{ "id": 4279283, "name": "In re ROBIN C., a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Robin C., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Robin C.", "decision_date": "2008-09-26", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201407\u20141033", "first_page": "523", "last_page": "530", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "385 Ill. App. 3d 523" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "730 N.E.2d 591", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 788", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186491 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0788-01" ] }, { "cite": "788 N.E.2d 1163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1167" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 25402 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/338/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "801 N.E.2d 565", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3777496 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "667 N.E.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 956", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150248 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "967" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0956-01" ] }, { "cite": "792 N.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 Ill. App. 3d 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2469777 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/339/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "877 N.E.2d 63", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273646 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/376/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "875 N.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164", "parenthetical": "Knecht, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 852", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4271721 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "860", "parenthetical": "Knecht, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/375/0852-01" ] }, { "cite": "860 N.E.2d 353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 Ill. App. 3d 1187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4266014 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1190" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/368/1187-01" ] }, { "cite": "867 N.E.2d 1212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1219", "parenthetical": "reversal for failure to strictly comply with section 3 - 601(b)(2) is not warranted unless the respondent suffered prejudice" }, { "page": "1220" }, { "page": "1220" }, { "page": "1221" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "372 Ill. App. 3d 677", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4270015 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684", "parenthetical": "reversal for failure to strictly comply with section 3 - 601(b)(2) is not warranted unless the respondent suffered prejudice" }, { "page": "685" }, { "page": "685" }, { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/372/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738342 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "838 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4260154 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/361/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "855 N.E.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590" }, { "page": "590" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 786", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265052 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789" }, { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0786-01" ] }, { "cite": "869 N.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415", "parenthetical": "public-interest exception" }, { "page": "417", "parenthetical": "Steigmann, J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "373 Ill. App. 3d 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4269770 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "public-interest exception" }, { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/373/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "884 N.E.2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "379 Ill. App. 3d 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4276546 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/379/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "702 N.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559-60", "parenthetical": "capable-of-repetition exception" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209988 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492", "parenthetical": "capable-of-repetition exception" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0482-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 807, "char_count": 16618, "ocr_confidence": 0.806, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.600236412087337e-08, "percentile": 0.45003782073781134 }, "sha256": "894abedca012d9f5e88eeebbaf2523b4afac12e8b523c487f8cfaed79de4b4ef", "simhash": "1:4b6634923e69af35", "word_count": 2709 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:58:06.429737+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re ROBIN C., a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Robin C., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE TURNER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn November 2007, a petition was filed for the emergency involuntary admission of respondent, Robin C., alleging she was mentally ill, reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon herself or others, and unable to provide for her basic physical needs. In December 2007, the trial court conducted a hearing and granted the petition. The court ordered respondent hospitalized for no more than 90 days.\nOn appeal, respondent argues (1) the petition for involuntary admission was defective and (2) the State failed to set forth clear and convincing evidence warranting involuntary admission. We reverse.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn November 2007, Springfield police officer J. Waller filed a petition for emergency involuntary admission as to respondent pursuant to section 3 \u2014 601 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 601 (West 2006)). In his factual basis, Waller stated respondent was found at a motel after police were called because she was \u201cthrowing rocks at the building while naked.\u201d Respondent had \u201cwritten all over herself\u2019 and had also written on her bathroom floor and walls. Waller stated respondent \u201cwas making crazy statements,\u201d including that she would \u201cblow up a school.\u201d Waller stated respondent had no food in her apartment and, because of her state of mind, could not care for herself. Respondent agreed to go to the hospital but only after taking off her clothes.\nThe petition alleged respondent was mentally ill, reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon herself or another in the near future, unable to provide for her basic physical needs so as to guard herself from serious harm without the assistance of family or outside help, and in need of immediate hospitalization for the prevention of such harm. Two medical certificates were also filed indicating respondent was subject to involuntary admission and in need of immediate hospitalization.\nIn December 2007, the trial court conducted a hearing on the petition. Dr. Narasimhulu Sarma testified he has worked as a psychiatrist for 37 years. Based on his examination of respondent, Dr. Sarma diagnosed her with chronic paranoid schizophrenia with symptoms of disorganization. As to his belief that respondent suffers from a mental illness, Dr. Sarma found respondent to be \u201cquite psychotic\u201d and \u201cparanoid.\u201d Dr. Sarma stated prior to her admission respondent was found outside of a motel throwing rocks while naked. He indicated it was \u201cvery clear\u201d that respondent would be a potential threat of harm to herself and others. Dr. Sarma also noted respondent had threatened to blow up a school in the past. He believed respondent was in need of treatment and hospitalization. When asked if the formulated treatment plan was the least-restrictive alternative, Dr. Sarma stated it was \u201cthe best that we can do for her.\u201d He recommended a period of commitment not to exceed 90 days. On cross-examination, Dr. Sarma testified respondent had exhibited psychotic behavior following her admission but not any dangerous behaviors such as throwing objects or threatening people.\nRespondent testified she was 44 years old and denied throwing rocks at a building while naked. She stated she would continue to take her medicine, which she believed had helped her. If discharged, respondent indicated she could stay at her aunt\u2019s house although she preferred to return to the motel.\nOn cross-examination, respondent testified to her actions prior to admission. She stated she was outside of a building when two men started throwing rocks. When the police arrived, respondent stated she took off her undergarments because she \u201cdidn\u2019t need them.\u201d She had also \u201cwritten on\u201d herself and described it as tracing a scar with a blue marker. She asked the officers if she could wash it off so as not to give the appearance that she was having a \u201cpsychotic episode.\u201d\nThe trial court found respondent suffered from a mental illness and as a result of that illness was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon herself or another in the near future. The court ordered respondent hospitalized for no more than 90 days. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Mootness\nInitially, we note this case is moot. Section 3 \u2014 813(a) of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 813(a) (West 2006)) provides that an initial order for hospitalization shall not exceed 90 days. Here, the trial court\u2019s order granting the petition for involuntary admission was entered on December 7, 2007. Since the 90 days have passed and the court\u2019s order no longer has any force or effect, it is impossible for this court to grant any effectual relief to any party. However, as numerous courts have found involuntary-admission cases fall within recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine, we will address this appeal on the merits. See In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 492, 702 N.E.2d 555, 559-60 (1998) (capable-of-repetition exception); In re Alaka W., 379 Ill. App. 3d 251, 258, 884 N.E.2d 241, 246-47 (2008); In re Dorothy J.N., 373 Ill. App. 3d 332, 334, 869 N.E.2d 413, 415 (2007) (public-interest exception); In re Elizabeth McN., 367 Ill. App. 3d 786, 789, 855 N.E.2d 588, 590 (2006).\nB. Petition for Involuntary Admission\nRespondent argues the petition for involuntary admission was defective because it did not list the names and addresses of the respondent\u2019s family members or guardian or that a diligent effort was made to determine that information.\nSection 3 \u2014 601(b)(2) of the Code requires a petition for involuntary admission to include the following:\n\u201cThe name and address of the spouse, parent, guardian, substitute decision maker, if any, and close relative, or if none, the name and address of any known friend of the respondent whom the petitioner has reason to believe may know or have any of the other names and addresses. If the petitioner is unable to supply any such names and addresses, the petitioner shall state that diligent inquiry was made to learn this information and specify the steps taken.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 601(b)(2) (West 2006).\nAs important liberty interests are involved in involuntary-commitment proceedings, strict compliance with statutory procedures is required. In re Louis S., 361 Ill. App. 3d 763, 768, 838 N.E.2d 218, 222 (2005). Our supreme court has held procedural deviations from the Code do not require reversal of a commitment order if the defects could have and should have been objected to immediately, could have been easily cured if objected to immediately, and in the end made no difference anyway. In re Nau, 153 Ill. 2d 406, 419, 607 N.E.2d 134, 140 (1992); see also In re Tommy B., 372 Ill. App. 3d 677, 684, 867 N.E.2d 1212, 1219 (2007) (reversal for failure to strictly comply with section 3 \u2014 601(b)(2) is not warranted unless the respondent suffered prejudice). Whether a respondent\u2019s procedural rights were violated is a question of law and our review is de novo. In re Shirley M., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1187, 1190, 860 N.E.2d 353, 356 (2006).\nIn the case sub judice, the petition for involuntary admission contains a section where the petitioner can list the names and addresses of those people mentioned in section 3 \u2014 601(b)(2) or, if the names are not listed, space to describe the steps taken in making the diligent inquiry to identify and locate those individuals. The lines available for the names, addresses, and/or steps taken were left blank here. Thus, the petition was deficient as it failed to comply with the Code.\nAlthough the petition was defective, we find respondent suffered no prejudice. Dr. Sarma testified at the hearing that he talked with respondent\u2019s mother the previous week, and she was concerned about respondent returning to the mother\u2019s home. Dr. Sarma stated respondent\u2019s mother wanted her to stay in a motel because she was afraid of respondent. When asked if he had spoken with anyone else, Dr. Sarma stated respondent had an aunt, but she was not available.\nRespondent did not object at the hearing to the deficiencies in the petition. Moreover, her testimony did not suggest any hardship or prejudice because of the State\u2019s failure to contact other responsible adults or otherwise comply with section 3 \u2014 601(b)(2). The only people respondent mentioned were her mother and her aunt. While not listed in the petition, the evidence indicates Dr. Sarma contacted respondent\u2019s mother and attempted to contact her aunt. Respondent has not identified anyone else that could have or should have been listed. Thus, we find respondent suffered no prejudice.\nWe note this court addressed this same issue in Tommy B., where the section 3 \u2014 601(b)(2) portion of the petition was also left blank. In pointing out the petition is reviewed by numerous individuals, including the petitioner, the facility director, the circuit clerk, the attorney for the State, the respondent\u2019s attorney, and the trial judge, this court noted \u201cnot one person noticed the petition is missing required information.\u201d Tommy B., 372 Ill. App. 3d at 685, 867 N.E.2d at 1220. If discovered at the hearing, we found these deficiencies could be speedily addressed to \u201cavoid needless appeals\u201d and \u201csave countless resources.\u201d Tommy B., 372 Ill. App. 3d at 685, 867 N.E.2d at 1220; see also Dorothy J.N., 373 Ill. App. 3d at 338, 869 N.E.2d at 417 (Steigmann, J., specially concurring) (noting the recent increase in involuntary-admission cases on appeal wherein \u201cthe same issues tend to arise in case after case\u201d). The same can be said here. Procedural deficiencies and mistakes in mental-health cases \u201csuggest a lack of attention to process\u201d (In re Lillie M., 375 Ill. App. 3d 852, 860, 875 N.E.2d 157, 164 (2007) (Knecht, J., dissenting)), and we reiterate the need for greater attention to detail in complying with the statutory requirements in these cases.\nC. Involuntary Commitment\nRespondent argues the State failed to present clear and convincing evidence warranting her involuntary admission. We agree.\nA trial court\u2019s decision on involuntary admission is accorded great deference on appeal and will not be overturned unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Hannah E., 376 Ill. App. 3d 648, 661, 877 N.E.2d 63, 75 (2007). The court\u2019s judgment will be considered against the manifest weight of evidence \u201c \u2018only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence.\u2019 \u201d Elizabeth McN, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 789, 855 N.E.2d at 590, quoting In re John R., 339 Ill. App. 3d 778, 781, 792 N.E.2d 350, 353 (2003).\n\u201c[Ilnvoluntary admission procedures implicate substantial liberty interests which must be balanced against the State\u2019s dual interests in protecting society from dangerous mentally ill persons and protecting those who are unable to care for themselves.\u201d In re Rovelstad, 281 Ill. App. 3d 956, 967, 667 N.E.2d 720, 726 (1996). A person is subject to involuntary admission under the Code if he or she has a mental illness and because of that illness is \u201creasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or herself or another in the near future.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 119(1) (West 2006).\n\u201cProof of mental illness alone is not sufficient to support involuntary admission.\u201d In re Nancy A., 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 555, 801 N.E.2d 565, 580 (2003). \u201cA person may not be confined against his will merely because he is mentally ill if he is dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom.\u201d In re O.C., 338 Ill. App. 3d 292, 296, 788 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (2003). Instead, to satisfy its burden of proof, \u201cthe State must submit \u2018explicit medical testimony\u2019 that the respondent is reasonably expected to be a serious danger to himself or others as a result of his mental illness.\u201d In re Bert W., 313 Ill. App. 3d 788, 794, 730 N.E.2d 591, 597 (2000). However, the trial court is not required to wait until the respondent actually harms himself or another before ordering hospitalization. Tommy B., 372 Ill. App. 3d at 687, 867 N.E.2d at 1221.\nIn this case, Dr. Sarma testified respondent suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia with symptoms of disorganization and paranoia. She had also been hospitalized \u201cseveral times in the past.\u201d We find the State presented clear and convincing evidence of respondent\u2019s mental illness. We note respondent does not contest this issue on appeal.\nDespite our finding as to mental illness, we find the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that respondent would seriously harm herself or others. Dr. Sarma testified respondent posed \u201ca potential threat of harm to herself or others.\u201d However, his opinion of the \u201cpotential threat of harm\u201d was based on the factual basis of the petition and the hearsay therein, that respondent was naked while throwing stones at a building. The State asked him if her throwing stones placed someone in expectation of being harmed, and Dr. Sarma responded yes. The evidence does not indicate who was placed in harm\u2019s way. Dr. Sarma noted respondent had threatened to blow up a school \u201cin the past I believe.\u201d He also stated respondent\u2019s mother told him she did not want to bring respondent back home because she was afraid of respondent. No witnesses offered direct testimony that respondent had engaged in these or other harmful behaviors.\nDr. Sarma\u2019s firsthand knowledge of respondent\u2019s condition came by way of examination and contradicted the hearsay allegations he relied upon. He stated she exhibited psychotic behaviors while she was hospitalized. However, she had not exhibited any dangerous behaviors like throwing things, had not run around naked, or threatened anyone. He also stated she was taking her medications, although he believed she was not yet responding.\nRespondent denied being naked and throwing rocks. She felt she had improved and no longer needed to remain hospitalized. She also believed her medications were helping and said she would continue to take them.\nThe trial court agreed with respondent that it appeared her medications were working. The court stated she appeared to be lucid, which the court found contradicted Dr. Sarma\u2019s testimony that she was \u201cquite psychotic\u201d based on his examination prior to the hearing. The court also found respondent understood her mental illness and was \u201cable to control herself quite well.\u201d However, because \u201cshe was outside reportedly naked in the cold winter days of Springfield in November and because that conduct placed her or others, at least her, in harm,\u201d the court concluded she was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon herself or another in the near future.\nIn this case, no direct or substantive evidence showed respondent had engaged in dangerous or violent acts that would place her or others in jeopardy of serious physical harm in the near future. No evidence showed respondent harmed or threatened to harm her mother or anybody at the motel. It may be that respondent could reasonably have been expected to inflict serious physical harm upon herself or others, but the testimony from the State\u2019s witness failed to establish that danger. Instead, the expert\u2019s opinion was based on hearsay, and his belief that respondent was a \u201cpotential\u201d threat of harm was weakened by his testimony that she had not shown any threatening behaviors while she was hospitalized and on her medication. While the State proved respondent suffered from a mental illness, the evidence failed to show she was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon herself or others in the near future because of her mental illness. Thus, the trial court erred in granting the petition for involuntary admission. Because of our resolution of this issue, we need not consider respondent\u2019s remaining allegation of error.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nReversed.\nMcCullough, j., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE TURNER" }, { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN,\ndissenting:\nBecause I conclude that the trial court heard sufficient evidence to justify its findings, I respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Cynthia Z. Tracy, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Peoria, and Veronique Baker, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Chicago, for appellant.", "John E Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Timothy J. Londrigan, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re ROBIN C., a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Robin C., Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201407\u20141033\nOpinion filed September 26, 2008.\nCynthia Z. Tracy, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Peoria, and Veronique Baker, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJohn E Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Timothy J. Londrigan, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0523-01", "first_page_order": 539, "last_page_order": 546 }