{ "id": 4279057, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAURIE HERRIN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Herrin", "decision_date": "2008-09-25", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201406\u20140924", "first_page": "187", "last_page": "195", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "385 Ill. App. 3d 187" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "373 Ill. App. 3d 1129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4270375 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/373/1129-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3255149 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" }, { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 Ill. App. 3d 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3502916 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/150/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592090 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "731 N.E.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 957", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186521 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "959" }, { "page": "960" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0957-01" ] }, { "cite": "874 N.E.2d 940", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 1055", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4272301 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/375/1055-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 1376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "872 N.E.2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "851 N.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5703639 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 Ill. App. 3d 1129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4270375 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1133" }, { "page": "1131" }, { "page": "1132" }, { "page": "1133" }, { "page": "1133" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/373/1129-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3255149 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" }, { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0248-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 825, "char_count": 21404, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.874389886588898e-08, "percentile": 0.45993453672395573 }, "sha256": "12298b68f0f1ba2b086479463721f9d9a503c847226fc472f8f4e49e8750e8e1", "simhash": "1:3bf6d50023e69729", "word_count": 3452 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:58:06.429737+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAURIE HERRIN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nLaurie Herrin was found guilty of simple battery (two counts) and sentenced to 12 months of probation. Her probation was ultimately revoked, and she filed the instant appeal from the circuit court\u2019s revocation order. She claims that (1) the court lacked jurisdiction to revoke her probation, (2) revocation was improper on the merits, and (3) the court improperly ordered her to pay a public defender fee. We reverse on the first issue.\nBACKGROUND\nOn June 23, 2005, Herrin was charged by information with two counts of domestic battery. She was arrested and released the following day after posting bond. On October 17, 2005, Herrin appeared in court and entered negotiated guilty pleas involving reduction of the charges from domestic battery to simple battery. The court admonished her, accepted the pleas, and sentenced her to 12 months of probation pursuant to the plea agreement. The probation order (entered on October 17, 2005) contained a list of standard conditions with a handwritten notation stating, \u201cAll Apply.\u201d As special conditions, the order directed Herrin to pay a $200 fine, a probation fee, and a public defender fee. An \u201cX\u201d was also marked beside the following standard language: \u201cAs required by the probation officer, the Defendant shall undergo and pay for, as appropriate: medical, anger control, psychological, psychiatric, drug/alcohol and domestic violence treatment.\u201d This language was supplemented with a handwritten notation that read, \u201cONLY IF REQUIRED FOLLOWING EVAL.\u201d\nOn July 6, 2006, a probation officer filed a document in the Tazewell County circuit court styled, \u201cSTATEMENT CHARGING VIOLATION OF PROBATION AND PETITION TO REVOKE PROBATION.\u201d Through this document, the probation officer alleged that Herrin \u201cviolated the conditions of [her] probation\u201d by failing \u201cto complete substance abuse treatment ordered by probation due to her failure to schedule a substance abuse evaluation and do the recommended treatment.\u201d The document concluded as follows:\n\u201cWHEREFORE, your Petitioner prays:\na. That the Court enter an order for a summons to issue to the defendant for appearance before this Court.\nb. That on appearance of said defendant before this Court, said defendant be furnished with a copy of this Statement and Petition, and a date be set for a hearing on the above allegations charging a Violation of Probation.\nc. That at the conclusion of the hearing the Court enter an order revoking the probation of said defendant and sentence said defendant in accordance with law for the offense of which [she] was heretofore convicted herein.\u201d\nThe court summoned Herrin and appointed a public defender to represent her during the revocation proceedings. The matter was then continued on three separate dates in 2006: July 24 (by agreement of the parties), August 30 (by agreement of the parties), and October 16 (on the court\u2019s own motion). A revocation hearing ultimately occurred on November 20, 2006, more than 13 months after the order imposing a 12-month probation term. The probation officer testified that although Herrin attended two drug/alcohol evaluations, he did not \u201creceive anything in regards to her successful completion of any treatment.\u201d Written reports from the evaluations were then discussed on the record, and the parties stipulated to both reports.\nAccording to the report from the first evaluation, performed by Carolyn Sward on August 11, 2006, Herrin admitted to being an alcoholic and receiving medication to cope with alcohol cravings. She also claimed that she did not have time or money for counseling. Sward concluded that Herrin would not benefit from additional drug/alcohol counseling. According to the report from the second evaluation, performed by Pat Schaefer on November 7, 2006, Herrin took medication to prevent alcohol cravings but resisted attending or participating in treatment. Schaefer concluded that Herrin would benefit from attending Alcoholics Anonymous.\nThe defense acknowledged that Herrin had not received alcohol treatment. Herrin testified that she previously received a copy of Sward\u2019s report but did not receive a copy of Schaefer\u2019s report until the day before the hearing. She read both reports as indicating a probability that treatment would be beneficial, but she did not understand them to formally recommend treatment. She admitted to alcohol problems but denied having resisted treatment.\nThe court found that Herrin had resisted treatment and that the evaluators did not make treatment recommendations because of her resistance. This scenario, according to the court, was the \u201cindubitable equivalent of *** failure to successfully complete treatment.\u201d The following order was consequently entered:\n\u201cMATTER comes on probation hearing. Ct. finds petition proven. D\u2019s probation extended 1 year. D to submit to random drug/alcohol testing & not consume any alcohol.\u201d\nIn a subsequent order, the court directed Herrin to pay a public defender fee of $50. She then filed the instant appeal.\nANALYSIS\nHerrin\u2019s jurisdictional claim raises a question of law subject to de novo review. See In re D.G., 144 Ill. 2d 404 (1991).\nAbsent tolling of a defendant\u2019s probation term, a court has no authority to revoke the defendant\u2019s probation once the original term has expired. People v. Martinez, 150 Ill. App. 3d 516 (1986). Since Herrin\u2019s revocation hearing did not occur until after the original 12-month probation term expired, the court lacked jurisdiction unless the term was tolled. Tolling is effected by \u201c[p]ersonal service of the petition for violation of probation or the issuance of such warrant, summons or notice.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144(a) (West 2006). Of course such notice is not operative, however, unless the underlying pleading is valid. The underlying pleading in the instant case is the probation officer\u2019s \u201cSTATEMENT CHARGING VIOLATION OF PROBATION AND PETITION TO REVOKE PROBATION.\u201d We conclude that this pleading was invalid ab initio because the probation officer lacked authority to file it.\nIn People v. Dinger, 136 Ill. 2d 248 (1990), the Illinois Supreme Court held that a defendant could not petition to revoke her own probation. The court specifically observed that \u201cthe Unified Code of Corrections contemplates the revocation of an offender\u2019s probation only upon the filing by a proper party of a petition charging a violation of a condition of probation.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Dinger, 136 Ill. 2d at 259. Since this observation was dispositive, the court declined to \u201creach the State\u2019s [additional] contention that an interpretation allowing anyone other than the State\u2019s Attorney to file a petition unconstitutionally intrudes on its exclusive discretion in the management of a criminal prosecution.\u201d Dinger, 136 Ill. 2d at 259. The court thus did not address whether a nonattorney other than the defendant (such as a probation officer) can file a pleading that charges a probation violation and seeks revocation.\nIn People v. Kellems, 373 Ill. App. 3d 1129 (2007), the Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, concluded that a probation officer lacks authority to file a petition to revoke a defendant\u2019s court supervision. We agree with the basic rationale of Kellems and find it responsive to the open question from Dinger in this context. Section 5 \u2014 6\u20144(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) mentions a petition \u201ccharging a violation of a [probation] condition\u201d without specifically indicating who is authorized to file the pleading. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144(a) (West 2006). Such indication is unnecessary because the legislature has elsewhere declared, \u201cThe duty of each State\u2019s attorney shall be: To commence and prosecute all actions, *** civil and criminal, in the circuit court for his county, in which the people of the State or county may be concerned.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 55 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 9005(a)(1) (West 2006). Based on the plain meaning of this language, and a lack of any specific statutory exception applicable in the probation context, we conclude that a probation officer cannot file a pleading that charges a probation violation and seeks revocation. Such action constitutes the unauthorized practice of law and usurps the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s prerogative.\nJustice Schmidt cites subsections 5 \u2014 6\u20144(f) and (i) of the Code in reaching a contrary conclusion on this issue. We respectfully disagree with his interpretation of these provisions. Subsection 5 \u2014 6\u20144(f) authorizes \u201cthe supervising agency\u201d to move for modification of probation conditions. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144(f) (West 2006). However, such a general grant of institutional pleading authority does not answer the specific question of who can file the pleading in court. Prior to July 31, 1996, subsection 5 \u2014 6\u20144(f) explicitly stated that probation conditions could be modified \u201con motion of the probation officer.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144(f) (West 1994). However, this language was stricken by amendment through Public Act 89 \u2014 587 (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 587, eff. July 31, 1996). Probation officers have thus been removed from the pleading equation. Now the statutory language merely conveys a general grant of pleading authority to the supervising agency, which by virtue of its institutional nature cannot proceed pro se. When exercising its authority under subsection 5 \u2014 6\u20144(f), therefore, the agency must proceed like other institutional parties that plead in court \u2014 through counsel. More importantly, this discussion only encompasses motions to modify probation conditions. Authority to move for modification does not encompass authority to petition for revocation. See Dinger, 136 Ill. 2d 248.\nSubsection 5 \u2014 6\u20144(i) of the Code reads: \u201cInstead of filing a violation of probation, conditional discharge, supervision, or a sentence of county impact incarceration, an agent or employee of the supervising agency with the concurrence of his or her supervisor may serve on the defendant a Notice of Intermediate Sanctions.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144(i) (West 2006). This provision could have been worded, \u201cInstead of the State\u2019s attorney filing a violation of probation ***,\u201d but such wording was unnecessary for the reasons explained above. The State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s role as prosecutor of such actions is a foregone conclusion (see 55 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 9005(a)(1) (West 2006)) and thus does not need to be reiterated every time a statute mentions filings to initiate the proceedings. Moreover, it is inconsequential that subsection 5 \u2014 6\u20144(i) authorizes \u201can agent or employee of the supervising agency\u201d to serve a probationer with a notice of intermediate sanctions because, unlike pleading in court, such service does not constitute the practice of law. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144(3)(i) (West 2006).\nThere can be no question that the probation officer\u2019s pleading in the instant case amounted to law practice. Yet the probation officer lacks a law license. His actions not only constituted the unauthorized practice of law but also usurped the statutory prerogative of the State\u2019s Attorney.\nCONCLUSION\nFor these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell County entered on November 20, 2006, is reversed.\nReversed.\nWRIGHT, J., concurs.\nOtherwise, by comparison, the State could send a secretary, paralegal, or other nonattorney to appear in court and plead a violation of supervision or conditional discharge. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144.1(a) (West 2006) (authorizing \u201cthe State\u201d to make an \u201coral or written motion\u201d charging a violation of supervision or conditional discharge). This, of course, would constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Prosecution by the State\u2019s Attorney was not specifically mentioned here because it was a foregone conclusion, not because nonattorneys were being authorized to plead in court.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE" }, { "text": "JUSTICE SCHMIDT,\nspecially concurring:\nI concur with the majority\u2019s opinion that defendant\u2019s probation was improperly terminated. However, I disagree with the majority\u2019s analysis and, therefore, write separately.\nDefendant\u2019s initial contention is that the trial court lacked authority to act upon the petition to revoke her probation when it entered its November 20, 2006, order. As this contention raises a question of law, we review it de novo. People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 289, 851 N.E.2d 26, 31 (2006).\nDefendant\u2019s argument is based on the theories and reasoning discussed in People v. Kellems, 373 Ill. App. 3d 1129, 872 N.E.2d 390 (2007). In Kellems, the Fourth District held that a probation officer lacks authority to file a petition to revoke probation and, as such, a trial court is without authority to consider such a petition. Kellems, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 1133. The court based its reasoning on the power given by the legislature to a probation officer and to a State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office. The court noted that the legislature did not give probation officers the authority to file such a document in the Probation and Probation Officers Act (730 ILCS 110/12 (West 2004)). Kellems, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 1131.\nThe Kellems court then noted that the legislature gave, in section 3 \u2014 9005 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 9005(a)(1) (West 1992)), the authority to commence \u201cand prosecute all actions, suits, indictments[,] and prosecutions, civil and criminal, in the circuit court for his county, in which the people of the State or county may be concerned.\u201d See Kellems, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 1132. Given that this power was conferred upon the State\u2019s Attorney, and the fact that such authority had not been granted to probation officers, the Kellems court held that a court lacks \u201cauthority to consider\u201d a petition to revoke filed by a probation officer. Kellems, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 1133.\nThe State acknowledges that if we follow Kellems, the trial court lacked authority to rule on the petition and the order extending defendant\u2019s probation must be dismissed. The State responds, however, by urging us not to follow Kellems and by noting that our supreme court has never specifically addressed this issue. The State notes that in People v. Dinger, 136 Ill. 2d 248, 554 N.E.2d 1376 (1990), the supreme court merely stated that a petition must be filed by a proper party and that a defendant cannot, herself, file a petition to revoke her own probation. Dinger, 136 Ill. 2d at 259. The State notes that the Dinger court did \u201cnot reach the State\u2019s contention that an interpretation allowing anyone other than the State\u2019s Attorney to file a petition unconstitutionally intrudes on its exclusive discretion in the management of a criminal prosecution.\u201d Dinger, 136 Ill. 2d at 259. Therefore, the State argues, following Kellems would be unwise and unwarranted expansion of the \u201cDinger doctrine.\u201d\nBefore explaining my disagreement with the reasoning of the Kellems court, I must first note that the term \u201cpetition to revoke\u201d is somewhat of a misnomer. The Unified Code of Corrections (the Code) does not technically allow anyone to file a petition to revoke. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20141 et seq. (West 2006). Section 5 \u2014 6\u20144 of the Code sets forth the applicable procedures to inform the court of an alleged violation of a condition of probation. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144 (West 2006). Nowhere in this section, however, is a \u201cpetition to revoke\u201d mentioned. Technically, a \u201cpetition *** charging a violation of a condition\u201d may be filed with the court. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144(a) (West 2006). Once the petition charging a violation of a condition is filed, the court may: (1) order the issuance of a notice to the offender to be present by the county probation department or such other agency designated by the court to handle probation matters; (2) order a summons to the offender to be present for a hearing; or (3) order a warrant for the offender\u2019s arrest if there is a danger the offender will flee or cause serious harm to others. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144(a)(1) through (a)(3) (West 2006). Personal service of either the notice, summons, or warrant tolls the period of probation. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144(a) (West 2006). The Code continues by stating that the court \u201cshall conduct a hearing of the alleged violation.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144(b) (West 2006). At the hearing, the \u201cState has the burden of going forward with the evidence and proving the violation by the preponderance of the evidence.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144(c) (West 2006). Following the hearing, if the court finds a condition of probation was violated then it has many options, one of which is to revoke probation altogether and \u201cimpose any other sentence that was available under section 5 \u2014 5\u20143 of [the] Code or section 11 \u2014 501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code at the time of initial sentencing.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 6 \u2014 4(e) (West 2006).\nThe term of art, \u201cpetition to revoke,\u201d is used by many in the criminal justice arena. However, a petition to revoke is actually a petition charging a violation of a condition of probation that simply requests revocation as a consequence of the alleged violation. This distinction is somewhat significant given the Kellems court\u2019s proclamation that a probation officer lacks \u201cauthority to file a petition to revoke defendant\u2019s supervision.\u201d Kellems, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 1133. While a probation officer may not have authority to file a \u201cpetition to revoke,\u201d he or she most certainly has authorization to file a petition charging a violation of a condition of probation.\nSection 5 \u2014 6\u20144(i) states that \u201c[i]nstead of filing a violation of probation, *** an agent or employee of the supervising agency with the concurrence of his or her supervisor may serve on the defendant a Notice of Intermediate Sanctions.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144(i) (West 2006). The legislature therefore empowered the probation department to serve defendant a notice of intermediate sanctions \u201cinstead of filing a violation of probation.\u201d This language clearly evinces the legislative intent to provide a probation department with the option of filing a petition charging a violation of probation (petition to revoke) with the court or, instead, filing a notice of intermediate sanctions.\nSection 5- \u2014 6\u20144(f) further supports the conclusion that the legislature intended to give the probation department the authorization to file a petition charging a violation of a condition of probation. Paragraph (f) states that the \u201cconditions of probation *** may be modified by the court on motion of the supervising agency *** after notice and a hearing.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144(f) (West 2006). I can think of no rational reason why the legislature would allow a \u201csupervising agency\u201d to make a motion to modify probationary conditions in one breath, and deny the same agency the ability to file a petition charging a violation of a condition in another.\nIt is axiomatic to note that our primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. People v. Bailey, 375 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 874 N.E.2d 940 (2007). Therefore, I respectfully disagree with the majority\u2019s analysis and would find that probation officer Daymon Aeilts, with the concurrence of his supervisor, was authorized to file the statement charging violation of probation. The State, through the Tazewell County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office, then chose to prosecute the matter to conclusion.\nI would not address defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred when finding she violated a condition of her probation. As this court has previously stated, \u201cWe will not disturb a trial court\u2019s finding in a proceeding to revoke probation unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d People v. Clark, 313 Ill. App. 3d 957, 959, 731 N.E.2d 432, 435 (2000). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when a contrary result is clearly evident. People v. Clark, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 960. I would hold that the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant violated a condition of her probation was against the manifest weight of the evidence and would reverse the trial court\u2019s order of November 20, 2006, on that basis.\nDefendant\u2019s certificate of conditions of probation stated she shall undergo drug or alcohol treatment \u201cONLY IF REQUIRED FOLLOWING EVAL[UATION].\u201d Neither of the evaluation reports \u201crequired\u201d her to submit to treatment. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the probation department sent her any kind of notice demanding she engage in alcohol treatment. The trial court acknowledged that \u201cboth of these evaluations indicate that no recommendation [for treatment] was made.\u201d Nevertheless, the trial court found that she violated a condition of her probation because she was \u201cresistant\u201d to treatment. The opposite conclusion was the only option available to the trial court. Neither evaluator demanded or required treatment. The State never required defendant to undergo treatment. Defendant cannot be revoked for failing to do something she was never required to do. The finding that defendant violated the treatment condition of her probation was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For that reason, I concur in the majority\u2019s judgment.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE SCHMIDT," } ], "attorneys": [ "Verlin R. Meinz (argued), of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Stewart Umholtz, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pekin (Terry A. Mertel and Robert M. Hansen (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAURIE HERRIN, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201406\u20140924\nOpinion filed September 25, 2008.\nVerlin R. Meinz (argued), of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nStewart Umholtz, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pekin (Terry A. Mertel and Robert M. Hansen (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0187-01", "first_page_order": 203, "last_page_order": 211 }