{ "id": 4277888, "name": "In re ATUL R., a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Treatment (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Atul R., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Atul R.", "decision_date": "2008-06-13", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201407\u20140703", "first_page": "1164", "last_page": "1170", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 1164" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "712 N.E.2d 422", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208088 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "572 N.E.2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "886" }, { "page": "886" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591886 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231-32" }, { "page": "230-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "781 N.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442049 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "820 N.E.2d 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" }, { "page": "440" }, { "page": "426" }, { "page": "440" }, { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448124 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" }, { "page": "57" }, { "page": "32" }, { "page": "57" }, { "page": "56-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "871 N.E.2d 794", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "799" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "373 Ill. 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App. 3d 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35381 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 Ill. App. 3d 1026", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4275397 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1028" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/379/1026-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 753, "char_count": 15594, "ocr_confidence": 0.848, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.001246353132238e-08, "percentile": 0.46407203663225155 }, "sha256": "dedcdaf5031aa405f16ded432b4dfa6915d948a9a1cb0707818718f3a30ddea6", "simhash": "1:f9ec14a0a1c0bf50", "word_count": 2445 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:01.752924+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re ATUL R., a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Treatment (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Atul R., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a July 2007 hearing, the trial court found respondent, Atul R, subject to involuntary treatment (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1 (West 2006)).\nRespondent appeals, arguing that (1) the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was subject to involuntary treatment, and (2) the trial court\u2019s order authorizing involuntary treatment failed to comply with the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(1) (West 2006)) because his criminal defense attorney was not notified of the petition. Because we agree with respondent\u2019s second argument, we reverse.\nRespondent was found unfit to stand trial on a charge not specified in the record. He was admitted to the McFarland Mental Health Center (MMHC). In July 2007, Sreehari Patibandla, respondent\u2019s psychiatrist at MMHC, filed a petition seeking to involuntarily administer treatment to respondent. The petition alleged that (1) respondent (a) had a mental illness, (b) refused to receive psychotropic medication, and (c) exhibited (i) deterioration of his ability to function, (ii) suffering, or (iii) threatening behavior; (2) respondent\u2019s mental illness had existed for a period of time marked by the continuing presence of symptoms or the repeated episodic occurrence of symptoms; (3) respondent lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the psychotropic medication; (4) the benefits of the psychotropic medication clearly outweighed the harm; and (5) other less-restrictive services were explored and found inappropriate. The petition requested the following medications: (1) Geodon (80 to 240 milligrams per day), (2) lithium (600 to 2,100 milligrams per day), and (3) lorazepam (2 to 8 milligrams per day). The petition also requested the use of certain blood tests necessary for the safe and effective administration of the requested medications.\nAt the hearing on the petition, which was held later in July 2007, Patibandla testified that respondent had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. As a result of that mental illness, respondent developed delusional thoughts and threatening behavior. Patibandla explained that during the previous seven days, respondent had been involuntarily medicated. Respondent had made statements that he would \u201cmess up\u201d staff members and \u201cstatements of killing.\u201d Respondent told Pati-bandla that he felt the presence of \u201cthe evil angels\u201d in the hospital and was going to kill them. Following the medication, respondent experienced improved sleep and less \u201cpressured\u201d speech patterns. Patibandla opined that respondent lacked the capacity to give informed consent as to his treatment because he did not think he was mentally ill or needed medication.\nPatibandla then testified that in the involuntary-treatment petition, he had requested (1) Geodon, lithium, and lorazepam as the first-choice medications and (2) Zyprexa, Abilify, Seroquel, valproic acid, and Trileptal as alternative medications. Patibandla opined that the medications would allow respondent to sleep better and \u201c[h]is energy level would be more in tune with everyone else.\u201d Further, the medications would \u201chelp with the delusional thinking\u201d and allow respondent to \u201crationally converse.\u201d\nPatibandla acknowledged that the suggested \u201cmood stabilizers\u201d had possible side effects. He explained that respondent previously had received multiple doses of Geodon without any side effects. Patibandla also stated that respondent would be monitored for possible side effects through certain testing and procedures. Patibandla opined that the potential benefits of the proposed medications clearly outweighed the potential harm if respondent did not receive them. Patibandla further stated that other less-invasive treatment was inappropriate for respondent.\nThe trial court admitted in evidence the State\u2019s exhibit No. 1, which was a list of medical and nursing staff who were authorized to administer the requested medications to respondent.\nRespondent interjected during counsel\u2019s cross-examination of Pati-bandla that his former guru was \u201cthe Devil himself.\u201d Respondent stated that he was \u201cthe second coming of Jesus Christ,\u201d a messenger of Christ, and \u201cNicodemus in my past life.\u201d Respondent was dismissed from medical school \u201cbecause of Lucifer\u2019s direct involvement with my life.\u201d He believed \u201cLucifer\u201d wanted to destroy him because he represented \u201cthe truth of the second coming of Jesus Christ.\u201d Further, respondent stated he did not have a \u201cviolent intention\u201d when he committed armed robbery, explaining that he \u201cdeliberately used a BB gun.\u201d\nOn direct examination, respondent testified that the medications sought to be administered were very dangerous and \u201cextremely sedative.\u201d They caused respondent to function as a \u201czombie.\u201d He did not believe he was mentally ill. Respondent would \u201crelish the opportunity of psychotherapy.\u201d Respondent testified that he was not violent and did not threaten anyone.\nBased on the evidence, the trial court found \u201cthe treatment requested is needed and would be beneficial to the patient.\u201d\nThis appeal followed.\nAs an initial matter, on March 20, 2008, the State filed a motion to cite supplemental authority, In re Alfred H.H., 379 Ill. App. 3d 1026 (2008). On March 28, 2008, respondent responded to the State\u2019s motion requesting this court deny the motion. We ordered respondent\u2019s response to the State\u2019s motion taken with the case and now deny it.\nRespondent argues that the trial court\u2019s order authorizing involuntary treatment failed to comply with the Code because his criminal defense attorney was not notified of the petition. Before considering the merits of this issue, we address two preliminary matters. Specifically, we consider whether the issue is moot and whether the respondent waived review of the issue (more specifically referred to as forfeiture and procedural default (People v. Corrie, 294 Ill. App. 3d 496, 506, 690 N.E.2d 128, 135 (1998))).\nFirst, the issue is moot. The underlying judgment, entered by the trial court on July 27, 2007, was limited to 90 days, which have passed.\nAn issue raised in an otherwise moot appeal may be addressed when (1) the immediacy or magnitude of the interests involved in the case warrants the reviewing court\u2019s action or (2) \u201c \u2018the issue is \u201c \u2018likely to recur but unlikely to last long enough to allow appellate review to take place because of the intrinsically short-lived nature of the controversies.\u2019 \u201d \u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Felzak v. Hruby, 226 Ill. 2d 382, 392, 876 N.E.2d 650, 657-58 (2007).\nThe first exception to the mootness doctrine, known as the public-interest exception, applies only if a clear showing exists that (1) the question at issue is of \u201ca substantial public nature,\u201d (2) an authoritative determination is needed to guide public officers in the performance of their duties, and (3) the circumstances are likely to recur in other cases. Felzak, 226 Ill. 2d at 393, 876 N.E.2d at 658; In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d 338, 350, 851 N.E.2d 1, 8 (2006). The public-interest exception must be \u201cnarrowly construed and requires a clear showing of each criterion.\u201d Felzak, 226 Ill. 2d at 393, 876 N.E.2d at 658.\nThe second exception to the mootness doctrine, the capable-of-repetition exception, applies only if (1) the challenged action is of such short duration that it cannot be fully litigated prior to its cessation and (2) the same complaining party may reasonably be expected to be subject to the same action again. Like the public-interest exception, the capable-of-repetition exception must be narrowly construed and requires a clear showing of each criterion. J.T., 221 Ill. 2d at 350, 851 N.E.2d at 8.\nIn In re Alfred H.H., 379 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1028 (2008), this court recently discussed the mootness doctrine in mental-health cases, as follows:\n\u201cFor the last several years, this court has rather routinely recognized an exception to the mootness doctrine in cases involving involuntary mental-health admission and involuntary mental-health treatment. However, given the supreme court\u2019s clear, consistent, and recent adherence to the established exceptions to the mootness doctrine without regard to the type of cases before it, we conclude that Supreme Court of Illinois doctrine requires us to determine whether an otherwise moot appeal comes within an established exception to the mootness doctrine.\u201d\nIn this case, respondent argues that the trial court\u2019s involuntary-treatment order failed to comply with the Code (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(1) (West 2006)) because his criminal defense attorney was not notified of the petition. Given that (1) strict compliance with statutory procedures is required based on the important liberty interests involved in involuntaiy-treatment cases (In re Lisa G.C., 373 Ill. App. 3d 586, 590, 871 N.E.2d 794, 799 (2007)) and (2) our supreme court has stated that \u201cthe procedures courts must follow to authorize the involuntary medication of mental[-]health patients involve matters of \u2018substantial public concern\u2019 \u201d (In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 46, 820 N.E.2d 424, 434 (2004), quoting In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 402, 781 N.E.2d 237, 243 (2002)), respondent\u2019s arguments regarding the in voluntary-treatment order\u2019s compliance with the Code constitute questions of public importance. In addition, answers to respondent\u2019s arguments will provide an authoritative determination to guide public officers in the performance of their duties in mental-health cases. Finally, the circumstances in this case are likely to recur in other involuntary-treatment cases. Accordingly, we conclude that respondent clearly established the criteria necessary to satisfy the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Because we so conclude, we need not address whether respondent also established the criteria necessary to satisfy the capable-of-repetition exception to the mootness doctrine.\nSecond, we consider whether the issue is waived. Citing In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d 225, 572 N.E.2d 883 (1991), the State contends that the respondent waived review of whether notice of the petition should have been served on his criminal defense attorney because he did not raise that issue in the trial court. In Splett, our supreme court held that proof of formal notice of the proceeding may be excused when circumstances demonstrate that actual notice is sufficient. Splett, 143 Ill. 2d at 231-32, 572 N.E.2d at 886. In finding that formal notice is not necessary if the respondent receives actual notice of the petition, our supreme court noted that reversal of an order granting a petition for involuntary commitment is not required if (1) the respondent and his attorney took part in the proceedings on the merits and never challenged a procedural defect to which an objection could and should have been immediately made; (2) the procedural defect could have been cured easily if a timely objection had been made; and (3) the procedural defect made no difference in the end result. Splett, 143 Ill. 2d at 230-31, 572 N.E.2d at 886.\nIn this case, the result of the proceedings could indeed affect the respondent\u2019s criminal case. See Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d at 57, 820 N.E.2d at 440. Moreover, waiver is a limitation on the parties and not the courts. \u201c[A] reviewing court may ignore waiver in order to achieve a just result.\u201d In re Janet S., 305 Ill. App. 3d 318, 320, 712 N.E.2d 422, 423-24 (1999). Thus, we choose to address the merits of this issue.\nSection 2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(1) of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(a\u2014 5)(1) (West 2006)) provides in part:\n\u201cThe petitioner shall deliver a copy of the petition[ ] and notice of the time and place of the hearingt ] to the respondent, his or her attorney, any known agent or attorney-in-fact, if any, and the guardian, if any, no later than [three] days prior to the date of the hearing.\u201d\nIn Robert S., the respondent was found unfit to stand trial on unknown charges. Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d at 32, 820 N.E.2d at 426. He was subsequently admitted to a mental-health facility and during his stay there, his treating psychiatrist petitioned to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication. Notice of the petition was never served on the respondent\u2019s criminal defense attorney. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the petition to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication.\nOn appeal, our supreme court considered whether pursuant to section 2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(1) of the Code, the respondent\u2019s criminal defense attorney was entitled to notice of the petition to administer psychotropic medication. The court determined that the respondent\u2019s criminal defense attorney was due such notice because, at the very least, that attorney was the respondent\u2019s agent, and as such, the plain language of section 2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(1) required that notice be served on him or her. Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d at 57, 820 N.E.2d at 440. In reaching that conclusion, the court noted:\n\u201cRespondent came to be in a mental[-]health facility because he was found unfit to stand trial in a criminal proceeding. In that proceeding, he was represented by an attorney. All of the parties to this action were aware of that proceeding. Although the purpose of the instant proceeding was to determine whether psychotropic medication should be forced upon respondent for his own benefit and/or the safety of those around him, ultimately, there may be consequences pertinent to the pending criminal matter.\nWe note that the language concerning notification in section 2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(1) of the Code is very broad and general. It refers to notification of, inter alios, a respondent\u2019s \u2018attorney\u2019 and \u2018any known agent,\u2019 without qualification or limitation. We have previously construed this section to require notification of \u2018any other interested parties to the proceeding.\u2019 See In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d [200, 226, 641 N.E.2d 345, 357 (1994)]. In the absence of any restrictive language in the statute, we believe respondent\u2019s criminal defense attorney qualifies as a party to whom notice is due. In the very least, criminal counsel was a \u2018known agent,\u2019 and thus should have been given notice of this proceeding.\u201d Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d at 56-57, 820 N.E.2d at 440.\nHere, respondent came to be in a mental-health facility because he was found unfit to stand trial in a criminal proceeding. In that proceeding, he was represented by an attorney. All of the parties to this action were aware of that proceeding. Section 2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(1) of the Code mandates that an agent for the respondent must be given notice of a petition seeking to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication, and our supreme court has determined that a respondent\u2019s criminal defense attorney falls into this category. Thus, the respondent\u2019s criminal defense attorney was entitled to notice of the petition.\nBecause we reverse the trial court\u2019s involuntary-treatment order, we do not address respondent\u2019s remaining argument.\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nReversed.\nKNECHT and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Laurel Spahn, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Hines, and Veronique Baker, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Chicago, for appellant.", "John P. Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Norbert J. Goetten and Robert J. Biderman, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re ATUL R., a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Treatment (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Atul R., Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201407\u20140703\nOpinion filed June 13, 2008.\nLaurel Spahn, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Hines, and Veronique Baker, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJohn P. Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Norbert J. Goetten and Robert J. Biderman, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1164-01", "first_page_order": 1182, "last_page_order": 1188 }