{
  "id": 4279438,
  "name": "In re J.H., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Ruth H., Respondent (Alma Learetta Tyson, Counsel for Mother-Respondent, Appellant))",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ruth H.",
  "decision_date": "2008-08-05",
  "docket_number": "No. 1\u201407\u20142042",
  "first_page": "507",
  "last_page": "510",
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:18:27.294728+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "In re J.H., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Ruth H., Respondent (Alma Learetta Tyson, Counsel for Mother-Respondent, Appellant))."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE SOUTH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAlma Learetta Tyson was appointed to represent an indigent mother in wardship proceedings and filed a petition for payment of her fees. Because it was filed after a deadline, which was established by a general order issued by the presiding judge of the child protection division of the circuit court of Cook County, that petition was denied, and Tyson is now appealing that decision. We reverse and remand.\nThe facts relevant to this appeal are undisputed. In July 1996, Alma Learetta Tyson was appointed counsel for the indigent mother of the subject of a petition for an adjudication of wardship. Tyson represented the mother in that proceeding and in proceedings involving the mother\u2019s three other children. Tyson\u2019s initial petition for $1,502 in fees was approved by the trial court in 2000.\nIn May 2005, the presiding judge of the child protection division of the circuit court of Cook County issued General Order 05 \u2014 29, which provided:\n\u201c1. Effective April 3, 2006 all attorney fee petitions for court appointed attorneys must be filed by the earlier of: A) 30 days after entry of a final order closing the case, or B) six (6) months after the attorney performed the service or incurred the cost.\n2. Attorneys who have cases with outstanding current obligations greater than six (6) months old must file, and motion for hearing, attorney fee petitions for those obligations by April 3, 2006.\u201d\nIn May 2007, the presiding judge issued a \u201cMemorandum\u201d to \u201cAll Child Protection Division Judges and Conflict Bar Attorneys\u201d which purported to clarify various issues regarding fee petitions. One item included in the memorandum referred to the timing of fee requests. It stated that \u201c[flee petitions must be presented in a timely manner pursuant to General Order 05 \u2014 29.\u201d The memorandum\u2019s introduction explicitly stated that \u201cthese guidelines are intended to provide general guidance only. The trial judge decides appropriate reasonable fees in a given case.\u201d\nIn June 2007, Tyson submitted a second fee petition, seeking payment of $1,343 for services performed in the years 2000-03, 2005 and 2007. The State objected to the petition as untimely, citing General Order 05 \u2014 29. The trial court\u2019s denial of the petition focused solely on its timing: \u201cIn that fee petitions here in Juvenile Court and all the bar attorneys I understand have been apprised of this need to file thirty days after case closure or within six months after the delivery of the service. At this point I find that the fee petition is not timely filed in that the fees Counsel is seeking [are] from 2001, 2003, and 2005.\u201d\nTyson advised the court that she had not been aware of the order imposing time deadlines on fee petitions and noted that her petition was filed within 30 days of the closing of the case. The trial court concluded: \u201cAt this point I find the fee petition has not been filed in a timely manner and it is denied at this time. This is a final and appeal-able order.\u201d Tyson then brought the instant appeal.\nSupreme Court Rule 299(a) provides that attorneys appointed to represent indigent parties \u201cshall be entitled to receive a reasonable fee for their services.\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 299(a). The rule further provides that in determining a reasonable fee, the appointing court \u201cshould consider (1) the time spent and the services rendered; (2) the attorney\u2019s skill and experience; (3) the complexity of the case; (4) the overhead costs and the burden on the attorney\u2019s practice; (5) the rate of compensation for comparable services in the locality; (6) the reduction of the comparable fee by a pro bono factor; (7) the number of appointments given to the attorney; and (8) the availability of public funds.\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 299(a). The rule also dictates that \u201cNo single factor is determinative in establishing a reasonable fee.\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 299(a).\nAlthough a circuit court may establish local administrative rules, those rules may not conflict with substantive law, including statutes and our supreme court\u2019s rules. Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 226 Ill. 2d 334, 357 (2007). In this appeal, Tyson contends that General Order 05 \u2014 29 conflicts with substantive law and must be invalidated because it denies payment of her legitimately earned fees. Had the order required the dismissal of Tyson\u2019s fee petition, the instant appeal would directly raise the issue of the potential conflict between Rule 299 and a local rule completely denying untimely petitions.\nHowever, Tyson and the State agree that General Order 05 \u2014 29 did not mandate the denial of a fee petition for noncompliance with its deadlines. The order imposed no specific penalty for noncompliance, and the presiding judge\u2019s clarifying memorandum explained that trial judges remained free to determine appropriate fees in each individual case. The trial court was permitted to impose an appropriate sanction for noncompliance with the order (Valio v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 311 Ill. App. 3d 321, 328 (2000)), but the order nonetheless allowed the court to determine and award reasonable compensation for Tyson\u2019s services. We, therefore, conclude that the order, on its face, does not substantively deny attorney fees that are due under Illinois law and is not invalid on that basis.\nThe trial court apparently adopted a different view of the order, however. As previously noted, the court\u2019s explanation of its ruling addressed only the petition\u2019s failure to meet the order\u2019s deadlines. The court did not refer to any of the compensation factors identified by Rule 299, and in denying the petition as untimely, the court ignored the rule\u2019s admonition that no single factor is to be considered determinative in establishing the attorney\u2019s fee. The court\u2019s ruling demonstrates that it perceived its fee-setting discretion to be precluded by General Order 05 \u2014 29. When the record shows that the trial court did not exercise discretion because of an erroneous belief that its discretion was foreclosed, we reverse and remand for further consideration of the issue. Moffitt v. Illinois Power Co., 248 Ill. App. 3d 752, 762 (1993).\nAccordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nHALL and KARNEZIS, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE SOUTH"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Alma Learetta Tyson, of Chicago, appellant pro se.",
      "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Sara Dillery Hynes, and Nancy Kisicki, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re J.H., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Ruth H., Respondent (Alma Learetta Tyson, Counsel for Mother-Respondent, Appellant)).\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201407\u20142042\nOpinion filed August 5, 2008.\nAlma Learetta Tyson, of Chicago, appellant pro se.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Sara Dillery Hynes, and Nancy Kisicki, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0507-01",
  "first_page_order": 523,
  "last_page_order": 526
}