{ "id": 4279249, "name": "CHICAGO'S PIZZA, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHICAGO'S PIZZA FRANCHISE LIMITED USA, f/k/a Pizza USA, Inc., et al., DefendantsAppellees", "name_abbreviation": "Chicago's Pizza, Inc. v. Chicago's Pizza Franchise Limited USA", "decision_date": "2008-08-07", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201407\u20140679", "first_page": "849", "last_page": "870", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "384 Ill. App. 3d 849" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "363 Ill. App. 3d 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5765765 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/363/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894509 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" }, { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 Ill. App. 3d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5423856 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/253/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 843", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927618 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0843-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5595094 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/359/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5188724 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/234/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 Ill. App. 3d 908", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5209549 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915", "parenthetical": "\"Private suits for injunctive relief may be brought in situations where one competitor is harmed or may be harmed by the unfair trade practices of another\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/230/0908-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. App. 3d 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2561101 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" }, { "page": "47" }, { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/206/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3598584 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" }, { "page": "113" }, { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5371098 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" }, { "page": "81" }, { "page": "81-82" }, { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/261/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260430 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256346 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" }, { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "622 F. Supp. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3808883 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1117" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/622/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 Ill. App. 3d 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2518602 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" }, { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/190/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "877 F. Supp. 1114", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7846303 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/877/1114-01" ] }, { "cite": "975 F. Supp. 1092", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 11905659 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1103" }, { "page": "1103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/975/1092-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 866", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3465056 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0866-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2577553 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" }, { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/204/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 Ill. App. 3d 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273129 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/377/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5480949 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" }, { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2533709 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77-78" }, { "page": "78" }, { "page": "78" }, { "page": "78" }, { "page": "78" }, { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3164374 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392", "parenthetical": "an appellant has the burden of presenting a sufficiently complete record of proceedings at the trial court level to support a claim of error, and a reviewing court will resolve any doubts arising from the incompleteness of the record against the appellant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 881", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3718180 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "883" }, { "page": "885" }, { "page": "883" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/343/0881-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415308 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" }, { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132506 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257223 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3217275 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0171-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1502, "char_count": 50048, "ocr_confidence": 0.833, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.691933170513656e-07, "percentile": 0.6993554450471823 }, "sha256": "5c4e4c035349b87c5997396b667e6a5938f4875fcacbe2c76804c5ee071f2c76", "simhash": "1:fdca70ae87eb55cf", "word_count": 7962 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:18:27.294728+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CHICAGO\u2019S PIZZA, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHICAGO\u2019S PIZZA FRANCHISE LIMITED USA, f/k/a Pizza USA, Inc., et al., DefendantsAppellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MURPHY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs, Chicago\u2019s Pizza, Inc., Chicago\u2019s Best, Inc., and Flovig, Inc., filed a complaint against defendants, Chicago\u2019s Pizza Franchise Limited and Irfanullah Muhammed, alleging that defendants used the Chicago\u2019s Pizza name to mislead consumers, benefit from plaintiffs\u2019 investment in the Chicago\u2019s Pizza name, and divert sales from plaintiffs\u2019 restaurants to defendants\u2019. After a bench trial, the trial court found that plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving that defendants\u2019 actions caused plaintiffs to lose revenue.\nI. BACKGROUND\nMartin Flores and his wife opened their first Chicago\u2019s Pizza restaurant in 1991. By 2002, they had three Chicago\u2019s Pizza locations in Chicago: 3114 North Lincoln Avenue, 3006 North Sheffield, and 1919 West Montrose. From 2002 until 2006, Muhammed ran an unaffiliated Chicago\u2019s Pizza pizzeria, with its sole location at 5062 North Sheridan Road. Although Muhammed had only one store, his ads listed multiple \u201clocations,\u201d some of which corresponded with plaintiffs\u2019 locations. The ads also described worldwide locations and claimed that defendants\u2019 restaurant had been in existence since 1970, even though Muhammed did not open the restaurant until 2002.\nCertain of plaintiffs\u2019 restaurants were called Chicago\u2019s Pizza, while others went by Chicago\u2019s Pizza & Pasta. Plaintiffs\u2019 logo was a red oval with the word \u201cChicago\u2019s\u201d written inside, with either \u201cPizza\u201d or \u201cPizza & Pasta\u201d under the oval. Defendants\u2019 logo was a red, white, and blue pizza with \u201cChicago\u2019s Pizza\u201d written in the bottom, blue portion and \u201cPizzeria\u201d written in green in the middle.\nPlaintiffs filed a 10-count complaint alleging that defendants used the Chicago\u2019s Pizza name in an effort to mislead the public into thinking that it was a franchised business affiliated with plaintiffs. Plaintiff Chicago\u2019s Pizza, Inc., the Lincoln Avenue location, alleged tortious interference with business expectancy and violations of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Deceptive Trade Practices Act) (815 ILCS 510/1 et seq. (West 2004)) and the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2004)). Chicago\u2019s Best, the Montrose Avenue location, and Flovig, the Sheffield Avenue location, alleged violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act against both defendants.\nIn 2006, the case proceeded to trial, where the following evidence was presented.\nA. Martin and Patricia Flores\nMartin Flores testified that he owns four locations of Chicago\u2019s Pizza: North Lincoln, North Sheffield, West Montrose, and West Irving Park. At the time of trial, the Irving Park location had just been opened, and his West Wilson store relocated to Montrose two years before. The Lincoln store opened in 2001.\nChicago\u2019s Pizza was incorporated in 1992 and started as a two-person operation. Sales increased every year, and at the time of the trial, the business had 160 employees. However, at the end of 2002 or 2003, Flores saw a decrease in sales, especially in the Wrigley Field area. Until that time, other competitors opened in the area, but they did not affect his business. He believed that the decrease in business was a result of the opening of a Chicago\u2019s Pizza on Sheridan Road, which was not affiliated with his restaurants. He received hundreds of complaints from customers about the quality of the Sheridan restaurant\u2019s food.\nFurthermore, in February and March 2006, people began complaining that plaintiff was fraudulently charging their credit cards; however, plaintiffs did not charge their credit cards, and the alleged customers were not in plaintiffs\u2019 computer system.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 tax records showed that gross sales for the Lincoln location was $1.9 million for the 2000 tax year; $2.3 million for 2001; $2,078,765 for 2002; $1.8 million for 2003; and $2,296,000 for 2004. During the time frame when he noticed a decrease in sales, he increased his advertising to recover some of the customers he had lost. Sales increased when defendants\u2019 restaurant closed in 2006.\nIn 2000, Flores changed the name of the restaurant on his menus and the Internet to Chicago\u2019s Pizza & Pasta. When he opened his first full-service restaurant on Lincoln in 2001, the name on the sign was Chicago\u2019s Pizza & Pasta. The signs at the Wilson and Sheffield locations have always been Chicago\u2019s Pizza, and the sign on Montrose was Chicago\u2019s Pizza & Pasta beginning in 2003.\nPatricia Flores, Martin\u2019s niece, testified that until the year before, she worked at the Chicago\u2019s Pizza location on Montrose. At one point, a customer presented a coupon for what purported to be Chicago\u2019s Pizza, which listed one phone number for \u201cdowntown area, Lincoln area\u201d and \u201cLincoln Park, Sheffield area\u201d and another number for \u201cWilson area, Montrose location\u201d and \u201cRogers Park, Sheridan area.\u201d Patricia testified that this coupon was not for plaintiffs\u2019 Chicago Pizza. After receiving additional complaints, she called the phone number that the customer gave her for a Chicago\u2019s Pizza located on Sheridan. Patricia asked the person who answered the phone whether the restaurant was affiliated with the Chicago\u2019s Pizza on Montrose, and he said yes.\nPatricia testified that when the Montrose store was opened in 2002, the sign placed outside said Chicago\u2019s Pizza & Pasta, as did the menus. However, they always answered the phone \u201cChicago Pizza.\u201d\nB. Defendant Irfanullah Muhammed\nIrfanullah Muhammed testified that he bought the goodwill of an existing pizzeria named Paisan\u2019s Pizza for $87,000 and changed the name. He did not examine the books and records for the business before purchasing it, and his only experience with the pizza business was observing his friend\u2019s pizza business in Japan for three or four months.\nAt the time he incorporated his business in 2002, Muhammed told the State that he would be doing business under the name Chicago Pizza Inn U.S.A. However, he never opened a business named Chicago Pizza Inn U.S.A. When he opened his business under the name Chicago\u2019s Pizza, he did not look in the phone book to determine whether any other businesses were already using that name. For a short time in 2004 the business was dissolved for failure to pay the franchise fee, but he continued to run it. When he reincorporated in 2004, he learned that he could not use the name Pizza U.S.A. and instead tried to use the name Chicago Pizza & Pasta. He ultimately closed the business in February or March 2006.\nDefendants\u2019 ads had either a \u201ccircle R\u201d next to \u201cChicago\u2019s Pizza,\u201d as if it were registered, or the \u201cTM\u201d designation. Muhammed never obtained a registration; he abandoned his application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office.\nAlthough defendants only had one location, on Sheridan Road, their ads included multiple \u201clocations,\u201d with different phone numbers for each. For example, defendants\u2019 phone book ad and one of their menus showed locations for Lincoln/Sheffield, Downtown/Loop, Montrose/Wilson, and Lakefront/Sheridan/Loyola, and urged customers to \u201ccall for your nearest location.\u201d In a Yellow Book coupon, defendants listed one phone number for \u201cDowntown Area, Lincoln Area, Lincoln Park, Sheffield Area\u201d and a second number for \u201cWilson Area, Montrose Location, Rogers Park, Sheridan Area.\u201d Another ad had six phone numbers for different areas that were not labeled \u201clocations\u201d: Lincoln Park, Sheffield area, Montrose/Wilson, Downtown, UIC & Loop, and Sheridan & Loyola. Muhammed testified that his ads had different phone numbers for different \u201clocations\u201d to avoid overwhelming one phone line and so that the order could be assigned to drivers who delivered in particular areas. He denied that he was trying to create the impression that his restaurant had multiple locations.\nSeveral of defendants\u2019 ads or menus listed worldwide locations, including Dubai, Frankfurt, Rome, and New York. Muhammed admitted that these locations did not exist, but he wanted to open franchises in New York and Tokyo. His friend was going to open a location in San Francisco and his brother was going to open one in Washington, D.C.\nCertain ads or menus also made reference to \u201cEstablished 1970\u201d and \u201cSince 1970\u201d or provided, \u201cThanks to all Wonderful Customers for their Continued Support towards the Prosperity of Chicago\u2019s Pizza Since 1970.\u201d As Muhammed did not open the restaurant until 2002, the restaurant was not established in 1970. He testified that the year 1970 refers to when a restaurant called Strawberry Pizza, located in Japan, began using a particular crust recipe.\nCertain ads also state that defendants\u2019 restaurant is open until 5 a.m. Muhammed testified that the restaurant\u2019s closing time was 5 a.m. but was changed to 3 a.m. During the time when a 5 a.m. closing time was advertised, sometimes he closed earlier.\nMuhammed testified that he first learned of plaintiffs\u2019 restaurants after this lawsuit was filed. In response, he put up a sign visible to both the public and the employees that answered the phone saying that the restaurant was not affiliated with any other locations or companies. Employees answered the phone \u201cChicago\u2019s Pizza Sheridan,\u201d and he instructed them that if any customers asked about Chicago\u2019s Pizza & Pasta, \u201ctell them to call different numbers.\u201d\nMuhammed testified that plaintiffs\u2019 and defendants\u2019 restaurants carry different items. For example, Muhammed testified that his pizzeria did not carry 40% of the appetizers listed on plaintiffs\u2019 menu, and he did not sell any of plaintiffs\u2019 salads, chicken dishes, wraps, or gourmet sandwiches. They sold different desserts, and defendants carried Pepsi products, while plaintiffs carried Coke products. In addition, halal food, which plaintiffs do not sell, constituted 20% to 30% of defendants\u2019 gross sales.\nMuhammed testified that after this litigation ends, he plans to reopen his business under the name \u201cChicago\u2019s Pizza.\u201d\nC. Customers\n1. Wolf Stern\nWolf Stern testified that he ordered pizzas about once a month from plaintiffs\u2019 Lincoln Avenue location. In December 2003, he decided to order a pizza and looked in the Yellow Pages for the Chicago\u2019s Pizza on Lincoln Avenue. When he could not find it, he called the Chicago\u2019s Pizza on Sheridan and asked for the phone number of the Lincoln Avenue location. The person Stern spoke to asked him for his address and said they could deliver from the Sheridan location, so Stern placed an order. Stern\u2019s understanding was that he was ordering from an affiliate of the Chicago\u2019s Pizza on Lincoln. When the pizza did not arrive within the agreed-upon period of time, Stern called the location two or three times and was told that the driver was right around the corner. He had to wait almost two hours for the delivery to arrive, and the pizza he bought was \u201cterrible.\u201d Stern called the store again to express his dissatisfaction, and the man he talked to offered him a discount on his next order, which would be placed in the computer system and honored at all of their locations, including Lincoln Avenue.\nIn 2004, Stern met Martin Flores when Flores threw a party for their sons\u2019 baseball team at Chicago\u2019s Pizza. Flores told him about issues he was having with another store with a similar name, and Stern explained the problem he had in December 2003. In the meantime, Stern had stopped ordering from Chicago\u2019s Pizza and had told his friends of his negative experience. After speaking to Flores, Stern again began patronizing the Chicago\u2019s Pizza on Lincoln Avenue.\n2. Travis Cohen\nTravis Cohen testified that for two years until February 2006, he ordered pizza from the Sheffield location of Chicago\u2019s Pizza at least once a week. In February 2006, he looked in the phone book, which had multiple locations for Chicago\u2019s Pizza. Because he knew that Sheffield turned into Sheridan, he thought that the Sheridan location was the same as the Sheffield location. Therefore, he ordered a pizza from the Sheridan location. He testified that Chicago\u2019s Pizza charged his debit card $22.12 for this order, but another charge for $55 appeared on his account two days later. Cohen called the Sheridan location regarding the extra charge and was advised to call Maria, the area manager for Chicago\u2019s Pizza. Cohen called Maria at the number that the person at the Sheridan location gave him and discovered that the two locations were not affiliated. Cohen filed a police report and filed a grievance with his bank. After this incident, he is ordering pizzas again from the Sheffield location.\n3. Anthony Poole\nAnthony Poole testified that in February 2005, he saw an ad for Chicago\u2019s Pizza and called the number listed to order a pizza. He had ordered from the Montrose and Wilson locations of Chicago\u2019s Pizza at least 12 times. When the pizza arrived, the quality was different, but he assumed there was a new person in plaintiffs\u2019 kitchen. A few weeks later, he ordered another pizza by using the phone number from the same ad. He asked the employee on the phone whether this was the location on Wilson, and the employee responded that it was. When the pizza arrived, the packaging and aroma were different from normal, so he asked the deliveryman what location it came from. The deliveryman said the Chicago\u2019s Pizza on Sheridan. Poole told him to take the pizza back and called the Sheridan location. He spoke to the same person as before and questioned him on the discrepancy between locations. The employee responded that he told Poole earlier that they deliver to the Wilson area, not that the location was on Wilson Avenue. After this incident, he is ordering pizzas again from the Montrose and Wilson locations.\n4. Joseph Bitterman\nJoseph Bitterman testified that he was a customer of the Chicago\u2019s Pizza on Sheffield beginning in late 2004. In July 2005, he looked in the phone book and saw an ad for Chicago\u2019s Pizza, with different phone numbers for each of its four locations: Lincoln/Sheffield, Downtown/Loop, Montrose/Wilson, and Lakefront/Sheridan/Loyola. The ad listed a toll-free number to call \u201cfor your nearest location\u201d and represented that the pizzerias were open until 5 a.m. Bitterman called the Sheffield location believing he was calling the Chicago\u2019s Pizza he had done business with on Lincoln and Sheffield. The food he received was \u201cdisgusting to say the least,\u201d but when he called the store at 4 a.m. to complain, it was closed. The following day, he returned the food to the Chicago\u2019s Pizza on Sheffield, from which he thought he had ordered, but did not believe the employees when they told him that they had not made the sandwich. He disparaged the store to 20 or 30 people before he learned that he had ordered from a Chicago\u2019s Pizza on Sheridan.\n5. Judith Levine\nJudith Levine testified that she has been patronizing the Wilson and Montrose locations of plaintiffs\u2019 Chicago\u2019s Pizza for 15 years. In April 2005, she clipped a Yellow Book coupon for Chicago\u2019s Pizza with three phone numbers \u2014 one for \u201cLincoln Park and Sheffield areas,\u201d one for \u201cWilson and Montrose areas,\u201d and a third for \u201cSheridan and Broadway areas.\u201d She believed that the coupon was for plaintiffs\u2019 restaurants, since it had the same name and the locations listed on the coupon were similar to plaintiffs\u2019 locations, so she attempted to use it at plaintiffs\u2019 Montrose location. Plaintiffs\u2019 Montrose location informed her that the coupon was not theirs but still honored it.\n6. Mary DeArmond\nMary DeArmond testified that she was referred to the Chicago\u2019s Pizza on Montrose. In the summer of 2005, her friend searched in his cell phone for the nearest Chicago\u2019s Pizza. A number of Chicago\u2019s Pizza locations came up, but her friend called the location on Sheridan because it was the closest to his house. Her friend placed an order, and when she went to pick it up, she asked whether the restaurant was affiliated with the Chicago\u2019s Pizza on Montrose. The employee said that it was. Since then, she has not ordered from the Sheridan location, but she has ordered from the Montrose location several times.\nD. Accountant Sam Remer\nSam Remer, an accountant, testified that he was retained by Martin Flores to determine whether defendants\u2019 actions damaged plaintiffs\u2019 business and the amount of lost revenue. He reviewed Chicago\u2019s Pizza, Inc.\u2019s (the Lincoln location) tax returns for 2000 through 2004 and spoke to Martin Flores, his assistant, and his accountant. Remer did not review any other financial records of plaintiffs\u2019. He concluded that the Lincoln location\u2019s sales declined in 2002 and 2003 but increased somewhat in 2004. He estimated that lost sales for 2002 and 2003 were $830,000 and its lost profits were $500,000. The carry-out and delivery portions of the business sustained the majority of the losses. Flores told him that a number of delivery drivers had to be laid off.\nAlthough the Lincoln Avenue dining room opened in 2001, Remer testified that Martin Flores told him that it did not open until 2002. Believing that the Lincoln Avenue\u2019s dining room was an extra source of income in 2002 that the business did not have in 2001, Remer added $250,000 to the difference between the numbers for 2001 and 2002. Therefore, of the $830,000 he estimated in lost sales for those two years, $250,000 was attributable to the dining room income that he believed plaintiffs had in 2002 but not in 2001. Remer agreed that if there was a dining room operating in 2001, his numbers \u201cwould have to be changed.\u201d Remer testified that before he learned that the dining room revenue needed to be added to the damages calculation, he had concluded that plaintiffs\u2019 lost sales \u201cappeared to be minimal.\u201d\nRemer opined that defendants\u2019 actions caused these losses. Based on his research, the depositions of Muhammed, his brother, and a driver, Remer concluded that there was a concerted effort to cause confusion between the two establishments.\nDefendants\u2019 tax return for 2002 showed sales of $30,000 a year, or approximately $100 a day. Remer discounted the tax return, however, because it contradicted the deposition testimony of Muhammed, his brother, and a driver, who stated that the daily sales were between $2,000 and $4,000 a day. He also identified mathematical errors in the return and stated that the gross profit ratio was understated. No employees were shown on the tax returns for 2002 and 2003; apparently defendants\u2019 employees were paid in cash. Defendants\u2019 business records were not provided to Remer, who considered the tax returns to be fraudulent.\nRemer did not know the geographic area that plaintiffs\u2019 Lincoln Avenue store delivered to, nor did he know how many other business had a pizza delivery business within the same area. He discounted other area businesses\u2019 contribution to any decrease in plaintiffs\u2019 sales based on what Martin Flores told him. He also relied on Pizza Today Magazine\u2019s conclusion that national pizza consumption had not changed much in the last 15 years.\nE. Trial Court\u2019s Decision\nAt the close of plaintiffs\u2019 case, defendants moved for a directed finding, which the trial court denied. The trial resumed; defendants did not call any witnesses but did present exhibits. The trial court found that Muhammed was not truthful in his advertising, including his use of the trademark designation and his claims of being established in 1970 and having restaurants in foreign countries; however, the trial court \u201cfails to see how this false advertisement hurt Plaintiffs business.\u201d Furthermore, although Martin Flores testified that his business was injured because defendants had \u201csuch an inferior product,\u201d \u201cif Muhammed had a better product, he may have been more serious competition. Bad pizza will not survive in Chicago; there is too much competition. Flores apparently does have a very good product and does have very loyal customers at each of his restaurants. However, in the very competitive food business, he could lose them for any number of reasons.\u201d The trial court concluded that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving that defendants interfered with the business in such a manner as to cause lost revenue. Therefore, it found for defendants on all counts. Plaintiffs\u2019 motion for new trial was denied, and this appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Manifest Weight of the Evidence\nThe standard of review in a bench trial is whether the judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Dargis v. Paradise Park, Inc., 354 Ill. App. 3d 171, 177 (2004). A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court in a bench trial unless the judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. First Baptist Church of Lombard v. Toll Highway Authority, 301 Ill. App. 3d 533, 542 (1998). \u201cA judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence.\u201d Judgment Services Corp. v. Sullivan, 321 Ill. App. 3d 151, 154 (2001).\nAs the trier of fact, the trial judge was in a superior position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and determine the weight to be given to their testimony. Buckner v. Causey, 311 Ill. App. 3d 139, 144 (1999). When contradictory testimony that could support conflicting conclusions is given at a bench trial, an appellate court will not disturb the trial court\u2019s factual findings based on that testimony unless a contrary finding is clearly apparent. Buckner, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 144.\n1. Denial of directed finding\nPlaintiffs first contend that the trial court erred by entering judgment in favor of defendants when it denied their motion for directed finding pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1110 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1110 (West 2004)) and defendants did not present any evidence during their case. Defendants argue that the evidentiary record before the trial court at the time of the motion for directed finding was not the same as the record before the court after trial because at the close of trial, the court considered all of the evidence, \u201cincluding the testimony of Defendants\u2019 witnesses, Defendants\u2019 exhibits, and the written findings of fact and conclusions of law presented by both parties.\u201d As plaintiffs point out, defendants did not present any witnesses, and the exhibits they submitted duplicated plaintiffs\u2019 trial exhibits, with the exception of defendants\u2019 exhibits 7, 8, and 9, which were substantially similar but not the same.\nPlaintiffs cite Geske v. Geske, 343 Ill. App. 3d 881 (2003), in support of their argument. In Geske, at the close of the plaintiffs case, the defendant presented a motion for directed finding, which the trial court denied. The defendant rested without presenting any evidence, and the trial court found for the defendant. On the first appeal, the court found in an unpublished order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23) that the trial court erred by entering judgment in the defendant\u2019s favor because when the defendant rested without offering any additional evidence, the initial determination that the plaintiff had satisfied his required burden of proof was unchallenged. Geske, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 883. On remand, the trial court, citing its previous application of an incorrect standard, denied the plaintiffs motion for entry of judgment in her favor and ruled in favor of the defendant. On a second appeal, the court affirmed the trial court\u2019s decision to reopen the motion and correct its prior ruling. Geske, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 885.\nUnlike the defendant in Geske, who did not present any evidence, defendants here submitted their trial exhibits, even if most were the same as plaintiffs\u2019. Therefore, the trial court\u2019s initial determination that plaintiffs satisfied their burden of proof was not \u201cunchallenged,\u201d as it was in Geske. See Geske, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 883. Furthermore, defendants\u2019 exhibits 7 and 9, while similar to plaintiffs\u2019 exhibits, are not identical to them. Although plaintiffs claim that defendants\u2019 exhibit 8 duplicates their exhibits, that exhibit is missing from the record, and the omission must be construed against plaintiffs. Foutch v. O\u2019Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392 (1984) (an appellant has the burden of presenting a sufficiently complete record of proceedings at the trial court level to support a claim of error, and a reviewing court will resolve any doubts arising from the incompleteness of the record against the appellant).\nBruss v. Klein, 210 Ill. App. 3d 72 (1991), is instructive. In Bruss, the defendants presented a motion for directed finding at the close of the plaintiff\u2019s case, which the trial court denied. The defendants called one witness to the stand, and following the trial, the trial court entered judgment for the defendants. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court\u2019s ruling in favor of the defendants was against the manifest weight of the evidence because by denying the motion for directed finding, the trial court found that he met his burden of proof. The court noted that, in ruling on a defendant\u2019s motion for directed finding, a trial court must first determine whether the plaintiff made out a prima facie case. Bruss, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 77-78, citing Kokinis v. Kotrich, 81 Ill. 2d 151, 155 (1980). If a prima facie case exists, then the trial judge must consider all the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, draw reasonable inferences from the testimony, and consider the weight and quality of the evidence. Bruss, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 78. If the weighing process results in the negation of some of the evidence necessary to the plaintiff\u2019s prima facie case, the court should grant the defendant\u2019s motion and dismiss the action. Bruss, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 78.\n\u201cWe do not agree with plaintiff\u2019s argument, however, that the court\u2019s ruling in the motion for a directed finding must be considered a determination that plaintiffs testimony was credible and that his case was thus proved, precluding a judgment for defendants at the conclusion of the trial.\u201d Bruss, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 78. The court noted that if a defendant\u2019s motion is denied, the court should continue as if the motion had not been made and proceed with trial. Bruss, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 78, citing Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at 155. \u201cThe fact that the trial court did not grant either of defendants\u2019 motions does not mean that the court could not rule for defendants at the conclusion of the trial, even based on a ground raised in the motions.\u201d Bruss, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 78.\nTherefore, we find that the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion for directed finding did not cause its final judgment to be against the manifest weight of the evidence.\n2. Tortious interference with business expectancy\nPlaintiffs also contend that the trial court\u2019s finding that Chicago\u2019s Pizza, Inc., failed to prove tortious interference with business expectancy was against the manifest weight of the evidence. This tort recognizes that a person\u2019s business relationships constitute a property interest and, as such, are entitled to protection from unjustified tampering by another. Miller v. Lockport Realty Group, Inc., 377 Ill. App. 3d 369, 373 (2007). The elements of the tort of intentional interference with a business expectancy include (1) a reasonable expectancy of entering into a valid business relationship; (2) the defendant\u2019s knowledge of the expectancy; (3) the defendant\u2019s intentional and unjustified interference that prevents the realization of the business expectancy; and (4) damages resulting from the interference. Mannion v. Stallings & Co., Inc., 204 Ill. App. 3d 179, 188 (1990). A cause of action for intentional interference with a business expectancy need not be based on an enforceable contract that is interfered with; rather, it is the interference with the relationship that creates the actionable tort. Lusher v. Becker Brothers, Inc., 155 Ill. App. 3d 866, 869-70 (1987).\nPlaintiffs first argue that they proved a reasonable expectancy of maintaining and entering into business relationships with existing and new customers. Specifically, they had a reasonable expectancy of maintaining business relationships with Stern, Poole, Cohen, and other customers deceived by defendants, and of entering into a new business relationship with DeArmond.\nThe trial court found that while Flores apparently had a good product and loyal customers, \u201cin the very competitive food business, he could lose any of them for any number of reasons.\u201d Similarly, defendants, citing Intervisual Communications, Inc. v. Volkert, 975 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Ill. 1997), argue that offering proof of a past customer relationship is not sufficient to prove a reasonable expectation of a future business relationship. In Intervisual, the court stated that the first element requires the plaintiff to \u201cspecifically identify [third] parties who actually contemplated entering into a business relationship with him.\u201d Intervisual, 975 F. Supp. at 1103. If a plaintiff were not required to specifically identify parties who actually contemplated entering into a business relationship with him, \u201c \u2018liability under a theory of tortious interference with prospective business expectancies would be virtually without limit and impossible to calculate.\u2019 \u201d Intervisual, 975 F. Supp. at 1103, quoting Celex Group, Inc. v. The Executive Gallery, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1114, 1125 n.19 (N.D. Ill. 1995).\nIt is clear that Wolf Stern contemplated a business relationship with plaintiffs, as he called defendants\u2019 store and asked for the phone number of the Lincoln Avenue location. The person Stern spoke to asked for his address and said they could deliver from the \u201cSheridan location.\u201d When he ordered from defendants, he believed he was doing business with plaintiffs. Jason Bitterman also ordered from defendants, believing he was doing business with the Chicago\u2019s Pizza on Lincoln and Sheffield. Furthermore, this court has previously ruled that \u201cthe opportunity to obtain customers is an expectancy protected by the tort of interference with a business expectancy.\u201d Downers Grove Volkswagen, Inc. v. Wigglesworth Imports, Inc., 190 Ill. App. 3d 524, 529 (1989), citing North Broadway Motors, Inc. v. Fiat Motors of North America, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 466, 1117 (N.D. Ill. 1984). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7766B, Comment c, at 22 (1979) (one type of protected relation is \u201cinterference with a continuing business or other customary relationship not amounting to a formal contract\u201d).\nSecond, the name of defendants\u2019 restaurant and their advertising campaign suggest the defendants\u2019 knowledge of the expectancy. Also, defendants deceived customers Stern, DeArmond, Poole, and Cohen into thinking they were an affiliate of plaintiffs\u2019.\nPlaintiffs contend that they satisfied the third element, the defendants\u2019 intentional and unjustified interference that prevents the realization of the business expectancy. To prevail, it is insufficient for a plaintiff to merely show that the defendant interfered with a business expectancy. Rather, \u201c[t]he element of \u2018purposeful\u2019 or \u2018intentional\u2019 interference refers to some impropriety committed by the defendant in interfering with the plaintiffs expectancy.\u201d Romanek v. Connelly, 324 Ill. App. 3d 393, 406 (2001); Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7766B, Comment a, at 20 (1979). Plaintiffs must prove that defendants acted \u201cintentionally with the aim of injuring\u201d plaintiffs\u2019 expectancy. Romanek, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 406. While \u201cone may not simply sue any competitor who lures away customers, *** the privilege of competition is not available to those who use wrongful means to interfere.\u201d Downers Grove Volkswagen, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 528.\nPlaintiffs argue that defendants intentionally and unjustifiably prevented plaintiffs\u2019 realization of doing business with Stern, DeArmond, Poole, and Cohen by allowing them to place orders with defendants and then lying to Poole and DeArmond about the affiliation. While the trial court found that defendants used a distinctive logo on their advertising, we disagree with their argument that Bitter-man and Cohen simply mistook defendants\u2019 ad for plaintiffs\u2019. Defendants\u2019 ads represented that they had numerous locations when they only had one. Two of the four locations (Downtown/Loop, Lakefront/Sheridan/Loyola) described in several of defendants\u2019 ads did not match plaintiffs\u2019; however, two others (Lincoln/Sheffield, Montrose/Wilson) corresponded with plaintiffs\u2019 Lincoln, Sheffield, and Montrose stores.\nThe fourth element is damages resulting from the interference. Mannion, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 188. \u201cAlthough the amount of an award of lost profits need not be proven with absolute certainty, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving such damages with reasonable certainty.\u201d SK Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 284 Ill. App. 3d 417, 426-27 (1996). Plaintiffs contend that they suffered damages because defendants diverted four specific orders, and Stern refused to do his usual weekly business with plaintiffs for one year. They also cite Rem-er\u2019s testimony that plaintiffs\u2019 lost sales for 2002 and 2003 exceeded $730,000 and their lost profits were $500,000. Significantly, plaintiffs do not challenge any of the trial court\u2019s specific findings as to damages. The trial court concluded that plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving that defendants interfered with their business in such a manner to cause them to lose revenue.\nRegarding the diversion of specific orders, as the trial court found, each witness testified that he or she returned to ordering from plaintiffs. Furthermore, the only customer to testify as to defendants\u2019 actions during 2002 and 2003, the time when plaintiffs alleged, and their expert testified to, diminished sales, was Stern.\nFurthermore, the trial court rejected Remer\u2019s testimony because he did not conduct an independent investigation as to changes in the industry, the area of the city, or of people\u2019s eating habits at the time of the alleged decline in revenue. In addition, Remer accepted Flores\u2019s explanation as to lost revenues. While Remer testified that defendants\u2019 records were inaccurate and that his gross sales must have been $800,000 a year, the trial court doubted whether defendants earned that much if the food was as bad as plaintiffs\u2019 witnesses testified it was.\nIn addition, Remer\u2019s initial figures were based on erroneous assumption that the Lincoln dining room did not open until 2002, when in fact it opened in 2001. Remer agreed that if there was a dining room operating in 2001, his numbers \u201cwould have to be changed,\u201d but he did not testify as to what that change would be. He also testified that before he learned that the dining room revenue needed to be added to the damages calculation, he had concluded that plaintiffs\u2019 lost sales \u201cappeared to be minimal.\u201d We find that the trial court\u2019s conclusion as to damages was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nTherefore, we conclude that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the trial court\u2019s findings as to tortious interference with business expectancy were against the manifest weight of the evidence.\n3. Deceptive Trade Practices Act\nPlaintiffs argue that they are entitled to injunctive relief and attorney fees because defendants violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The purpose of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act is to prohibit unfair competition, and it is primarily directed toward acts that unreasonably interfere with another\u2019s conduct of his or her business. Phillips v. Cox, 261 Ill. App. 3d 78, 81 (1994). \u201cUnfair competition is a broader concept than trademark infringement and depends upon likelihood of confusion as to the source of plaintiffs goods when the whole product, rather than just the service mark, is considered.\u201d Thompson v. Spring-Green Lawn Care Corp., 126 Ill. App. 3d 99, 113 (1984); Phillips, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 81. A plaintiff may be granted relief under the theory of unfair competition regardless of whether his product or service is in direct competition with the defendant\u2019s product or service. Thompson, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 113.\nIn relevant part, section 2 of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act provides:\n\u201cA person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his or her business, vocation, or occupation, the person:\n(1) passes off goods or services as those of another;\n(2) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services;\n(3) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection, or association with or certification by another;\n(4) uses deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in connection with goods and services;\n(5) represents that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that he or she does not have;\n* * *\n(8) disparages the goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading representation of fact;\n(9) advertises goods with intent not to sell them as advertised;\n\u00ed|\u00ed\n(12) engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding.\u201d 815 ILCS 510/2(a) (West 2004).\nIn order to prevail under section 2, \u201ca plaintiff need not prove *** actual confusion or misunderstanding.\u201d 815 ILCS 510/2(b) (West 2004).\nThe trial court found that plaintiffs did not prove that defendants\u2019 conduct caused their lost revenue, a finding that we concluded is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, the Deceptive Trade Practices Act does not require proof of \u201cmonetary damages, loss of profit, or intent to deceive\u201d to merit injunctive relief. 815 ILCS 510/3 (West 2004). In fact, plaintiffs cannot seek damages under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Empire Home Services, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 671; Greenberg v. United Airlines, 206 Ill. App. 3d 40, 46 (1990). Rather, a \u201cperson likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade practice of another may be granted injunctive relief upon terms that the court considers reasonable.\u201d 815 ILCS 510/3 (West 2004); Greenberg, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 47. See Disc Jockey Referral Network, Ltd. v. Ameritech Publishing of Illinois, 230 Ill. App. 3d 908, 915 (1992) (\u201cPrivate suits for injunctive relief may be brought in situations where one competitor is harmed or may be harmed by the unfair trade practices of another\u201d). In Bingham v. Inter-Track Partners, 234 Ill. App. 3d 615, 621 (1992), the court held that \u201cinjunctive relief is warranted when a party\u2019s trade practice creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding.\u201d\nDefendants argue that they did not \u201cpass off\u201d their goods and services as those of plaintiffs because the words \u201cChicago\u2019s Pizza\u201d are generic and descriptive of the parties\u2019 location and goods. They also point out that they prominently display their distinctive logo on their advertising, menus, and telephone book listings.\nWe disagree with defendants and conclude that plaintiffs demonstrated that defendants\u2019 trade practices created a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding. Specifically, defendants\u2019 trade practices (1) cause the likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods and services, in violation of subsection 2(a)(2); (2) cause the likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection, or association with or certification by another, in violation of subsection 2(a)(3); and (3) use deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in connection with goods and services, in violation of subsection 2(a)(4). See Multiut Corp. v. Draiman, 359 Ill. App. 3d 527, 537 (2005). Defendants have also engaged in \u201cany other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding,\u201d in violation of subsection 2(a)(12). 815 ILCS 510/2(a)(12) (West 2004).\nIn addition to the similar name, defendants\u2019 menus, coupons, and ads falsely advertised numerous locations, even though they only had one. The ads urged customers to \u201ccall for your nearest location\u201d and had different numbers for the different \u201clocations.\u201d These phone numbers corresponded to each of the phony locations, so defendants appeared to have locations in different parts of the city. Two of defendants\u2019 \u201clocations\u201d (Lincoln/Sheffield, Montrose/Wilson) corresponded to plaintiffs\u2019 locations on Lincoln, Sheffield, and Montrose/ Wilson. Adding to the confusion, many of the ads and coupons that touted multiple \u201clocations\u201d did not have defendants\u2019 own address on them.\nWhile defendants blame the customers for their own alleged \u201cmistakes,\u201d it was defendants\u2019 ads that caused their confusion. Indeed, plaintiffs proved not only a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding as a result of defendants\u2019 ads and coupons, as required by the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, but also actual confusion by customers. See Thompson, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 113. For example, Anthony Poole, an established customer of plaintiffs\u2019, testified that defendants\u2019 employee told him he was ordering from the Wilson \u201clocation,\u201d when plaintiffs, not defendants, had a restaurant on Wilson. Similarly, Wolf Stern, also a regular customer of plaintiffs\u2019, called defendants because he wanted the phone number for the Lincoln Avenue location. Stern specifically testified that when he ordered a pizza, he believed he was doing business with an affiliate of plaintiffs\u2019. When he called defendants to complain about the poor quality of the food, an employee offered him a discount, which would be good at the Lincoln Avenue \u201clocation,\u201d even though plaintiffs, not defendants, had a restaurant on Lincoln Avenue. Mary DeArmond also testified that one of defendants\u2019 employees told her that their restaurant was affiliated with the Chicago\u2019s Pizza on Montrose.\nSimilarly, Joseph Bitterman saw an ad for Chicago\u2019s Pizza with different phone numbers for different locations. Bitterman called the number for the Sheffield \u201clocation\u201d believing he was calling plaintiffs\u2019 restaurant on Sheffield and placed an order. Judith Levine, a customer of plaintiffs\u2019 for 15 years, believed that defendants\u2019 coupon, which listed three \u201clocations,\u201d was for plaintiffs\u2019 restaurants until she attempted to use it. Finally, Patricia Flores testified that she called a phone number on one of defendants\u2019 ads and was advised that it was affiliated with the Chicago\u2019s Pizza on Montrose. Martin and Patricia Flores also testified that they received a number of customer complaints regarding defendants\u2019 products, even though they were not plaintiffs\u2019.\nIn Phillips, the plaintiffs bought the defendant\u2019s sign-making business, which included both real and personal property and the right to use the name \u201cDavid Cox Signs.\u201d Six years later, the defendant opened a sign-making business next door to the plaintiffs and named his business \u201cDavid R Cox d/b/a Sign Design and Construction.\u201d The plaintiffs filed a complaint for injunctive relief, claiming that the defendant diverted the plaintiffs\u2019 customers, thereby depriving them of sales and revenue. The complaint was dismissed. On appeal, the court applied the \u201cbroad language\u201d of subsection 2(12) of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and noted that any conduct that creates a likelihood of consumer confusion or misunderstanding is potentially actionable under subsection 2(12), even if the conduct is not specifically covered by other sections of the act. Phillips, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 81-82. The court held that the plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action because (1) the defendant located his sign-making business next door to the plaintiffs\u2019 business, (2) both parties were engaged in the same type of business, and (3) the defendant was operating his business under a name that is \u201cvery similar\u201d to the name used by the plaintiffs. Phillips, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 83.\nSimilarly, in Empire Home Services, the plaintiff\u2019s advertising emphasized a telephone number, 588-2300, which generated more than 1,000 responses a day. The defendant began using the phone number 588-3200, and when some potential Empire customers mistakenly phoned the defendant, told the customers that they reached Empire, or a company \u201cjust like Empire.\u201d The defendant referred the customers to Carpet America, which contacted the caller and claimed to be Empire, using a sales presentation and purchase orders similar to Empire\u2019s. The court ruled that the complaint stated a claim under subsections 2(1), (2), and (3) of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Empire Home Services, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 670.\nWhile Phillips and Empire involved the sufficiency of complaints rather than the sufficiency of the proof at trial, they demonstrate the type of conduct that this court has found violative of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Defendants used a similar name, and their ads advertised numerous locations, some of which corresponded to plaintiffs\u2019 locations on Lincoln, Sheffield, and Montrose/Wilson. In light of the evidence of defendants\u2019 ads, menus, and coupons, and the potential for customer confusion, we find that plaintiffs demonstrated that defendants violated section 2 of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Furthermore, although defendants\u2019 restaurant is currently closed, Muhammed testified that after this litigation ends, he plans to reopen his business under the name \u201cChicago\u2019s Pizza,\u201d thus perpetuating the potential for confusion. Therefore, we find that plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief. 815 ILCS 510/3 (West 2004); Empire Home Services, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 671; Greenberg, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 46.\nIn addition, costs or attorney fees may be assessed against a defendant \u201conly if the court finds that he has wilfully engaged in a deceptive trade practice.\u201d 815 ILCS 510/3 (West 2004). \u201cWillful\u201d is defined as \u201cvoluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1630 (8th ed. 2004). Muhammed denied knowing about plaintiffs\u2019 restaurants until this lawsuit was filed in 2003. Even assuming that to be the case, the uncontroverted customer testimony was that defendants continued to mislead consumers about their association with plaintiffs\u2019 restaurants after the complaint was filed. Therefore, we find because defendants \u201cwilfully engaged in a deceptive trade practice,\u201d plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney fees.\n4. Consumer Fraud Act\nPlaintiff Chicago\u2019s Pizza, Inc., also alleged a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act. Section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act provides that the use of any practice described in section 2 of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act also constitutes a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act. 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2004). While plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the same does not apply for Chicago\u2019s Pizza, Inc.\u2019s claim for violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.\nSection 10a(c) of the Consumer Fraud Act provides that \u201cin any action brought by a person under this Section, the Court may grant injunctive relief where appropriate.\u201d 815 ILCS 505/10a(c) (West 2004). We have previously held that the \u201cConsumer Fraud Act provides a private cause of action only where a plaintiff can show that he suffered damage as a result of unlawful conduct proscribed by the statute.\u201d Smith v. Prime Cable of Chicago, 276 Ill. App. 3d 843, 859 (1995). Although \u201ca violation of the Consumer Fraud Act may occur in the absence of damages, a private cause of action does not arise absent a showing of both a violation and resultant damages.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Tarin v. Pellonari, 253 Ill. App. 3d 542, 554 (1993). We find that Chicago\u2019s Pizza, Inc.\u2019s failure to prove actual damages, as described above, precludes damages or injunctive relief under the Consumer Fraud Act.\nB. Discovery\nFinally, plaintiffs contend that the trial court precluded them from engaging in complete discovery concerning defendants\u2019 financial and business records and the identity of their customers. A trial court has great latitude in ruling on discovery matters. Mutlu v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 337 Ill. App. 3d 420, 434 (2003). A trial court\u2019s rulings on such matters will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Mutlu, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 434.\nPlaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it denied them access to defendants\u2019 \u201cfinancial and business records\u201d and computer-based customer lists. Plaintiffs do not, however, cite to pages of the record for their requests or the trial court\u2019s denial. Indeed, it is unclear what requests plaintiffs are referring to. Therefore, we consider this argument waived. 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7); Feret v. Schillerstrom, 363 Ill. App. 3d 534, 541 (2006).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nPlaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the trial court\u2019s findings as to their claims for tortious interference and consumer fraud are against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, we find that plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief and attorney fees pursuant to the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Therefore, we reverse in part and remand for entry of injunctive relief and a determination as to reasonable attorney fees.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.\nCAMPBELL and O\u2019BRIEN, JJ., concur.\nTwo other menus included in the record do not list the multiple \u201clocations.\u201d\nWhile plaintiffs argue that defendants\u2019 exhibit 8 corresponds to plaintiffs\u2019 exhibits 4 and 5, exhibit 8 is missing from the record.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MURPHY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Craig D. Tobin and Tomas Petkus, both of Tobin, Petkus & Munoz LLC, of Chicago, for appellants.", "Steven J. Hampton, Ronald A. DiCerbo, and Michael J. Krautner, all of McAndrews, Held & Malloy, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHICAGO\u2019S PIZZA, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHICAGO\u2019S PIZZA FRANCHISE LIMITED USA, f/k/a Pizza USA, Inc., et al., DefendantsAppellees.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201407\u20140679\nOpinion filed August 7, 2008.\nRehearing denied September 8, 2008.\nCraig D. Tobin and Tomas Petkus, both of Tobin, Petkus & Munoz LLC, of Chicago, for appellants.\nSteven J. Hampton, Ronald A. DiCerbo, and Michael J. Krautner, all of McAndrews, Held & Malloy, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0849-01", "first_page_order": 865, "last_page_order": 886 }