{ "id": 4277386, "name": "In re DANTE W., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Dante W., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Dante W.", "decision_date": "2008-06-16", "docket_number": "No. 1-06-0010", "first_page": "401", "last_page": "420", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "383 Ill. App. 3d 401" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "657 N.E.2d 908", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222749 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" }, { "page": "328" }, { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463404 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 U.S. 285", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1775137 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" }, { "page": "272" }, { "page": "2395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/487/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3254843 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" }, { "page": "51" }, { "page": "54-55" }, { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 N.E.2d 958", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576240 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" }, { "page": "360" }, { "page": "368", "parenthetical": "\"[w]hether a defendant intelligently waived his right to counsel depends, in each case, on the particular facts and circumstances of that case, including the defendant's background, experiences, and conduct\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "810 N.E.2d 472", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461664 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" }, { "page": "515" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appeal, the claimed error must be raised at trial and in a written posttrial motion" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186", "parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appeal, the claimed error must be raised at trial and in a written posttrial motion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "725 N.E.2d 1258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"presence at the commission of the crime, even when joined with flight from the crime or knowledge of its commission, is not sufficient to establish accountability\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224780 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268", "parenthetical": "\"presence at the commission of the crime, even when joined with flight from the crime or knowledge of its commission, is not sufficient to establish accountability\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "736 N.E.2d 1001", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453255 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 N.E.2d 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223610 ], "weight": 14, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147-48" }, { "page": "143" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "146" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "148" }, { "page": "148" }, { "page": "148" }, { "page": "148" }, { "page": "146" }, { "page": "148" }, { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 N.E.2d 1290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5566993 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245-46" }, { "page": "239" }, { "page": "241" }, { "page": "245" }, { "page": "245-46" }, { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 1118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228419 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" }, { "page": "269" }, { "page": "270" }, { "page": "269-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3125912 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464-65" }, { "page": "458-59" }, { "page": "459" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204502 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656-57" }, { "page": "666" }, { "page": "2045-46" }, { "page": "656-57" }, { "page": "666" }, { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "841 N.E.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3875001 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 L. Ed. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 U.S. 91", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12031506 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" }, { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/350/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 18, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687-88" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "694-95" }, { "page": "2065" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" }, { "page": "692" }, { "page": "696" }, { "page": "2067" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1403, "char_count": 48432, "ocr_confidence": 0.81, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.989986461619564e-08, "percentile": 0.3130773261298246 }, "sha256": "62a827f00b5c9ca71822de19de5586b3c355c8a1c15f31ddc120f0d3b96b4388", "simhash": "1:fb70f40b7c6e0791", "word_count": 7800 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:46:05.228492+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re DANTE W., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Dante W., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARCIA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial, the respondent, Dante W., was adjudicated delinquent based on the commission of first degree murder and aggravated vehicular hijacking. The respondent now appeals alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress statements. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nOn January 11, 2003, Jimmy Patton was shot and killed in Garfield Park. His car was also stolen. After arresting Joshua Council, Chicago police detectives began looking for Robert Hughes, Antonio Woodson, and the respondent. The respondent was 15 years old when he was arrested on September 22, 2003. The State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship against the respondent for knowing and intentional murder, murder during the course of a felony, and aggravated vehicular hijacking. The trial court found extended juvenile jurisdiction warranted. The matter proceeded to trial in January 2005.\nI. Motion to Suppress Statements\nBefore trial, the respondent filed a \u201c \u2018Re-Corrected\u2019 Motion to Suppress Video Statements,\u201d alleging \u201cbecause of his mental, educational, emotional arid/or psychological capacity\u201d the respondent was unable to understand his Miranda rights. The hearing on the respondent\u2019s motion to suppress commenced on August 26, 2004, continued from date to date, and concluded on December 21, 2004.\nThe State presented testimony from Chicago police detectives Greg Swiderek and John Roberts, youth officer Ayanna Parsons, and Assistant State\u2019s Attorney (ASA) Caren Armbrust, all of whom were present with the respondent at various times at the police station. The respondent and his mother, Cherisse W, testified in the respondent\u2019s case.\nFollowing the respondent\u2019s arrest on September 22, 2003, he was transported to Area 4 and placed in an interview room.\nAt 4:30 p.m., when Detective Swiderek arrived for his shift, he was told by Officer Harry Matheos that the respondent had been arrested. Because the respondent was a minor, Detective Swiderek told Officer Matheos to notify the respondent\u2019s parents. Officer Matheos went to the respondent\u2019s address, but no one was home.\nAt 5:20 p.m., Detective Swiderek and his partner, Detective Roberts, spoke to the respondent for the first time when the respondent knocked on the door of the interview room and asked why he was there. The detectives told the respondent they were investigating the death of a man and the theft of his car on January 11, in Garfield Park. The respondent said he was there, but did not kill the man. Swiderek told the respondent they could not speak with him without a parent or guardian present. The respondent gave detectives his grandmother\u2019s phone number.\nAt 6:30 p.m., Detective Roberts spoke with the respondent\u2019s grandfather. Roberts asked him to come to Area 4, because the respondent was under arrest for murder. The respondent\u2019s grandfather agreed to come and spoke by phone with the respondent. The grandfather called back to tell Roberts he would not be coming because he was not the respondent\u2019s legal guardian. He gave Roberts the phone number of the respondent\u2019s mother.\nDetective Roberts called the respondent\u2019s mother. She told him she was not coming to Area 4 and hung up. Roberts called back and left a message. Roberts then left a message with the respondent\u2019s grandparents.\nAt 7:30 p.m., Detective Swiderek took the respondent to an interview room used to videotape statements and introduced him to youth officer Parsons. Swiderek told the respondent that Parsons was there to protect his rights and asked the respondent if he understood. The respondent said he did. Swiderek then left the room.\nWhen she was alone with the respondent, Parsons asked him about his \u201cwell-being.\u201d The respondent told her he was fine, he had been given a drink, and he did not have to go to the bathroom. After speaking with the respondent, Parsons attempted to contact his family, but was unsuccessful.\nWhen Detective Swiderek returned, he told the respondent that he was under arrest for the murder of Jimmy Patton and advised the respondent of his Miranda rights. After each right, Swiderek asked the respondent if he understood that right and the respondent answered that he did. The respondent was able to explain to Swiderek what each Miranda right meant. Swiderek also asked the respondent if he understood that he could be charged as an adult. The respondent answered that he did.\nDetective Swiderek then had a conversation with the respondent regarding the events of January 11. The respondent \u201cappeared fine\u201d during the conversation. The respondent \u201cspoke intelligently and was able to explain his actions.\u201d After speaking with the respondent, Swi-derek contacted the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office.\nWhile Detective Swiderek spoke to the respondent, Detective Roberts continued in his attempts to contact the respondent\u2019s parents or a guardian. Roberts phoned the Broadview police department and asked that a squad car be sent to the respondent\u2019s mother\u2019s house. Broadview police officers left a note with Roberts\u2019 contact information at her house. Roberts called the respondent\u2019s grandfather and left a message. Roberts also left a message on the respondent\u2019s grandmother\u2019s cell phone.\nAt 8 p.m., ASA Armbrust arrived at Area 4. Before speaking with the respondent, she met with detectives, reviewed police reports, and watched the videotaped statements of \u201cother offenders who had previously been charged.\u201d\nAt 10 p.m., Armbrust met with the respondent. Detective Swi-derek and youth officer Parsons were also present. Armbrust believed Parsons was in the room because the respondent\u2019s family \u201ceither [was] unwilling [to come to Area 4] or there was no answer at the houses.\u201d\nArmbrust introduced herself as an assistant State\u2019s Attorney. She told the respondent that she was not his attorney. Armbrust then informed the respondent of his Miranda rights. After each right she asked the respondent if he understood that right and he said he did. Armbrust then asked the respondent to explain each right to her. The respondent explained each right in his own words.\nAfter the respondent told Armbrust about the events of January 11, Armbrust presented him with choices regarding how to memorialize his statement. The respondent chose to videotape his statement. Armbrust read the \u201cConsent to Videotape Statement\u201d to the respondent and asked if he still wanted to give a statement. The respondent indicated he did and signed the consent form. Armbrust, Swiderek, and Parsons also signed the form.\nWhile Swiderek and Armbrust spoke to the respondent, Roberts continued his efforts to contact the respondent\u2019s family. He requested a squad car be sent to the respondent\u2019s grandparents\u2019 home. He also spoke to the respondent\u2019s great-grandmother, Augusta W, and grandmother, Betty Jackson.\nAt 12:20 a.m., the respondent\u2019s mother and grandmother arrived at Area 4. Swiderek, Roberts, and Parsons explained that the respondent was under arrest for murder, that he had chosen to give a videotaped statement, and that it was important a family member sit with the respondent while he made the statement. Neither woman wished to sit with the respondent.\nAfter both women had spoken to the respondent, they still declined to sit with him while he made a statement. Swiderek asked the respondent whom he wanted to sit with him. The respondent chose his grandmother. When Jackson was told the respondent wanted her to sit with him while he made his statement, she agreed and signed the \u201cConsent to Videotape Statement\u201d form.\nThe respondent\u2019s videotaped statement was taken at approximately 1:26 a.m. Armbrust, Swiderek, and the respondent\u2019s grandmother were present. Before the respondent gave his statement, he was again advised of his Miranda rights. The respondent was asked to repeat in his own words what the \u201cMiranda Warnings\u201d meant to him. Armbrust also asked the respondent if he had been threatened or promised anything in exchange for his statement. He denied he was.\nThe respondent never said he did not want to give a video statement and never asked for an attorney. His mother and grandmother never stated they did not want the respondent to give a videotaped statement and never asked for an attorney for the respondent.\nBefore resting, the State sought leave to play the videotaped statement so the court could see the respondent\u2019s \u201cdemeanor\u201d while he was making the statement. The respondent\u2019s counsel objected. The court denied the motion.\nThe State rested. The respondent moved for a \u201cdirected verdict.\u201d The trial court denied the motion.\nThe respondent testified that following his arrest, he was placed in an interview room. Two detectives entered the room, introduced themselves, and asked the respondent about January 11. The respondent told them he was at home. The detectives questioned the respondent for 30 minutes. They returned 20 minutes later and asked the same questions. The respondent again said he was at home. The second interview lasted for 10 minutes.\nThe detectives then took the respondent to another room where he watched the videotaped statement of Antonio Woodson, in which Woodson described the events of January 11. The respondent testified one of the detectives, he did not remember which one, promised him that if he \u201cwas to make [a] tape, [he] wasn\u2019t going to be charged.\u201d The respondent was told that putting his version of events on tape would be his \u201cbest bet\u201d to avoid being charged.\nBefore making his statement, the respondent was informed of his \u201crights\u201d for the first time by youth officer Parsons. The respondent also spoke to his mother and grandmother.\nDuring direct examination, the respondent testified regarding his understanding of his Miranda rights during questioning by ASA Arm-brust.\n\u201cQ. *** And when she asked you these rights, did you understand each and every right as she asked them?\nA. Some of them. Not all of them. I had \u2014 I told her to repeat them, to explain them to me.\u201d\nDuring cross-examination, the respondent testified the detectives also read him Miranda rights and he indicated that he understood each right. The respondent testified he understood the Miranda rights when Swiderek read them and when he repeated them back to ASA Armbrust. However, on redirect, the respondent testified he did not understand his Miranda rights and only said he did to end the interview and get home quicker.\nOn re-cross-examination, the respondent testified that both detectives promised he would not be charged if he made a statement, but he did not tell anyone about the promise. On re-redirect, the respondent testified that no one ever asked him about any promises being made in exchange for the statement and that he never signed anything verifying the transcription of the videotaped statement was true and accurate.\nAfter the respondent\u2019s testimony, the State renewed its \u201cMotion to Reconsider Exclusion of the Minor\u2019s Videotaped Confession.\u201d The State wished to play the portions of the statement during which ASA Armbrust told the respondent that she was a lawyer, but not his lawyer, and when she asked if he had been promised anything in exchange for his statement. The court denied the motion.\nThe State called ASA Armbrust in rebuttal. Armbrust testified she told the respondent she was an assistant State\u2019s Attorney and never told him that she was his attorney. She never told the respondent that he would not be charged if he made a statement. Armbrust asked the respondent if he had been promised anything in exchange for his statement and he said no.\nDetective Swiderek was also recalled. He denied promising not to charge the respondent if he made a statement.\nThe respondent testified in surrebuttal. The respondent testified, that Detective Roberts came into the interview room and told him that if \u201cI tell him what happened during that day, I wasn\u2019t going to be charged.\u201d The respondent described Roberts as \u201cabout six, six something, six-something feet; white, white guy; he had a suit on.\u201d The respondent did not know Roberts\u2019 age, but described him as having \u201clight gray, light brown hair.\u201d\nThe respondent\u2019s mother, Cherisse W, also testified in surrebuttal. On September 22, Detective Roberts called Cherisse W between 10:30 p.m. and 11 p.m. to tell her the respondent was in custody because of a stolen car. When she arrived at Area 4, Roberts told her the respondent was under arrest for murder. Roberts told her that \u201cif [the respondent] put his testimony on tape, it [would] be in his best interest to tell his side of the story, and nine times out of ten he would not be charged.\u201d Roberts told her the respondent would \u201cnot be charged *** because they had the shooter.\u201d\nCherisse W. told the detectives it was up to the respondent to decide whether to make a videotaped statement, but she would not have agreed to it. The respondent told her he was making a videotaped statement because Roberts said it would be in his best interest to do so.\nDetective Roberts testified that his only contact with the respondent was when the respondent knocked on the door of the interview room and asked Roberts and Swiderek why he was there. Roberts denied promising not to charge the respondent if he made a videotaped statement. He did not tell the respondent\u2019s mother that it would be in the respondent\u2019s best interest to make a videotaped statement.\nThe court denied the motion to suppress. The court found \u201cunder the totality of the circumstances,\u201d the respondent and his witness were not credible. The court found \u201cthe Miranda warnings were properly given[,] that the minor understood the warnings[,] that the minor waived the warnings[,] that the waiver was knowing[,] that the waiver was intelligent^ and] that the waiver was a voluntary waiver.\u201d\nII. Trial\nIn his opening statement before the jury, the respondent\u2019s counsel admitted the respondent went to the park \u201clooking for a car to steal.\u201d Though the respondent \u201cwas physically present when the fatal act occurred,\u201d the respondent had no idea that a gun was involved until it was \u201cwhipped\u201d out. Counsel asked the jury to find the respondent not guilty because the \u201ctrue perpetrators\u201d had already been caught and punished.\nThe State presented the testimony of Steve Banks. On January 11, Banks, the victim, and J.C. Parker were drinking in Parker\u2019s car when they were approached by three men. One man asked for a light. The victim exited Parker\u2019s car and walked to his car. As he attempted to unlock the door, two of the men grabbed the key and the third man pulled out a gun. Banks and Parker drove away to notify the police. When they returned, the victim was faceup on the sidewalk with a visible gunshot wound to the chest.\nDetective John Roberts testified that in the course of the investigation into the victim\u2019s death, a lead developed which pushed Roberts in the direction of Joshua Council.\nOn September 5, 2003, Roberts interviewed Council. After the interview, Roberts began to look for Robert Hughes, \u201cAntonio,\u201d and the respondent. Hughes was arrested a few days later. While interviewing Hughes, Roberts learned Antonio\u2019s last name was Woodson. Wood-son was arrested that day. Roberts issued an investigative alert for the respondent after he was unable to find the respondent at his home.\nRoberts testified about the arrest of the respondent and his attempts to locate the respondent\u2019s mother. His testimony was substantially similar to that given at the suppression hearing. He again denied promising not to charge the respondent if he made a videotaped statement.\nDetective Greg Swiderek testified as he did at the suppression hearing. The respondent told Swiderek that on January 11, he was at a party at Hughes\u2019 house with Council and Woodson. Council wanted to steal a car \u201cto get some rims for his brother\u2019s car.\u201d Council asked the respondent to come along and to keep an eye out for the police. As they walked to Garfield Park, Council told the respondent that Wood-son had a gun.\nWhen they arrived at the park, there was a gold car with the engine running and a red car with people sitting in it. Council walked up to the red car and told the occupants that the gold car belonged to his grandfather. He asked the occupants of the red car where his grandfather was. To clear up Council\u2019s questions about the ownership of the gold car, the victim exited the red car. While the victim walked to the gold car, Council asked him for a cigarette. Woodson then walked up to the victim and fired, but nothing happened. Woodson fired again and the victim fell to the ground. Hughes, Woodson, Council, and the respondent got into the gold car and drove away.\nSwiderek denied showing the respondent the videotaped statements of Hughes, Woodson, and Council. Swiderek also denied that Roberts promised not to charge the respondent if he made a statement.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Caren Armbrust\u2019s testimony was consistent with her testimony at the suppression hearing. During her testimony, the respondent\u2019s videotaped statement was played. At the beginning of the videotape, Armbrust read the respondent his Miranda rights and gave a \u201cshort summary\u201d of the statement. The respondent\u2019s videotaped statement was consistent with his statement to Swiderek.\nThe State rested. The respondent\u2019s counsel moved for a \u201cjudgment of acquittal.\u201d The trial court denied the motion.\nThe respondent presented the testimony of his mother. Cherisse W. testified the respondent had been diagnosed with \u201cAttention Deficit Disorder\u201d and was in special education classes at school. Cherisse W testified that when she spoke to Detective Roberts on the phone following the respondent\u2019s arrest, he told her the respondent was in custody because of a stolen car. When she arrived at Area 4, she learned the respondent was under arrest for murder. Roberts told her he had advised the respondent to \u201cput his version on the table.\u201d Roberts also \u201cstressed at that point that [the respondent] would not be charged because they had the shooter.\u201d Cherisse W. was allowed to see the respondent but was not left alone with him. She thought he looked scared. The respondent told her Roberts had promised not to charge him if he agreed to give a statement on tape. Cherisse W did not request an attorney for the respondent because he was not going to be charged.\nBetty Jackson, the respondent\u2019s grandmother, testified that her daughter called her around 11 p.m. and said the respondent was under arrest because of a car. When they arrived at Area 4, Roberts told them the respondent was under arrest for murder. Roberts also said it was in the respondent\u2019s best interest to put \u201chis version of what happened on tape\u201d because Woodson, Council, and Hughes had made videotaped statements. Roberts promised the respondent would not be charged if he made a statement.\nWhen Jackson saw the respondent, he was \u201csitting *** all crunched up, biting on his sweater,\u201d and appeared to have been crying. When Jackson asked the respondent if he was sure he wanted to make a statement, he told her he had seen the other statements and wanted to put his version on tape. She did not ask for an attorney for the respondent because he was not going to be charged.\nThe respondent rested after Jackson\u2019s testimony.\nThe State called Roberts in rebuttal. Roberts denied promising not to charge the respondent if he made a statement.\nBefore closing statements, the trial court held a jury instruction conference. The State presented instructions from the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions (IPI). The respondent\u2019s counsel presented non-IPI instructions that attempted to define what accountability was not. The State objected to several of the defense instructions. The court sustained the objections.\nIn its closing argument, the State reminded the jury that under accountability, because the respondent participated in a felony that led to a death, he was responsible for that death even if he did not fire the gun.\nIn his closing argument, the respondent\u2019s counsel admitted the respondent intended to steal a car the night of January 11, \u201cthere is no way of getting around it. *** We are not trying to suggest you overlook that, that was wrong, we offer no excuse for that. But just as that\u2019s an improper motive, it does not make [the respondent] accountable and responsible for murder.\u201d\nThe respondent\u2019s counsel admitted the respondent \u201chad knowledge of an offense. *** What he didn\u2019t have was the level of participation in that offense.\u201d Counsel conveyed to the jury that the respondent should not be held responsible for the victim\u2019s death; he should be found not guilty of first degree murder.\nDuring its deliberations, the jury sent out a note asking, \u201c[i]f we find guilty on vehicular hijacking, do we have an option to find [the respondent] not guilty on first degree murder?\u201d To answer the question, the court reread to the jury IPI Criminal 4th No. 7.02X, \u201cExplanation To Jury That It May Not Find Defendant Guilty of Felony Murder and Not Guilty of Underlying Felony.\u201d Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 7.02X (4th ed. 2000).\nThe jury found the respondent guilty of first degree murder and aggravated vehicular hijacking.\nThe respondent\u2019s counsel filed a motion for a new trial. After oral argument, the trial court denied the motion.\nThe court sentenced the respondent to the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, until his twenty-first birthday. The court also sentenced the respondent to a stayed adult sentence of 25 years. This additional 25-year sentence would be imposed if the respondent violates his juvenile sentence. This timely appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nThe respondent contends his trial counsel was ineffective because he had a \u201cfundamental misapprehension of the law, and, as a result, repeatedly conceded [the respondent\u2019s] guilt to the jury and failed to subject the State\u2019s case to meaningful adversarial testing.\u201d The respondent also contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress statements.\nI. Assistance of Counsel\nA defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must establish (1) the attorney\u2019s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526, 473 N.E.2d 1246 (1984). A defendant\u2019s failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test defeats a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.\nWhen reviewing an attorney\u2019s performance, this court \u201cmust indulge a strong presumption that counsel\u2019s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action \u2018might be considered sound trial strategy.\u2019 \u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 100 L. Ed. 83, 93, 76 S. Ct. 158, 164 (1955). \u201cGenerally, matters of trial strategy will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless counsel failed to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing.\u201d People v. Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 441, 841 N.E.2d 889 (2005).\nTo show prejudice \u201c[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. \u201cA reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome\u201d of the proceeding. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.\nThe Strickland Court also noted that there are some circumstances \u201cwhere prejudice is presumed.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 696, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 666, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2045-46 (1984), the Supreme Court explained \u201c[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the prosecution\u2019s case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. *** But if the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated.\u201d Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656-57, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 666, 104 S. Ct. at 2045-46. Our supreme court adopted this principle in People v. Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d 449, 464-65, 488 N.E.2d 513 (1985).\nIn Hattery, the defendant was charged with murder and entered a not guilty plea. At trial, the defendant\u2019s counsel admitted the defendant\u2019s guilt in his opening statement.\n\u201c \u2018We are not asking you to find Charles Hattery not guilty. At the end of your deliberations, you will find him guilty of murder. We are asking you to consider the evidence that you hear today and in the next few days to explain why he did the horrible thing that he did. Once you have found him guilty, we will proceed and you will find him eligible for the death penalty. The question, and the only question facing you, will be whether to impose the death penalty on Charles Hattery.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d at 458-59.\nDefense counsel did not present any evidence and did not make a closing statement; instead, counsel cross-examined the State\u2019s witnesses in an attempt to show the defendant was compelled to commit the crime. While compulsion is not a defense to murder, it can be \u201ca mitigating circumstance sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty.\u201d Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d at 459.\nThe court did not analyze Hattery\u2019s ineffective assistance of counsel claim pursuant to Strickland. Instead, the court relied on Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 668, 104 S. Ct. at 2047, for the proposition that when \u201ccounsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution\u2019s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversarial] process itself presumptively unreliable.\u201d\nThe court found Hattery\u2019s trial counsel did not subject the State\u2019s case to meaningful adversarial testing. \u201cThe concession of defendant\u2019s guilt by his attorneys was unequivocal.\u201d Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d at 464. Trial counsel\u2019s \u201cstrategy \u2014 which attempted to show that defendant was guilty of murder but undeserving of the death penalty \u2014 was totally at odds with defendant\u2019s earlier plea of not guilty.\u201d Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d at 464. The comments regarding the defendant\u2019s guilt \u201cimpressed upon the jury the false notion that the guilt or innocence of the defendant was not at issue, but, rather, had already been decided.\u201d Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d at 464. Thus, Hattery\u2019s counsel was ineffective because his \u201cactions deprived defendant of the right of having the issue of his guilt or innocence presented to the jury as an adversarial issue.\u201d Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d at 464.\nIn this case, the respondent advocates for the application of the Cronic presumption of prejudice because he contends his counsel conceded his guilt during opening statements.\nHowever, \u201c[t]he rule in Hattery must be narrowly construed.\u201d People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 269, 538 N.E.2d 1118 (1989). It is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel when a defendant\u2019s attorney \u201cconcedes his client\u2019s guilt to offenses in which there [was] overwhelming evidence of that guilt.\u201d Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d at 269. \u201cIn situations where there is overwhelming evidence of guilt and no defense, if counsel contests all charges he is liable to lose credibility with the trier of fact when it comes to charges where a legitimate defense exists.\u201d Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d at 270. If defense counsel concedes the defendant\u2019s guilt, \u201cineffectiveness may be established; however, the defendant faces a high burden before he can forsake the two-part Strickland test.\u201d Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d at 269-70.\nThe respondent relies on People v. Chandler, 129 Ill. 2d 233, 245-46, 543 N.E.2d 1290 (1989), to support his contention his ineffective assistance of counsel claim meets that burden.\nIn Chandler, the defendant was charged with murder, residential burglary, and arson. The defendant admitted to police he was in the victim\u2019s home, but denied killing the victim. At trial, the defense did not present any witnesses, even though defense counsel\u2019s opening statement told the jury the defendant was going to testify. In his closing argument, defense counsel admitted the defendant entered the victim\u2019s house, but he did not stab the victim. \u201cHe concluded, T don\u2019t think if you take a realistic view of this that you can find defendant guilty of murder.\u2019 \u201d Chandler, 129 Ill. 2d at 239.\nOn appeal, the defendant argued he was \u201cdenied his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney conceded defendant\u2019s guilt at trial.\u201d Chandler, 129 Ill. 2d at 241. The defendant, relying on Hattery, argued that his trial counsel\u2019s actions did not subject the State\u2019s case to meaningful adversarial testing.\nOur supreme court disagreed, finding \u201ccounsel\u2019s remarks did not completely and unequivocally concede defendant\u2019s guilt.\u201d Chandler, 129 Ill. 2d at 245. Unlike the defense counsel in Hattery, Chandler\u2019s counsel \u201cvigorously argued that the jury should believe everything [the] defendant told the police, including defendant\u2019s denial of killing the victim, and did not concede any fact to which defendant did not admit in his statements to the police.\u201d Chandler, 129 Ill. 2d at 245-46. The court \u201c[did] not believe that counsel\u2019s statements, standing alone, warrant forsaking the Strickland test under the Hattery analysis.\u201d Chandler, 129 Ill. 2d at 246.\nThough the court ultimately found Chandler\u2019s counsel was ineffective, it did so under Strickland, not Cronie. Thus, Chandler provides no direct support for the respondent\u2019s contention that Cronie should be applied here.\nOur supreme court further explained its holding in Chandler in People v. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d 133, 147-48, 673 N.E.2d 258 (1996). In Shatner, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder, armed robbery, and arson. The defendant appealed, alleging his counsel was ineffective for failing to present a defense to the charge of felony murder. Defense counsel told the jury in his closing statement \u201c \u2018if he\u2019s guilty of anything, he\u2019s guilty of robbery.\u2019 \u201d Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d at 143. Shatner contended his counsel\u2019s defense strategy was \u201canalogous\u201d to the strategy used in Hattery, because defense counsel admitted to felony murder by conceding the defendant took part in a robbery during which the victim was killed. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d at 145.\nThe court did not agree. The Shatner court examined the record and found the defendant\u2019s counsel was his advocate throughout the proceedings. Thus, the court declined the defendant\u2019s \u201cinvitation to discard the two-prong Strickland test in reviewing his ineffective assistance claim.\u201d Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d at 146. Accordingly, the court examined whether defense counsel\u2019s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness by comparing Shatner\u2019s trial counsel\u2019s performance to that of trial counsel in Chandler.\nIn Shatner, as in Chandler, \u201cdefense counsel did not vigorously challenge the prosecution\u2019s claim that defendant participated in the robbery of the victim.\u201d Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d at 147. However, the court found Chandler did \u201cnot mandate a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel\u201d because the \u201ccourt\u2019s finding of ineffective assistance did not rest exclusively on Chandler\u2019s counsel\u2019s alleged failure to develop a theory of innocence.\u201d Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d at 147. Chandler\u2019s counsel was \u201cdeficient because he failed to cross-examine several key prosecution witnesses; cross-examined others in an extremely conclusory manner; and called no witnesses to testify.\u201d Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d at 147.\nOn the other hand, Shatner\u2019s counsel cross-examined the State\u2019s witnesses, presented defense witnesses, and pursued a trial strategy that sought to \u201cminimize his client\u2019s admitted involvement in the robbery\u201d by shifting the blame to someone else. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d at 148. Shatner\u2019s \u201ccounsel sought to convince the jury that defendant\u2019s minimal involvement in the scheme warranted either a finding of innocence or a conviction for robbery only.\u201d Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d at 148. Though this strategy was \u201crisky,\u201d it was \u201cperhaps the only strategy which could have been seriously pursued given defendant\u2019s admissible incriminating statements.\u201d Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d at 148.\n\u201cUltimately, it was the defendant\u2019s own statements, *** and not the actions or strategy of his counsel, which undermined any claim of innocence that defendant may have had. If a defendant enters a not-guilty plea in the face of overwhelming evidence of his guilt, we are unwilling to find that his counsel was ineffective simply because he failed to contrive a leak-proof theory of innocence on defendant\u2019s behalf. To do so would effectively require defense attorneys to engage in fabrication or subterfuge.\u201d Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d at 148.\nHere, as in Chandler and Shatner, the respondent has not met the high burden necessary to forsake the Strickland test. Though the respondent contends the State\u2019s case was not subjected to meaningful adversarial testing because his trial counsel \u201crepeatedly conceded [his] guilt to the jury,\u201d the record does not support the assertion that the respondent\u2019s trial counsel\u2019s performance was equivalent to counsel\u2019s performance in Hattery. The respondent\u2019s counsel did not admit anything more than the facts of the respondent\u2019s statement to the police. He never told the jury the respondent was guilty of murder. In fact, he asked the jury to find the respondent not guilty because the \u201ctrue perpetrators\u201d of the murder had been arrested.\nThe respondent\u2019s counsel vigorously advocated for the respondent before, during, and after trial. Pretrial, the respondent\u2019s counsel moved to quash the respondent\u2019s arrest and to suppress the respondent\u2019s statements. At trial, counsel gave opening and closing statements, cross-examined the majority of the State\u2019s witnesses, presented defense witnesses, and objected often. Posttrial, counsel filed a motion for a new trial alleging various trial errors.\nThe respondent\u2019s trial did not approach the \u201cadversarial breakdown of the Hattery proceedings, where defense counsel acted not as an advocate for the accused, but as a proponent for the prosecution.\u201d Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d at 146. Thus, we decline to review the respondent\u2019s ineffective assistance of counsel claim pursuant to Cronic. We will review the claim pursuant to the two-prong Strickland test.\nThe respondent argues his trial counsel\u2019s performance was ineffective, because, as in Chandler, a \u201cmisapprehension\u201d of the law led the respondent\u2019s counsel to admit the respondent participated in a felony during which the victim was killed. \u201cHowever, *** the determination in Chandler that counsel was ineffective was not based simply on counsel\u2019s apparent failure to comprehend the law of accountability. [Citations.] Rather, *** counsel\u2019s misapprehension of accountability had infected the entire conduct of the trial.\u201d People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 568, 736 N.E.2d 1001 (2000).\nThis case is more analogous to Shatner than to Chandler. Here, the respondent\u2019s counsel did not dispute the respondent\u2019s participation in the plan to steal a car or that an accomplice actually killed the victim. Rather, counsel admitted to the contents of the videotaped statement and nothing more. Counsel\u2019s strategy was apparently to try to convince the jury that though the respondent went to the park to steal a car, his mere presence when the victim was shot was not enough to hold him accountable for the victim\u2019s death. See People v. Perez, 189 Ill. 2d 254, 268, 725 N.E.2d 1258 (2000) (\u201cpresence at the commission of the crime, even when joined with flight from the crime or knowledge of its commission, is not sufficient to establish accountability\u201d). In fact, counsel argued the respondent had no idea a gun was involved until it was \u201cwhipped\u201d out and submitted jury instructions attempting to define what actions do not make one accountable for the actions of another.\nHere, as in Shatner, the proceedings did not lack an adversarial character. The respondent\u2019s counsel cross-examined the State\u2019s witnesses, presented defense witnesses, moved to suppress the respondent\u2019s videotaped statement during pretrial proceedings, and objected often during trial. Though the respondent contends his trial counsel conceded the respondent\u2019s guilt \u201clong before the evidence could have seemed overwhelming,\u201d the respondent\u2019s counsel knew the respondent\u2019s videotaped statement was going to be shown to the jury. Instead of advancing a theory of complete innocence that would be rebutted by the video, counsel admitted to the respondent\u2019s knowledge of the plan to steal a car to contrast the respondent\u2019s lack of knowledge when it came to the homicide.\nRespondent\u2019s counsel also attempted to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the respondent\u2019s videotaped statement by examining the detectives and the assistant State\u2019s Attorney regarding attempts to contact the respondent\u2019s parents or guardians and an alleged promise not to charge the respondent if he made a statement.\nAs in Shatner, it was the respondent\u2019s \u201cown statements *** which undermined any claim of innocence\u201d the respondent\u2019s counsel might have advanced. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d at 148. Had the respondent\u2019s counsel argued the respondent was innocent of all charges, he would have lost credibility with the jury when the respondent\u2019s videotaped statement was played. Instead, the respondent\u2019s counsel admitted to the truth of the statement, argued the respondent should not be held accountable for a murder in which he did not participate, and repeatedly asked the jury to find the respondent not guilty.\nViewing counsel\u2019s performance under \u201cthe totality of the circumstances\u201d of this case, the respondent\u2019s counsel\u2019s strategic decision to admit to the facts of the respondent\u2019s statement and nothing more was not unreasonable. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d at 147. Thus, the respondent\u2019s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.\nII. Motion to Suppress\nThe respondent next contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress statements when \u201cthe record affirmatively shows [the respondent] did not understand his right to counsel and therefore could not validly waive it.\u201d The respondent alleges his testimony at the suppression hearing, his \u201climited mental capacity,\u201d and the lack of a concerned adult who helped him to understand his rights show that he did not understand his Miranda rights and, thus, could not have knowingly waived them.\nThe State contends the respondent waived this argument for the purpose of his appeal by failing to include it in his posttrial motion. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988) (to preserve an issue for appeal, the claimed error must be raised at trial and in a written posttrial motion).\nThe respondent responds that counsel\u2019s failure to include this claim in his posttrial motion was ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree.\nThe respondent\u2019s posttrial motion argued the trial court erred when it denied the respondent\u2019s motion to quash his arrest for lack of probable cause, that the jury \u201ccompletely disregarded\u201d the testimony of the respondent\u2019s mother and grandmother, that the State\u2019s sole eyewitness did not identify the respondent, that the police committed misconduct, and that the trial court erred when it answered the jury\u2019s note. Though the respondent\u2019s counsel did not include a claim regarding the respondent\u2019s alleged misunderstanding of his Miranda rights, it is possible that was a strategic decision.\nThe respondent\u2019s motion to suppress statements was denied after a lengthy hearing and a specific finding that the respondent was not credible. Under the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the respondent\u2019s counsel not to include the claim in his motion for a new trial.\nEven were we to relax the waiver rule, the record does not, as the respondent contends, \u201caffirmatively\u201d show the respondent did not understand his right to counsel.\nThe respondent does not deny he was given his Miranda rights several times. The respondent also does not deny he told Swiderek and Armbrust that he understood those rights. The respondent told Swiderek the right to an attorney \u201cmeans [the respondent had] the right to have an attorney\u201d when speaking to the police. When the respondent told Armbrust he did not understand the right to have an attorney during questioning, she explained that right to the respondent several times.\nHowever, to support his contention the State did not prove he made a knowing waiver, the respondent points to his explanation of the right to an attorney, \u201cI don\u2019t have to talk unless I want my lawyer here\u201d as proof he did not understand the right to an attorney.\nWhen reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, this court \u201cwill accord great deference to the trial court\u2019s factual findings, and will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence; however, the court will review de novo the ultimate question posed by the legal challenge to a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress.\u201d People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 505, 810 N.E.2d 472 (2003). Factual findings receive this deference because the trial court \u201cassessed credibility [and] demeanor.\u201d People v. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 364, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990).\n\u201cThe State has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his or her rights.\u201d People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 51, 554 N.E.2d 174 (1990). \u201cOnce the State has established its prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that his waiver was not knowing, intelligent or voluntary.\u201d Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 51. \u201c[I]n order to effect an intelligent and knowing wavier of Miranda rights, a defendant must have \u2018 \u201c \u2018a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.\u2019 \u201d \u2019 \u201d Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 515, quoting Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d at 360, quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 272, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 2395 (1988).\n\u201cIn determining whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the characteristics of the defendant and the details of the interrogation, without any one circumstance or factor controlling.\u201d Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 54-55; see also Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d at 368 (\u201c[w]hether a defendant intelligently waived his right to counsel depends, in each case, on the particular facts and circumstances of that case, including the defendant\u2019s background, experiences, and conduct\u201d).\n\u201c[T]he receiving of an incriminating statement by a juvenile is a sensitive concern.\u201d People v. Prude, 66 Ill. 2d 470, 476, 363 N.E.2d 371 (1977). \u201c[C]are must be taken to assure that a juvenile\u2019s incriminating statement was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright, or despair.\u201d In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 328, 657 N.E.2d 908 (1995). A juvenile\u2019s \u201cmental capacity *** must be taken into consideration in determining whether a waiver was valid.\u201d W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 328. The existence of a \u201cmental deficiency *** is a factor which must be considered in the totality of the circumstances under which the right to counsel was waived or a statement or confession was given.\u201d W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 328.\nThough the respondent told Armbrust he understood the right to an attorney after she explained it to him, the respondent later said that he did not understand any of his rights. The respondent claimed he only said that he understood his rights because he was promised he was not going to be charged.\nAt the completion of the suppression hearing, the trial court found the respondent was not credible. The respondent testified he understood his Miranda rights, he understood some of his Miranda rights and he understood the remaining rights after they were explained to him, and that he never understood his rights, but he said he did because he had been promised that he was not going to be charged if he made a statement. Swiderek and Armbrust testified the respondent told them he understood his rights, could explain his rights, and asked for an explanation of the rights he did not understand.\nIt is the trial court\u2019s \u201cresponsibility to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and to consider and weigh each of the factors.\u201d Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 59. Here, after hearing the respondent\u2019s testimony and observing his demeanor, the trial court did not find the respondent credible, and instead found a knowing and intelligent waiver. Considering the totality of the circumstances, that finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe respondent next argues he did not understand his Miranda rights because of his \u201climited mental capacity.\u201d\nThe respondent relies on the \u201cAmended Social Investigation Report\u201d as \u201cscientific support\u201d for the respondent\u2019s alleged inability to understand his rights. According to this report, the respondent was diagnosed with a \u201clevel three learning disability\u201d and read at a third-grade level.\nHowever, nothing in the record suggests the respondent\u2019s third-grade reading level prevented him from understanding Swiderek\u2019s and Armbrust\u2019s oral explanations of his rights. Additionally, the fact the respondent was in special education classes does not lead directly to the conclusion that at age 15 and after at least four other arrests, the respondent did not understand his rights. The report which analyzed the respondent\u2019s reading level also stated that the respondent\u2019s academic difficulties were because of his truancy and that his current teacher thought the respondent was a \u201cbright kid\u201d who understood \u201cabstract things.\u201d\nThe respondent next contends his statements should be suppressed because no \u201cconcerned adult\u201d helped him to understand his rights.\nHowever, the record indicates the respondent spoke to several concerned adults. The respondent spoke to his grandfather and youth officer Parsons before making any statements. After the respondent made his initial statements, but before the videotaped statement, he spoke to both his mother and grandmother. The record indicates the respondent\u2019s grandmother was in the room when the respondent was given his Miranda rights before making the videotaped statement. The respondent\u2019s grandmother heard the respondent state he understood each right and the respondent\u2019s explanation of each right in his own words.\nThe trial court\u2019s determination that the respondent knowingly and intelligently waived his rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We therefore conclude the respondent\u2019s suppression motion was properly denied.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated above, the decision of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCAHILL, EJ., and R. GORDON, J., concur.\nJoshua Council\u2019s surname is given various spellings in the record.\nThe respondent\u2019s mother\u2019s first name is given various spellings in the record.\nThe actual videotape is not in the record; only a transcript of the videotaped statement has been provided.\nWe question how the instruction gave any guidance to the jury in light of the question asked. The jury\u2019s question concerned the inverse situation to that of the jury instruction: whether it could find the respondent guilty of the underlying felony and not guilty of felony murder. However, no issue is raised regarding the propriety of the instruction.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARCIA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Debra Loevy-Reyes, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Peter Fischer, and Clare Wesolik Connolly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re DANTE W., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Dante W., Respondent-Appellant).\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201406\u20140010\nOpinion filed June 16, 2008.\nRehearing denied June 27, 2008.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Debra Loevy-Reyes, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Peter Fischer, and Clare Wesolik Connolly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0401-01", "first_page_order": 417, "last_page_order": 436 }