924295958898e-08, "percentile": 0.49496766027671885 }, "sha256": "b0b8b0fa5a377966e20364a450a7cf2059896632522e4d52a1a444e276f79298", "simhash": "1:b364584e35a61f7d", "word_count": 4922 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:01.752924+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEON PALMER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn January 2006, a jury convicted defendant, Leon Palmer (who had earlier waived his right to counsel and had chosen to represent himself), of residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 3 (West 2000)). The trial court later sentenced him to 30 years in prison to be served consecutively with a sentence he had been serving.\nDefendant appeals, arguing that (1) because a bona fide doubt existed as to his fitness, the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself at trial without first ordering a fitness evaluation; (2) the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument (a) improperly attacked defendant\u2019s integrity and tactics and (b) impugned the exercise of his constitutional right to represent himself; and (3) the court abused its discretion by refusing to revoke defendant\u2019s waiver of counsel for post-sentencing proceedings. Because we agree only with defendant\u2019s third argument, we affirm and remand with directions.\nI. BACKGROUND\nBecause defendant challenges neither the sufficiency of the evidence against him nor its admissibility, we discuss the evidence and the case\u2019s procedural history only to the extent necessary to put his arguments in context.\nIn August 2001, the State charged John Doe (identified only by a description of his deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)) with (1) residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 3 (West 2000)) (committed in August 2000), (2) two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 14(a)(2) (West 1998)), (3) unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 3(a) (West 1998)), and (4) aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(b)(8) (West 1998)) (committed in July 1999). In June 2005, based upon a DNA match, the State moved to amend the charging instrument to allege that defendant was the offender. The State explained that it did not know the offender\u2019s actual name when it filed the August 2001 charges. The trial court later granted the State\u2019s motion to amend.\nIn August 2005, defendant appeared in court on these charges and stated that he wanted to represent himself. The court admonished him in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 401 (134 Ill. 2d R. 401) and accepted his waiver of his right to counsel.\nIn September 2005, the State advised the trial court that because defendant had an extensive criminal record, the possible sentences he faced upon conviction differed from those that the court explained to defendant when he waived his right to counsel. The court then informed defendant that it was going to readmonish him regarding his right to counsel and the correct penalties he faced. The court also explained that defendant had another opportunity to accept the appointment of the public defender\u2019s office. After the court again admonished defendant pursuant to Rule 401, defendant (1) persisted in his intent to represent himself and (2) again declined the court\u2019s offer of appointed counsel. Defendant also expressed his unhappiness with the proceedings, stating that they were \u201cpointless.\u201d\nDuring the course of pretrial and posttrial proceedings, defendant pro se filed the following documents: (1) an August 2005 motion to dismiss indictment instanter; (2) an October 2005 motion for severance; (3) a November 2005 motion to dismiss charges; (4) a January 2006 motion to dismiss instanter; (5) a March 2006 motion to reduce his sentence and/or motion to reconsider his sentence; (6) a May 2006 petition for court-appointed counsel in relation to filing an amended motion, brief, and written argument in postjudgment proceedings; (7) a July 2006 petition for writ of coram nobis; (8) a July 2006 petition for relief from judgment; (9) a July 2006 petition to this court \u201cfor leave to [file an] interlocutory appeal\u201d; (10) a January 2007 letter to the trial court requesting an extension of time to complete his research so that he could file an amended sentencing motion; and (11) a July 2007 motion to reduce his sentence.\nIn defendant\u2019s October 2005 handwritten motion for severance, he wrote the following: \u201cThat the above said cases was [sic] alleged to have been committed years apart[,] and if said cases [are] allowed to be consolidated^] it will prejudice the jury.\u201d Defendant prevailed on this motion, given that the State, in response, elected to try defendant only on the residential-burglary charge.\nIn defendant\u2019s November 2005 pro se motion to dismiss, he \u201cvehemently denie[d] having been anywhere near the alleged crime scene on the day of the event\u201d and contended that the only evidence the State had against him were \u201cthe bloodstain and the semen [which] were years old when tested and finally reported[,] causing at least drying, contamination[,] and generally deterioration of the DNA sample.\u201d He asserted that this DNA evidence, without corroboration, was insufficient to establish his guilt. The trial court denied this motion, and the case proceeded to trial.\nDuring defendant\u2019s opening statement at trial, he informed the jurors that his blood was present in the residence and that he would try to show them how it got there. He also told the jury that someone (whose name he did not know) who was related to the people who lived in the residence invited defendant into the house to drink a beer. When he dropped the beer, he cut his finger, and \u201ca splatter got on the wall.\u201d\nThe State then presented evidence that a window in a Decatur residence was broken out, and a bloodstain was left, apparently by the burglar, on a table inside the residence near the window. The family living in the residence testified (1) as to the circumstances surrounding the burglary, (2) that they did not know defendant, and (3) that he did not have permission to be in their residence. Police and expert testimony described how the bloodstain was processed and resulted in a DNA match for defendant. After the State rested, defendant declined to put on any evidence. Based on the evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of residential burglary.\nAt defendant\u2019s February 2006 sentencing hearing, the trial court received the presentence investigation report (PSI), which showed that defendant was 50 years old and had eight prior felony convictions, with his first occurring 30 years earlier. Defendant\u2019s convictions included two for residential burglary, two for burglary, and one for attempted burglary.\nThe State also presented testimony from a woman who stated that as she walked home in Decatur on an evening in July 1999, a man began speaking with her and then dragged her from the road. As she fought with him, the man hit her, knocking her unconscious. When she awakened, she was undressed and the tampon she had been wearing due to her menstruation had been removed. Decatur police officers later found her clothing and the tampon, and subsequent testing showed the semen stain found on the woman\u2019s shorts matched defendant\u2019s DNA profile.\nThe State\u2019s presentation of this evidence upset defendant, who complained that he had not yet been convicted of this 1999 event and was present in court instead for sentencing regarding the 2000 residential burglary. The trial court explained that the State was entitled to present this evidence, and defendant responded that he wanted to leave the courtroom, explaining, \u201cYou just go on and do what you got to do because I don\u2019t want to hear no [sic] more of this kangaroo type of stuff.\u201d\nAfter the State completed presenting evidence regarding the 1999 incident, defendant returned to the courtroom, and the trial court sentenced him to 30 years in prison on the residential-burglary charge.\nIn March 2006, defendant pro se filed a motion to reduce his sentence and/or reconsider the sentence. In later pleadings related to that motion, defendant for the first time asked for appointed counsel to represent him. In June 2006, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s request for appointed counsel, explaining as follows:\n\u201c(1) Defendant waived his constitutional right to assistance of counsel for proceedings in the [c]ircuit [cjourt; (2) although defendant has the right to appointed counsel on appeal, he does not have the absolute right to revoke his waiver at this stage of the proceedings in the [c]ircuit [c]ourt; and (3) defendant has not shown good cause for the [c]ircuit [c]ourt to exercise its discretion to allow withdrawal of defendant\u2019s waiver of counsel.\u201d\nIn July 2006, defendant pro se filed with this court his \u201cpetition for leave to [file] an interlocutory appeal,\u201d which he stated was being made \u201cpursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308\u201d (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). In that petition, defendant asserted that the trial court erred by not appointing counsel at the postsentencing stage in view of the \u201cobvious behavior problems during trial which created sufficient doubt about [defendant\u2019s] competence.\u201d Defendant added the following: \u201cThe trial court has ignored its reasonable duty to take reasonable measures to thwart failures of fairness by not investigating his competency before allowing him to represent his own criminal case *** and waive counsel.\u201d In August 2006, this court denied defendant\u2019s petition, explaining that Rule 308 does not apply to criminal cases.\nAlso in July 2006, defendant pro se filed for writ of coram nobis, challenging his conviction on the ground that the trial court did not make inquiries to determine whether he was competent to waive counsel. In support of that petition, defendant asserted the following:\n\u201cGiven the behavior by [defendant], including outward fits of disorderly conduct during trial, a sufficient doubt about [defendant\u2019s] competence was created which required and warranted further inquiry. The correct course was to suspend trial until evaluation could be made.\u201d\nIn July 2007, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant\u2019s posttrial motions, including his petition for writ of coram nobis, found them to be without merit, and denied them. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Defendant\u2019s Claim That the Trial Court Erred by Not Ordering a Fitness Evaluation of Him\nDefendant first argues that his conviction and sentence must be reversed and remanded because the trial court erroneously allowed him to represent himself at trial without first ordering a fitness evaluation when a bona fide doubt existed as to his fitness. Citing People v. Sandham, 174 Ill. 2d 379, 382, 673 N.E.2d 1032, 1033 (1996), and section 104 \u2014 11(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104 \u2014 11(a) (West 2004)), he contends that although a defendant is presumed fit to stand trial, the court must still order a fitness hearing sua sponte when a bona fide doubt of fitness arises. Defendant then asserts that\n\u201c[throughout the proceedings in this case, the court never questioned [defendant\u2019s] fitness to represent himself, despite repeated indications before and during trial that [he] was unable to understand the nature of the proceedings. Because a bona fide doubt existed as to [defendant\u2019s] fitness, the court had a sua sponte duty to appoint competent counsel and to have [defendant] evaluated for fitness.\u201d\nIn support of defendant\u2019s claim that the record demonstrates that a bona fide doubt arose as to his fitness to stand trial or to represent himself, he cites the following: (1) when the trial court described one of defendant\u2019s motions as \u201cgibberish\u201d and asked him to explain it, defendant responded that he could not see the papers \u201cbecause of [his] eyes [and his] medical problems\u201d; (2) when defendant was read-monished regarding his waiver of counsel under Supreme Court Rule 401, he objected to the proceedings and initially stood mute in response to the court\u2019s questions; thereafter, when the court asked if he would like the public defender\u2019s office to be appointed to represent him, he replied, \u201cI plead the fifth on that\u201d; (3) the remarks defendant made in his opening statement, particularly about how he had been in the burglarized residence legitimately and cut his finger there; (4) \u201cthroughout the trial, [defendant] expressed confusion as to the nature of each exhibit and how one spot of blood could yield several exhibits\u201d; (5) \u201c[defendant] had trouble understanding that [one of the residence\u2019s occupants] had information that might be harmful to [his] case\u201d; (6) defendant told the probation officer who wrote the PSI that defendant had been suffering from diabetes for 5V2 years, had poor vision, had arthritis, and his mental health was \u201cnot too good\u201d as a result of depression; and (7) defendant claimed that he took LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide) every day for a year, 20 years earlier, and had extensively smoked cannabis and crack cocaine. Defendant summarized his argument as follows: \u201cThe defendant\u2019s demeanor, irrationality, and mental[-]health issues should have triggered a bona fide doubt of fitness to waive counsel.\u201d We deem defendant\u2019s argument to be wholly without merit.\nAs the supreme court explained in People v. Johnson, 206 Ill. 2d 348, 361-62, 794 N.E.2d 294, 303 (2002), a defendant is considered to be fit if he understands the nature of the proceedings and can assist in his own defense. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant had an absolute right to represent himself in a criminal case. Following Faretta, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that fitness to waive counsel requires no more than fitness to stand trial. People v. Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 23, 670 N.E.2d 583, 594 (1996). The standard of review regarding the issue of whether a bona fide doubt existed as to defendant\u2019s fitness is abuse of discretion. Sandham, 174 Ill. 2d at 382, 673 N.E.2d at 1033.\nThis record compellingly demonstrates that defendant fully understood the nature of the proceedings and was clearly able to assist in his own defense. Our earlier reference to some of the documents defendant filed in this case strongly supports this conclusion. Indeed, his three-page August 2005 motion to dismiss indictment instanter demonstrated not only defendant\u2019s command of the English language and his ability to write well, but also his understanding of some legal technicalities. For instance, in his October 2005 pro se motion, defendant wrote the following: \u201cIllinois law mandates that a person (inmate) shall be taken before the nearest[,] most accessible magistrate in that area (county), without unnecessary delay[,] and the same holds true for anyone indicted by an information/indictment.\u201d\nThat portions of some of defendant\u2019s motions appeared to the trial court to be \u201cgibberish\u201d does nothing to diminish our conclusion. See Redd, 173 Ill. 2d at 24, 670 N.E.2d at 595 (noting that the defendant\u2019s numerous and voluminous motions and his imprecision in expressing himself as an attorney did not demonstrate that he lacked the mental capacity to waive counsel). Indeed, given the technical nature of the rules that apply to evidence and procedure in criminal cases, we would have expected to see more instances of \u201cgibberish\u201d than the court found.\nWe explicitly reject defendant\u2019s contentions that any deficiencies in his pro se representation lend any support whatsoever to his claim that he was somehow not fit to waive his right to counsel. See Redd, 173 Ill. 2d at 24, 670 N.E.2d at 594 (\u201cDefendant\u2019s ability to articulate his case and to precisely motion the court are merely measures of his proficiency or lack thereof as a lawyer. His ability to represent himself is not indicative of his competence to choose self-representation\u201d). Ten years ago, this court noted that \u201ca defendant\u2019s decision to represent himself is universally viewed as unwise\u201d (People v. Williams, 277 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1058, 661 N.E.2d 1186, 1190 (1996)), and we adhere to that opinion. Nonetheless, given Faretta, a defendant retains the constitutional right to choose to represent himself in a criminal trial no matter how unwise that decision may be. Thus, as long as a trial court has properly admonished a defendant in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 401, we will not protect defendant from the consequences of his unwise decision to represent himself.\nWere we to hold otherwise, we would be inviting defendants \u201cto game the system,\u201d a circumstance a California court called, \u201c[pjlaying \u2018the Faretta game\u2019.\u201d People v. Williams, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1165, 1169-70, 269 Cal. Rptr. 705, 707 (1990). Both trial and reviewing courts must ever be wary of a defendant who tries to use the exercise of one constitutional right \u2014 here, the decision to represent himself at trial\u2014 against another \u2014 the right to stand trial or waive counsel only if he is fit to do so \u2014 especially when that defendant can attempt to change the courtroom dynamics simply by his own conduct or, more likely, his own misconduct.\nAlmost 30 years ago (even before Faretta), the Fifth District addressed a situation very much like the one in this case. In People v. Black, 68 Ill. App. 3d 309, 312, 385 N.E.2d 899, 902 (1979), the defendant was convicted of armed robbery after waiving his right to counsel and choosing to defend himself. He argued on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by failing sua sponte to order a fitness hearing. The Fifth District rejected that argument, writing as follows:\n\u201cAn accused is not entitled to such a hearing unless the trial court has notice of facts which raise a bona fide doubt of defendant\u2019s fitness or competency. [Citation.] A careful reading of the record reveals no evidence that defendant was unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him nor unable to prepare a defense. [Citation.] ApparentlyU defendant\u2019s alleged \u2018irregular conduct\u2019 before and at trial was no more than an attempt to disrupt these proceedings. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to order a fitness hearing on its own motion.\u201d Black, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 314-15, 385 N.E.2d at 903.\nWe fully agree with Black\u2019s analysis and conclusion and hold that they apply to this case.\nIn support of our rejection of defendant\u2019s argument, we note that the trial court demonstrated its awareness of the issue of fitness when the court, at the September 2005 readmonition pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 401 regarding defendant\u2019s waiver of his right to counsel (at which proceeding defendant expressed his displeasure), stated the following:\n\u201cFor the record[,] I am going to add we have had this defendant in court before. There is no basis to find him unfit, so I am not even going to consider a fitness report. We have seen his actions. This is [stc] the actions of a person who understands what is going on, and there is no reason to file a fitness petition.\u201d\nWe conclude that (1) the record fully supports this determination by the experienced trial court and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion by not ordering a fitness examination of defendant.\nB. Defendant\u2019s Claim That the Prosecutor\u2019s Improper Closing Argument Requires Reversal\nDefendant next argues that reversal is required because the prosecutor\u2019s \u201cintentional misconduct included attacks on the integrity and tactics of the pro se defendant, and impugned [defendant\u2019s] exercise of his constitutional right to represent himself.\u201d Defendant concedes that he made no objection to the prosecutor\u2019s alleged improper argument but asks this court to review the issue as plain error. Not only do we conclude that no plain error is present, we conclude that the prosecutor\u2019s remarks did not constitute error at all. See People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 1, 27, 737 N.E.2d 230, 245 (2000) (\u201cBefore invoking the plain[-]error exception, however, \u2018it is appropriate to determine whether error occurred at all.\u2019 People v. Wade, 131 Ill. 2d 370, 376[, 546 N.E.2d 553, 555] (1989)\u201d).\nIn People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 123, 871 N.E.2d 728, 745 (2007), the Supreme Court of Illinois recently discussed the applicable law when a defendant complains of a prosecutor\u2019s closing argument and wrote the following:\n\u201cProsecutors are afforded wide latitude in closing argument. [Citation.] In reviewing comments made at closing arguments, this court asks whether or not the comments engender substantial prejudice against a defendant such that it is impossible to say whether or not a verdict of guilt resulted from them.\u201d\nThe supreme court in Wheeler also wrote that \u201c[w]hether statements made by a prosecutor at closing argument were so egregious that they warrant a new trial is a legal issue this court reviews de novo.\u201d Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 121, 871 N.E.2d at 744.\nDuring the initial portion of the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument, he said that a case of this kind \u201cis probably the hardest type of case for a prosecutor to handle because it looks like Goliath is picking on David, but the thing that you have to realize is that the defendant has a constitutional right to defend himself.\u201d The prosecutor then mentioned that whether the jury believed defendant\u2019s decision to represent himself was a wise choice or not, defendant made that decision, which was his right. The prosecutor also mentioned that he had \u201ctried to extend [defendant] courtesies and treat him like another lawyer\u201d and did not try to cut corners, adding that the State \u201cgave you a case just like [defendant] would have [had] with an attorney representing him.\u201d The prosecutor concluded by emphasizing to the jury that the only evidence it could consider was that which \u201ccomes from the witness stand, and things that [defendant] may have been saying that weren\u2019t backed up or weren\u2019t produced as evidence in court, you can\u2019t consider.\u201d\nRegarding these rather mild remarks by the prosecutor, defendant argues to this court that \u201c[b]y emphasizing that [defendant] represented himself, the prosecutor set up his rebuttal during which he demeaned [defendant\u2019s] exercise of the right to self-representation.\u201d Before the prosecutor spoke in rebuttal, defendant presented his closing argument pro se and informed the jury that he had his argument all written out but that he hated \u201cto try to talk with paper so I am just going to speak from here, I mean, from my heart.\u201d Defendant then mentioned \u201cthe people from forensics [who] spoke about DNA,\u201d and added, \u201cI really didn\u2019t complete high school or nothing [sic] like that. I am not going for no [sic] sympathy from nobody [sic], but I was trying to understand what they was [sic] talking about [regarding] the DNA and the exhibits.\u201d Defendant also explained his difficulty speaking about the scientific exhibits \u201cbecause I was confused so I don\u2019t know who else might have been confused by the confusion.\u201d\nDefendant concluded his closing argument with a request that the jury \u201crealize and take into consideration that *** things ain\u2019t [sic] always the way they appear to be, and you know *** everything is not always put out there for you to understand. Some things are not able to be said. *** I\u2019m pretty sure whatever decision you come up with [will] come from your hearts.\u201d\nIn the prosecutor\u2019s rebuttal argument, which was very short, he first noted the strength of the DNA evidence against defendant and, in view of that, remarked:\n\u201cSometimes, the best defense in the world is, maybe, not hire a high-powered attorney, represent yourself, and play on the sympathy of the jury.\nThat has no part in your decision in this case. The decision should come from the testimony you heard from the witness stand and not sympathy that [defendant] is trying to engender.\u201d\nDefendant deems the prosecutor\u2019s rebuttal as containing \u201cintentional insults designed to discredit [defendant] in the jurors\u2019 eyes as to his role as defense attorney.\u201d Further, defendant contends that these comments penalized him \u201cfor asserting his constitutional right to exercise his right to represent himself and improperly diminished his presumption of innocence.\u201d\nGiven the circumstances of this case, we view the prosecutor\u2019s remarks as entirely proper. Defendant\u2019s pro se representation was the 800-pound gorilla in the courtroom, and absent an explanation concerning this situation, the jury might well have speculated about it and felt sympathy for defendant\u2019s plight, when in fact none was due. Further, absent some explanation, this situation might appear to the jury to be like Goliath picking on David.\nIn so concluding, we adhere to the views we recently expressed in People v. Montgomery, 373 Ill. App. 3d 1104, 1118, 872 N.E.2d 403, 415 (2007):\n\u201cTo slightly revise a common saying regarding campaigning for elective office, trying felony cases before a jury \u2018ain\u2019t beanbag.\u2019 These are serious matters with high stakes, and we expect advocates in our adversary system of justice to use all of their forensic skills to persuade the jury of the wisdom or justice of their respective positions.\u201d\nC. Defendant\u2019s Claim That the Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Refusing To Revoke His Waiver of Counsel for Postsentencing Proceedings\nLast, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to revoke his waiver of counsel for postsentencing proceedings. He points out that after sentencing, he pro se filed a series of pleadings, including a motion to reconsider his sentence, and asked for the appointment of counsel to represent him. The trial court denied his request. The State concedes defendant\u2019s argument on this point, and we accept the State\u2019s concession.\nIn People v. Baker, 92 Ill. 2d 85, 91-92, 440 N.E.2d 856, 859 (1982), the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a defendant\u2019s waiver of the right to counsel carries through to all subsequent proceedings unless (1) the defendant later requests counsel or (2) other circumstances suggest that the waiver is limited to a particular stage of the proceedings. Here, after representing himself at trial and at the sentencing hearing, defendant sought the appointment of counsel to represent him on his motion to reconsider his sentence.\nIn People v. Williams, 358 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1105, 833 N.E.2d 10, 16 (2005), this court held that a hearing on the motion to reconsider sentence is a critical stage of the criminal proceedings. Thus, an indigent defendant is entitled to the appointment of counsel at that stage. However, in June 2006, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s request for appointed counsel at that stage, ruling, in part, that (1) defendant did not have the absolute right to revoke his waiver and (2) he had not shown good cause for the court to exercise its discretion to allow withdrawal of defendant\u2019s waiver of counsel. We conclude that the court erred by ruling that defendant needed to show good cause for his request.\nIn People v. Burton, 184 Ill. 2d 1, 24, 703 N.E.2d 49, 60 (1998), the Supreme Court of Illinois addressed the timing of a defendant\u2019s request to waive counsel and wrote the following:\n\u201cA number of courts have held that a defendant\u2019s request is untimely when it is first made just before the commencement of trial, after trial begins, or after meaningful proceedings have begun. [Citations.] Once such proceedings have begun, the trial judge has discretion to deny a defendant\u2019s request to represent himself.\u201d\nSeveral years before Burton, this court similarly addressed the subject in People v. Ward, 208 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1081-82, 567 N.E.2d 642, 647-48 (1991), in which we strongly suggested a series of specific points for trial courts to discuss with a defendant who has informed the court that he wishes to waive his right to counsel (in addition to the Rule 401 admonitions). One of the points we urged a court to make was that \u201cin the event the court accepts defendant\u2019s decision to represent himself, defendant will not be given an opportunity to change his mind during trial.\u201d Ward, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 1082, 567 N.E.2d at 648.\nIf a trial court has fully complied with Rule 401 (and especially if the court has followed our Word suggestions), the court can hold the defendant to his election to proceed pro se even though the defendant subsequently changes his mind during trial. Indeed, considering (1) the importance of judicial administration and (2) the need to avoid giving a defendant the opportunity \u201cto game the system\u201d (as discussed earlier), a court would be justified in informing a defendant of a deadline (perhaps a few weeks before the trial date) by which his decision to proceed pro se at trial will become irrevocable, making clear that it is not just at trial itself that the decision will become irrevocable.\nHowever, nothing about the circumstances in this case \u2014 namely, defendant\u2019s request for court-appointed counsel to assist him on his postsentencing motion \u2014 suggests any abuse of the system. For whatever reason, defendant finally changed his mind about the wisdom of pro se representation. We emphasize that defendant\u2019s change of mind occurred at a new stage of the proceedings, which constituted a clean slate for the trial court\u2019s consideration of the issue. Thus, the court erred by requiring him to demonstrate good cause for doing so.\nAccordingly, although we affirm defendant\u2019s residential-burglary conviction, we remand for the appointment of counsel for postsentenc-ing purposes in accordance with the views expressed herein.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm defendant\u2019s residential-burglary conviction and remand for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed herein. Because the State has in part successfully defended a portion of the criminal judgment, we grant the State its statutory assessment of $50 against defendant as costs of this appeal. See People v. Smith, 133 Ill. App. 3d 613, 620, 479 N.E.2d 328, 333 (1985), citing People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166, 179, 374 N.E.2d 194, 199 (1978).\nAffirmed and remanded with directions.\nAPPLETON, P.J., and KNECHT, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Arden J. Lang, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Jack Ahola, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEON PALMER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201407\u20140620\nOpinion filed May 23, 2008.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Arden J. Lang, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJack Ahola, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1151-01", "first_page_order": 1169, "last_page_order": 1181 }