{ "id": 4279535, "name": "WILLIAM BRUSS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHESTER JOHN PRZYBYLO et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Bruss v. Przybylo", "decision_date": "2008-09-26", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201406\u20140884", "first_page": "399", "last_page": "427", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "385 Ill. App. 3d 399" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1083915 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44" }, { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/351/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 F.3d 790", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9037333 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800-01", "parenthetical": "\"Milivojevich made it clear that there was no arbitrariness exception to the First Amendment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/397/0790-01" ] }, { "cite": "828 F.2d 718", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1748015 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the Supreme Court \"left open the possibility\" of civil court intervention in cases of fraud or collusion" }, { "page": "725", "parenthetical": "same" }, { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/828/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 595", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6184346 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" }, { "page": "784" }, { "page": "3025" }, { "page": "603" }, { "page": "784" }, { "page": "3025" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "696 F. Supp. 838", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7400118 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "840-41", "parenthetical": "\"The mere expulsion from a religious society, with the exclusion from a religious community, is not a harm for which courts can grant a remedy\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/696/0838-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 F.2d 355", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1862039 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/707/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "789 F.2d 392", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1573809 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396", "parenthetical": "\"The claim here relates to appellant's status and employment as a minister of the church. It therefore concerns internal church discipline, faith, and organization, all of which are governed by ecclesiastical rule, custom, and law\"" }, { "page": "396", "parenthetical": "\"The 'neutral principles' doctrine has never been extended to religious controversies in the areas of church government, order and discipline, nor should it be\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/789/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 F.2d 553", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1326610 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558-59", "parenthetical": "\"The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. *** Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/460/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "878 F.2d 1575", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10541545 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1577", "parenthetical": "\"once a court is called upon to probe into a religious body's selection and retention of clergymen, the First Amendment is implicated\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/878/1575-01" ] }, { "cite": "861 F.2d 761", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10531887 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/861/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "734 F. Supp. 30", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4076766 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"the Court can discern no justification for refusing to apply the First Amendment analysis and reasoning of the Supreme Court and lower federal court case law involving hierarchical churches to [congregational churches]\"" }, { "page": "33", "parenthetical": "\"an indispensable part of any church is the collection of individuals who have joined together in worship and constitute the church's membership\"" }, { "page": "32", "parenthetical": "following Hutchison and refusing to apply neutral principles to membership dispute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/734/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 F. Supp. 444", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4185772 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" }, { "page": "448" }, { "page": "448", "parenthetical": "\"it is clear that the plaintiffs have voluntarily submitted to be bound by the decisions of a particular religious society and that they have no recourse for review concerning the validity of their expulsion [from membership] on the issue of their gift of tongues\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/506/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "978 F.2d 940", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "943", "parenthetical": "deferring to decision of subordinate authority in hierarchical polity because Watson demands deference to \" 'the highest of the[ ] church judicatories to which the matter has been carried.' [Citation.]\" (emphasis omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 F.3d 184", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11308345 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187", "parenthetical": "Seventh Circuit" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/21/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 F. Supp. 2d 651", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3823713 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" }, { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/452/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 799", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3621013 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805", "parenthetical": "\"if plaintiff has not appealed to higher church tribunals, that is his remedy. [Citation.] If plaintiff has made such appeal and been denied relief, this court must defer to the decision of the church\"" }, { "page": "805", "parenthetical": "\"Appointment [of ministers] is undoubtedly an ecclesiastical matter to which judicial deference is mandated by the first amendment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/177/0799-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 F. Supp. 676", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3686248 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" }, { "page": "683", "parenthetical": "\"The scope of review is constitutionally limited so that the civil courts do not adjudicate ecclesiastical matters\"" }, { "page": "682", "parenthetical": "\"because the 'hands off' policy [of Milivojevich] is of constitutional dimension, we find it difficult to justify the application of a different standard where a congregational church is involved\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/591/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5414470 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 L. Ed. 120", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "weight": 6, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" }, { "page": "136-37" }, { "page": "139" }, { "page": "136" }, { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 U.S. 94", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11298982 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" }, { "page": "156" }, { "page": "116" }, { "page": "154-55" }, { "page": "120-21" }, { "page": "156-57" }, { "page": "115" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "116" }, { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/344/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3914634 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" }, { "page": "137" }, { "page": "7-8" }, { "page": "18" }, { "page": "137" }, { "page": "8" }, { "page": "16" }, { "page": "137" }, { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/280/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 F.3d 78", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7649459 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87", "parenthetical": "\"later Supreme Court opinions have recognized [Waison's] holding as grounded in concerns of constitutional dimension\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/98/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 U.S. 679", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1134226 ], "weight": 26, "year": 1872, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" }, { "page": "678" }, { "page": "722" }, { "page": "673" }, { "page": "722" }, { "page": "674" }, { "page": "725" }, { "page": "675" }, { "page": "727" }, { "page": "676" }, { "page": "728-29" }, { "page": "676-77" }, { "page": "733-34" }, { "page": "678" }, { "page": "734" }, { "page": "678" }, { "page": "728" }, { "page": "676" }, { "page": "729" }, { "page": "676", "parenthetical": "\"All who unite themselves to [a religious organization] do so with the implied consent to [its] government, and are bound to submit to it\"" }, { "page": "722" }, { "page": "674" }, { "page": "722-23" }, { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/80/0679-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5235657 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1871, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537", "parenthetical": "the \"constitution intended to guarantee, from all interference by the State, not only each man's religious faith, but his membership in the church\"" }, { "page": "537", "parenthetical": "the \"constitution intended to guarantee, from all interference by the State, not only each man's religious faith, but his membership in the church\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/58/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 F.3d 328", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 943661 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331", "parenthetical": "\"It has thus become established that the decisions of religious entities about the appointment and removal of ministers and persons in other positions of similar theological significance are beyond the ken of civil courts\"" }, { "page": "331", "parenthetical": "Fourth Circuit" }, { "page": "331", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/126/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 U.S. 367", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11334280 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368", "parenthetical": "Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ." }, { "page": "584", "parenthetical": "Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ." }, { "page": "500", "parenthetical": "Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ." }, { "page": "368" }, { "page": "584" }, { "page": "500" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/396/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 742", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5287909 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224793 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645", "parenthetical": "\"any statute which is valid under the first amendment is also valid under the Constitution of Illinois\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477692 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 872", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 4852 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "876-77" }, { "page": "844" }, { "page": "1598-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/0872-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 U.S. 440", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11317464 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" }, { "page": "665" }, { "page": "606" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "665" }, { "page": "606" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "665" }, { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/393/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5436734 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" }, { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 Ill. App. 3d 1097", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4267296 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1119" }, { "page": "1119" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/368/1097-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 Ill. App. 3d 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4264454 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657" }, { "page": "657-58" }, { "page": "658" }, { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/365/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 825", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126364 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" }, { "page": "828" }, { "page": "828" }, { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0825-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 1006", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336074 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1011" }, { "page": "1013", "parenthetical": "\"Milivojevich merely leaves open, but does not endorse, the possibility that limited review might be available in cases of fraud or collusion\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/1006-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 U.S. 696", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182027 ], "weight": 87, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "explaining the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine" }, { "parenthetical": "explaining the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine" }, { "parenthetical": "explaining the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine" }, { "page": "710" }, { "page": "163" }, { "page": "2381", "parenthetical": "applying Watson in a first amendment case" }, { "page": "707-08" }, { "page": "161-62" }, { "page": "2379-80" }, { "page": "717" }, { "page": "167" }, { "page": "2384" }, { "page": "721" }, { "page": "170" }, { "page": "2386" }, { "page": "718" }, { "page": "168" }, { "page": "2384" }, { "page": "717-18" }, { "page": "167" }, { "page": "2384" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "165" }, { "page": "2382" }, { "page": "709" }, { "page": "162" }, { "page": "2380" }, { "page": "724-25" }, { "page": "171" }, { "page": "2387-88" }, { "page": "710" }, { "page": "163" }, { "page": "2381" }, { "page": "709" }, { "page": "163" }, { "page": "2380" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "165" }, { "page": "2382" }, { "page": "721-23" }, { "page": "170" }, { "page": "2386-87" }, { "page": "721" }, { "page": "170" }, { "page": "2386" }, { "page": "720" }, { "page": "169" }, { "page": "2385-86" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "165" }, { "page": "2382" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "165" }, { "page": "2382" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "165" }, { "page": "2382" }, { "page": "723" }, { "page": "170" }, { "page": "2387" }, { "page": "722-23" }, { "page": "170-71" }, { "page": "2386-87" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "165" }, { "page": "2382" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "165" }, { "page": "2382" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "165" }, { "page": "2382" }, { "page": "712" }, { "page": "165" }, { "page": "2382" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "165" }, { "page": "2382" }, { "page": "715-16" }, { "page": "166-67" }, { "page": "2383-84" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "165" }, { "page": "2382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/426/0696-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2157, "char_count": 75896, "ocr_confidence": 0.805, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.597150932025813e-08, "percentile": 0.3507880189153885 }, "sha256": "5c33dbae0adfc6975a80a6d73b99de8a583e8c3563650c99d3bdbacca04a7fcd", "simhash": "1:eecef6232f4e14d7", "word_count": 12099 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:58:06.429737+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WILLIAM BRUSS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHESTER JOHN PRZYBYLO et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs, William and Marianne Bruss, appeal the order of the circuit court of Du Page County dismissing with prejudice their complaint pursuant to two separate motions to dismiss brought by defendants, Father Chester John Przybylo, John Suich, Beverly Suich, Joe Valdez, Carl Schaeffer, Bill Klaske, Daniel Moreno, and Delores Dooley, under sections 2 \u2014 615 and 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615, 2 \u2014 619 (West 2006)). Plaintiffs contend that the court erred in dismissing their complaint, because they stated property claims not subject to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine (see Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 49 L. Ed. 2d 151, 96 S. Ct. 2372 (1976) (explaining the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine)). Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice. We affirm.\nOn April 18, 2006, plaintiffs filed a three-count complaint for declaratory and other relief against defendants. The following facts (taken as true for purposes of our review at this stage in the proceedings (see Abrams v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc., 306 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1011 (1999))) are drawn from plaintiffs\u2019 complaint. Defendants are the pastor (Father Przybylo) and members of the board of directors (the remaining defendants) of The Shrine of Christ the King (Shrine), a church located in Winfield, Illinois, in the diocese of Joliet. The Shrine was established \u201cto promote, preserve and extend the use of the Tridentine Latin Mass of the Roman Catholic Church, according to the 1962 or earlier missal and to foster the accompanying knowledge and practices, doctrines, rights and customs at that time of the Roman Catholic Church, and to establish and maintain an independent shrine to accomplish these objectives.\u201d We infer from the record that the Shrine, while practicing Roman Catholic rites, is an independent congregation and not part of the Roman Catholic Church. Further, the Shrine was constituted as an Illinois not-for-profit corporation and not as a religious corporation. Plaintiffs attached to their complaint an unsigned copy of the constitution and bylaws of the Shrine.\nPlaintiffs alleged that they were members of the Shrine and had been members of the Shrine\u2019s board of directors for many years. Plaintiffs alleged that the individual defendants (except Father Przybylo) held themselves out as members of the Shrine and members of the Shrine\u2019s board of directors. Plaintiffs alleged that Father Przybylo purports to be an ordained Roman Catholic priest who, beginning in 1996, has been employed by the Shrine as its pastor and as a Roman Catholic priest. Plaintiffs attached to the complaint a copy of the employment contract between Father Przybylo and the Shrine. The recitals in the employment contract provided that Father Przybylo was seeking and the Shrine was offering employment as a Roman Catholic priest and pastor. The employment contract authorized Father Przybylo to provide daily mass, including Sundays and other holy days of obligation, and to perform the usual and customary priestly duties for the congregation.\nPlaintiffs alleged that Father Przybylo was not a member of any Roman Catholic diocese or religious order recognized by the Roman Catholic Church. They further alleged that Father Przybylo did not possess faculties from the Roman Catholic Church, and specifically from the Bishop of the Diocese of Joliet, to practice the rites the Shrine expected and employed him to practice.\nPlaintiffs alleged that Father Przybylo was named as a defendant in a civil action in Cook County, and they attached a copy of the Cook County complaint as an exhibit. The Cook County complaint alleged that Father Przybylo had sexually molested an anonymous minor, the plaintiff in the Cook County action.\nIn count I of their complaint, plaintiffs sought to maintain a derivative action on behalf of the Shrine, notwithstanding the fact that the Shrine was not a named party, either plaintiff or defendant, to the action. In count I, plaintiffs sought the termination or rescission of the employment agreement between Father Przybylo and the Shrine. The thrust of count I is that Father Przybylo never possessed the qualifications or ability to fulfill the terms of the employment agreement. Plaintiffs sought the disgorgement of all compensation and benefits received by Father Przybylo in addition to his termination.\nIn count II of their complaint, plaintiffs sought a declaration that the January 2006 election of the Shrine\u2019s board of directors was invalid. The thrust of count II appears to be that Father Przybylo improperly influenced, manipulated, and controlled access to voting membership among the persons of the congregation for the purpose of ultimately influencing and controlling who would be elected to the board of directors of the Shrine. In particular, plaintiffs alleged that the 2006 election of members of the board of directors of the Shrine was invalid because too many of the voters were not qualified to be voting members of the Shrine under the Shrine\u2019s constitution and bylaws. Plaintiffs alleged that, as a result of the improper 2006 election, the board of directors of the Shrine is neither properly constituted nor elected. Plaintiffs sought the following relief: (1) a review of the membership rolls of the Shrine culminating in a determination of the qualifications of the voting members of the Shrine; (2) a declaration that the January 2006 and subsequent elections are invalid; (3) the appointment of a temporary receiver to oversee and secure the Shrine\u2019s assets until valid elections can be held properly; (4) the holding of a proper election allowing the participation of all individuals who would have qualified to vote in an election in 1995 or any time thereafter; and (5) the removal of Father Przybylo from the board of directors and his ejection from the rectory to allow the Shrine to hire a new and qualified priest.\nIn count III, plaintiffs sought the suspension of Father Przybylo from his duties with the Shrine. Plaintiffs\u2019 request for suspension is based on the fact that a complaint alleging sexual improprieties was filed against Father Przybylo. Plaintiffs alleged that it is the practice of the Roman Catholic Church to suspend its clergy while charges like those in the Cook County action are being investigated. Plaintiffs alleged that the remaining defendants breached their fiduciary duties as members of the Shrine\u2019s board by failing to suspend Father Przybylo when the Cook County action was brought to their attention. As relief, plaintiffs requested that Father Przybylo be suspended from his duties pending the Shrine\u2019s investigation and resolution of the Cook County action. Plaintiffs also sought a money judgment against the other named defendants for losses or expenses incurred, or to be incurred, defending Father Przybylo against any claims arising out of the Cook County action or any similar suit.\nOn April 21, 2006, plaintiffs filed an emergency petition for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs alleged that, at a regularly scheduled board meeting of the Shrine, defendants improperly amended the minutes of previous meetings by removing references to certain unspecified actions and statements. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants improperly removed the secretary of the board because she objected to the improper amendments to the minutes of previous meetings. Plaintiffs further alleged that defendants refused to take any action in response to this lawsuit. Plaintiffs requested the prevention of further actions of the board pending the outcome of this action, the prevention of the removal of the Shrine\u2019s monetary and religious assets, the appointment of a receiver to secure the assets of the Shrine, the suspension of Father Przybylo from his duties, and the removal of Father Przybylo from any property owned by the Shrine. On April 24, 2006, the trial court denied the petition.\nOn May 26, 2006, defendants filed a motion to strike the sexual misconduct allegations and to impound the copy of the Cook County complaint, contending that the Cook County action had been improperly filed, had not been resolved, and thus amounted to little more than gossip. About a week later, on June 1, 2006, defendants filed separate motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to sections 2 \u2014 615 and 2 \u2014 619 of the Code. In the section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss, defendants asserted, among other things, that plaintiffs had not included the Shrine as a necessary party and had not sufficiently pleaded damages to entitle them to relief. In the section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss, defendants asserted that (1) plaintiffs lacked standing to prosecute their claims, because they were not currently members of the Shrine and (2) the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precluded the trial court from deciding the issues raised in plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, because, essentially, they involved matters of church governance and doctrine.\nOn August 10, 2006, the trial court heard argument on the three pending motions. The trial court granted with prejudice both the section 2 \u2014 615 and the section 2 \u2014 619 motions to dismiss and denied defendants\u2019 motion to strike and impound.\nThe trial court reasoned that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine set forth in Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 49 L. Ed. 2d 151, 96 S. Ct. 2372, prohibited civil courts from resolving disputes involving religious law and polity. The trial court reviewed the relief requested in each of the three counts, noting that count I challenged the qualifications of Father Przybylo and sought to nullify the employment contract; that count II requested the trial court to review the membership rolls and determine who was properly a voting member of the Shrine, along with invalidating all elections beginning with the January 2006 election; and that count III requested the trial court to suspend Father Przybylo from his duties as pastor and as board member of the Shrine. The trial court stated that, in counts I, II, and III, the Shrine had disputes with plaintiffs that would require the trial court \u201cto look at [the Shrine\u2019s] Constitution and its rules and apply those rules to determine the outcome\u201d of those counts. Additionally, the trial court reasoned that the case presented \u201ca matter which I believe is not a readily decidable issue involving property. *** This [case], however, does involve the interpretation of the congregation\u2019s Constitution and the intervention into its internal affairs, all three counts.\u201d The trial court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precluded it from further involvement in the matter. The trial court further found that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the claims in the complaint, owing to their expulsion from the membership of the board of the Shrine and from the membership of the Shrine itself. Thus, the trial court granted with prejudice the section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss. Turning to the section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss, the trial court did not clearly articulate the facial defects in the pleading that it discerned, but it nevertheless granted with prejudice the motion.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 counsel immediately asked the trial court whether plaintiffs should bother filing a motion seeking leave to amend the complaint; the trial court stated that such a motion would be unavailing. Plaintiffs timely appeal. We note that, on appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in denying them leave to amend, apparently based on this exchange. We believe, however, that in substance plaintiffs are actually asserting that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice, and we shall proceed with our analysis of plaintiffs\u2019 contentions with this understanding.\nOn appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court relied on the affirmative matters that provided the basis for the section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss in granting the section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs dispute the trial court\u2019s findings that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars its involvement and that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the complaint. Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court erroneously dismissed the action with prejudice instead of allowing plaintiffs the opportunity to further plead.\nWe review de novo a trial court\u2019s decision to grant a section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss. Oldendorf v. General Motors Corp., 322 Ill. App. 3d 825, 828 (2001). A section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss \u201cattacks the legal sufficiency of a complaint by asserting that it fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.\u201d Oldendorf, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 828. In deciding a section 2 \u2014 615 motion, the trial court is to consider only those facts apparent from the face of the complaint, matters of which the trial court may take judicial notice, and any judicial admissions contained in the record. Oldendorf, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 828. The trial court will take as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint along with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the well-pleaded allegations; the trial court is to view the allegations and inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Oldendorf, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 828.\nSimilarly, we review de novo a trial court\u2019s decision to grant a section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss. Zahl v. Krupa, 365 Ill. App. 3d 653, 657 (2006). A section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss admits the legal sufficiency of the claims but raises defenses or affirmative matters that defeat the claims. Zahl, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 657-58. The questions presented on review of a section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss are whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Zahl, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 658. Like a section 2 \u2014 615 motion, when considering a section 2 \u2014 619 motion, the trial court is to accept as true all well-pleaded facts and to make all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Zahl, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 658.\nFinally, whether pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 or section 2 \u2014 619, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice only if it is apparent that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that will entitle him or her to recover. Village of Roselle v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1097, 1119 (2006). Where a claim can be stated, the trial court abuses its discretion if it dismisses the complaint with prejudice and refuses the plaintiff further opportunities to plead. Muirfield Village-Vernon Hills, LLC v. K. Reinke, Jr., & Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d 178, 195 (2004). We thus review the trial court\u2019s decision to dismiss a complaint with prejudice for an abuse of discretion. Muirfield Village, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 195.\nBefore commencing our analysis of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint with respect to defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss, we initially address an argument defendants raise on appeal. Defendants urge this court to strike all reference to the Cook County action and to strike from the record the copy of the Cook County complaint appended to plaintiffs\u2019 complaint. We note that defendants did not file a motion in the trial court to that effect and they did not file a cross-appeal on that issue. Accordingly, we hold that defendants\u2019 request is not properly before us on appeal and decline to consider further defendants\u2019 contentions on the issue of the Cook County action.\nBefore engaging with the intricacies of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, we briefly deal with the trial court\u2019s alternate basis for dismissing the complaint with prejudice pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code: plaintiffs\u2019 standing. The trial court held that plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain this action. Below, defendants argued, and the trial court accepted, that plaintiffs pleaded no direct injuries different from those that other members would have experienced. Plaintiffs concede that they have attempted to bring derivative claims on behalf of the Shrine for the conduct they alleged in their complaint. Defendants further reasoned that, because plaintiffs were expelled from the Shrine, they no longer had any standing to bring either individual or derivative actions involving the Shrine. The trial court apparently adopted this rationale, holding that plaintiffs lacked standing because they had been expelled from membership of the Shrine\u2019s board of directors and from membership of the Shrine itself. We find this to be error.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 expulsion occurred, according to the affidavit submitted with defendants\u2019 section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss, in May 2006. This action was filed April 18, 2006, before the expulsion occurred. At the time the action was filed, plaintiffs were members of both the Shrine and its board of directors. Defendants point to no authority that would retroactively divest plaintiffs of standing in light of actions that defendants had undertaken after a suit had been filed. We hold that plaintiffs had sufficient standing to bring either individual or derivative claims and that the trial court erred in dismissing this action for plaintiffs\u2019 lack of standing.\nWe now consider the trial court\u2019s application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part: \u201cCongress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ***.\u201d U.S. Const., amend. I. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is rooted in both the free exercise and the establishment clauses of the first amendment. See Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 21 L. Ed. 2d 658, 665, 89 S. Ct. 601, 606 (1969); J. Nowak & R. Rotunda, Constitutional Law \u00a717.12, at 1413 (6th ed. 2000) (\u201cOf course, the government cannot declare which party is correct in matters of religion, for that would violate the principles of both religion clauses. A judicial declaration of such matters would simultaneously establish one religious view as correct for the organization while inhibiting the free exercise of the opposing belief\u201d). The first amendment is applicable to the states by its incorporation into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876, 844, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1598-99 (1990). Illinois has its own constitutional protection of free exercise and prohibition of establishment. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a73 (\u201cThe free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall forever be guaranteed ***. No person shall be required to attend or support any ministry or place of worship against his consent, nor shall any preference be given by law to any religious denomination or mode of worship\u201d). \u201cState courts have the authority to interpret their respective constitutional provisions more broadly than United States Supreme Court interpretations of similar Federal constitutional provisions.\u201d People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414, 426 (1994). Illinois courts, however, construe the protections of article I, section 3, as coextensive with the corresponding protections of the first amendment. See People v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635, 645 (2000) (\u201cany statute which is valid under the first amendment is also valid under the Constitution of Illinois\u201d). In interpreting the United States Constitution, Illinois courts follow, as they must, the United States Supreme Court, the final arbiter of the Constitution. People v. Nally, 216 Ill. App. 3d 742, 764 (1991). Accordingly, the decisions of the Supreme Court are the touchstone for our understanding of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.\nThe parties agree that the Shrine is a congregational church, independent and autonomous. The parties disagree over whether the Shrine\u2019s polity is itself of consequence to this matter. Plaintiffs claim it is, but do not elaborate. Defendants have the correct view, contending that \u201cany church, whether hierarchical or congregational, has the autonomy [to] select the clergy.\u201d (Emphasis added.) As we demonstrate below, if the subject matter of an internal church dispute is not appropriate for state intervention, then abstention is equally compulsory whether the church is congregational or hierarchical, and whether the dispute has been addressed by an adjudicatory body, if any, within the church.\nAs for the subject matter of this dispute, the parties characterize it differently. Plaintiffs claim that the dispute is ultimately about property rights and therefore abstention is unwarranted. See, e.g., Maryland, & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368, 24 L. Ed. 2d 582, 584, 90 S. Ct. 499, 500 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ.) (\u201ca State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters\u201d (emphasis in original)). Defendants argue that the dispute is principally about Father Przybylo\u2019s fitness as a pastor and about the qualifications of certain purported voting members of the Shrine. Defendants contend, therefore, that improper state involvement in quintessentially ecclesiastical matters is inevitable if this case is adjudicated by our courts. See Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (\u201cIt has thus become established that the decisions of religious entities about the appointment and removal of ministers and persons in other positions of similar theological significance are beyond the ken of civil courts\u201d); Chase v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 509, 537 (1871) (the \u201cconstitution intended to guarantee, from all interference by the State, not only each man\u2019s religious faith, but his membership in the church\u201d).\nWe begin our analysis by, first, extracting the general outlines of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine from the decisions of the Supreme Court and, second, reviewing how lower courts have refined those principles. The Supreme Court\u2019s major decisions in this area all concern hierarchical churches, but a careful reading of the cases will disclose principles applicable to all manner of church polity.\nOur survey begins with Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 20 L. Ed. 666 (1872), universally regarded by the federal courts as the genesis of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. Watson derived the doctrine from federal common law, but the Court later incorporated Watson\u2019s principles into its first amendment jurisprudence. See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 163, 96 S. Ct. at 2381 (applying Watson in a first amendment case); Scotts African Union Methodist Protestant Church v. Conference of African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church, 98 F.3d 78, 87 (3d Cir. 1996) (\u201clater Supreme Court opinions have recognized [Waison\u2019s] holding as grounded in concerns of constitutional dimension\u201d). Watson concerned a fracture within the Walnut Street Church, a local congregation of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUSA), a hierarchical polity overseen ultimately by a general assembly, \u201cthe highest judicatory\u201d of the PCUSA. Watson, 80 U.S. at 734, 20 L. Ed. at 678. The real property of the Walnut Street Church had been deeded to the church trustees for use in keeping with the fundamental laws of the PCUSA. In May 1865, the general assembly of the PCUSA expressed loyalty to the federal government and denounced slavery. This declaration led the Walnut Street Church to split into pro- and anti-slavery camps. The pro-slavery group, the minority within the church, claimed title to the church property because its views were more consistent historically with the PCUSA\u2019s beliefs. Fractures along the same lines developed in the Presbytery of Louisville and the Synod of Kentucky, the intermediate governing bodies with jurisdiction over the Walnut Street Church. The factions within the Walnut Street Church allied themselves with their corresponding factions within the Presbytery and the Synod. The general assembly declared the pro-slavery contingents within the Synod and the Presbytery illegitimate and excluded them from membership in the assembly. This declaration effectively designated the anti-slavery contingent as the true and legitimate Walnut Street Church and thus the rightful owner of the church property. Watson, 80 U.S. at 722, 20 L. Ed. at 673.\nThe anti-slavery faction within the Walnut Street Church sued to determine ownership of the church property. During the pendency of the suit, the anti-slavery factions of the Presbytery and the Synod, together with their adherents within the Walnut Street Church, formally separated from the PCUSA and joined a different denomination. Watson, 80 U.S. at 722, 20 L. Ed. at 674.\nThe Supreme Court held that the controversy was inappropriate for adjudication by civil courts. As with many of its holdings in this area, the Court\u2019s holding in Watson is couched in terms particular to hierarchical churches, but the core, determinative principles, which admittedly are somewhat difficult to extract, are not limited to any particular church polity. Facially, the Court\u2019s holding in Watson is based on a rule of deference to a church\u2019s own prior adjudication of the dispute brought to the civil courts. This, in short, is \u201cprocedural deference.\u201d Closer examination of Watson, however, discloses a more fundamental rule of deference tied strictly to the subject matter of a dispute, or \u201csubject-matter deference.\u201d On the best reading of the Supreme Court decisions, a reading supported by lower federal decisions, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine fulfills its aim only if subject-matter deference is considered the controlling principle behind the doctrine. Where the subject matter of a church dispute is not appropriate for secular adjudication, courts must abstain even if the church has not itself taken formal action on the dispute.\nThe Court in Watson began its analysis by describing how the rule of procedural deference operates based on the organization of the church. The Court began with congregational churches:\n\u201cIn such cases, where there is a schism [in a congregational church] which leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting bodies, the rights of such bodies to the use of the property must be determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations. If the principle of government in such cases is that the majority rules, then the numerical majority of members must control the right to the use of the property. If there be within the congregation officers in whom are vested the powers of such control, then those who adhere to the acknowledged organism by which the body is governed are entitled to the use of the property.\u201d Watson, 80 U.S. at 725, 20 L. Ed. at 675.\nTurning to hierarchical churches, the Court said:\n\u201c[I]n cases of this character we are bound to look at the fact that the local congregation is itself but a member of a much larger and more important religious organization, and is under its government and control, and is bound by its orders and judgments. There are in the Presbyterian system of ecclesiastical government, in regular succession, the Presbytery over the session or local church, the Synod over the Presbytery, and the general assembly over all. These are called, in the language of the church organs, \u2018judicatories,\u2019 and they entertain appeals from the decisions of those below, and prescribe corrective measures in other cases.\nIn this class of cases we think the rule of action which should govern the civil courts, founded [on] a broad and sound view of the relations of church and state under our system of laws, and supported by a preponderating weight of judicial authority is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Watson, 80 U.S. at 727, 20 L. Ed. at 676.\nThe emphasized language articulates a rule of abstention that appears to combine subject-matter deference with procedural deference. The Court mandates abstention in (1) a certain class of cases (2) decided by church judicatories. But shortly later in the opinion, the Court speaks of subject-matter deference in isolation:\n\u201cIn this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property,[] and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to a total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Watson, 80 U.S. at 728-29, 20 L. Ed. at 676-77.\nThe emphasized language at the start of this passage expresses values that are consistent with a subject-matter deference that applies without regard to church structure and procedures. Though procedural considerations occupy the remainder of the passage, the Court would shortly again speak of subject-matter deference in isolation. Criticizing the Kentucky state court in the case for holding that secular abstention from a church controversy is necessary only where \u201cthe [church] tribunal acted within its jurisdiction,\u201d the Court said:\n\u201c[I]t may very well be conceded that if the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church should undertake to try one of its members for murder, and punish him with death or imprisonment, its sentence would be of no validity in a civil court or anywhere else. Or if it should at the instance of one of its members entertain jurisdiction as between him and another member as to their individual right to property, real or personal, the right in no sense depending on ecclesiastical questions, its decision would be utterly disregarded by any civil court where it might be set up.[] ***\nBut it is a very different thing where a subject-matter of dispute, strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character \u2014 a matter over which the civil courts exercise no jurisdiction \u2014 a matter which concerns theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them \u2014 becomes the subject of its action. It may be said here, also, that no jurisdiction has been conferred on the tribunal to try the particular case before it, or that, in its judgment, it exceeds the powers conferred upon it, or that the laws of the church do not authorize the particular form of proceeding adopted; and, in a sense often used in the courts, all of [these] may be said to be questions of jurisdiction. But it is easy to see that if the civil courts are to inquire into all these matters, the whole subject of the doctrinal theology, the usages and customs, the written laws, and fundamental organization of every religious denomination may, and must, be examined into with minuteness and care, for they would become, in almost every case, the criteria by which the validity of the ecclesiastical decree would be determined in the civil court. This principle would deprive these bodies of the right of construing their own church laws *** and would in effect transfer to the civil courts where property rights were concerned the decision of all ecclesiastical questions.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Watson, 80 U.S. at 733-34, 20 L. Ed. at 678.\nWith this, the Court abruptly ended its discussion and decided the case on the more prosaic doctrine of standing, ruling that the plaintiffs no longer had a stake in the property of the Walnut Street Church because they had left the PCUSA. Watson, 80 U.S. at 734, 20 L. Ed. at 678.\nAs we see it, the Court\u2019s directive for secular courts to defer to church adjudications of ecclesiastical controversies was just the surface holding of the case. That holding was, of course, valid for the facts in Watson because the controversy had been addressed by a judicatory body of the PCUSA. Unmistakable signs of a broader holding, however, are evident in the instances where the Court enumerates the subjects inappropriate for secular courts without suggesting that the duty to abstain from those subjects depends, in any given case, on where the controversy lies within the procedural channels of the church. In view of these passages, we cannot believe that the Court would have intervened in the Walnut Street Church controversy if the governing body of the PCUSA had not previously acted to settle the division within the denomination. That is, though the applied holding in Watson invokes subject-matter and procedural considerations, the Court\u2019s larger discussion reveals that the subject-matter considerations bore the weight of the decision and that the PCUSA\u2019s action was nonessential to the outcome.\nThe Court\u2019s next two decisions in this area, Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 74 L. Ed. 131, 50 S. Ct. 5 (1929), and Kedroff u. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 97 L. Ed. 120, 73 S. Ct. 143 (1952), are straightforward applications of Watson. Like Watson, Gonzalez was decided before the first amendment was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. The plaintiff in Gonzalez sued a Roman Catholic archbishop, claiming a right to be appointed a chaplain in the archbishop\u2019s diocese pursuant to a trust established decades earlier by the plaintiff\u2019s ancestor. The archbishop had refused to appoint the plaintiff because he did not meet the qualifications of a chaplain as set forth in canon law. In a brief discussion, the Court deferred to the archbishop\u2019s decision:\n\u201cAmong the Church\u2019s laws which are thus claimed to be applicable are those creating tribunals for the determination of ecclesiastical controversies. Because the appointment is a canonical act, it is the function of the Church authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses them. In the absence of fraud, collusion or arbitrariness,[] the decisions of the proper Church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise.\u201d Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16, 74 L. Ed. at 137, 50 S. Ct. at 7-8.\nNoting that there was \u201cnot even a suggestion that [the archbishop] exercised his authority arbitrarily,\u201d the Court found no ground for intervening. Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 18, 74 L. Ed. at 137, 50 S. Ct. at 8.\nProcedural and subject-matter considerations are intertwined in the Court\u2019s discussion, yet we cannot imagine that the Court would have intervened if the plaintiff had gone directly to the courts and the \u201cChurch authorities\u201d had not previously acted on his petition. Moreover, we believe the Court would have justified its abstention by reference to the content of the controversy, i.e., the qualifications of clergy.\nIn Kedroff, the Court was asked to decide whether the right to use and occupy a cathedral in New York was held by the Russian Orthodox Church, a hierarchical denomination whose supreme authority was seated in Moscow, or by the American diocese of that denomination, which had title to the property. The issue turned on the constitutionality of a New York statute that purported to grant autonomy to the American diocese, which had elected its own ruling prelate. The Court found that the statute effectively \u201cprohibit[ed] the free exercise of an ecclesiastical right, the Church\u2019s choice of [authority]\u201d because it \u201c[b]y fiat *** displace[d] one church administrator with another\u201d and \u201cpasse[d] the control of matters strictly ecclesiastical from one church authority to another.\u201d Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 119, 97 L. Ed. at 138, 73 S. Ct. at 156. The Court discussed Watson and quoted from it at length, including this statement:\n\u201cIn this country the full and free right to entertain any religious brief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all.\u201d Watson, 80 U.S. at 728, 20 L. Ed. at 676.\nAccording to the Court, Watson\n\u201cradiates *** a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine. Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven,[] we think, must now he said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of religion against state interference.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116, 97 L. Ed. at 136-37, 73 S. Ct. at 154-55.\nConsistent with Watson, the Court also recognized the State\u2019s special interest in determining property rights:\n\u201cThere are occasions when civil courts must draw lines between the responsibilities of church and state for the disposition or use of property. Even in those cases when the property right follows as an incident from decisions of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues, the church rule controls.\u201d Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 120-21, 97 L. Ed. at 139, 73 S. Ct. at 156-57.\nThe Court concluded that it should abstain because the dispute was foremost \u201ca matter of ecclesiastical government\u201d that involved property rights only incidentally. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 115, 97 L. Ed. at 136, 73 S. Ct. at 154.\nHere again, the Court\u2019s emphasis on what subjects are forbidden to courts was such that we cannot imagine the Court ruling differently had the New York statute purported to confirm rather than abrogate the power of the Russian Orthodox Church over the American diocese. In that scenario, the church hierarchy would not be infringed but the statute nonetheless would be invalid as an attempt by the state to act in matters of church administration.\nNext to Watson, the Court\u2019s most quoted decision on ecclesiastical abstention is Milivojevich. Milivojevich, like Watson, is a lengthy decision full of lofty pronouncements on the proper stance of the state toward church disputes. In Milivojevich, the Holy Assembly of the hierarchical Serbian Orthodox Church (Mother Church) removed the plaintiff as bishop of the Mother Church\u2019s American-Canadian Diocese (Diocese) on grounds of misconduct and reorganized the Diocese into three parts. The plaintiff asked the civil courts to declare these actions invalid because they were not taken according to the Mother Church\u2019s constitution and laws. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 707-08, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 161-62, 96 S. Ct. at 2379-80.\nThe Court held that abstention was clearly mandatory under the principles of Watson and its progeny. The substance of the dispute, the Court found, was of ecclesiastical concern. First, as to the defrockment of the plaintiff, the Court observed that \u201cquestions of church discipline and the composition of the church hierarchy are at the core of ecclesiastical concern\u201d and that \u201cthe bishop of a church is clearly one of the central figures in such a hierarchy.\u201d Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 717, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 167, 96 S. Ct. at 2384. Second, the reorganization of the Diocese \u201cinvolv[ed] a matter of internal church government, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical affairs.\u201d Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 721, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 170, 96 S. Ct. at 2386.\nThe Court did not, however, end its discussion here. The Court consumed a great deal of space criticizing the Supreme Court of Illinois for questioning the Mother Church\u2019s procedures. The Illinois court claimed to apply the \u201carbitrariness\u201d prong of the Gonzalez exception to abstention. The Illinois court found that the removal of the plaintiff was \u201c \u2018arbitrary\u2019 \u201d because it was not \u201c \u2018in accordance with the prescribed procedure of the constitution and the penal code of the [Mother Church].\u2019 \u201d Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 718, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 168, 96 S. Ct. at 2384, quoting Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America & Canada v. Milivojevich, 60 Ill. 2d 477, 503 (1975). According to the Court, the Illinois court should have abstained once it was apparent that the Holy Assembly was the church body \u201cin whose sole discretion the authority to make those ecclesiastical decisions [was] vested.\u201d Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 717-18, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 167, 96 S. Ct. at 2384. The inquiry of the Illinois court into whether \u201cthe decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulations\u201d was prohibited by \u201cthe constitutional mandate that civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.\u201d Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 165, 96 S. Ct. at 2382.\nIn two places in the opinion, the Court stated its broader holding. Early in the decision the Court said:\n\u201cFor where resolution of [a] dispute[ ] cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as binding on them, in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before them.\u201d Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 162, 96 S. Ct. at 2380.\nIn the final paragraph of the case, the Court said:\n\u201c[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments permit hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters. When this choice is exercised and ecclesiastical tribunals are created to decide disputes over the government and direction of subordinate bodies, the Constitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon them.\u201d Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 724-25, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 171, 96 S. Ct. at 2387-88.\nThis passage might lead the reader to conclude that abstention from a church controversy is required only where: (1) the controversy concerns a certain subject matter; and (2) the church is hierarchical and its highest tribunals have addressed the controversy. This is not a reasonable reading in the context of the case. In these passages, the Court is not limiting the scope of the abstention doctrine to any particular church polity, or requiring a prior adjudication by the church as a prerequisite to abstention. Such would be grossly inconsistent with the several instances elsewhere in the opinion where the Court stresses, without reference to any particular kind of church or church procedure, that civil courts may not resolve controversies on certain subjects. The Court says, for instance, that courts must not decide \u201c \u2018controversies over religious doctrine and practice.\u2019 \u201d (Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 163, 96 S. Ct. at 2381, quoting Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 449, 21 L. Ed. 2d at 665, 89 S. Ct. at 606) or \u201cbecome entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs\u201d (Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 163, 96 S. Ct. at 2380). What we believe the Court is doing in the above passages is casting its rejection of the Gonzalez \u201carbitrariness\u201d exception in terms particular to hierarchical churches. The Court is reinforcing the point, which it made in critiquing the Illinois court, that civil courts must not inquire \u201cwhether the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulations\u201d (Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 165, 96 S. Ct. at 2382). We cannot read Milivojevich as undercutting the Court\u2019s holdings in prior cases that, where the subject matter of a dispute concerns ecclesiastical matters, a court must abstain no matter the type of church polity involved or the presence or absence of a prior church adjudication of the controversy.\nWe note two other important aspects of the Court\u2019s decision in Milivojevich. First, the Court rejected the Illinois court\u2019s purported application of \u201cneutral principles\u201d to the constitutions of the Mother Church and the Diocese. The Illinois court had concluded that these documents granted the Diocese administrative autonomy. The Court refused to explore the \u201cvarious church constitutional provisions relevant to [the Illinois court\u2019s] conclusion,\u201d for the provisions \u201cwere not so express that the civil courts could enforce them without engaging in a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity.\u201d Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 721-23, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 170, 96 S. Ct. at 2386-87. It \u201csuffice[d]\u201d that \u201cthe final province\u201d on matters of church polity lay with the Holy Assembly. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 721, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 170, 96 S. Ct. at 2386.\nSecond, the Court refused to view the matter as a church property dispute. If the Holy Assembly\u2019s decisions implicated property rights, it was \u201cthe incidental effect of an ecclesiastical determination that [was] not subject to judicial abrogation, having been reached by the final church judicatory in which authority to make the decision resides.\u201d Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 720, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 169, 96 S. Ct. at 2385-86.\nAs we have seen, Milivojevich is a somewhat challenging case from which to extract general principles given the Court\u2019s repeated couching of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in terms of a particular kind of church polity, namely a hierarchy, and more specifically a hierarchy whose highest tribunal, or judicatory authorities, has ruled on the matter. So worded, these holdings say nothing about a duty to abstain in the case of: (1) a hierarchical church whose highest judicatory levels the dispute did not reach before it was brought to the civil courts; (2) a congregational church; or (3) a church, whether hierarchical or congregational, that lacks adjudicatory bodies altogether. The question is whether, under the Court\u2019s abstention jurisprudence, a church dispute must have reached a certain position within the church polity before abstention is mandated, or whether the subject matter of the dispute is a sufficient, and perhaps the only appropriate, ground for deference. To use the phraseology we developed above, is procedural deference a necessary or even appropriate component of the abstention doctrine?\nWe believe, as explained above, that Milivojevich itself answers the question in the negative, albeit impliedly. However, some lower courts applying the abstention doctrine have given significant and sometimes decisive weight to the status of a dispute within the particular polity of the church. For instance, certain decisions have developed a kind of ripeness doctrine that mandates abstention where the dispute has not yet reached the highest level in a hierarchical church. See, e.g., First Baptist Church v. Ohio, 591 F. Supp. 676, 683 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (\u201cCivil courts must insure that an aggrieved church member has exhausted all internal \u2018rights of appeal\u2019 before any inquiry is made into internal church matters. Only after such appeal rights have been exhausted can a court determine that the highest church judicatory body has spoken on the matter\u201d); Williams v. Palmer, 177 Ill. App. 3d 799, 805 (1988) (\u201cif plaintiff has not appealed to higher church tribunals, that is his remedy. [Citation.] If plaintiff has made such appeal and been denied relief, this court must defer to the decision of the church\u201d). Under First Baptist Church and Williams, if the dispute has not made its way through the church channels designated for dispute resolution, abstention is necessary, independently of the subject matter of the dispute.\nOne court has used procedural considerations to conclude that abstention was not warranted. In Vann v. Guildfield Missionary Baptist Church, 452 F. Supp. 2d 651 (W.D. Va. 2006), the plaintiff sued his church, a congregational polity, for wrongfully terminating him as pastor. The plaintiff alleged that he was fired by a single church official, contrary to the church bylaws that required such a decision to be made by a majority vote of members at a duly called church meeting. The church urged the court to abstain from the suit because it presented an ecclesiastical controversy. The court refused, holding that the abstention doctrine \u201cpresupposes that the religious organization itself has acted before immunizing the decision from judicial review.\u201d Vann, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 655. The court acknowledged the Supreme Court\u2019s admonition in Milivojevich against a secular court\u2019s inquiry \u201cwhether the decisions of [the church] complied with church laws and regulations\u201d (Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 165, 96 S. Ct. at 2382), but found \u201can important difference between conducting an inquiry into which part of a religious organization has spoken and asking whether the organization has spoken at all.\u201d Vann, F. Supp. 2d at 656 n.5. The court concluded that abstention was unwarranted because the plaintiff\u2019s termination, having not been accomplished by vote of the congregation, \u201cwas not the decision of a religious entity or church.\u201d Vann, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 656.\nVann is without doubt a more radical use of procedural considerations than is seen in First Baptist Church and Williams. In these latter decisions, it was assumed that a dispute concerning \u201cmatters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law\u201d (Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 165, 96 S. Ct. at 2382) is never appropriate for court intervention even where the plaintiff has exhausted all remedies within the church. See First Baptist Church, 591 F. Supp. at 683 (\u201cThe scope of review is constitutionally limited so that the civil courts do not adjudicate ecclesiastical matters\u201d); Williams, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 805 (\u201cAppointment [of ministers] is undoubtedly an ecclesiastical matter to which judicial deference is mandated by the first amendment\u201d). That is, procedural considerations provide independent justification for abstention, and they never warrant intervention where subject-matter deference would not.\nUnder Vann\u2019s approach, by contrast, a court may intervene if the church has not formally acted \u2014 despite the existence within the church of a genuine controversy over ecclesiastical matters. Vann is irreconcilable with any intelligent reading of Watson and its progeny, which flatly proscribe court involvement in \u201cmatters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law,\u201d Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 165, 96 S. Ct. at 2382. Vann\u2019s error is in assuming that, where a church has not formally acted, there is no ecclesiastical controversy.\nVann is useful for bringing into sharp relief the error in any approach that conditions abstention on the procedural posture within the church of the dispute in question. If it is repugnant to the first amendment to require a church to have formally acted at all with respect to the dispute before abstention is appropriate, it is a fortiori erroneous to require the dispute to have traversed any kind of appellate process within the church before abstention is warranted. Such a tack reduces the first amendment from a substantive protection of religious conscience, shielding even the most informal of churches, to a crude form of res judicata \u2014 a mechanical procedural requirement.\nDespite their differences, Vann, First Baptist-Church, and Williams share the assumption that a court is permitted to determine when a church has formally acted (Vann) or has taken all available action (First Baptist Church and Williams). The risk in this approach is that it may entail \u201ca searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity\u201d (Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 723, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 170, 96 S. Ct. at 2387). We recognize that the Court in Milivojevich reviewed the polity of the Mother Church, finding that the Holy Assembly was the final authority on matters of discipline and administration. However, the Court emphasized that the Holy Assembly\u2019s preeminence was undisputed by the parties, and the Court issued a stern warning against the entanglement that may result from a civil court\u2019s study of a church\u2019s polity. See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 722-23, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 170-71, 96 S. Ct. at 2386-87. Such an inquiry is undesirable, we believe, even if its effect is limited to providing supplemental grounds for abstention that is independently compelled by the subject matter of the dispute.\nWe believe the more circumspect approach is to rest the abstention decision entirely on the subject matter of the dispute. We are guided here by several lower federal courts that have insightfully explained that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, properly understood, applies without regard to the polity of the church from which the dispute arises, or to the status of the dispute within the church\u2019s adjudicatory channels, if any. To arrive at such conclusions, these courts have had to extract the core of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine from its enmeshment with the facts of Watson, Gonzalez, Kedroff, and Milivojevich, which concerned hierarchical polities. Watson and Milivojevich, of course, were faced particularly with adjudications by the highest authorities within the hierarchies.\nIn Young v. Northern Illinois Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals construed this frequently quoted passage from Milivojevich:\n\u201c[N]o \u2018arbitrariness\u2019 exception \u2014 in the sense of an inquiry whether the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulations \u2014 is consistent with the constitutional mandate that civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 165, 96 S. Ct. at 2382.\nThe court said:\n\u201cThe language \u2018highest judicatories\u2019 is derived from Watson ***, which referred to the \u2018highest *** church judicatories to which the matter has been carried.\u2019 In other words, it refers to the body internal to the church which made the final disposition of the matter which subsequently gave rise to the case at hand. It does not mean that a civil court need only defer to the \u2018highest\u2019 decision-making body of the church and may ignore others. Rather, it means that the civil court must defer to the highest body to which the matter had been carried prior to reaching the civil court.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Young, 21 F.3d at 186 n.2.\nAccord Lewis v. Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conference, 978 F.2d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 1992) (deferring to decision of subordinate authority in hierarchical polity because Watson demands deference to \u201c \u2018the highest of the[ ] church judicatories to which the matter has been carried.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d (emphasis omitted)).\nNot only is abstention not contingent on an adjudication of a dispute by the highest authority within a church, no formal adjudication at all is necessary. In Nunn v. Black, 506 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Va. 1981), a congregation of the worldwide Church of God of Prophecy held a meeting and expelled the plaintiffs as members because they falsely claimed to have the gift of glossolalia, or speaking in tongues. The plaintiffs sued, claiming that the expulsion was wrongful because the congregation did not employ the procedures dictated by the church\u2019s governing law. The plaintiffs also alleged that, because they had contributed substantial sums of money to the congregation, the expulsion deprived them of their beneficial interest in the church property. The court held that, no matter how egregiously the congregation may have departed from the proper procedures, the subject matter of the dispute made abstention compulsory. The court said:\n\u201c[I]t is certain that the ecclesiastical issue of the validity of the plaintiffs\u2019 speaking by inspiration of the Holy Spirit pervades the present controversy and removes it from this court\u2019s competence. *** It is the very nature of religious matters that ecclesiastical decisions are accepted as articles of faith, as opposed to the rational, objective mode of analysis and procedure used in secular decision-making. Therefore, in the present case, constitutional concepts of due process, involving secular notions of \u2018fundamental fairness\u2019 or impermissible objectives, are therefore hardly relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical cognizance. [Citation.] Thus, the plaintiffs\u2019 contentions that their due process rights were violated in that their contributions to the Church were expropriated by the expulsion is of no merit.\u201d Nunn, 506 F. Supp. at 448.\nThe court immediately added:\n\u201c[T]he above conclusion is not varied by the fact that the Church of God of Prophecy has no structured decision-making process.\u201d Nunn, 506 F. Supp. at 448.\nThis is an implicit clarification that, though Watson and Milivojevich concerned adjudications by churches with highly formalized structures, abstention turns on the essence of the dispute brought to the secular courts. Thus, where the subject matter is forbidden to civil courts, the duty to abstain is in no way defeated or diminished by the structure or sophistication of the church, or by the presence or absence of any formal adjudication of the matter within the church itself.\nConsequently, a congregational church, whatever its formality, enjoys equal protection under the first amendment with a hierarchical church. See Burgess v. Rock Creek Baptist Church, 734 F. Supp. 30, 31 n.2 (D.D.C. 1990) (\u201cthe Court can discern no justification for refusing to apply the First Amendment analysis and reasoning of the Supreme Court and lower federal court case law involving hierarchical churches to [congregational churches]\u201d); First Baptist Church, 591 F. Supp. at 682 (\u201cbecause the \u2018hands off\u2019 policy [of Milivojevich] is of constitutional dimension, we find it difficult to justify the application of a different standard where a congregational church is involved\u201d); cf. 1 W. Bassett, Religious Organizations and the Law \u00a75:48 (1997) (\u201cOnly rarely do the courts address the problem of entrenched board majorities who continue in office for years at a time, impervious to recall and unheeding of congregation voices calling for resignation, or new elections. *** Where a church is hierarchical in polity the problem of entrenched directorships is rare because of the possibility of appeal from the local congregation for redress to superior authorities. In hierarchical churches the courts will usually defer to the chain of authority. The problem exists, more properly, in churches of congregational polity. Even here, however, courts will rarely intervene to order an election\u201d).\nIn light of these principles, we are neither more nor less inclined to abstain given that the Shrine is congregational rather than part of a hierarchical polity. Nor is it of moment to us whether the Shrine has formally addressed or adjudicated plaintiffs\u2019 grievances. The sole determinant here is the subject matter of the dispute, to which we now turn.\nCount I seeks rescission of the employment agreement between the Shrine and Father Przybylo, on the ground that Father Przybylo lacks faculties from the local Roman Catholic bishop. Plaintiffs allege that such faculties are necessary for Father Przybylo to minister as a Roman Catholic priest as specified by the employment contract. Count III alleges that Father Przybylo has been accused of sexual abuse in an unrelated criminal proceeding. Plaintiffs seek the suspension of Father Przybylo because (1) the allegations are \u201cserious and present a threat to the continued operations of the [Shrine]\u201d; and (2) it is the policy of the Roman Catholic Church to suspend clergy so accused pending disposition of the charges. Count II asks for a declaration that certain individuals approved as voting members of the Shrine by Father Przybylo are in fact not qualified for voting membership. Count II also seeks invalidation of the January 2006 election of Shrine board members because individuals not qualified as voting members cast ballots in the election. As is obvious from the complaint, we are directly called on to judge the qualifications and fitness of Father Przybylo to be pastor of the Shrine as well as the qualifications of certain individuals to be voting members of the Shrine.\nCivil courts may not involve themselves in \u201cmatters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.\u201d Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 165, 96 S. Ct. at 2382. \u201cReligious bodies must be free to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters which pertain to church government, faith and doctrine.\u201d Dowd v. Society of St. Columbans, 861 F.2d 761, 764 (1st Cir. 1988). The qualifications of pastors and members generally fall within these proscribed subjects. As for pastors, the Supreme Court said in Gonzalez: \u201c[I]t is the function of the Church authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses them.\u201d Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16, 74 L. Ed. at 137, 50 S. Ct. at 7. One commentator has observed:\n\u201cThe case law is almost entirely consistent. Ministerial qualifications and appointments to church offices are essentially and entirely doctrinal decisions.\u201d 1 W. Bassett, Religious Organizations and the Law \u00a77:25 (1997).\nThis is an accurate summary. See Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1577 (1st Cir. 1989) (\u201conce a court is called upon to probe into a religious body\u2019s selection and retention of clergymen, the First Amendment is implicated\u201d); Bell, 126 F.3d at 331 (Fourth Circuit) (\u201cIt has thus become established that the decisions of religious entities about the appointment and removal of ministers and persons in other positions of similar theological significance are beyond the ken of civil courts\u201d); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1972) (\u201cThe relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. *** Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern\u201d); Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1986) (\u201cThe claim here relates to appellant\u2019s status and employment as a minister of the church. It therefore concerns internal church discipline, faith, and organization, all of which are governed by ecclesiastical rule, custom, and law\u201d); Young, 21 F.3d at 187 (Seventh Circuit) (\u201cMilivojevich, read in its entirety, holds that civil court review of ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals, particularly those pertaining to the hiring or firing of clergy, are in themselves an \u2018extensive inquiry\u2019 into religious law and practice, and hence forbidden\u201d) (emphasis in original); Kaufmann v. Sheehan, 707 F.2d 355, 358-59 (8th Cir. 1983) (\u201cWhile there may be some secular aspects *** to the priesthood or clergy, it is apparent that the priest or other member of the clergy occupies a particularly sensitive role in any church organization. Significant responsibility in matters of faith *** and exercise of religion characterize such positions\u201d).\nEqually broad is the ban on secular review of member qualifications. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 729, 20 L. Ed. at 676 (\u201cAll who unite themselves to [a religious organization] do so with the implied consent to [its] government, and are bound to submit to it\u201d); Burgess, 734 F. Supp. at 33 (\u201can indispensable part of any church is the collection of individuals who have joined together in worship and constitute the church\u2019s membership\u201d); Grunwald, v. Bornfreund, 696 F. Supp. 838, 840-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (\u201cThe mere expulsion from a religious society, with the exclusion from a religious community, is not a harm for which courts can grant a remedy\u201d); Nunn, 506 F. Supp. at 448 (\u201cit is clear that the plaintiffs have voluntarily submitted to be bound by the decisions of a particular religious society and that they have no recourse for review concerning the validity of their expulsion [from membership] on the issue of their gift of tongues\u201d); Chase, 58 Ill. at 537 (the \u201cconstitution intended to guarantee, from all interference by the State, not only each man\u2019s religious faith, but his membership in the church\u201d).\nPlaintiffs do not dispute these propositions, but argue that our deference here is limited because this case \u201cinvolves a property control dispute over the property and assets belonging to the Shrine of Christ the King between factions of the membership of the local congregation.\u201d Plaintiffs invoke the Supreme Court\u2019s holding that \u201c \u2018there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without \u201cestablishing\u201d churches to which property is awarded.\u2019 \u201d Jones, 443 U.S. at 599, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 782, 99 S. Ct. at 3023, quoting Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 449, 21 L. Ed. 2d at 665, 89 S. Ct. at 606. Because there are no clear signs in Jones or any other decision by the Court that a neutral principles analysis is applicable beyond property cases, we believe it best to err on the side of expanding rather than restricting first amendment protection. Thus, we follow the several courts that have categorically refused to apply neutral principles where a controversy involves \u201cmatters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law\u201d (Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 165, 96 S. Ct. at 2382). See, e.g., Hutchison, 789 F.2d at 396 (\u201cThe \u2018neutral principles\u2019 doctrine has never been extended to religious controversies in the areas of church government, order and discipline, nor should it be\u201d); Burgess, 734 F. Supp. at 32 (following Hutchison and refusing to apply neutral principles to membership dispute). As this case involves subjects impermissible for court review, we decline to even attempt a neutral principles analysis.\nWe conclude that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precludes adjudication of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint. The complaint was properly dismissed with prejudice because plaintiffs could not plead any set of facts setting forth this controversy that would avoid the application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. Village of Roselle, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1119 (a complaint is properly dismissed with prejudice where it is apparent that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that will entitle him or her to recover). Moreover, because the trial court properly granted defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code, we do not need to consider whether the trial court also properly granted defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code. Even if the trial court\u2019s decision concerning the section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss were erroneous, it would not affect our ultimate holding, that the trial court properly dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs\u2019 complaint.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGEOMETER and JORGENSEN, JJ., concur.\nFacuities, a term of historical ecclesiastical law, is defined as \u201c[a]n authorization granted to a person to do what otherwise would not be allowed.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 613 (7th ed. 1999).\nCongregational polity exists when \u201ca religious congregation ***, by the nature of its organization, is strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations, and so far as church government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority.\u201d Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 722, 20 L. Ed. 666, 674 (1872). Hierarchical polity, on the other hand, exists when \u201cthe religious congregation *** is but a subordinate member of some general church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control more or less complete in some supreme judicatory over the whole membership of that general organization.\u201d Watson, 80 U.S. at 722-23, 20 L. Ed. at 674. Henceforth, by \u201chierarchical church\u201d we mean a hierarchical polity, not an individual congregation within that polity. Thus, when we speak of the autonomy of a hierarchical church, we mean the autonomy of a hierarchical polity vis-\u00e1-vis the state. We are not concerned with the autonomy that individual hierarchical churches lack due to the internal constraints of hierarchical polity.\nThis is a foreshadowing of the Court\u2019s holding in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602, 61 L. Ed. 2d 775, 784, 99 S. Ct. 3020, 3025 (1979), quoting Maryland & Virginia Churches, 396 U.S. at 368, 24 L. Ed. 2d at 584, 90 S. Ct. at 500, that the first amendment does not bar courts from \u201c \u2018settling church property disputes so long as it involves no considerations of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of [the] faith.\u2019 \u201d\nHere again is an allusion to the principle that would be expressly adopted in Jones.\nLikewise, plaintiffs\u2019 membership in the Shrine was terminated during the pendency of this lawsuit. However, plaintiffs did not leave voluntarily like the plaintiffs in Watson but rather were ousted. As we noted above, defendants cite no authority that would permit them to unilaterally divest plaintiffs of standing after they filed their suit.\nThis narrow exception to abstention was later characterized as dictum in Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 712, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 165, 96 S. Ct. at 2382. Milivojevich further held that, even if the Court\u2019s precedents could be construed as creating an exception to ecclesiastical abstention, the first amendment would not countenance an \u201carbitrariness\u201d exception that would entail a court determining whether a church \u201ccomplied with [its] laws and regulations.\u201d Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 165, 96 S. Ct. at 2382. No Supreme Court case since Milivojevich has discussed an exception to ecclesiastical abstention, leaving lower courts to speculate on the vitality of even the \u201cfraud\u201d and \u201ccollusion\u201d aspects of the exception articulated in Gonzalez. See, e.g., Crowder v. Southern Baptist Convention, 828 F.2d 718, 725 n.18 (11th Cir. 1987) (the Supreme Court \u201cleft open the possibility\u201d of civil court intervention in cases of fraud or collusion); Abrams, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 1013 (\u201cMilivojevich merely leaves open, but does not endorse, the possibility that limited review might be available in cases of fraud or collusion\u201d). Since plaintiffs do not claim any exception to abstention, we need not determine what remained of the Gonzalez exception after Milivojevich.\nHere the Court cited Gonzalez\u2019s fraud/collusion/arbitrariness exception to the abstention doctrine.\nThis, it is generally held, was the internment of the \u201carbitrariness\u201d component of the Gonzalez exception. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2005) (\u201cMilivojevich made it clear that there was no arbitrariness exception to the First Amendment\u201d); Bell, 126 F.3d at 331 (same); Crowder, 828 F.2d at 725 (same). The Court in Milivojevich still found it appropriate to verify that the church body that took the disputed action was the \u201cfinal authority\u201d on \u201cmatters of church discipline and internal organization.\u201d Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 715-16, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 166-67, 96 S. Ct. at 2383-84. At least one Illinois court, the First District in Ervin v. Lilydale Progressive Missionary Baptist Church, 351 Ill. App. 3d 41 (2004), has not been careful to distinguish what inquiries are permissible under Milivojevich. Ervin holds that courts \u201ccan decide whether the proper church authority terminated a pastor.\u201d Ervin, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 44. This seems an acceptable paraphrase of Milivojevich, but the Ervin court crosses into error when it later states, without qualification, that \u201cany church *** has the autonomy to select the clergy as long as the method of selection comports with the church\u2019s governing law\u201d and that the \u201cfirst and fourteenth amendments do not prohibit court intervention when the church fails to follow the procedures it has, itself, enacted.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ervin, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 45. This broad license for court intervention is inconsistent with Milivojevich, which holds that courts may not inquire into whether \u201cthe decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulations\u201d (Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 165, 96 S. Ct. at 2382). Likely, Ervin strayed because of its incautious reliance on Kedroff s holding that courts may determine whether \u201cimproper methods of choice\u201d were used in the selection of clergy (Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116, 97 L. Ed. at 136, 73 S. Ct. at 154). Kedroff was citing Gonzalez\u2019s fraud/collusion/arbitrariness exception to abstention, but Milivojevich eliminated the arbitrariness aspect of the exception.\nThe \u201cneutral principles\u201d analysis for church property disputes, adumbrated as early as Watson, would be formally adopted in Jones. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 784, 99 S. Ct. at 3025.\nVann seemed not to apply an exception to abstention so much as conclude that the doctrine had no application in the first instance because no church action was involved.\nFrom the court\u2019s description, the Church of God of Prophecy is a hierarchical church, though the court never labels it as such.\nAt least one court has held that a plaintiffs interest in court involvement is \u201csubstantially lessened\u201d where the dispute has been formally adjudicated by the church. See Crowder, 828 F.2d at 726. As explained above, we think this approach raises an unacceptable risk of state entanglement in matters of church procedure.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mark J. Carroll and John J. Pcolinski, Jr., both of Guerard, Kalina & Butkus, of Wheaton, for appellants.", "Walter E Maksym, Jr., of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WILLIAM BRUSS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHESTER JOHN PRZYBYLO et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201406\u20140884\nOpinion filed September 26, 2008.\nMark J. Carroll and John J. Pcolinski, Jr., both of Guerard, Kalina & Butkus, of Wheaton, for appellants.\nWalter E Maksym, Jr., of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0399-01", "first_page_order": 415, "last_page_order": 443 }