{ "id": 4279620, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ISAAC CURRY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Curry", "decision_date": "2008-07-28", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201406\u20140355", "first_page": "315", "last_page": "326", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "384 Ill. App. 3d 315" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "63 F.3d 332", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7414529 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/63/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 F.3d 278", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 8929206 ], "weight": 11, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" }, { "page": "280" }, { "page": "280" }, { "page": "280-81" }, { "page": "282" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/421/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 F.3d 839", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1095737 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "840" }, { "page": "841" }, { "page": "841" }, { "page": "841" }, { "page": "841" }, { "page": "842" }, { "page": "842" }, { "page": "843" }, { "page": "844" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/406/0839-01" ] }, { "cite": "858 N.E.2d 454", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 Ill. App. 3d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4267190 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/368/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "867 N.E.2d 49", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56", "parenthetical": "recidivism exception articulated in Apprendi remains viable after Shepard" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "372 Ill. App. 3d 772", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4268677 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781", "parenthetical": "recidivism exception articulated in Apprendi remains viable after Shepard" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/372/0772-01" ] }, { "cite": "764 N.E.2d 1232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1239-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183355 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "780 N.E.2d 1133", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1143" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 773", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637141 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0773-01" ] }, { "cite": "847 N.E.2d 763", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "769" }, { "page": "780" }, { "page": "780", "parenthetical": "section 33B - 1 is constitutional \"because the timing and sequence of a defendant's prior convictions are inherent in the convictions themselves and need not be submitted to a jury\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 Ill. App. 3d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4263480 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" }, { "page": "127" }, { "page": "127-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/365/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7924", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(e)" }, { "page": "(e)" }, { "page": "(e)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "526 U.S. 227", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11133049 ], "weight": 24, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" }, { "page": "318" }, { "page": "1218" }, { "page": "230-31" }, { "page": "318" }, { "page": "1218" }, { "page": "231" }, { "page": "318" }, { "page": "1218" }, { "page": "239" }, { "page": "324" }, { "page": "1222" }, { "page": "248" }, { "page": "329" }, { "page": "1226-27" }, { "page": "249" }, { "page": "329-30" }, { "page": "1227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/526/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 U.S. 616", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3668643 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" }, { "page": "923" }, { "page": "587-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/224/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 U.S. 224", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11503479 ], "weight": 21, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" }, { "page": "357" }, { "page": "1222" }, { "page": "227" }, { "page": "357" }, { "page": "1222-23" }, { "page": "227" }, { "page": "357" }, { "page": "1222-23" }, { "page": "227" }, { "page": "357" }, { "page": "1223" }, { "page": "243" }, { "page": "368" }, { "page": "1230" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "368-69" }, { "page": "1231" }, { "page": "226-27" }, { "page": "357" }, { "page": "1222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/523/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 U.S. 13", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5879404 ], "weight": 30, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" }, { "page": "211" }, { "page": "1257" }, { "page": "16" }, { "page": "211-12" }, { "page": "1257" }, { "page": "15-16" }, { "page": "211" }, { "page": "1257" }, { "page": "17" }, { "page": "212" }, { "page": "1258" }, { "page": "16" }, { "page": "211" }, { "page": "1257" }, { "page": "25" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "1262" }, { "page": "25" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "1262" }, { "page": "26" }, { "page": "218" }, { "page": "1263" }, { "page": "25" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "1262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/544/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 24, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "2351" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "2351" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "2352" }, { "page": "469-70" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "2352" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "443" }, { "page": "2352" }, { "page": "497" }, { "page": "459" }, { "page": "2366" }, { "page": "490" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "2362-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "656 N.E.2d 1090", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1099" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222795 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "686 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 677", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725072 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 N.E.2d 59", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 Ill. App. 3d 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5139217 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/240/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "843 N.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5735959 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154-55" }, { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0148-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1126, "char_count": 28526, "ocr_confidence": 0.831, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14364756400855802 }, "sha256": "334ef9ffe69b80469c88893eb70fa2a93052bede11779926b8a47843317f0263", "simhash": "1:f84c1e0ecb36b4b9", "word_count": 4773 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:18:27.294728+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ISAAC CURRY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE TURNER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn March 2006, a jury found defendant, Isaac Curry, guilty of armed robbery. In April 2006, the trial court adjudged defendant an habitual criminal and sentenced him to life in prison under the Habitual Criminal Act (Act) (720 ILCS 5/33B \u2014 1 through 33B \u2014 3 (West 2006)).\nOn appeal, defendant argues his natural-life sentence under the Act violates his rights to due process and to a jury trial. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn June 2005, the State charged defendant by amended information with the offense of armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 2(a) (West 2004)), alleging that defendant, while armed with a dangerous weapon, a butcher knife, knowingly took United States currency from the presence of Cynthia Summers and Diana Huddlestun by threatening the imminent use of force. The State provided notice of its intention to seek a sentence of natural life in prison under the Act based on defendant\u2019s two prior Class X felony convictions. See 720 ILCS 5/33B \u2014 1 (West 2004). Defendant pleaded not guilty.\nIn March 2006, defendant\u2019s jury trial commenced. Cindi Summers testified she was working as an assistant manager at Walgreens in Decatur on May 29, 2005. Diana Huddlestun was operating the cash register. At approximately 9 p.m., Summers stated five or six customers were inside the store. An announcement was made for the customers to bring their purchases to the register as the store was about to close. Summers then locked the entrance door while the exit door remained open.\nThereafter, an African-American male appeared at the exit door and asked if he could buy a pack of cigarettes \u201creal quick.\u201d The male walked to the coolers to get something to drink and then headed to the front register. At the checkout counter, the man presented a bottle of orange juice and two cigarette lighters. Summers stated the man \u201cgrabbed [her] arm and forced [her] to the ground.\u201d The man also pulled out a butcher knife and told her to get down on the ground or he would cut her. While kneeling on the floor, Summers heard the cash register open. The man told Huddlestun to get facedown on the floor. When she did, the male told them to count to 100. Once they believed the man had left, Summers got up and locked the doors. Huddlestun called 9-1-1. After the police arrived, Summers determined $120 had been taken from the register. Summers was unable to identify the individual because all she could remember was the knife.\nDiana Huddlestun testified she worked as a cashier at the Walgreens on May 29, 2005. When the male who asked to enter the store walked inside, Huddlestun kept glancing at him because it was \u201cunusual\u201d for someone to come in and ask to buy a pack of cigarettes and then walk away since the cigarettes are behind the register. Huddlestun testified she scanned the individual\u2019s orange juice and two lighters. The male then grabbed Summers and told her to get facedown on the floor or he would cut her. He then demanded Huddlestun open the register. She stated she was looking at his face because she \u201cwanted to remember exactly what he looked like in case he hurt\u201d them. After Summers went to the floor, the man pointed the knife at Huddlestun and told her to open the register or he would cut her. Huddlestun opened the register and stepped back. The man then grabbed the money and told Huddlestun to get on the floor. Huddles-tun identified defendant as the man with the knife.\nHuddlestun testified Decatur police detective Patrick Campbell came to her house on June 1, 2005, to show her a photo array. She identified a photo of defendant as the person who robbed the Walgreens. At a photo lineup, Huddlestun again identified defendant as the one who robbed her at knifepoint.\nAfter the conclusion of the State\u2019s evidence, defendant exercised his constitutional right not to testify. See U.S. Const., amend. V Following closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty. In April 2006, defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial, which the trial court denied.\nDefendant also filed a motion to bar application of section 33B \u2014 1 of the Act (720 ILCS 5/33B \u2014 1 (West 2006)), arguing sentencing him to life in prison as an habitual criminal would violate the United States and Illinois Constitutions. The State filed a notice upon conviction of its intention to pursue natural-life sentencing based on defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions, those being the Class X felonies of armed robbery in Macon County case No. 95\u2014CF\u20141025 and armed robbery in Macon County case No. 90\u2014CF\u201468. The State attached certified copies of those convictions to the notice. In case No. 95\u2014CF\u20141025, the State indicated defendant was sentenced to 20 years on the offense of armed robbery alleged to have been committed on October 14, 1995. In case No. 90\u2014CF\u201468, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of armed robbery that allegedly occurred on January 27, 1990, and was sentenced to nine years in prison.\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to bar the application of section 33B \u2014 1. The court then adjudged defendant an habitual criminal and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole or mandatory supervised release. Defendant filed a postsentencing motion, which the court denied. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nDefendant argues his natural-life sentence violates his constitutional rights to due process and to a jury trial because he was sentenced under section 33B \u2014 1 of the Act without a finding by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that his two prior armed-robbery convictions did not result from, and were not connected with, the same transaction. We disagree.\n\u201cIn general, the Habitual Criminal Act mandates the imposition of a natural-life sentence on a defendant convicted of three temporally separate Class X offenses, or other eligible serious felonies, within a 20-year period.\u201d People v. Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d 148, 154-55, 843 N.E.2d 292, 296 (2006). Specifically, section 33B \u2014 1 of the Act provides as follows:\n\u201c(a) Every person who has been twice convicted in any state or federal court of an offense that contains the same elements as an offense now classified in Illinois as a Class X felony, criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping!,] or first degree murder, and is thereafter convicted of a Class X felony, criminal sexual assault!,] or first degree murder, committed after the 2 prior convictions, shall be adjudged an habitual criminal.\n(b) The 2 prior convictions need not have been for the same offense.\n(c) Any convictions which result from or are connected with the same transaction, or result from offenses committed at the same time, shall be counted for the purposes of this [s]ection as one conviction.\n(d) This [a]rticle shall not apply unless each of the following requirements are satisfied:\n(1) the third offense was committed after the effective date of this Act;\n(2) the third offense was committed within 20 years of the date that judgment was entered on the first conviction, provided, however, that time spent in custody shall not be counted;\n(3) the third offense was committed after conviction on the second offense;\n(4) the second offense was committed after conviction on the first offense.\n(e) Except when the death penalty is imposed, anyone adjudged an habitual criminal shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/33B \u2014 1 (West 2006).\nSection 33B \u2014 2(a) of the Act provides that \u201cunless the defendant admits [prior] conviction[s], the court shall hear and determine such issue, and shall make a written finding thereon.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/33B\u2014 2(a) (West 2006). \u201cA duly authenticated copy of the record of any alleged former conviction of an offense set forth in [s]ection 33B \u2014 1 shall be prima facie evidence of such former conviction.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/33B \u2014 2(b) (West 2006). \u201cThe date that an offense was committed may be established by circumstantial evidence!,] such as a certified copy of the conviction and a presentence investigation report.\u201d People v. Walton, 240 Ill. App. 3d 49, 57, 608 N.E.2d 59, 65 (1992). The State has the burden of establishing the defendant\u2019s eligibility for sentencing as an habitual criminal by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Eaglin, 292 Ill. App. 3d 677, 682, 686 N.E.2d 695, 698 (1997), citing People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 53, 73, 656 N.E.2d 1090, 1099 (1995).\nAt the sentencing hearing, the State presented a certified copy of Macon County case No. 90\u2014CF\u201468, wherein defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of armed robbery. Count I pertained to victim William Handt, and count II pertained to victim Debbie Weltmer. The offenses in both counts were committed on January 27, 1990, and involved defendant taking currency from the victims while armed with a knife. In April 1990, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of nine years in prison.\nIn Macon County case No. 95\u2014CF\u20141025, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of armed robbery. The offense was committed on October 14, 1995, and involved defendant taking money and food stamps from Rick Yutzy while armed with a wrench handle. In February 1996, the trial court sentenced defendant to 20 years in prison.\nDefendant argues his life sentence violates the rule established in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), and clarified in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 161 L. Ed. 2d 205, 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005), because the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence, not a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, that his two prior armed-robbery convictions did not result from, and were not connected with, the same transaction. See 720 ILCS 5/33B\u20141(c) (West 2006). Defendant concedes his prior convictions were not committed at the same time and notes the State\u2019s documents sufficiently established the number, timing, and sequence of his prior convictions. However, he contends the certified copies of his prior convictions did not furnish conclusive proof that those convictions arose from unrelated or unconnected transactions.\nInitially, a short history on the pertinent case law is in order as to the enhancement of a sentence based on a defendant\u2019s conduct during the commission of the crime and any prior convictions. In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350, 357, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1222 (1998), the United States Supreme Court was confronted with a federal statute prescribing a maximum prison sentence of 2 years for an illegal-immigration offense but authorizing a 20-year maximum sentence if the defendant had a prior aggravated felony conviction. The defendant pleaded guilty to the indictment of being in the United States after being deported, but the indictment did not mention his prior felony convictions. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 357, 118 S. Ct. at 1222-23. The defendant argued he could not be sentenced in excess of the minimum because his indictment had not mentioned those prior convictions. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 357, 118 S. Ct. at 1222-23. The district court disagreed and sentenced him to 85 months in prison. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 357, 118 S. Ct. at 1223.\nThe Supreme Court noted recidivism \u201cis a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court\u2019s increasing an offender\u2019s sentence.\u201d Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 368, 118 S. Ct. at 1230. As recidivism does not relate to the commission of the offense, the Court concluded that \u201cto hold that the Constitution requires that recidivism be deemed an \u2018element\u2019 of petitioner\u2019s offense would mark an abrupt departure from a longstanding tradition of treating recidivism as \u2018go[ing] to the punishment only.\u2019 \u201d Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 368-69, 118 S. Ct. at 1231, quoting Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 629, 56 L. Ed. 917, 923, 32 S. Ct. 583, 587-88 (1912). As the statute in question \u201csimply authorizes a court to increase the sentence for a recidivist,\u201d the Court found the Government was not required to include the defendant\u2019s prior convictions in the indictment. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226-27, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 357, 118 S. Ct. at 1222.\nDuring its following term, the Supreme Court construed the federal carjacking statute providing for an enhanced sentence if serious bodily injury occurred during the commission of the offense in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999). There, the defendant was charged with and found guilty of carjacking. Jones, 526 U.S. at 230, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 318, 119 S. Ct. at 1218. The issue of serious bodily harm was not alleged in the indictment or tried to the jury. Jones, 526 U.S. at 230-31, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 318, 119 S. Ct. at 1218. At the sentencing hearing, the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that a victim had suffered serious bodily injury and sentenced defendant to 25 years in prison, which included a 10-year enhancement. Jones, 526 U.S. at 231, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 318, 119 S. Ct. at 1218.\nThe Supreme Court found \u201cserious bodily harm\u201d constituted an element of the offense that must be submitted to a jury for verdict. Jones, 526 U.S. at 239, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 324, 119 S. Ct. at 1222. The Jones majority rejected the dissenting justices\u2019 arguments that Almendarez-Torres \u201cstood for the broad proposition that any fact increasing the maximum permissible punishment may be determined by a judge by a preponderance\u201d and would therefore be dispositive of the issues before the Court. Jones, 526 U.S. at 249 n.10, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 330 n.10, 119 S. Ct. at 1227 n.10. Instead, the Court stated Almendarez-Torres \u201cstands for the proposition that not every fact expanding a penalty range must be stated in a felony indictment, the precise holding being that recidivism increasing the maximum penalty need not be so charged.\u201d Jones, 526 U.S. at 248, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 329, 119 S. Ct. at 1226-27. In noting the history of treating recidivism as a sentencing factor, the Court stated that \u201cunlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense ***, a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.\u201d Jones, 526 U.S. at 249, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 329-30, 119 S. Ct. at 1227.\nA year later in Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 442, 120 S. Ct. at 2351, the defendant in that case fired several shots into the home of an African-American family and later admitted being the shooter. During police questioning, he gave a statement, which he later retracted, that he fired the shots because of the family\u2019s race and that he did not want them in the neighborhood. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 442, 120 S. Ct. at 2351. The defendant was charged with various offenses, but none of the counts mentioned the state hate-crime statute or alleged he acted with a racially biased purpose. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 442, 120 S. Ct. at 2352. The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of illegal possession of a firearm and bomb possession. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-70, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 442, 120 S. Ct. at 2352. At an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acted with a racially biased purpose and sentenced him to an enhanced 12-year term on the firearm-possession counts. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 443, 120 S. Ct. at 2352.\nThe Supreme Court found the trial court\u2019s enhancement amounted to \u201can unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 459, 120 S. Ct. at 2366. The Court held the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. Y, XIV) required that, \u201c[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.\nThe Supreme Court revisited issues raised by Apprendi in Shepard. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 211, 125 S. Ct. at 1257. At the sentencing hearing, the government argued the defendant\u2019s sentence should be extended pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA) (18 U.S.C. \u00a7924(e) (2000)). Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 211-12, 125 S. Ct. at 1257. Under federal law, the ACCA provided for extended prison terms for defendants who had been convicted of three prior serious drug offenses or violent felonies. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7924(e) (2000). Under the ACCA, a burglary committed in an enclosed space or building, a so-called \u201cgeneric burglary,\u201d qualified as a violent felony but a burglary committed in a boat or motor vehicle did not. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 15-16, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 211, 125 S. Ct. at 1257. On four previous occasions, the defendant had pleaded guilty to burglary in Massachusetts, but the state statutes did not differentiate between generic burglary and burglary committed in a boat or motor vehicle. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 17, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 212, 125 S. Ct. at 1258.\nThe Supreme Court stated the issue centered on \u201cwhether a sentencing court can look to police reports or complaint applications to determine whether an earlier guilty plea necessarily admitted, and supported a conviction for, generic burglary.\u201d Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 211, 125 S. Ct. at 1257. Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Souter noted the record was silent on whether the defendant\u2019s prior convictions were generic burglaries as the defendant did not admit the generic fact in a plea agreement or recorded colloquy. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 217, 125 S. Ct. at 1262. Justice Souter continued by stating:\n\u201c[T]he Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a jury standing between a defendant and the power of the State, and they guarantee a jury\u2019s finding of any disputed fact essential to increase the ceiling of a potential sentence. While the disputed fact here can be described as a fact about a prior conviction, it is too far removed from the conclusive significance of a prior judicial record, and too much like the findings subject to Jones and Apprendi, to say that Almendarez-Torres clearly authorizes a judge to resolve the dispute.\u201d Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 217, 125 S. Ct. at 1262.\nThe plurality concluded as follows:\n\u201c[Ejnquiry under the ACCA to determine whether a plea of guilty to burglary defined by a nongeneric statute necessarily admitted elements of the generic offense is limited to the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this information.\u201d Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 218, 125 S. Ct. at 1263.\nNumerous Illinois courts have found section 33B \u2014 1 constitutional as it falls within the recidivism exception to the rule set forth in Apprendi. See People v. Ligon, 365 Ill. App. 3d 109, 126, 847 N.E.2d 763, 769 (2006); People v. Allen, 335 Ill. App. 3d 773, 785, 780 N.E.2d 1133, 1143 (2002); People v. Jones, 328 Ill. App. 3d 233, 243, 764 N.E.2d 1232, 1239-40 (2002). Illinois courts have also found the Apprendi recidivism exception remains valid after Shepard. See People v. Johnson, 372 Ill. App. 3d 772, 781, 867 N.E.2d 49, 56 (2007) (recidivism exception articulated in Apprendi remains viable after Shepard)', People v. Yancey, 368 Ill. App. 3d 381, 393, 858 N.E.2d 454, 464 (2005); Ligon, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 127, 847 N.E.2d at 780.\nDefendant argues section 33B \u2014 1(c) unconstitutionally increased his Class X felony sentence to one of mandatory life imprisonment based on facts that are, as in Shepard, \u201ctoo far removed\u201d from the fact of a prior conviction, i.e., that his two prior convictions did not \u201cresult from\u201d and are not \u201cconnected with\u201d the same transaction. See 720 ILCS 5/33B \u2014 1(c) (West 2006). In support of his argument, defendant relies on the Seventh Circuit\u2019s decision in United States v. Ngo, 406 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2005).\nThere, a jury found the defendant guilty of (1) conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and (2) distributing methamphetamine. Ngo, 406 F.3d at 840. The presentence investigation recommended the defendant be sentenced as a career offender based on his two prior armed-robbery convictions. Ngo, 406 F.3d at 841. The defendant, however, argued he was not a career offender because his armed-robbery convictions were \u201crelated\u201d and only counted as one prior conviction. Ngo, 406 F.3d at 841. The district court found the defendant\u2019s prior convictions were not \u201cpart of a common scheme or plan,\u201d thereby subjecting him to sentencing as a career offender. Ngo, 406 F.3d at 841.\nOn appeal, the defendant argued the district court\u2019s finding that his prior convictions were unrelated \u201cexceeded the judicial fact[-]finding exception for recidivism recognized in Almendarez-Torres [citation], and preserved in Apprendi.\u201d Ngo, 406 F.3d at 841. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the Almendarez-Torres exception was still viable after Shepard but stated the exception \u201cis quite narrow.\u201d Ngo, 406 F.3d at 842. The Seventh Circuit found the Shepard plurality \u201csuggest [ed] that the recidivism exception exempts only those findings traceable to a prior judicial record of \u2018conclusive significance.\u2019 \u201d Ngo, 406 F.3d at 842.\nIn finding the defendant a career offender, the district court had looked to the fact the robberies took place 10 days apart as well as to the type of establishment burglarized. The Seventh Circuit, however, concluded the district court\u2019s findings were \u201cdetermined by resorting to sources of information without the \u2018conclusive significance\u2019 of a prior judicial record\u201d and were not authorized by the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling in Almendarez-Torres. Ngo, 406 F.3d at 843. Accordingly, the defendant\u2019s sentence was in violation of the sixth amendment as it was \u201cbased upon impermissible fact[-]finding.\u201d Ngo, 406 F.3d at 844.\nWe find Ngo distinguishable from the facts presented in this case. Our supreme court has stated the Act requires convictions on \u201cthree temporally separate Class X offenses.\u201d Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d at 155, 843 N.E.2d at 296. The Act states multiple convictions will only be counted as a single conviction if they \u201cresult from or are connected with the same transaction.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/33B \u2014 1(c) (West 2006). The determination of whether the convictions are connected can be made from sources of information bearing the \u201cconclusive significance of a prior judicial record.\u201d Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 217, 125 S. Ct. at 1262. Moreover, that determination bears little difference here to the determination of the timing and sequence of a defendant\u2019s prior convictions, which have been held to be within the purview of the trial court. See Ligon, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 127-28, 847 N.E.2d at 780 (section 33B \u2014 1 is constitutional \u201cbecause the timing and sequence of a defendant\u2019s prior convictions are inherent in the convictions themselves and need not be submitted to a jury\u201d).\nThe fact that defendant\u2019s first two armed-robbery convictions were not connected with the same transaction is clear from the record. Defendant was first convicted of armed robbery in 1990, and he was sentenced to nine years in prison. Defendant\u2019s second conviction for armed robbery occurred in 1995. Defendant\u2019s intervening stay as a guest of the government clearly shows his convictions met the requirements of section 33B \u2014 1 of the Act. That the qualifying offenses here were not part of the same transaction is inherent in the convictions themselves and not like a finding of serious bodily harm, as in Jones, or a racially biased purpose, as in Apprendi, that would require a determination by a jury of defendant\u2019s peers.\nWe find support for this conclusion in United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2005), cited by the State on appeal. There, the defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of firearms. Thompson, 421 F.3d at 280. Under the ACCA, a defendant is subject to a minimum 15-year prison term if he has at least three prior violent felony convictions that were \u201c \u2018committed on occasions different from one another.\u2019 \u201d Thompson, 421 F.3d at 280, quoting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7924(e)(1) (2000). The district court found the conditions applied and sentenced the defendant to 15 years in prison. Thompson, 421 F.3d at 280.\nOn appeal, the defendant argued his rights under the sixth amendment were violated when the district court, not a jury or by his own admission, found his violent felonies were committed on separate occasions. Thompson, 421 F.3d at 280-81. The Fourth Circuit, citing Shepard, found \u201cthe \u2018fact of a prior conviction\u2019 remains a valid enhancement even when not found by the jury.\u201d Thompson, 421 F.3d at 282.\nIn looking at whether the applicable offenses were committed on different occasions, the court of appeals noted \u201c \u2018occasions\u2019 are \u2018those predicate offenses that can be isolated with a beginning and an end\u2014 ones that constitute an occurrence unto themselves.\u2019 \u201d Thompson, 421 F.3d at 285, quoting United States v. Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332, 335 (4th Cir. 1995). In looking at the presentence report, the court found the defendant\u2019s burglaries were committed on different occasions as they occurred \u201con distinct days in separate towns in different homes.\u201d Thompson, 421 F.3d at 285. As a matter of common sense, concluding the offenses occurred on separate occasions could not be seen \u201cto represent impermissible judicial fact[-]finding.\u201d Thompson, 421 F.3d at 285. Instead, \u201c[t]he data necessary to determine the \u2018separateness\u2019 of the occasions is inherent in the fact of the prior convictions.\u201d Thompson, 421 F.3d at 285. That determination can be made with \u201cdata normally found in conclusive judicial records.\u201d Thompson, 421 F.3d at 286.\nLikewise, in the case sub judice, whether defendant\u2019s convictions were connected with the same transaction is readily ascertainable from conclusive judicial records. In looking at the charging documents and the docket sheets, we note defendant\u2019s first two armed robberies were committed over five years apart and were separated by a prison sentence imposed following the first conviction. Our conclusion that defendant\u2019s convictions were not connected cannot be seen as impermissible judicial fact-finding as the separate nature of the offenses is readily apparent from the State\u2019s certified copies of the convictions. No other conclusion can be had. We also note defendant offers nothing to support a claim the convictions were related.\nHere, defendant\u2019s criminal history included convictions on three Class X felonies. Defendant\u2019s second offense was committed after his first conviction. He committed his third offense after the conviction for his second offense, and the third offense occurred within 20 years of the date of judgment on his first conviction. Moreover, the three convictions neither resulted from nor were connected with the same transaction and were not committed at the same time. Defendant\u2019s convictions thereby satisfied the requirements of section 33B \u2014 1 of the Act. Under these facts, we find the trial court\u2019s sentencing defendant to a life term as an habitual offender under the Act did not violate defendant\u2019s constitutional rights.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment. As part of our judgment, we award the State its $50 statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE TURNER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles M. Schiedel, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, and Charles W Hoffman, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack Ahola, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Anastacia R. Brooks, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ISAAC CURRY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201406\u20140355\nOpinion filed July 28, 2008.\nCharles M. Schiedel, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, and Charles W Hoffman, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack Ahola, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Anastacia R. Brooks, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0315-01", "first_page_order": 331, "last_page_order": 342 }