{ "id": 4278133, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO SALINAS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Salinas", "decision_date": "2008-06-18", "docket_number": "No. 1-05-2791", "first_page": "481", "last_page": "505", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "383 Ill. App. 3d 481" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "125 S. Ct. 1292", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 L. Ed. 2d 94", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "543 U.S. 1135", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5928962, 5929252, 3437957, 5889897, 5948596, 5944959 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/543/1135-04", "/us/543/1135-05", "/us/543/1135-06", "/us/543/1135-01", "/us/543/1135-03", "/us/543/1135-02" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 975003 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 569957 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 U.S. 573", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1777746 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587", "parenthetical": "during a traffic stop, police may seize an object that is in plain view \" ' \"assuming there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity\" ' \" (emphasis omitted)" }, { "page": "651", "parenthetical": "during a traffic stop, police may seize an object that is in plain view \" ' \"assuming there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity\" ' \" (emphasis omitted)" }, { "page": "1380", "parenthetical": "during a traffic stop, police may seize an object that is in plain view \" ' \"assuming there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity\" ' \" (emphasis omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/445/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060013 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 1065", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3650531 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1070" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/1065-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5111095 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" }, { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/243/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 Ill. App. 3d 963", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265837 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "976" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/368/0963-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 836", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4258973 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847" }, { "page": "848" }, { "page": "849", "parenthetical": "\"In a bench trial, a judge's determination based on his own private knowledge, that is untested by cross-examination or the rules of evidence, amounts to a denial of due process\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/361/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4263027 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" }, { "page": "483" }, { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351274 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5456423 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589", "parenthetical": "explaining that \"[b]ecause [the officer's] questions occurred after the purpose of the stop was completed, the questions impermissibly prolonged defendant's detention\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 109", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6194938 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" }, { "page": "100" }, { "page": "1661" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a71983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "544 U.S. 93", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5902037 ], "weight": 11, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" }, { "page": "306" }, { "page": "101" }, { "page": "308" }, { "page": "101" }, { "page": "309" }, { "page": "102" }, { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/544/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 U.S. 405", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5902584 ], "weight": 22, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" }, { "page": "846" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "406-07" }, { "page": "845-46" }, { "page": "836-37" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "846" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "407-08" }, { "page": "846" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "408" }, { "page": "847" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "410" }, { "page": "848" }, { "page": "838" }, { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/543/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 975007 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" }, { "page": "19", "parenthetical": "finding that the defendant's fourth amendment rights were violated when \"the purpose of the traffic stop concluded\" but \"[t]he officer's directions to defendant *** continued\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187389 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" }, { "page": "667" }, { "page": "1396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/440/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11338811 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436-37", "parenthetical": "\" 'stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a \"seizure\" ' \" under the fourth amendment" }, { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "\" 'stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a \"seizure\" ' \" under the fourth amendment" }, { "page": "3148", "parenthetical": "\" 'stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a \"seizure\" ' \" under the fourth amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706523 ], "weight": 11, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" }, { "page": "235" }, { "page": "224-27" }, { "page": "232" }, { "page": "242" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "249" }, { "page": "242-43", "parenthetical": "\"During a lawful seizure, *** police may ask questions unrelated to the original detention and are not required to form an independent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before doing so\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609689 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" }, { "page": "228" }, { "page": "235" }, { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5573473 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4023602 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" }, { "page": "732" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/348/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12122945 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" }, { "page": "310" }, { "page": "2417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79338 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" }, { "page": "23-24" }, { "page": "32" }, { "page": "32" }, { "page": "32, 36" }, { "page": "32" }, { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599175 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "776" }, { "page": "776-77", "parenthetical": "finding that an informant's tip did not provide police with reasonable suspicion because the tip did not contain sufficient details that police were able to corroborate prior to seizing the defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 Ill. App. 3d 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4267898 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752", "parenthetical": "recognizing that \"[cjourts no longer employ rigid presumptions based on the distinction between citizen informants and paid informants\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/371/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578251 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 898", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599157 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901" }, { "page": "901" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0898-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5456 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "286" }, { "page": "1098" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974984 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" }, { "page": "257" }, { "page": "257-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 Ill. App. 3d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4268505 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" }, { "page": "413", "parenthetical": "finding that an informant's tip, alone, did not provide police with reasonable suspicion because it lacked specificity" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/371/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451345 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" }, { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4272783 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/376/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19-20" }, { "page": "905" }, { "page": "1879" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 945", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5730684 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "949" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/0945-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 730", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6199658 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" }, { "page": "512" }, { "page": "1542" }, { "page": "741-42" }, { "page": "513" }, { "page": "1543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 326", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9505639 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" }, { "page": "847" }, { "page": "949" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477765 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4272768 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" }, { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/376/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351271 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431" }, { "page": "431" }, { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3602037 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 690", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11746351 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" }, { "page": "920" }, { "page": "1663" }, { "page": "810" }, { "page": "1772" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 Ill. App. 3d 998", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 7328958 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1007-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/374/0998-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3164374 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 Ill. App. 3d 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3628026 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/381/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411706 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2", "parenthetical": "declining to view the defendant's argument as waived when the State made no objection to defense counsel's oral motion to preserve the defendant's appellate rights" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 740", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4263436 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0740-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" }, { "page": "188", "parenthetical": "recognizing that the State can waive its right to assert forfeiture based on the defendant's failure to raise a trial objection and file a written posttrial motion if the State fails to object to the defendant's oral motion for a new trial" }, { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 N.E.2d 966", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "978" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 1027", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3530104 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1039-40" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/1027-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 N.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2829084 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 1063", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1066" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5455316 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206-07" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "708 N.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" }, { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121990 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" }, { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 1261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1271" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3604084 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0302-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1818, "char_count": 66044, "ocr_confidence": 0.813, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.252253796664034e-08, "percentile": 0.38610803178100345 }, "sha256": "95e93f9df631b065fc492eff0de3aafe8691ae96b75d47a8bab4e46951ec8fa2", "simhash": "1:3b7e346817c8d1f5", "word_count": 10545 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:46:05.228492+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO SALINAS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant Pedro Salinas was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/ 402(a)(2)(D) (West 2004)) and sentenced to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, defendant seeks reversal of his conviction, asserting that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence because: (1) the traffic stop that resulted in the seizure of the controlled substance violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; and (2) the trial court improperly relied on evidence outside the record in delivering its ruling. We affirm.\nFollowing a narcotics surveillance operation, defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(D) (West 2004)) when police officers recovered 5,118 grams of cocaine from defendant\u2019s vehicle on April 1, 2004. The surveillance operation also resulted in the arrests of codefendants Carlos Ayala and Tomas Cantuo, who were also charged with narcotics offenses.\nPrior to trial, defendant, through counsel, filed a motion to suppress, seeking to suppress the cocaine the police recovered from his vehicle, contending that the search and seizure violated his fourth and fourteenth amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. In his motion, defendant argued that at the time police stopped his car for an improper lane change, \u201cthe police did not possess probable cause to arrest, or a reasonable suspicion to support a \u2018Terry\u2019 stop.\u201d Nonetheless, defendant contended that police ordered him out of the vehicle, handcuffed him, and \u201cperformed a full search of the vehicle,\u201d during which they recovered a box containing cocaine. Defendants argued that the search and seizure was illegal and, accordingly, sought suppression of \u201call fruits derived illegally from the search and seizure.\u201d Codefendants Ayala and Cantuo also filed motions to suppress, and the trial court conducted a hearing on all three motions.\nAt the hearing, Officer Andrew Carvajal testified that on April 1, 2004, he was a member of the Chicago police department\u2019s long-term narcotics investigation team when he met with, and received information from, a paid confidential informant. Officer Carvajal classified the informant as \u201creliable\u201d and indicated that he had received information from this informant on approximately 30 to 40 occasions over the past two years, and that the informant\u2019s information had led to a number of arrests as well as the seizure of narcotics. He could only recall three occasions where the informant\u2019s tip did not prove to be accurate. On this occasion, the informant told Officer Carvajal that \u201che had information that a shipment of cocaine had arrived\u201d at a residence located at 4405 South Trumbull \u201ceither the night before or *** two nights before.\u201d The informant further informed Carvajal that a man named \u201cCarlos\u201d resided at that address and described him as a short Hispanic male with a slim build who was in his late thirties. The informant did not identify defendant or provide any specific information pertaining to him. Moreover, the informant did not provide any information as to how the narcotics were packaged. At the conclusion of the conversation with his confidential informant, Officer Carvajal conducted a meeting and relayed the information provided by the informant to the other members of his team. After hearing the substance of the informant\u2019s tip, the team decided to conduct a surveillance operation at 4405 South Trumbull. Accordingly, Officer Carvajal and approximately 10 other officers commenced surveillance at the South Trumbull address at approximately 3:30 p.m.\nIn explaining his role in the surveillance operation, Officer Carva-jal testified that he wore plain clothes and sat alone in an unmarked car parked in an alley near the residence. He had radio contact with the other members of his team. At some point, Officer Robert Berter-mann, who was engaged in surveillance in the front of the residence, informed the other officers over the radio that defendant was in the area. Specifically, Officer Bertermann relayed over the radio that defendant and a female approached 4405 South Trumbull in a vehicle, that defendant conversed with a man later identified as codefendant Carlos Ayala, that Ayala then entered the house, retrieved a bag, which he handed to defendant, and that defendant and the woman accompanying him returned to their vehicle and drove away. Officer Car-vajal never saw defendant from his surveillance position in the rear of the South Trumbull residence. He explained that defendant was not arrested after receiving the bag because no one had seen defendant commit a crime. Instead, mobile surveillance commenced on defendant\u2019s vehicle.\nOfficer Bertermann confirmed that he assumed a surveillance position at the front of the South Trumbull residence on April 1, 2004, at approximately 3:30 p.m. He further confirmed that at approximately 5:30 p.m, he saw defendant arrive at 4405 South Trumbull in a Jeep vehicle that contained a female occupant, who was later identified as Candelaria Vargas, and converse with Carlos Ayala on the front steps of the residence. From his surveillance position, he was unable to hear the contents of the five-minute conversation. At the conclusion of the conversation, Officer Bertermann observed Ayala enter the residence and emerge shortly thereafter with a large plastic bag containing a square-shaped box that was approximately 15 inches high and 6 inches wide. Although he was unable to see the contents of the box, Officer Betermann saw Ayala hand the box to defendant, who then placed it in the Jeep and proceeded to drive northbound on Trumbull Avenue. Several members of the surveillance team then commenced mobile surveillance on defendant\u2019s vehicle.\nOfficer Fernando Velez was part of the four-person team that engaged in mobile surveillance on defendant\u2019s car. Mobile surveillance commenced on South Trumbull Avenue and concluded approximately one hour later at 4000 North on the Kennedy Expressway. Officer Velez explained he witnessed defendant make two lane violations near Diversey Avenue. Specifically, he observed defendant change lanes without using his turn indicator. However, because Officer Velez was driving an unmarked police vehicle that was not equipped with flashing lights or emergency equipment, he was unable to pull over defendant\u2019s vehicle. Accordingly, he obtained the assistance of several officers from the 17th District, who curbed defendant\u2019s vehicle.\nAt the time of the traffic stop, Officer Velez conceded that he possessed neither a search warrant nor an arrest warrant. Nevertheless, after defendant\u2019s vehicle was stopped, Officer Velez walked to defendant\u2019s car, identified himself as a police officer, revealed that he was part of a narcotics investigation, and that defendant had been seen accepting a box from the South Trumbull residence that was under surveillance. Defendant immediately acknowledged that he had received a box containing narcotics at the residence. Defendant further stated that Candelaria Vargas, his passenger, was not involved in the transaction. Following defendant\u2019s confession, Officer Velez recovered a Mr. Coffee box containing 5,118 grams of shrink-wrapped cocaine, which was sitting in plain view in the backseat of the vehicle. After he recovered the narcotics, Officer Velez placed defendant in custody and used his radio to inform the remaining members of the surveillance team that narcotics had been recovered from defendant\u2019s car. Officer Velez acknowledged that defendant did not receive a ticket for the traffic violations and that he did not mention the lane violations in the report that he prepared of defendant\u2019s arrest.\nCandelaria Vargas confirmed that she was a passenger in defendant\u2019s car on April 1, 2004, when police stopped the vehicle at approximately 6:30 p.m. She testified that defendant was a friend of her father\u2019s and denied that he was her boyfriend. Vargas acknowledged that she and defendant had visited 4405 South Trumbull earlier in the day and that defendant conversed with Carlos Ayala; however, she did not see Ayala hand defendant a package. After leaving the South Trumbull residence, Vargas explained that defendant \u201cwas driving fine.\u201d She did not observe defendant make any lane changes without using his turn indicator; rather, \u201c[i]f he did move, he did put the signal on.\u201d After police stopped defendant\u2019s vehicle, two officers approached the car, and one of the officers immediately removed defendant from the car and \u201cquickly\u201d placed him in handcuffs without engaging in any prior conversation. Vargas then exited the car herself and was also handcuffed and led away from the vehicle. She then saw an officer remove a bag from the rear of the car. Vargas denied that any conversation had taken place prior to the removal of the bag because \u201c[t]here wasn\u2019t any time.\u201d\nWhile Officer Velez commenced mobile surveillance on defendant\u2019s car, Officers Carvajal and Bertermann remained in their surveillance positions near the South Trumbull residence. At approximately the same time that Officer Velez stopped defendant\u2019s vehicle after defendant had made two illegal lane changes, Officer Bertermann observed codefendant Cantuo arrive at the South Trumbull residence. Officer Bertermann saw Ayala hand Cantuo a box that was approximately 10 inches long and 8 inches wide. After observing the second transaction, Officer Bertermann believed he had witnessed narcotics transactions and commenced mobile surveillance on Can-tuo\u2019s vehicle. He then heard Officer Velez\u2019s radio transmission that narcotics had been recovered from defendant\u2019s vehicle. Thereafter, Officer Bertermann confronted Cantuo, who consented to a search of his vehicle. During the search, Officer Bertermann recovered a box containing cocaine from the backseat of Cantuo\u2019s vehicle. Defendant and Cantuo were then both transported back to 4405 South Trumbull. Thereafter, police entered the South Trumbull residence, arrested codefendant Carlos Ayala, and recovered a suitcase containing cocaine from the trunk of a vehicle parked in Ayala\u2019s garage.\nUpon the conclusion of the live testimony, the parties delivered closing arguments. Defense counsel initially emphasized that the informant\u2019s tip did not mention defendant and did not contain sufficient detail; rather, the informant simply provided an address and the name \u201cCarlos.\u201d Accordingly, counsel argued that at the time of the stop, the police did not have reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in a narcotics transaction based on the informant\u2019s tip. Thereafter, counsel conceded that the issue of whether defendant actually committed the alleged traffic violations was essentially a credibility determination based on the conflicting testimony of Officer Velez and Candelaria Vargas. However, counsel argued that even if the police were initially justified in curbing defendant\u2019s vehicle after witnessing two lane violations and conducting an investigatory Terry stop, their subsequent actions were not reasonably related to the scope of the stop. Counsel noted that instead of inquiring about the lane violations, Officer Velez immediately began discussing the narcotics investigation with defendant. Counsel emphasized that the police never ticketed defendant for the purported traffic violations and that the violations were not mentioned in the police report. Accordingly, counsel argued that \u201cthis was not a Terry type stop. They were not investigating a lane change. They were making a lack of probable cause type of stop in this case,\u201d and, accordingly, suppression was warranted.\nAfter reviewing the evidence, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. In delivering its ruling, the trial court found no credibility in Vargas\u2019s testimony, noting that she was unable to provide details as to any social itinerary that took place on April 1, 2004, and further found that Vargas\u2019s testimony was tainted by bias, which was \u201cpredicated on her relationship, whatever that might be, with defendant.\u201d In contrast, the trial court found that \u201cthe officers\u2019 testimony was succinct and accurate and credible.\u201d Based on their testimony, the trial court found that the police were justified in stopping defendant\u2019s vehicle after witnessing defendant execute illegal lane changes. The court further found it of \u201cno concern\u201d that the officers\u2019 \u201cinitial interaction did not relate to the [traffic violation] that could be observed,\u201d stating:\n\u201cI don\u2019t believe the Constitution would constrain that officer to address that item first. I have no problem with the officers initially making these inquiries relative to this narcotics investigation, letting [defendant] know he has been watched for a period of time. I consider that good police work. It is likely in my view that we never reached the traffic stop when a Defendant \u2014 -certainly consistent with what I believe to be common sense \u2014 immediately puts himself in a situation where he is admitting then, not now, that the narcotics are his and not Ms. Vargas\u2019 out of some sense of nobility ***. The Defendant at that juncture makes the admission, and the traffic stop, the citations, the presence or absence of a Driver\u2019s License or insurance, falls a completely distant second in the investigation.\u201d\nThereafter, the court classified defendant\u2019s admission as \u201cspontaneous\u201d and found that \u201che made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver when he agreed to the search of the vehicle sui [sic] sponte after being confronted with the investigation alone.\u201d\nAfter the trial court denied his motion to suppress, defendant retained new counsel, and with the assistance of his newly retained counsel, filed a motion seeking to suppress the incriminating statement that he made to police following the traffic stop. He argued suppression was warranted because he was never informed of his Miranda rights and because the statement was made after he was subjected to \u201cpsychological and mental coercion.\u201d\nThereafter, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant\u2019s newly filed motion to suppress his statement. Before evidence was presented, however, defense counsel informed the court that defendant withdrew his contention that suppression of his statement was warranted due to purported police coercion and specified that the sole issue before the court was whether suppression was warranted because his Miranda rights were violated.\nOfficer Velez was the first witness called upon to testify and his testimony was consistent with that offered at the prior hearing. Specifically, Officer Velez testified that after commencing mobile surveillance on defendant\u2019s car, he witnessed defendant make two improper lane changes. Once defendant was pulled over, he approached defendant, and upon learning that defendant did not speak English, conversed with defendant in Spanish and informed defendant that he was a police officer engaged in a narcotics surveillance operation and that defendant had been seen removing a box from the South Trumbull location. Defendant immediately acknowledged that he had picked up a box and that there were narcotics in the box, but denied that his passenger was involved in the narcotics transaction. Officer Velez testified that at the time defendant \u201cvolunteered [the] statement,\u201d defendant had not been placed under arrest and he had not informed defendant of his Miranda rights. Moreover, defendant was not handcuffed prior to giving his statement. Officer Velez acknowledged that there were eight other police officers nearby, but denied that defendant was surrounded at the time he provided his statement. Following defendant\u2019s confession, Officer Velez recovered the box from the backseat of the vehicle.\nDefendant testified on his own behalf. He explained that after he was pulled over by police, the officers \u201ccame close to the car and they surrounded us. They opened the doors. They pulled us out of the car. And they put the handcuffs on us.\u201d Thereafter, he and Vargas were placed in separate police cars and he was driven to a parking lot, where the police commenced a search of his vehicle. Defendant confirmed that he had not been informed of his Miranda rights, but indicated that he never conversed with the police. Specifically, he denied that he informed the officers that he was in possession of narcotics or gave them permission to search his vehicle.\nAfter hearing the aforementioned testimony, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his statement. The court initially noted that defendant acknowledged in his written motion that he had made a statement to police and, accordingly, the allegations in the motion were inconsistent with defendant\u2019s live testimony. The court indicated that it would accept the allegations in the written motion that a statement had, in fact, been made, and held that suppression was not warranted because the statement \u201cwas voluntary to the extent the Defendant was not under arrest at the point it was made and there was no obligation under Miranda to give him any rights at that time.\u201d\nFollowing the denial of defendant\u2019s pretrial motions, the parties proceeded to trial. At the start of defendant\u2019s bench trial, the parties stipulated to the testimony provided at the two prior suppression hearings. Officer Velez was the sole witness to provide live testimony. At trial, he explained that on April 1, 2004, he recovered a cardboard Mr. Coffee box encased in a plastic bag that contained \u201cten and half kilograms of cocaine, heat sealed.\u201d The parties then stipulated that the chain of custody was properly maintained and that 5,118 grams of cocaine were recovered from the box. After reviewing the prior hearing transcripts, the trial court declined to convict defendant of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and, instead, found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled substance. The trial court then presided over defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing, and after considering the arguments advanced in aggravation and mitigation, sentenced defendant to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment, \u201cthe minimum [sentence] allowable under the law\u201d based on the amount of cocaine recovered from defendant\u2019s vehicle.\nDefendant filed a posttrial motion, seeking a reduction of his sentence, which the trial court denied. Thereafter, he filed a timely notice of appeal.\nOn appeal, defendant solely contests the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress the cocaine seized from his car. He advances no argument contesting the trial court\u2019s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress his statement based on purported Miranda violations.\nInitially, we must address the State\u2019s argument that defendant has forfeited appellate review of this issue because he failed to properly preserve this claim. Specifically, defendant failed to challenge the trial court\u2019s ruling on his motion to suppress in a posttrial motion.\nAs a rule, to properly preserve an issue for appellate review, the defendant must make a timely objection at trial and include the error in a written posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988); People v. Jones, 364 Ill. App. 3d 740, 748 (2006). However, in this case, we note that defense counsel orally informed the court that he wished to preserve all of defendant\u2019s \u201cappellate rights with regard to legal motion that [was] previously filed,\u201d and the State made no objection to defense counsel\u2019s statement. Moreover, following the trial, defense counsel made an oral motion for a new trial, and again, the State made no objection. See People v. Ramirez, 312 Ill. App. 3d 1, 2 (2000) (declining to view the defendant\u2019s argument as waived when the State made no objection to defense counsel\u2019s oral motion to preserve the defendant\u2019s appellate rights); see also Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 188 (recognizing that the State can waive its right to assert forfeiture based on the defendant\u2019s failure to raise a trial objection and file a written posttrial motion if the State fails to object to the defendant\u2019s oral motion for a new trial). Furthermore, because defendant\u2019s claim implicates fundamental constitutional concerns it is subject to plain error review. People v. Bui, 381 Ill. App. 3d 397 (2008); 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). For these reasons, we will address the merit of his appeal.\nAs another preliminary matter, we note that defendant acknowledges in his opening brief that he has failed to provide transcripts of the portion of the joint hearing conducted on December 14, 2004. As a general rule, it is the appellant\u2019s burden to provide a sufficiently complete record to allow for meaningful appellate review and all doubts arising from the incompleteness in the record will be resolved against the appellant. Foutch v. O\u2019Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984); Koppel v. Michael, 374 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1007-08 (2007). In this case, the joint hearing commenced on October 6, 2004, and was conducted over a period of several days. On October 26, 2004, the hearing was continued until December 14, 2004, to allow codefendants\u2019 counsel to call one additional witness. Defendant, however, has been unable to procure the transcript from the December 14, 2004, continuance date. At oral argument, defense counsel informed this court that when he contacted the court reporter\u2019s office he was told that the case was not on call for that date; however, he has been unable to obtain an affidavit from the court reporter because she has been on medical leave. Counsel further informed this court that he believes the December 14, 2004, hearing date is not relevant to resolve defendant\u2019s appeal. We now turn to the merit of defendant\u2019s appeal.\nIn reviewing an appeal from a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply the two-part standard of review adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 920, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996). People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 542 (2006). Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s factual findings are reviewed for clear error and will only be reversed if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431 (2001); In re Mario T., 376 Ill. App. 3d 468, 472 (2007). However, the trial court\u2019s ultimate decision as to whether suppression is warranted is reviewed de novo. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 431; Mario T., 376 Ill. App. 3d at 472. In this case, defendant does not challenge any of the trial court\u2019s factual determinations. Accordingly, the sole issue before this court is his legal challenge to the trial court\u2019s ultimate disposition, which we review de novo.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because police violated his fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when they stopped defendant\u2019s car after he committed several traffic violations and immediately engaged in conversation about their narcotics investigation instead of inquiring into the traffic offenses. Defendant maintains that at the time of the stop, police lacked reasonable suspicion to believe he had committed a narcotics offense, and, accordingly, the police unjustifiably prolonged the traffic stop when they commenced discussion of their narcotics investigation. The State responds that the officers who stopped defendant\u2019s car had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant had committed a narcotics offense based on the tip provided by Officer Carvajal\u2019s confidential informant. Accordingly, the police were justified in engaging defendant in a discussion about their narcotics surveillance operation immediately after they curbed his vehicle.\nThe fourth amendment of the United States Constitution recognizes the \u201cright of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d U.S. Const., amend. IV* The guarantees of the fourth amendment apply to states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. People v. James, 163 Ill. 2d 302, 311 (1994). Reasonableness is the \u201c \u2018central requirement\u2019 \u201d of the fourth amendment. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838, 847, 121 S. Ct. 946, 949 (2001), quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502, 512, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1542 (1983); see also People v. Conner, 358 Ill. App. 3d 945, 949 (2005).\nPursuant to the United States Supreme Court\u2019s ruling in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), \u201can officer may \u2018briefly stop a person for temporary questioning if the officer has knowledge of sufficient articulable facts at the time of the encounter to create a reasonable suspicion that the person in question has committed or is about to commit a crime.\u2019 \u201d People v. Richardson, 376 Ill. App. 3d 612, 617 (2007), quoting People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476, 487 (2005). Reasonable suspicion \u201cis a less exacting standard than probable cause\u201d (People v. Ward, 371 Ill. App. 3d 382, 412 (2007)) and \u201cexists when \u2018articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, *** warrant a reasonably prudent officer\u2019 to investigate\u201d (People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d 231, 255 (2003), quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276, 286, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1098 (1990)).\nUnder some circumstances, an informant\u2019s tip may provide police officers with the reasonable suspicion necessary to effectuate a proper Terry stop. People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476, 487 (2005); People v. Miller, 355 Ill. App. 3d 898, 901 (2005). The informant\u2019s classification as a citizen informant or a paid informant is \u201cunimportant.\u201d People v. Munson, 206 Ill. 2d 104, 123 (2002); see also People v. Nitz, 371 Ill. App. 3d 747, 752 (2007) (recognizing that \u201c[cjourts no longer employ rigid presumptions based on the distinction between citizen informants and paid informants\u201d). Rather, to determine whether an informant\u2019s tip provides reasonable suspicion, it is important to consider the informant\u2019s reliability as well as the quality and content of the information that he or she provided. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d at 257; Miller, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 901. Specifically, courts should consider \u201cthe detail of the tip, whether the tip established the informant\u2019s basis of knowledge, whether the informant indicated he or she witnessed any criminal activity, and whether the tip accurately predicts future activity of the suspect.\u201d People v. Kline, 355 Ill. App. 3d 770, 776 (2005); see also Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d at 257-58. Indeed, \u201c[a]n informant\u2019s ability to predict a person\u2019s future behavior is an important indicator of reliability because \u2018[w]hen significant aspects of the [informant\u2019s] predictions [are] verified, there [is] reason to believe not only that the [informant] was honest but also that he was well informed, at least well enough to justify the stop.\u2019 \u201d People v. Chavez, 327 Ill. App. 3d 18, 32 (2001), quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 310, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2417 (1990). Generally, \u201cwhere the information lacks sufficient detail and the informant does not claim to have witnessed any criminal activity, the information is not reliable without corroboration and a stop may not be warranted.\u201d People v. Jackson, 348 Ill. App. 3d 719, 731 (2004).\nBoth parties rely on Chavez to support their respective arguments as to the existence, or lack thereof, of reasonable suspicion in this case based on the informant\u2019s tip. In Chavez, police commenced a surveillance operation upon the receipt of information from a known confidential informant who had provided police with information on nine prior occasions, eight of which resulted in the seizure of contraband. On this occasion, the informant revealed that \u201cVictor,\u201d a 5-foot-10-inch tall \u201c \u2018Latino male\u2019 \u201d weighing 180 pounds, would drive a Ford automobile to a specific tavern to pick up two kilograms of cocaine. From their surveillance position near the tavern, police observed the defendant arrive at the tavern at approximately 7:50 p.m. driving a Ford Taurus. The defendant entered the tavern and exited five minutes later carrying a brick-shaped object, which he placed in the backseat of his car. Police stopped the defendant\u2019s car one block from the tavern, and after learning that the defendant\u2019s name was Victor Chavez, seized the brick-shaped object, which consisted of wrapped cocaine, from the vehicle. Chavez, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 23-24.\nThe trial court denied the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, and thereafter, he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. On appeal, the defendant sought reversal of his conviction, asserting, in pertinent part, that the informant\u2019s tip did not provide police with reasonable suspicion to effectuate a Terry stop. We disagreed. Initially, we noted that the informant had a \u201cformidable track record of rehable information\u201d based on the fact that eight out of his nine prior tips resulted in the seizure of contraband. Chavez, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 32. Thereafter, we noted:\n\u201cImportantly, the officers were also able to confirm the informant\u2019s prediction of defendant\u2019s future behavior as they were able to observe defendant carry what looked like two kilogram bricks of cocaine out of the tavern. It is critical that the cocaine bricks were visible as defendant crossed the street and were also visible from the outside of defendant\u2019s vehicle. Had the bricks been obscured from view, the police would not have had sufficient confirmation of specific and articulable facts that the defendant had committed, or was about to commit, a crime.\u201d Chavez, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 32.\nBecause the informant\u2019s tip provided police with the reasonable suspicion necessary to effectuate a Terry stop, we upheld the defendant\u2019s conviction. Chavez, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 32, 36.\nIn this case, Officer Carvajal\u2019s informant, like the informant in Chavez, had a \u201cformidable track record of reliable information.\u201d Chavez, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 32. Officer Carvajal testified that his informant had provided him with tips on 30 to 40 occasions and that the tips had resulted in the seizure of contraband on all but three occasions. Despite the informant\u2019s impressive track record, however, we do not find his tip provided officers with reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a narcotics offense. Unlike the tip in Chavez, the informant\u2019s tip in this case was devoid of any prediction of future behavior. The informant simply revealed to Officer Carvajal that \u201che had information that a shipment of cocaine had arrived\u201d at a residence located at 4405 South Trumbull \u201ceither the night before or *** two nights before\u201d and that a man named \u201cCarlos,\u201d who was a slim Hispanic male in his late thirties, resided at that address. In addition to the lack of prediction of future behavior, the tip also failed to establish the informant\u2019s basis of knowledge. See In re D.W., 341 Ill. App. 3d 517, 523 (2003). Indeed, the informant did not reveal that he had witnessed any criminal act or explain how he garnered his information. Jackson, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 732. We also find that the informant\u2019s tip in this case lacks specificity. Ward, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 413 (finding that an informant\u2019s tip, alone, did not provide police with reasonable suspicion because it lacked specificity). Notably, the informant did not provide any details of the cocaine shipment, including the amount of cocaine that was shipped, the method of shipment, or the manner in which the cocaine was packaged.\nFinally, there is nothing to suggest that police were able to cor-rob\u00f3rate any of the details that were provided by the confidential informant at the time of the stop. See Kline, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 776-77 (finding that an informant\u2019s tip did not provide police with reasonable suspicion because the tip did not contain sufficient details that police were able to corroborate prior to seizing the defendant). Indeed, while the cocaine bricks in Chavez were visible to the officers engaged in surveillance in that case, Officer Bertermann testified that he was unable to see the contents of the bag that defendant had received from Ayala. Chavez, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 32. Moreover, Officer Carvajal testified that the first time that police learned that the man who resided at the South Trumbull residence was named Carlos was at the time of Ayala\u2019s arrest. Although the State emphasizes that defendant was stopped after police observed two suspicious transactions, the record actually reveals that defendant\u2019s car was seized at approximately the same time that codefendant Cantuo arrived at the South Trumbull residence. While Officer Bertermann testified that he heard Officer Velez\u2019s radio transmission that narcotics had been recovered from defendant\u2019s car within seconds after he commenced mobile surveillance on codefendant Cantuo\u2019s vehicle, the record is devoid of evidence that Officer Velez was aware of the second transaction at the time he stopped defendant\u2019s vehicle. Indeed, Officer Velez testified that at the time he made his radio transmission informing other members of his team that he had recovered narcotics from defendant\u2019s vehicle, he did not know what his other team members were doing.\nAccordingly, we disagree with the State that the informant\u2019s tip in this case provided police with reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant had engaged in a narcotics transaction at the time they stopped his vehicle. We must now determine whether the police, absent reasonable suspicion to believe defendant had committed a narcotics offense, violated defendant\u2019s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when they stopped defendant\u2019s car for a traffic violation and immediately initiated conversation regarding the narcotics surveillance operation.\nDefendant, relying on People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220 (2003), contends that although Officer Velez was justified in stopping defendant\u2019s vehicle after defendant had changed lanes without signaling, his subsequent conduct in confronting defendant with evidence of the narcotics surveillance operation was impermissible because it \u201cwas in no way reasonably related to the lane change violations\u201d and necessarily prolonged the duration of the stop. The State, however, citing our supreme court\u2019s recent decision in People v. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d 222 (2008), responds that it is immaterial that Officer Velez\u2019s questioning was not reasonably related to the lane change violation and that there is no evidence his questioning unreasonably increased the duration of the stop.\nInitially, we note that the parties agree that defendant was seized when police stopped his vehicle. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436-37, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 332, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3148 (1984) (\u201c \u2018stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a \u201cseizure\u201d \u2019 \u201d under the fourth amendment), quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 667, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979); see also People v. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d 7, 13 (2003). The parties also agree that Officer Velez\u2019s decision to stop defendant\u2019s vehicle was reasonable and, accordingly, the initial seizure lawful, because he had probable cause to believe that defendant had committed a traffic violation. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 95, 116 S. Ct. at 1772; Harris, 228 Ill. 2d at 232; Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 433. Indeed, Officer Velez testified that he witnessed defendant change lanes without signaling on two occasions, a clear violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code. See 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 804(d) (West 2004). However, because \u201c \u2018a seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution\u2019 \u201d (Harris, 228 Ill. 2d at 235, quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 846, 125 S. Ct. 834, 837 (2005)), we must evaluate the reasonableness of Officer Velez\u2019s conduct following the initial stop.\nPrior to Harris, Illinois courts analyzed the propriety of police conduct during a traffic stop in accordance with the framework set forth in People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220 (2003). In Gonzalez, the court analogized a typical traffic stop to a Terry investigative stop and held that Terry\u2019s \u201cdual inquiry\u201d should be applied to determine the reasonableness of police conduct during the course of the stop. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228. Specifically, reviewing courts were directed to consider: (1) whether the stop was \u201c \u2018justified at its inception\u2019 \u201d (i.e. whether the officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a traffic violation); and (2) whether the officer\u2019s conduct during the course of the stop \u201c \u2018was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the [stop] in the first place.\u2019 \u201d Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct. at 1879. With respect to the second prong, the court explained that for an officer\u2019s conduct to be considered lawful, the officer could neither \u201cimpermissibly prolongt ] the detention\u201d nor \u201cchange[ ] the fundamental nature of the stop.\u201d Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235. Applying these principles to the case at hand, the court held that the defendant\u2019s fourth amendment rights were not violated when an officer requested the defendant, a passenger in a vehicle subject to a lawful traffic stop, to provide identification because the officer\u2019s request did not prolong the defendant\u2019s detention or change the nature of the traffic stop. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 236.\nThereafter, two subsequent United States Supreme Court cases cast doubt on the viability of the \u201calteration of the fundamental nature of the stop\u201d portion of the scope prong established in Gonzalez. In Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005), the court addressed the question of \u201c[w]hether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop.\u201d The defendant in Caballes was lawfully stopped after he was observed exceeding the speed limit. While one state trooper wrote up a speeding ticket, another officer walked around the defendant\u2019s car with a trained narcotics-detection dog. The dog alerted at the trunk, and based on the dog\u2019s alert, the officers searched the defendant\u2019s trunk, found marijuana, and arrested the defendant. After the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress was denied, he was convicted of a narcotics offense. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406-07, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 845-46, 125 S. Ct. at 836-37. In rejecting the argument that the officer\u2019s use of a narcotics-detection dog infringed on the defendant\u2019s constitutional rights, the Court explained that the initial stop was lawful because it was based on probable cause that the defendant had committed a traffic violation. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 846, 125 S. Ct. at 837. The Court then recognized that a lawful seizure may become unlawful if police conduct following the initial seizure unreasonably prolonged the stop, but accepted the state court\u2019s conclusion that the dog sniff did not impermissibly extend the duration of the stop because it was conducted while the officer wrote up the traffic warning. Ca-balles, 543 U.S. at 407-08, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 846, 125 S. Ct. at 837. Thereafter, the Court rejected the argument that the dog sniff fundamentally changed the character of the traffic stop, explaining that \u201c[ojfficial conduct that does not \u2018compromise any legitimate interest in privacy\u2019 is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. [Citation.] We have held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed \u2018legitimate,\u2019 and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband \u2018comprises no legitimate privacy interest.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 847, 125 S. Ct. at 837. Accordingly, because the use of the narcotics dog did not prolong the stop and did not infringe on the defendant\u2019s legitimate interest in privacy, the Court concluded that the defendant\u2019s rights under the fourth amendment were not violated. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 848, 125 S. Ct. at 838.\nApproximately two months later, the Supreme Court again addressed the propriety of police conduct during a lawful seizure in Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005). In Muehler, Iris Mena was detained in handcuffs by police who were executing a search warrant of the premises in which she and several others resided to search for a suspect in a recent gang-related shooting. While she was detained during the search of the residence, an officer asked Mena to provide her name, date and place of birth, as well as her immigration status. Following her detention, Mena filed a section 1983 (42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 (2000)) lawsuit against the officers, claiming the officers detained her \u201c \u2018for an unreasonable time and in an unreasonable manner,\u2019 \u201d thus violating her rights under the fourth amendment. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 96, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 306, 125 S. Ct. at 1469. The Supreme Court rejected the contention that the officers\u2019 questioning of Mena about her immigration status constituted a fourth amendment violation. Finding that Mena was lawfully seized during the officers\u2019 execution of the search warrant, the Court concluded that the officers\u2019 questioning of Mena did not constitute an additional fourth amendment violation, explaining, \u201c[w]e have \u2018held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.\u2019 [Citations.] \u2018[E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine the individual\u2019s identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Muehler, 544 U.S. at 101, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 308, 125 S. Ct. at 1471. Accordingly, like the dog sniff in Ca-balles, because there was no evidence the questioning prolonged Me-na\u2019s detention, \u201cno additional Fourth Amendment justification [z.e., reasonable suspicion] for inquiring about Mena\u2019s immigration status was required.\u201d Muehler, 544 U.S. at 101, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 309, 125 S. Ct. at 1472. Thus, no fourth amendment violation occurred. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 102, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 309, 125 S. Ct. at 1472.\nOur supreme court was called upon to interpret and apply the Caballes and Muehler holdings in People v. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d 222 (2008). The defendant in Harris was a passenger in a car that was stopped by police after the driver had made an illegal left turn. After the vehicle was stopped, the officer requested the defendant and the driver of the vehicle to provide identification. The officer returned to his squad car, searched the information provided by the defendant and the driver and discovered that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for the defendant. The officer conceded that he had not had reasonable suspicion to believe that there was a warrant for the defendant\u2019s arrest at the time of the search. However, based on the results of the search, the officer arrested the defendant and discovered cocaine in the defendant\u2019s jacket pocket during the search incident to the arrest. Thereafter, the defendant was charged and convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d at 224-27.\nIn determining whether the defendant\u2019s fourth amendment rights were violated, our supreme court initially concluded that the defendant was lawfully seized because the arresting officer had probable cause to stop the vehicle after observing the driver make an illegal left turn. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d at 232. Thereafter, the court reasoned that based on the decisions in Caballes and Muehler, the United States Supreme Court had\n\u201crejected [the] reasoning that led to this court\u2019s adoption of the \u2018fundamental alteration of the nature of the stop\u2019 portion of the \u2018scope\u2019 prong of Gonzalez. All that remains is the duration prong. During a lawful seizure, as occurred in both Muehler and Caballes, the police may ask questions unrelated to the original detention and are not required to form an independent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before doing so.\u201d Harris, 228 Ill. 2d at 242.\nUltimately, the court concluded that the warrant search, like the dog sniff in Caballes, did not unnecessarily prolong the stop and did not implicate any constitutionally protected privacy interests because \u201ca warrant is a matter of public record.\u201d Harris, 228 Ill. 2d at 233. Thereafter, the court, relying on Muehler, further found that the officer\u2019s initial request for identification was permissible, concluding: \u201cThe same principles that permit the questioning of Mena regarding her immigration status without the requirement of individualized reasonable suspicion permit an officer to request the passenger in a stopped vehicle to provide identification.\u201d Harris, 228 Ill. 2d at 244. Accordingly, the court concluded that neither the officer\u2019s request for identification nor the warrant search violated the defendant\u2019s rights under the fourth amendment and affirmed his conviction. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d at 249.\nApplying the reasoning of Caballes, Muehler, and Harris to the facts at hand, we conclude that no fourth amendment violation occurred. Because defendant was lawfully seized, Officer Velez was not required to have reasonable suspicion to commence a conversation with defendant about the narcotics surveillance operation. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d at 242-43 (\u201cDuring a lawful seizure, *** police may ask questions unrelated to the original detention and are not required to form an independent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before doing so\u201d). Moreover, because \u201cthe possession of contraband \u2018compromises no legitimate privacy interest\u2019 \u201d (Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 160 L. Ed. at 847, 125 S. Ct. at 837, quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 100, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1661 (1984)), the conversation did not infringe on defendant\u2019s constitutionally protected interest in privacy. Accordingly, as long as Officer Velez\u2019s actions did not unreasonably prolong the duration of the stop, no fourth amendment violation occurred. Although defendant adamantly contends that the conversation necessarily prolonged the duration of the stop, he cites to no evidence to substantiate his claim. The record reveals once defendant was stopped, Officer Velez immediately informed defendant of the surveillance operation and revealed that defendant had been seen accepting a box from the South Trumbull residence. Defendant, in turn, immediately acknowledged that he had received a box from the residence, admitted the box contained narcotics, and informed Officer Velez that his passenger was unaware of the narcotics transaction. Indeed, at oral argument, defense counsel conceded that the conversation was \u201cbrief.\u201d\nAccordingly, the facts in this case are readily distinguishable from those present in People v. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d 7 (2003), and People v. Parra, 352 Ill. App. 3d 584 (2004), the primary cases defendant relies upon to support his contention that the police in this case prolonged the stop, because the records in Bunch and Parra revealed that the officers engaged in conversations unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stops with the defendants after they had concluded their investigations of the traffic stops. See Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d at 19 (finding that the defendant\u2019s fourth amendment rights were violated when \u201cthe purpose of the traffic stop concluded\u201d but \u201c[t]he officer\u2019s directions to defendant *** continued\u201d); Parra, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 589 (explaining that \u201c[b]ecause [the officer\u2019s] questions occurred after the purpose of the stop was completed, the questions impermissibly prolonged defendant\u2019s detention\u201d). Here, in contrast, the purpose of the stop had not concluded when Officer Velez commenced his conversation with defendant about the narcotics surveillance operation. Based on the facts in this case, we find the conversation initiated by Officer Velez, although unrelated to the traffic stop, did not infringe on defendant\u2019s fourth amendment rights. Accordingly, we find that the trial court correctly found that defendant\u2019s motion to suppress lacked merit.\nNotwithstanding the lack of merit of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, defendant contends that he is entitled to a new suppression hearing because the trial court improperly relied upon evidence outside of the record in denying his motion, thus violating his constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial. Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court relied on facts outside the record when finding that the testimony offered by Candaleria Vargas at the suppression hearing was not credible.\nThe State again contends that defendant failed to properly preserve this argument, asserting that defendant\u2019s failure to object to the trial judge\u2019s statements at trial and in a posttrial motion resulted in forfeiture of this argument. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186. Defendant acknowledges that he failed to properly preserve this claim but correctly notes that claims of error involving judicial misconduct are not generally subject to the same rules of waiver. See People v. Dameron, 196 Ill. 2d 156, 171 (2001); People v. Jennings, 364 Ill. App. 3d 473, 483 (2005). Accordingly, defendant\u2019s argument concerning the trial court\u2019s conduct is subject to plain error review. People v. Hamilton, 361 Ill. App. 3d 836, 847 (2005); Jennings, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 483. However, even if we determine an error occurred, the error will be deemed harmless \u201cwhere we can safely conclude that the proceedings below would have produced the same result had the error not occurred.\u201d Hamilton, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 848; Jennings, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 483. We now address the merit of defendant\u2019s argument.\nThe federal and Illinois state constitutions afford criminal defendants due process of law, and, accordingly, every defendant is guaranteed the right to a fair and impartial trial. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a78. In a bench trial, the trial judge is presumed to know and properly apply the law (People v. Robinson, 368 Ill. App. 3d 963, 976 (2006)) and it is permissible for the trial judge to comment on the credibility of witnesses (People v. Hawkins, 243 Ill. App. 3d 210, 220 (1993)). However, a defendant\u2019s due process rights are violated when the trial judge\u2019s findings are based on evidence outside the record. See People v. Hamilton, 361 Ill. App. 3d 836, 849 (2005) (\u201cIn a bench trial, a judge\u2019s determination based on his own private knowledge, that is untested by cross-examination or the rules of evidence, amounts to a denial of due process\u201d).\nDefendant initially contends that the trial court relied on facts not in evidence when it deemed Candelaria Vargas\u2019s testimony incredible due to her romantic relationship with defendant. Defendant bases his contention on the remarks made by the trial court in delivering its ruling. Specifically, defendant points to the following statement:\n\u201c[Tjhis is a woman 20 years junior to the Defendant. She accompanies him, according to her, didn\u2019t really know where they were going, didn\u2019t have any social itinerary other than to the Tram-bull Street address and then to the Milwaukee Street address. I don\u2019t find any credibility in her testimony. That belief and my view of her credibility is based upon circumstances in which she was, on the facts introduced by the Police Department, and in the manner in which and what I would view as bias predicated on her relationship, whatever that may be, with [defendant].\u201d\nDefendant asserts that \u201c[t]he implication of the court\u2019s statement\u2014 that [defendant] and Vargas were in a romantic relationship \u2014 is rebutted by the record,\u201d because Vargas denied that defendant was her boyfriend. Accordingly, defendant contends that the trial court impermissibly relied on facts not in evidence when it found Vargas\u2019s testimony to be incredible due to her romantic relationship with defendant.\nWe disagree that the trial court improperly characterized the relationship between Vargas and defendant as a romantic one. Rather, the court found that Vargas\u2019s bias was \u201cpredicated on her relationship, whatever that may be, with [defendant].\u201d (Emphasis added.) Contrary to defendant\u2019s argument, the trial court did not characterize the relationship; it merely acknowledged the existence of their relationship and indicated some uncertainty as to the precise nature of that relationship. Because \u201cfeelings of bias and the relationship of [a] witness to a defendant are of material relevance\u201d (People v. Gvojic, 160 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1070 (1987)), and the trial court may comment on witness credibility (Hawkins, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 220), we do not find that the trial court erred in finding Vargas\u2019s testimony less credible than that offered by the police officers due to her relationship with defendant.\nDefendant also notes that the court found that Vargas\u2019s testimony lacked credibility based on the fact that she \u201cdidn\u2019t have any social itinerary other than to the Trumbull Street address and then to the Milwaukee Street address\u201d even though there was no testimony offered by any party regarding a Milwaukee Street address.\nDefendant is correct that the record is devoid of any reference to a Milwaukee Street address. At the suppression hearing, Vargas testified that on April 1, 2004, she resided in Rockford, Illinois, and she accompanied defendant to the South Trumbull address. Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court mentioned a Milwaukee Street destination, this was an error. However, we deem this error harmless. The court correctly noted that Vargas failed to provide details concerning her travel plans with defendant other than acknowledging a brief visit to the South Trumbull address. Moreover, the court\u2019s finding that Vargas\u2019s testimony was less credible than that offered by the police officers was not based solely on the details or lack thereof provided by Vargas; rather, the court\u2019s decision was based in large part on her relationship with defendant.\nFinally, defendant contends that the court relied on facts outside the record in denying his motion to suppress when it found that defendant orally consented to a search of his vehicle. Defendant is again correct that there is no evidence in the record that defendant consented to a search of his vehicle. Accordingly, the court\u2019s reliance on defendant\u2019s consent to uphold the search was error. However, we find that this error, too, was harmless, because we conclude the result would have remained the same absent this error. Notably, while defendant challenged the constitutionality of the stop itself, he never challenged Officer Velez\u2019s recovery of the cocaine following his confession. Indeed, notwithstanding defendant\u2019s lack of consent to search the vehicle, Officer Velez\u2019s recovery of the box was lawful. After defendant confessed to receiving a box containing cocaine from the South Trumbull residence, Officer Velez had probable cause to arrest defendant and was justified in seizing the box, which was sitting in plain view, in the backseat of defendant\u2019s vehicle. See generally People v. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d 261, 272 (2005), quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502, 513, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1983), quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 651, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380 (1980) (during a traffic stop, police may seize an object that is in plain view \u201c \u2018 \u201cassuming there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity\u201d \u2019 \u201d (emphasis omitted)).\nAccordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nTHEIS, J., concurs.\nWe note that a similar constitutional guarantee is also reflected in article I, section 6, of the Illinois State Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a76 (\u201cpeople shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, [and] seizures\u201d). On appeal, however, defendant solely challenges the legality of the search and seizure under federal grounds.\nThis is the second time our supreme court has filed an opinion in this case. The court initially considered this case in 2003, when it filed an opinion affirming the judgment of the appellate court (People v. Harris, 325 Ill. App. 3d 262 (2001)) reversing the defendant\u2019s conviction. People v. Harris, 207 Ill. 2d 515 (2003). However, the United States Supreme Court vacated the court\u2019s judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Caballes decision. Illinois v. Harris, 543 U.S. 1135, 161 L. Ed. 2d 94, 125 S. Ct. 1292 (2005).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREIMAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent and would reverse the defendant\u2019s convictions.\nWe are presented with prosecution testimony which \u201ctaxes the gullibility of the credulous\u201d and therefore cannot support a criminal conviction. People v. Wright, 147 Ill. App. 3d 302, 318, 497 N.E.2d 1261, 1271 (1986). The trial court should have granted the defendant\u2019s motions to quash his arrest, excluded the evidence seized, and suppressed the defendant\u2019s alleged statements. It is axiomatic that upon review of a criminal conviction, great deference is afforded to the credibility findings of the trier of fact. We must affirm a conviction challenged as based on insufficient evidence or incredible testimony if any rational trier of fact, looking at that testimony and evidence, could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541, 708 N.E.2d 365, 369 (1999). However, a reviewing court also has the solemn duty to reverse a conviction where the evidence is insufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d at 541, 708 N.E.2d at 369. Where, as in this case, the State\u2019s main witness has been impeached as to a critical element of his testimony, coupled with his incredible testimony regarding how the drugs came to be discovered in the defendant\u2019s car, the issue of reasonable doubt is raised. \u201cWhile due weight must be given to the trier of fact as to the credibility of *** witnesses, \u2018it is our duty to reverse the judgment if the evidence is not sufficient to remove all reasonable doubt ***.\u2019 \u201d People v. Morgan, 69 Ill. 2d 200, 206-07, 370 N.E.2d 1063, 1066 (1977), quoting People v. Nunes, 30 Ill. 2d 143, 146, 195 N.E.2d 706, 707 (1964).\nIn the case at hand, unlike the majority, I do not believe that we can or should say that the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to remove all reasonable doubt as to the propriety of the police conduct and therefore the defendant\u2019s guilt. People v. Mathis, 133 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1039-40, 479 N.E.2d 966, 978 (1985). The police officer who stopped the defendant\u2019s car claimed that he did so for lane change violations. But by his own admission he never mentioned these violations to the defendant. Instead, he told the defendant he was the subject of a drug investigation. The police officer claimed that immediately upon hearing this statement, the defendant abandoned all caution and common sense and admitted that he had just received a box of drugs and pointed to a box on his backseat. Because I find the testimony of the arresting police officer in this case to be fantastic and incredible, I would find no basis for the stop of the defendant. This in turn would require suppression of his statement to the police and the evidence recovered from his vehicle, necessitating reversal of his conviction. I therefore would not reach the issue of whether the police stop was unlawfully extended.\nThe State asserts that the police officers who stopped the defendant\u2019s car had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was transporting illegal drugs which he had just obtained from a home where according to a reliable informant, a shipment of cocaine had been received one or two days earlier. I concur with the majority\u2019s determination that the police had insufficient cause for a stop on this basis. The arresting police officer knew that another police officer had seen the defendant stop at the home on South Trumbull Avenue and receive from an occupant of the home, a plastic bag which appeared to contain a square box. The defendant then drove away in his car. The arresting police officer acknowledged that his police report erroneously stated that the defendant was seen carrying a Mr. Coffee box from the house on South Trumbull. Despite what the State asserts was ample cause to stop the defendant\u2019s car, the police officers, who were several blocks away from the residence when they saw the defendant\u2019s car, chose to follow him rather than immediately stop him. They followed him for one hour, in rush hour traffic, ultimately using seven police vehicles.\nWhen they did stop the defendant one hour later, on the Kennedy Expressway, it was allegedly because 12 blocks earlier a police officer had observed the defendant making two lane changes without using his turn indicator. If true, this would have supported a stop of the vehicle for a traffic violation. But the arresting police officer\u2019s report of the incident did not mention any lane change violations. The arresting police officer admitted that when he walked up to the defendant\u2019s car after it was stopped, he made no mention to the defendant of any traffic violation whatsoever, nor did he ask the defendant for his driver\u2019s license, insurance card, vehicle registration, or any other identification customarily requested during a traffic stop. Instead, he immediately told the defendant that, as part of a narcotics investigation, the defendant had been seen accepting a \u201cbox\u201d from a residence. The police officer asserted this even though he had previously admitted that he was told only that the defendant had received a \u201cbag\u201d which appeared to contain a box. The defendant then allegedly spontaneously volunteered that he was transporting drugs which he had received from a man named Carlos at the house on South Trumbull. He also allegedly told the arresting police officer that his passenger was not involved in that drug transaction. Based upon this stunning, spontaneous admission, the police seized a Mr. Coffee box from the backseat of the defendant\u2019s car, found it to contain 5,118 grams of apparent cocaine in 10 bags, and arrested the defendant and also took his companion into custody. No citation was ever issued to the defendant for the two traffic violations for which the police officers testified they had stopped him in the first place. In fact the only mention of any traffic violation came much later, first appearing at the hearing on the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nThe testimony of the defendant and his companion at the hearing on the motion to suppress the defendant\u2019s statements differed significantly from that of the police. The defendant and his companion testified that he was stopped by the police without having committed any traffic violations. The companion testified that she did not observe the defendant changing lanes without using his signal. When the police stopped the defendant, two police officers immediately approached the car and one of them took the defendant out of his car and handcuffed him without saying a word to him. The defendant had not spoken to them at that point. The defendant\u2019s companion also got out of the car and was handcuffed. Without any conversation with the defendant, the police searched the car and removed a bag from it. If true, this version of the events would necessitate suppression.\nThe majority defers entirely to the trial court\u2019s credibility determinations. As I have noted, although great deference is to be afforded to such findings, we as a reviewing court are not to act as a rubber stamp, agreeing in all instances with the findings of the trial court no matter how patently improbable the testimony. The facts presented by this case give new meaning to testimony that \u201ctaxes the gullibility of the credulous\u201d as described in Wright. It is significant that the trial judge could have convicted the defendant of the charged offense of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. He was found to be in possession of 5,118 grams of a substance of which 995.3 grams were tested and found to be cocaine. But the trial judge convicted him only of the lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced him to the minimum prison term permitted by law. Even considering that the defendant had no prior convictions, these are not indications of a strong belief in the State\u2019s case. Again, we as a reviewing court have a duty to examine the totality of the facts and circumstances presented as evidence and to reverse a conviction if the evidence is insufficient to remove all reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt.\nI find that the testimony of the arresting police officer was grossly improbable and incredible as to the basis for the stop, the subsequent events, and the defendant\u2019s spontaneous confession immediately upon being stopped. Because the entirety of the State\u2019s case was based upon that evidence, the defendant\u2019s conviction should be reversed.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM," } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia Unsinn and Jonathan Krieger, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Michelle Katz, and Kingsley S. Sawyers, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO SALINAS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201405\u20142791\nOpinion filed June 18, 2008.\nCUNNINGHAM, J., dissenting.\nPatricia Unsinn and Jonathan Krieger, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Michelle Katz, and Kingsley S. Sawyers, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0481-01", "first_page_order": 497, "last_page_order": 521 }