{ "id": 4280308, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRANCE JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Johnson", "decision_date": "2008-09-08", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201406\u20140833", "first_page": "585", "last_page": "609", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "385 Ill. App. 3d 585" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "371 Ill. App. 3d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4269026 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/371/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352952 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78", "parenthetical": "\"it is not necessary to decide this question since the defendant has waived the issue\" by failing to offer case citation or other support as Supreme Court Rule 341 requires" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444731 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517", "parenthetical": "\"A reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with relevant authority cited\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4059981 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "\"point raised in a brief but not supported by citation to relevant authority *** is therefore forfeited\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265503 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568", "parenthetical": "by failing to offer supporting legal authority or \"any reasoned argument,\" plaintiffs waived consideration of their theory for asserting personal jurisdiction over defendants" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3569197 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32", "parenthetical": "consistent means \"harmonizing with his [trial] testimony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 910", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4264192 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "913-15, 922", "parenthetical": "evidence was not \"cumulative\" when trial court admitted as prior inconsistent statements both grand jury testimony and prior written statements for each witness" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/366/0910-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 984", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411689 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "995" }, { "page": "995", "parenthetical": "a witness's prior statement is \"consistent\" if it is \"consistent with his trial testimony\"" }, { "page": "995" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0984-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 782", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2980842 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "792" }, { "page": "792" }, { "page": "792" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/254/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5516622 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" }, { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 Ill. App. 3d 1055", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5138927 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1063", "parenthetical": "no reversible error where prosecutor commented that the State was \" '[not] responsible for the conditions over at Cook County Jail' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/240/1055-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4264566 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786", "parenthetical": "no reversible error where prosecutor remarked that \" 'jails throughout the United States are filled with people *** convicted of murder' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/366/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295651 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605" }, { "page": "605", "parenthetical": "no reversible error where prosecutor commented in closing that \"[the witness] is in the Illinois Department of Corrections. *** And yesterday, [the witness] came in here and said, I can't remember ***\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 Ill. App. 3d 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273781 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708", "parenthetical": "no reversible error where prosecutor's remarks \"did not specifically attribute any fear on the part of [witnesses] to defendant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/377/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 2d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3282880 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "\"The remarks by the prosecutor, while improper, do not amount to substantial prejudice\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/148/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2463141 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" }, { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "889 N.E.2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 1151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4277541 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/382/1151-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 Ill. App. 3d 954", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4274306 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "964" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/378/0954-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 Ill. App. 3d 1001", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3626929 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/381/1001-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 Ill. App. 3d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273667 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/377/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183262 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3949362 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" }, { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778576 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 476988 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209973 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453255 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224772 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302618 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224818 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128, 132", "parenthetical": "\"we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion\" by permitting certain prosecutorial remarks in closing" }, { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 Ill. App. 3d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4268505 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/371/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801356 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" }, { "page": "310, 312", "parenthetical": "\"counsel was not ineffective in failing to introduce at trial evidence of defendant's post-traumatic stress disorder\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096315 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" }, { "page": "380" }, { "page": "378" }, { "page": "378" }, { "page": "378, 411", "parenthetical": "counsel was not ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of defendant's neuropsychological impairment where it could \"evoke! ] compassion or demonstrate! ] possible future dangerousness\"" }, { "page": "409-10" }, { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 1089", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3473451 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1097" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/342/1089-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477049 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569470 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265436 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3217740 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/124/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238368 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403", "parenthetical": "\"jury is entitled to give little or no weight to a confession\"" }, { "page": "405" }, { "page": "405" }, { "page": "405" }, { "page": "405" }, { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ill. 2d 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2883509 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369-70" }, { "page": "369-70" }, { "page": "369-70" }, { "page": "369-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/33/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926982 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" }, { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578235 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461336 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219-20" }, { "page": "220" }, { "page": "220" }, { "page": "220" }, { "page": "220" }, { "page": "220", "parenthetical": "same" }, { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "adopting Strickland" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704722 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" }, { "page": "135" }, { "page": "135" }, { "page": "135" }, { "page": "135" }, { "page": "135" }, { "page": "135", "parenthetical": "to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show a deficient performance by counsel and prejudice from that deficient performance" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302605 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511340 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" }, { "page": "587" }, { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4263306 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" }, { "page": "293" }, { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704197 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" }, { "page": "565" }, { "page": "565", "parenthetical": "\"the first step is to determine whether error occurred\"" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "565" }, { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451309 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2958193 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721" }, { "page": "721" }, { "page": "721-22" }, { "page": "725" }, { "page": "721" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 1050", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511313 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1055-57" }, { "page": "1052-53" }, { "page": "1056-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/1050-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336062 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5603041 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29", "parenthetical": "court \" decline [d] to disturb\" trial court's finding that detectives were more credible than defendant on the issue of whether defendant had asked for an attorney" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461664 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3254843 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" }, { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 U.S. 477", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187603 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484-85" }, { "page": "386" }, { "page": "1884-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/451/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469-73" }, { "page": "720-23" }, { "page": "1625-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 L. Ed. 2d 362", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369-70" }, { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "512 U.S. 452", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 39831 ], "weight": 14, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" }, { "page": "2354" }, { "page": "457" }, { "page": "2354", "parenthetical": "discussing Miranda" }, { "page": "458" }, { "page": "2354-55", "parenthetical": "discussing Edwards" }, { "page": "458" }, { "page": "2355" }, { "page": "458" }, { "page": "2355" }, { "page": "458" }, { "page": "2355" }, { "page": "459" }, { "page": "2355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/512/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799373 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303-04" }, { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451664 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" }, { "page": "512" }, { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0502-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1741, "char_count": 61208, "ocr_confidence": 0.804, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8866679584737608e-07, "percentile": 0.72841930166585 }, "sha256": "565414cdf414cf2a3b45d34d312d469876be69709981d507f3610e3c47c979d4", "simhash": "1:dbab55745361dd60", "word_count": 10136 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:58:06.429737+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRANCE JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn September 23, 2005, a jury found defendant Terrance Johnson guilty of both the first-degree murder of Zhontele Payne and the aggravated battery with a firearm of James Williams; and the jury also acquitted defendant of the attempted murder of Williams. The charges arose out of a drive-by shooting on July 18, 2001, involving rival gangs. On March 2, 2006, the trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 45 years for the murder and 6 years for the aggravated battery.\nOn appeal, defendant makes six claims: (1) the trial court erred in failing to suppress defendant\u2019s pretrial confession on right to counsel grounds; (2) the trial court erred by barring a prior defense attorney from testifying at trial about defendant\u2019s claimed assertion of his right to counsel; (3) defense counsel was ineffective at trial; (4) the prosecutor committed error in his rebuttal closing; (5) the trial court erred by admitting both the written statement and the grand jury testimony of the aggravated battery victim, who recanted at trial; and (6) the mittimus must be corrected because it stated that defendant spent 1,657 days in custody, when he actually spent 1,687 days. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the conviction. However, the mittimus must be corrected.\nBACKGROUND\nIn the evening of July 18, 2001, Zhontele Payne and James Williams were shot in a drive-by shooting, near Maypole and LeClaire Streets in Chicago. Payne later died, and Williams sustained injuries. On August 27, 2001, a grand jury indicted defendant Terrance Johnson for Payne\u2019s murder and Williams\u2019 battery.\nBefore trial, defendant filed a motion on May 13, 2002, to quash his arrest due to lack of probable cause and to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of the arrest. That motion was heard on July 16, 2002, and denied. On September 25, 2002, defendant moved to suppress his videotaped confession based on his claim that he asserted his right to counsel in the presence of his attorney. Since his lawyer was a potential witness, the State filed a motion to disqualify his lawyer which was granted and defendant obtained new counsel. On March 16, 2004, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the confession.\nOn September 20, 2005, the jury trial began. In its case in chief, the State called Annie Payne, mother of the murder victim, who testified that she had identified her son\u2019s body; and Larry Porter, who testified that he observed a blue van pull up next to the victim\u2019s auto, that a gun protruded from the van window and fired, and that he identified the van.\nThe State\u2019s next witness was James Williams, the aggravated battery victim. Although Williams had provided prior to trial both a written statement and grand jury testimony, at trial he recanted his prior identification of defendant as the shooter. At trial, Williams identified the written statement and his signature on every page of it, and he testified that he recalled testifying in front of the grand jury.\nAt trial, Williams testified that, in the evening of July 18, 2001, prior to 7 p.m., he was in the front passenger seat of an automobile, with Roderick Young in the driver\u2019s seat and Zhontele Payne in the backseat, and they were \u201cabout to go to Great America\u201d; that Young parked the vehicle at Maypole and LeClaire Streets and exited; that another vehicle pulled alongside and shots were fired from the second vehicle; and that he was shot in the leg.\nHowever, at trial, Williams testified that he did not see the shooter. He answered \u201cI don\u2019t recall\u201d when asked whether he had previously stated in his written statement and before the grand jury that he saw defendant shooting a gun out the window of a blue minivan that had pulled up alongside their vehicle. At trial, Williams testified:, \u201cI didn\u2019t see no van. I didn\u2019t see nothing.\u201d\nAt trial, Williams testified that sometime shortly after he was released from the hospital, police detectives drove him down LeClaire Street, but he denied having pointed out defendant at that time. When asked whether he had stated to Assistant State\u2019s Attorney (ASA) Elizabeth Bauer Kent and before the grand jury that he had pointed out defendant to police detectives as defendant stood on LeClaire Street, Williams answered \u201cI don\u2019t recall.\u201d\nAt trial, Williams denied belonging to a gang. He also testified that he did not recall having told both ASA Bauer Kent and the grand jury that he was a member of a gang called the Mafia Insane Vice Lords and that defendant was a member of a gang called the Four Corner Hustlers.\nThe State then called ASA Thomas Driscoll, who had presented Williams to the grand jury and who read Williams\u2019 grand jury testimony to the trial jury. The State also called Detective Richard Milz, who had arrested defendant; Brian Smith and Leah Kane, a forensic investigator and scientist, respectively; and ASA Elizabeth Bauer Kent, who handwrote a statement signed by Williams and who asked questions during defendant\u2019s videotaped confession. Williams\u2019 written statement was read to the jury, and the videotape of defendant\u2019s confession was played for the jury. The State also introduced a stipulation that if Dr. Barry Lifschultz, a forensic pathologist, were called to testify, he would testify that Payne died from gunshot wounds.\nAfter the State rested, the defense called to the stand Amber Montgomery, defendant\u2019s former girlfriend, who testified that defendant was with her during the night of the shooting and did not leave her house until approximately 2:30 a.m. on July 19, 2001. Defendant testified that he was with his then-girlfriend until approximately 2 a.m., that his videotaped confession was coerced, and that he was the owner of the blue van previously identified by state witness Larry Porter.\nIn rebuttal, the State called Detective Raymond Schalk, who testified that defendant\u2019s former girlfriend told him that defendant had left her house at 10 p.m. on the night of the shooting. The State also recalled ASA Elizabeth Bauer Kent, who testified that defendant did not ask for an attorney and did not complain of any mistreatment prior to his confession; and Detective Milz, who also rebutted defendant\u2019s claims of coercion.\nAs previously noted, the jury convicted defendant of the first-degree murder of Payne and the aggravated batteiy of Williams and acquitted defendant of the attempted murder of Williams. Defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial, and defendant filed a pro se motion for ineffective assistance of counsel. Both motions were denied. At sentencing, the trial court stated that it was sentencing defendant to the minimum sentence, which was 45 years\u2019 incarceration for the first-degree murder charge, and a consecutive 6-year sentence for the aggravated battery charge. Defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider was denied, and this appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, defendant makes six claims: (1) the trial court erred in failing to suppress defendant\u2019s pretrial confession on right-to-counsel grounds; (2) the trial court erred by barring a prior defense attorney from testifying at trial about defendant\u2019s claimed assertion of his right to counsel; (3) defense counsel was ineffective at trial; (4) the prosecutor committed error in his rebuttal closing; (5) the trial court erred by admitting both the written statement and the grand jury testimony of the aggravated battery victim, who recanted at trial; and (6) the mittimus must be corrected because it stated that defendant spent 1,657 days in custody, when he actually spent 1,687 days.\n1. Right to Counsel\nDefendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his videotaped confession. At a suppression hearing, defendant\u2019s prior counsel testified that, at the police station and in his presence, defendant invoked his right to counsel. Defendant moved to suppress on the ground that the police subsequently obtained his confession in violation of this asserted right. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding that the State had showed that the defense attorney had not, in fact, visited defendant at the police station. On appeal, defendant claims that this factual finding by the trial court was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nOur standard of review is bifurcated, with an \u201cagainst the manifest weight\u201d standard for the trial court\u2019s factual findings and a \u201cde novo\u201d standard for the ultimate question of whether the evidence should have been suppressed. People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 512 (2004); People v. Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d 298, 303-04 (2003). As our supreme court has previously explained, \u201c[o]n review of a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress, we accord great deference to the trial court\u2019s factual findings, and we will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d at 303; see also Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d at 512. \u201cThis deferential standard of review is grounded in the reality that the circuit court is in a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe the witnesses\u2019 demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their testimony.\u201d Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d at 512. However, when it comes to applying the law to the facts, the trial court\u2019s vantage point is not any superior to that of the reviewing court.\nDefendant\u2019s suppression motion is based on one\u2019s fifth amendment right to counsel. Defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right to counsel was not applicable, because that right \u201cattaches only at the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings.\u201d Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 456, 128 L. Ed. 2d 362, 369-70, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2354 (1994). However, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-73, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 720-23, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1625-27 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that a suspect who was subject to custodial interrogation had the right to consult with an attorney. Davis, 512 U.S. at 457, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 370, 114 S. Ct. at 2354 (discussing Miranda). In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1884-85 (1981), the United States Supreme Court further held that a suspect who had invoked this right to counsel could not be subject to further questioning, unless an attorney was made available or the suspect initiated the conversation. Davis, 512 U.S. at 458, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 370, 114 S. Ct. at 2354-55 (discussing Edwards). The Edwards rule is not required by the fifth amendment itself, but is part of Miranda\u2019s \u201cprophylactic purpose.\u201d Davis, 512 U.S. at 458, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 371, 114 S. Ct. at 2355.\nIt is the Edwards rule that defendant claims protected him against interrogation and invalidated his confession. But the right to counsel must be clearly and unequivocally invoked by the defendant before the protections of the Edwards rule come into force. Davis, 512 U.S. at 458, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 371, 114 S. Ct. at 2355. As the United States Supreme Court observed in Davis, \u201c[t]he applicability of the \u2018 \u201crigid\u201d prophylactic rule\u2019 of Edwards requires courts to \u2018determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Davis, 512 U.S. at 458, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 371, 114 S. Ct. at 2355.\nWhile the United States Supreme Court held in Davis that a defendant\u2019s \u201cassertion\u201d of his right to counsel must be \u201cclear\u201d and unambiguous, the court did not state who bore the burden at a suppression hearing of proving that such an assertion had, in fact, occurred. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 371, 114 S. Ct. at 2355.\nWith respect to a Miranda waiver, as opposed to an Edwards assertion, the burdens of proof are well established. The State bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his or her Miranda rights. People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 51 (1990); see also People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 505 (2004). \u201cOnce the State has established its prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendant to show that his [Miranda] waiver was not knowing, intelligent or voluntary.\u201d Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 51. Since the Edwards rule is part of Miranda\u2019s prophylactic purpose, it makes sense to apply the same burden-shifting scheme here, which the trial court did.\nIn the case at bar, the State presented evidence that defendant . had waived his Miranda rights through testimony by the detective and the assistant State\u2019s Attorney who were present. Defendant then offered evidence that before the videotaped confession took place, he had asserted his right to counsel. The only witness who testified to this alleged assertion was defendant\u2019s prior attorney.\nThe attorney testified that, after he arrived at the police station, he walked straight upstairs to the detective division, without first stopping in the downstairs lobby, and that a detective took and made copies of his Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Committee card and sheriff\u2019s identification cards. Concerning the defendant\u2019s claimed assertion, the attorney testified that at the end of his meeting with defendant, he stated to a detective that his client was invoking his right to counsel; and defendant agreed with him.\nSpecifically, the attorney testified: \u201cAt that point I told the detective that I wanted to inform him once again and just make clear I was the attorney for Terrance Johnson. He was asserting his right to remain silent, his right to counsel and wouldn\u2019t say anything further unless I was there. And I said \u2018Isn\u2019t that right, Terrance?\u2019 And he says \u2018Yes.\u2019 \u201d\nIn rebuttal, the State called Commander Frank Cappatelli, who was a commander with the University of Illinois police department at the time of the hearing. Cappatelli testified that on July 19, 2001, he was a Chicago police detective sergeant and the acting homicide coordinator whose duties included checking in any attorney who came to visit a murder suspect in custody. Based on a review of his records from July 19 and 20, 2001, he testified that he did not have any contact with this attorney.\nThe trial court\u2019s ruling on the motion to suppress is quoted in full, below:\n\u201cI like to believe that attorneys are telling the truth, being officers of the Court. I also have to go by the evidence presented which I think the State has done an excellent job in meeting their burden and I think that the Defense just doesn\u2019t have \u2014 I heard a lot of explanations and excuses, but I have to go by the facts and I find that the Defendant has not met their burden that the State has shifted.\nTalk about Mr. Capatelli who\u2019s the Commander, in looking back at his notes he did say he never had any contact with an attorney that evening and he gave details as to the protocol that must be followed and said this is always followed. Certainly attorneys are suppose[d] to stop at the front desk and there was testimony that sometimes they can go upstairs, but that\u2019s not the correct protocol. And I guess what bothers me most is that once the statement was taken and [the attorney] found out that a statement had been made after stating that he was at the station, told the officers the Defendant is invoking his right to remain silent, that he did not go back to the police station with the detective names, write a complaint, or just to do something, there\u2019s no indication on the Court file. The evidence presented by the Defense is extremely weak in this case.\nSo, motion to suppress statement is denied.\u201d\nThe heart of the above-quoted suppression ruling was a credibility determination, pure and simple. Although the trial judge stated that he \u201clike[d] to believe that attorneys are telling the truth,\u201d he could not make that finding about defendant\u2019s attorney. This court owes great deference to a trial court\u2019s credibility determinations. People v. Griggs, 152 Ill. 2d 1, 29 (1992) (court \u201c decline [d] to disturb\u201d trial court\u2019s finding that detectives were more credible than defendant on the issue of whether defendant had asked for an attorney); People v. Matthews, 306 Ill. App. 3d 472, 483 (1999) (same). In addition, the trial court stated that the defense attorney\u2019s testimony was called into question by both Commander Cappatelli\u2019s testimony and defense attorney\u2019s own failure to protest once he discovered that a statement had been taken, in violation of his client\u2019s alleged assertion. We cannot find that the trial court\u2019s credibility finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nDefendant claims that our holding in People v. Anderson, 303 Ill. App. 3d 1050 (1999), compels reversal. In Anderson, the trial court found that defendant had not invoked his right to counsel, and this court held that the trial court\u2019s finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Anderson, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 1055-57. At the suppression hearing in Anderson, police detectives testified that defendant had met with two assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, and defendant testified that he had invoked his right when meeting with these two assistant State\u2019s Attorneys. Anderson, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 1052-53. Unlike the trial court, the reviewing court accepted \u201cthe defendant\u2019s testimony as true\u201d because the State failed to call in rebuttal either of the two known assistant State\u2019s Attorneys. Anderson, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 1056-57. By contrast, in the case at bar, the one detective who allegedly witnessed defendant\u2019s assertion was not known, and approximately 25 detectives were on duty. Since the facts of Anderson are readily distinguishable from the facts at bar, Anderson does not compel us to reach a different conclusion.\nDefendant also relies on People v. Bavas, 251 Ill. App. 3d 720 (1993), which bears little relation to the case at bar. In Bavas, the trial court granted the State\u2019s motion for a directed finding, with respect to defendant\u2019s petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver\u2019s license. Bavas, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 721. At the hearing, the arresting officer did not testify. Bavas, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 721. The only two witnesses who testified were defendant, who testified that he was not intoxicated when he left the pub, and the bartender, who corroborated defendant\u2019s testimony. Bavas, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 721-22. The appellate court held that the trial court\u2019s finding for the State was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Bavas, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 725. The facts of Bavas are distinguishable from the facts at hand. First, in Bavas, the testimony about defendant\u2019s conduct was corroborated by an independent witness; in the case at bar, the attorney\u2019s testimony about defendant\u2019s conduct was not corroborated. Second, in Bavas, the police officer was known to the State, but failed to appear. Bavas, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 721. Since both Anderson and Bavas are distinguishable, neither opinion compels a reversal in this case, and we affirm the trial court\u2019s suppression ruling.\n2. Limitation of Attorney\u2019s Testimony\nOn appeal, defendant claims that the trial court erred by allegedly barring his prior counsel from testifying at trial about defendant\u2019s alleged assertion of his right to counsel. On appeal, defendant claims that this evidence was relevant to show that defendant\u2019s will was overborne and thus his confession was false.\nAt first, the State moved to bar the prior defense attorney\u2019s testimony, and the trial court ruled: \u201cThat objection will be sustained until and unless the defendant testifies prior to [the attorney] taking the stand.\u201d Defendant then testified.\nAfter defendant\u2019s testimony, the State moved to bar his prior attorney from testifying on relevance grounds. Defendant had not testified that he asserted his right to counsel to a detective in counsel\u2019s presence. Instead, defendant testified that he asserted his right to the assistant State\u2019s Attorney. Thus, the State argued that there was no relevance to the attorney\u2019s testimony concerning an alleged assertion to a detective in the attorney\u2019s presence.\nDefense counsel responded: \u201c[Defendant] testified his lawyer came and he talked to his lawyer and that\u2019s what the lawyers [sic] is coming in to testify to.\u201d Defense counsel explained the purpose of this proposed testimony: \u201cIt corroborates the fact he\u2019s locked up in a room at the very least. It corroborates the defendant had a visit with his attorney.\u201d\nThe trial court then observed that if the defense was offering the attorney\u2019s testimony for the purpose of showing defendant was locked in a room, the testimony was cumulative:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Everybody said he was locked in a room. The detective said he was locked in a room, the defendant said that, the State\u2019s Attorney said he was locked in a room. I mean, it\u2019s cumulative.\u201d\nDefense counsel then responded that the attorney\u2019s testimony was relevant because defendant \u201ctestified on the stand that he knew he wasn\u2019t going home despite the fact his lawyer is there\u201d and that \u201che still wasn\u2019t going to go home until he cooperated.\u201d\nAt first, the trial court stated that it \u201cwas going to deny [the attorney\u2019s] testimony.\u201d Defense counsel then asked if he could at least \u201cget in the fact that [the attorney] went to the police station.\u201d The trial court responded: \u201cYou\u2019re going to put him on to say, did you go to the police station and talk to your client?\u201d Defense counsel answered:\n\u201cYes, at the very least, we should be allowed to do that without even getting in the conversation. Make sure there is no treading on any legal issues.\u201d\nThe trial court\u2019s final ruling emerged from the following colloquy among the assistant State\u2019s Attorney, defense counsel and the trial court:\n\u201cMR. LEAFBLAD [Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Judge, you know, if that\u2019s all they\u2019re going to put on, we can\u2019t get into any conversations at all, Judge. I mean, this is irrelevant grounds.\nMR. CHRISTIANSEN [Defense Counsel]: You know, if that\u2019s the ruling, we need to put him on at the very least to say he went to the police station and talked to the client, talked to his client at some point. Whatever time he said he\u2019s going to be there. At the very least, I mean.\nTHE COURT: All right.\nMR. CHRISTIANSEN: We won\u2019t even get to any conversation that they had.\nMR. LEAFBLAD: If it\u2019s just for the matter of the purpose of whether he claims he went to the Area five that day, and met with his client, that\u2019s it. I mean that\u2019s as far as it goes.\nTHE COURT: That\u2019s fine.\u201d\nAfter the trial court had already said \u201c[a] 11 right,\u201d defense counsel volunteered that he would not \u201cget to any conversation that they had.\u201d\nDuring this entire sidebar, defense counsel never once stated that he wanted to call the attorney for the purpose of testifying about defendant\u2019s alleged assertion of his right to counsel. As a result, this issue is waived on appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that a \u201cdefendant must both specifically object at trial and raise the specific issue again in a posttrial motion to preserve an alleged error for review.\u201d People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470 (2005); People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564 (2007).\nWhen a defendant has failed to preserve an error for review, an appellate court may still review for plain error. \u201c[T]he plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when (1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threaten[s] to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.\u201d Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565; Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471. With plain error analysis, \u201cit is the defendant who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.\u201d Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471. However, in order to find plain error, we must first find that the trial court committed an error. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565 (\u201cthe first step is to determine whether error occurred\u201d).\nWe apply this plain error review to an issue that already carries an abuse of discretion standard. \u201cGenerally, evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed unless the trial court abused that discretion.\u201d People v. Purcell, 364 Ill. App. 3d 283, 293 (2006). Specifically, the appellate court has applied an abuse of discretion standard to this exact same issue, namely, a trial court\u2019s decision to restrict testimony regarding a defendant\u2019s assertion of his right to counsel. People v. Jackson, 303 Ill. App. 3d 583, 587 (1999). An abuse of discretion occurs \u201conly where the ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.\u201d Purcell, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 293. Even if a trial court abused its discretion by unduly restricting testimony about the circumstances of a defendant\u2019s confession, a new trial is not required if the error was harmless. Jackson, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 587.\nIn the case at bar, it is hard to see how the trial court committed any error or the defendant suffered any prejudice from his attorney\u2019s failure to testify about the alleged assertion, when this testimony would not have corroborated defendant\u2019s trial testimony. In fact, one could argue that it would have conflicted with defendant\u2019s own description of his lawyer\u2019s visit. In describing the visit, defendant testified that his lawyer told him not to talk, but defendant did not claim that he or his attorney relayed this sentiment to anyone else. Defendant testified repeatedly that he did assert his right to counsel, but only to the assistant State\u2019s Attorney, at a time when his counsel was not present. It is impossible to see how noncorroborative and possibly conflicting testimony by his own attorney would have been relevant to defendant\u2019s case.\nThe attorney was allowed to testify, and did in fact testify, to the point that corroborated defendant\u2019s trial testimony, namely, that the attorney did, in fact, visit and talk with defendant at the police station.\nThe facts of our case are distinguishable from Jackson, where the appellate court found that the trial court committed error, albeit harmless error, by restricting testimony about defendant\u2019s assertion of his right to counsel. Jackson, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 587. In Jackson, defendant testified at trial that he repeatedly asserted his right to counsel to police officers, but the trial court precluded the officer who took defendant\u2019s statement from testifying about whether defendant had shown him his attorney\u2019s business card, and also barred the defense from introducing the business card that had been on defendant\u2019s person while defendant was in custody. Jackson, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 586. The facts of Jackson are distinguishable from the facts in the case at bar, because in Jackson the excluded evidence corroborated defendant\u2019s trial testimony, whereas in our case it did not.\nBecause we find that evidence about the assertion was properly excluded on relevance grounds, we do not reach the question of whether it would have also been barred on hearsay grounds. People v. Moss, 205 Ill. 2d 139, 159 (2001). To testify about the assertion, the attorney would have had to testify about both his own prior consistent statement and the statement by defendant. At the suppression hearing, the attorney testified that defendant asserted his right to counsel by stating \u201c[y]es,\u201d after the attorney informed a detective that defendant was asserting his right to counsel and then asked \u201c[\u00dcsn\u2019t that right, Terrance?\u201d We do not rule on whether, even if these statements were relevant, they would still have been barred on hearsay grounds.\n3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\nDefendant\u2019s third claim is that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that, to determine whether a defendant was denied his or her right to effective assistance of counsel, an appellate court must apply the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 135 (2007), citing People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (1984) (adopting Strickland). Under Strickland, a defendant must prove both that (1) counsel\u2019s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 135; People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 219-20 (2004); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.\nUnder the first prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must prove that his counsel\u2019s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness \u201cunder prevailing professional norms.\u201d Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 135; Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 220. Under the second prong, the defendant must show that, \u201cbut for\u201d counsel\u2019s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 135; Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 220. \u201c[A] reasonable probability that the result would have been different is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome \u2014 or put another way, that counsel\u2019s deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or fundamentally unfair.\u201d Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 220; Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 135. To prevail, the defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 135; Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 220. \u201cThat is, if an ineffective-assistance claim can be disposed of because the defendant suffered no prejudice, we need not determine whether counsel\u2019s performance was deficient.\u201d People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (2003).\nSpecifically, defendant claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) request Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.06\u2014 3.07 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06 \u2014 3.07); and (2) introduce evidence of defendant\u2019s mental health history. Both errors concern defendant\u2019s confession. The instruction directs the jury to evaluate the weight to give the confession, and defendant claims that knowledge of his mental health history would have affected the weight that the jury gave the confession.\nAlthough the voluntariness and admissibility of a confession are determined by the trial judge alone, a defendant may still present evidence to the jury concerning the weight to be given to the confession. People v. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d 486, 498 (1998); People v. Cook, 33 Ill. 2d 363, 369-70 (1965). Section 114 \u2014 11(1) of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides in full:\n\u201cThe issue of the admissibility of the confession shall not be submitted to the jury. The circumstances surrounding the making of the confession may be submitted to the jury as bearing upon the credibility or the weight to be given to the confession.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 11(f) (West 2006).\nThus, even though the trial judge in the case at bar ruled that the confession was admissible, defendant still had the right to argue to the jury that the confession was unreliable and untruthful and to present evidence to that effect. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d at 498; Cook, 33 Ill. 2d at 369-70. See also People v. Mullen, 141 Ill. 2d 394, 403 (1990) (\u201cjury is entitled to give little or no weight to a confession\u201d).\na. Jury Instruction\nThe instruction at issue, IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06 \u2014 3.07, directs a jury to consider the \u201ccircumstances\u201d of the confession and to determine its \u201cweight.\u201d It states in full:\n\u201cYou have before you evidence that the defendant made a statement relating to the offenses charged in the indictment. It is for you to determine [whether the defendant made the statement, and, if so,] what weight should be given to the statement. In determining the weight to be given to a statement, you should consider all of the circumstances under which it was made.\u201d IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06 \u2014 3.07.\nOn appeal, defendant concedes that the bracketed information should not have been given.\nDefendant is correct that refusal to give IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06\u2014 3.07 may constitute reversible error. For example, in Cook, our supreme court found that the trial court committed reversible error when the defense requested and the trial court refused to give an instruction similar to IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06 \u2014 3.07. Cook, 33 Ill. 2d at 369-70. The instruction in Cook was similar to IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06\u2014 3.07 in that both instructions directed the jury to consider the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, and to determine the weight that the statement warranted. Cook, 33 Ill. 2d at 369-70.\nDefendant is also correct that failure to request a particular jury instruction may be grounds for finding ineffective assistance of counsel, if the instruction was so \u201ccritical\u201d to the defense that its omission \u201cden[ied] the right of the accused to a fair trial.\u201d People v. Pegram, 124 Ill. 2d 166, 174 (1988); People v. Pollards, 367 Ill. App. 3d 17, 23 (2006).\nHowever, the omission of a particular instruction must be judged in light of the other instructions given. \u201cInstructions should not be viewed in isolation, but should be considered as a whole.\u201d People v. Hester, 131 Ill. 2d 91 (1989). Jury instructions are evaluated in their entirety to determine whether they fairly, fully and comprehensively informed the jury of the relevant law. Schultz v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 201 Ill. 2d 260, 273-74 (2002); People v. Watson, 342 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1097 (2003).\nIn the case at bar, the trial court gave an instruction that was almost identical, word for word, to IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06 \u2014 3.07. With respect to a witness\u2019 prior inconsistent and videotaped statement, the trial court instructed the jury:\n\u201cIt is for you to determine what weight should be given to that statement. In determining the weight to be given to an earlier statement, you should consider all of the circumstances under which it was made.\u201d\nSee IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11. With the exception of the word \u201cearlier,\u201d the above two sentences are the exact same, word for word, as the last two sentences of IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06 \u2014 3.07. IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06 \u2014 3.07 is three sentences long. The only sentence missing from the trial court\u2019s instruction is the first sentence of IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06 \u2014 3.07 which states: \u201cYou have before you evidence that defendant made a statement relating to the offenses charged in the indictment.\u201d\nThe only question then is whether the jury would have understood that prior inconsistent videotaped statements of a witness included defendant\u2019s confession. We do not see why the jury would have failed to make the connection where defendant was a witness, his confessions were inconsistent with his trial testimony, and the confession was videotaped.\nSince the trial court provided an almost identical instruction to IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06 \u2014 3.07 to the jury, we cannot find either that counsel\u2019s performance was deficient in failing to request it or that defendant suffered any prejudice. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 135 (to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show a deficient performance by counsel and prejudice from that deficient performance); Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 220 (same).\nb. Defendant\u2019s Mental Health History\nDefendant also claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to present, both at trial and at the suppression hearing, evidence of defendant\u2019s learning disability and depression, because this evidence would have aided the jury in determining whether defendant\u2019s will was overborne by the police when he gave his confession.\nAs discussed in section (1) above, the motion to suppress was based solely on prior counsel\u2019s testimony that defendant asserted his right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion simply because it found that prior counsel lacked credibility. Defendant\u2019s mental health history had no relevance, at all, in determining the credibility of another witness, namely, prior counsel. Thus, the absence of mental health information at the suppression hearing was not error by counsel and did not prejudice defendant. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 135; Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 220.\nOn appeal, defendant cites the presentence report as evidence of his mental health history and claims that his trial counsel should have introduced evidence of the mental health information contained in it. The report noted that this information came from interviews with defendant and his mother. The report stated, in relevant part:\n\u201cThe Defendant attended Austin Community Academy High School, located in Chicago, Illinois form 1995 to 1999. He stated that he was placed at Forest Academy, a therapeutic day school, located in Chicago, Illinois where he attended from 1999 to 2001. He stated that he was placed at Forest Academy because he suffered from depression and needed assistance to keep up in school. ***\nThe Defendant stated that he underwent counseling for depression on a daily basis while he was a student at Forest Academy from 1999 to 2001. *** The Defendant stated that he attempted suicide on one occasion when he was nineteen years of age in that he wrapped a shirt around his neck and was pulling on it. ***\nThis Investigator conducted a telephone interview with an individual who identified herself as Imogene Johnson, the Defendant\u2019s mother, who stated that the Defendant was diagnosed with depression and some kind of learning disability which made him eligible for Social Security Disability benefits when he was sixteen years of age.\u201d\nOn the basis of the presentence report, defendant claims that his trial counsel failed both to investigate and to call witnesses who could testify to the above-quoted information.\nWe cannot review this claim because defendant has failed to provide us with affidavits from the missing witnesses. He has failed even to name them. Our supreme court has held that \u201c[a] claim that trial counsel failed to investigate and call a witness must be supported by an affidavit from the proposed witness.\u201d People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 380 (2000). The failure to provide affidavits is fatal to the claim, and our supreme court has explained why. \u201cIn the absence of such an affidavit, a reviewing court cannot determine whether the proposed witness could have provided testimony or information favorable to the defendant, and further review of the claim is unnecessary.\u201d Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 380.\nEven if we considered the presentence report in lieu of an affidavit and assumed that the proposed witnesses were the two people interviewed by the probation officer, namely, defendant and his mother, defendant has still failed to show trial counsel was deficient.\nA decision whether or not to call a particular witness about a particular subject is a matter of trial strategy, left to the discretion of trial counsel. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 378; People v. Reid, 179 Ill. 2d 297, 310 (1997). This decision carries a strong presumption that it was the product of strategy rather than incompetence. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 378; People v. Ward, 371 Ill. App. 3d 382, 434 (2007). As a result, this type of decision is \u201cgenerally immune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.\u201d Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 378, 411 (counsel was not ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of defendant\u2019s neuropsychological impairment where it could \u201cevoke! ] compassion or demonstrate! ] possible future dangerousness\u201d); Reid, 179 Ill. 2d at 310, 312 (\u201ccounsel was not ineffective in failing to introduce at trial evidence of defendant\u2019s post-traumatic stress disorder\u201d).\nIn the case at bar, counsel\u2019s trial strategy was to persuade the jury to believe defendant\u2019s trial testimony, by portraying defendant as an intelligent young man. During closing, trial counsel argued to the jury:\n\u201cThe details are this: Terrance Johnson, you heard him. He\u2019s in high school. He works. He\u2019s no dummy. *** So if he had just committed murder, think about what he\u2019s doing when the detectives pull up. He goes over to the car after leaving his girlfriend\u2019s house *** and walks over to the detective\u2019s car *** to see what they want. If he ever committed this murder, could you ever possibly imagine doing that?\u201d\nA reviewing court will not second-guess a counsel\u2019s trial strategy simply because defendant was convicted.\nIn addition, the \u201creasonableness\u201d of counsel\u2019s decision not to present certain testimony \u201cmay be judged with reference to a defendant\u2019s own statements.\u201d Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 409-10. Counsel cannot be expected to present testimony that contradicts a defendant\u2019s own statements. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 410.\nThe presentence information, quoted above, contradicted, in part, defendant\u2019s trial testimony. At four different points in his trial testimony, defendant testified that in 2001 he attended or was enrolled at the Austin Community High School. By contrast, the probation officer reported in the presentence report that defendant stated that he had left Austin as early as 1999 and that he attended Forest Academy from 1999 until 2001, when he was arrested. Since the credibility of the defendant\u2019s trial testimony was a key issue for the jury to determine, trial counsel was not deficient for choosing not to present contradicting evidence.\nIn sum, we do not find counsel ineffective for choosing not to present mental health evidence, where: (1) the suppression motion was based solely on prior counsel\u2019s testimony that defendant asserted his right to counsel, and defendant\u2019s mental health was unrelated to the credibility of prior counsel; (2) defendant failed on appeal to provide affidavits from the proposed witnesses regarding defendant\u2019s mental health; (3) the mental health evidence ran counter to trial counsel\u2019s strategy of portraying defendant as an intelligent man; and (4) the proposed evidence would have contradicted, in part, defendant\u2019s trial testimony.\n4. Prosecutor\u2019s Rebuttal Closing\nDefendant\u2019s fourth claim is that the prosecutor\u2019s remarks during the prosecutor\u2019s rebuttal closing constituted reversible error.\nIt is not clear whether the appropriate standard of review for this issue is de novo or abuse of discretion. Last year, our supreme court held: \u201cWhether statements made by a prosecutor at closing argument were so egregious that they warrant a new trial is a legal issue this court reviews de novo.\u201d Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 121. However, the supreme court in Wheeler cited with approval People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99 (2000), in which the supreme court had previously applied an abuse of discretion standard. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 121. In Blue and numerous other cases, our supreme court had held that the substance and style of closing argument is within the trial court\u2019s discretion and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 128, 132 (\u201cwe conclude that the trial court abused its discretion\u201d by permitting certain prosecutorial remarks in closing); People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 128 (2001); People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 488 (2000); People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 583 (2000); People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 145 (1998); People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 295 (1995). Our supreme court had reasoned: \u201cBecause the trial court is in a better position than a reviewing court to determine the prejudicial effect of any remarks, the scope of closing argument is within the trial court\u2019s discretion.\u201d People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 441 (1993). Following Blue and other supreme court cases like it, this court had consistently applied an abuse of discretion standard. People v. Tolliver, 347 Ill. App. 3d 203, 224 (2004); People v. Abadia, 328 Ill. App. 3d 669, 678 (2001).\nSince Wheeler, appellate courts have been divided regarding the appropriate standard of review. The First District has applied an abuse of discretion standard, while the Third and Fourth Districts have applied a de novo standard of review. Compare People v. Love, 377 Ill. App. 3d 306, 313 (1st Dist. 2007), and People v. Averett, 381 Ill. App. 3d 1001 (1st Dist. 2008), with People v. McCoy, 378 Ill. App. 3d 954, 964 (3d Dist. 2008), and People v. Palmer, 382 Ill. App. 3d 1151, 1157, 889 N.E.2d 244, 251 (4th Dist. 2008). However, we do not need to resolve the issue of the appropriate standard of review at this time, because our holding in this case would be the same under either standard.\nIn addition, we will review only for plain error, because defendant failed to preserve the alleged error by objecting at trial. As noted above, to preserve an alleged error for review, a defendant must object both at trial and in a posttrial motion. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 470; Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 564. Also as discussed above, under the plain error doctrine, we will consider \u201ca clear or obvious error\u201d where either the evidence is \u201cclosely balanced\u201d or the error is \u201cso serious that it affected the fairness of defendant\u2019s trial.\u201d Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565; Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471.\nWhen reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, a reviewing court will consider the entire closing arguments of both the prosecutor and the defense attorney, in order to place the remarks in context. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 122; People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 53, 113 (2003); People v. Tolliver, 347 Ill. App. 3d 203, 224 (2004). A prosecutor has wide latitude during closing argument. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 123; Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 127. Reversal is warranted only if the prosecutor\u2019s remarks created \u201csubstantial prejudice.\u201d Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 123; Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 64; People v. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d 281, 332 (1992) (\u201cThe remarks by the prosecutor, while improper, do not amount to substantial prejudice\u201d). Substantial prejudice occurs \u201cif the improper remarks constituted a material factor in a defendant\u2019s conviction.\u201d Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 123.\nOn appeal, defendant claims, \u201cin closing rebuttal argument, the State argued that the reason Williams denied identifying Johnson was because he had been intimidated by Johnson.\u201d Defendant is correct in that a prosecutor may not suggest that a witness was afraid to testify because the defendant threatened or intimidated him, if no evidence at trial supports that argument. People v. Cox, 377 Ill. App. 3d 690 (2007); Mullen, 141 Ill. 2d at 405; People v. Sims, 285 Ill. App. 3d 598, 605 (1996).\nHowever, in the case at bar, contrary to defendant\u2019s claim, the prosecutor did not argue that defendant intimidated a witness. Defendant cites the following portion of the State\u2019s rebuttal:\n\u201cLet\u2019s talk about this James Williams character. Did we ever once try to pretend that James Williams when he came out of the back in his Cook County Jail uniform was anything more than the gangbanger that he is, the three-time convicted felon? Though at the time that this happened James Williams was only a two time convicted felon. All right?\nThe reason why there\u2019s a handwritten statement, the reason why there\u2019s Grand Jury testimony is because the law recognizes guys like James Williams, the convicted felons, the gangbangers after they get \u2014 you know, their wound heals, after they get over it, after they\u2019re sitting in Cook County Jail, you can just use your imagination what\u2019s going over there in Cook County Jail, is going to change his testimony, and there has to be some kind of method to hold a man like that responsible for what he did because gang crimes don\u2019t happen in front of nuns. They don\u2019t happen in front of teachers. They don\u2019t happen in front of people in society that we respect. They happen in front of other gangbangers who come to court and change their testimony. I mean did anybody find it curious the only thing that James Williams forgot was, well, that he is a gangbanger, that he\u2019s a gangbanger and who shot him? He remembered he was going to Great America that day. Come on. He knows who did the shooting.\nYou know who did the shooting too and that\u2019s because under the law you can take what he said in front of the Grand Jury, what he said in his Grand Jury testimony as substantive evidence. That\u2019s as if he got up there on that stand and said the very same things that he said to the Grand Jury, that he said in the handwritten. That\u2019s the law. You will get an instruction on that because the law recognizes guys like James Williams. Guys like James Williams aren\u2019t sitting in Cook County Jail writing love letters to Dick Devine. He is charged with attempt first degree murder himself. The Cook County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office is prosecuting him. We\u2019ve convicted him of another felony since this thing happened. The Cook County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office is no friend of James Williams as he sits in Cook County Jail.\u201d\nAt most, the defense could argue that, in the above-quoted statement, the State was arguing that there are \u201cgangbangers\u201d in Cook County jail, that cooperators are not popular among them, and that Williams was afraid of what would happen to him in jail as a result of cooperating. General comments about jail, or even the Cook County jail specifically, do not rise to the level of reversible error. People v. Sullivan, 366 Ill. App. 3d 770, 786 (2006) (no reversible error where prosecutor remarked that \u201c \u2018jails throughout the United States are filled with people *** convicted of murder\u2019 \u201d); People v. Jones, 240 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1063 (1992) (no reversible error where prosecutor commented that the State was \u201c \u2018[not] responsible for the conditions over at Cook County Jail\u2019 \u201d).\nOn appeal, defense claimed that the above-quoted \u201cCook County jail\u201d statement by the prosecutor clearly referred to intimidation by defendant and that the reference was as clear as the prosecutor\u2019s reference in Mullen, 141 Ill. 2d at 405. In Mullen, our supreme court held that the prosecutor\u2019s \u201cstatement clearly suggests that defendant threatened or intimidated witnesses so they would not testify against him.\u201d Mullen, 141 Ill. 2d at 405. The prosecutor in Mullen stated:\n\u201c \u2018And when you consider that, remember perhaps one of the most powerful things in this case was when Tyrone Carr got up on the stand the first time, and he said he did not want to answer.\nAnd use your common sense why he did not want to answer. The same reason that no one wanted to talk, at first; they did not want to get involved.\nWhy don\u2019t they want to get involved? They do not want one of these (indicating) in their back. Is this going to be what runs the streets of the City of Chicago?\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Mullen, 141 Ill. 2d at 405.\nIn Mullen, the prosecutor\u2019s remark about a gun \u201cin their back\u201d was a clear reference to defendant because the victim had been fatally shot in the back. Mullen, 141 Ill. 2d at 405. By contrast, in the case at bar, the prosecutor\u2019s remarks contained no distinguishing events or characteristics that could be tied specifically to defendant. Cox, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 708 (no reversible error where prosecutor\u2019s remarks \u201cdid not specifically attribute any fear on the part of [witnesses] to defendant\u201d).\nOn appeal, defendant claims that the prosecutor\u2019s reference was clear, because the prosecutor suggested that the witness was afraid of other inmates at the Cook County jail, and the prosecutor had asked defendant on cross examination if he knew people in custody at Cook County jail. However, when the \u201cCook County jail\u201d statement is viewed in the context of the entire closings, it is clear that it referred generally to gang intimidation rather than to defendant specifically. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 122 (reviewing court will consider entire closing arguments). For example, the prosecutor remarked in his initial closing argument that James Williams made his earlier statements \u201cbefore he was back in custody with other people awaiting trial, when he\u2019s not with some of his gang member friends.\u201d See People v. Sims, 285 Ill. App. 3d 598, 605 (1996) (no reversible error where prosecutor commented in closing that \u201c[the witness] is in the Illinois Department of Corrections. *** And yesterday, [the witness] came in here and said, I can\u2019t remember ***\u201d).\nThus, considering the contested statement both by itself and in context, we cannot find that the prosecutor suggested intimidation by defendant, as the defense now claims on appeal. As a result, defendant\u2019s claim of prosecutorial misconduct has no factual basis.\n5. Repetitive Evidence\nDefendant\u2019s fifth claim is that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted repetitive evidence of the prior statements of James Williams, a State witness. Williams made two prior statements: (1) a statement handwritten by Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Bauer Kent and signed by Williams; and (2) testimony before a grand jury. Defendant does not claim that admission of these two statements violated either the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment or the hearsay rule. Defendant concedes that the statements qualified under a well-established exception to the hearsay rule, namely, the exception for prior inconsistent statements. This exception is described in section 115 \u2014 10.1 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which states in relevant part:\n\u201cIn all criminal cases, evidence of a [prior inconsistent] statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if:\n(a) the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at *** trial, and\n(b) the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and\n(c) the statement\u2014\n(1) was made under oath at a[n] *** other proceeding, or\n(2) narrates, describes or explains an event or condition of which the witness had personal knowledge, and\n(A) the statement is proved to have been written or signed by the witness[.]\u201d 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10.1 (West 2006).\nWilliams\u2019 grand jury testimony qualified under section 115 \u2014 10.1 because it was made under oath at an \u201cother proceeding\u201d; and the handwritten statement qualified because it described an event of which the witness had personal knowledge and Williams identified his signature on every page of the statement. Thus, the hearsay rule is not at issue on appeal.\nDefendant claims the error was the repetition. Specifically, defendant claims the trial court erred by (1) by admitting both Williams\u2019 grand jury testimony and his prior written statement; (2) by permitting several witnesses to testify about the statements; and (3) by admitting the entire statements, although some parts were consistent with Williams\u2019 trial testimony.\nAs noted above, the admission of evidence is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this court will review only for an abuse of discretion. Purcell, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 293. In addition, we will review only for plain error, because defendant failed to preserve the alleged error for review. As noted above, to preserve an alleged error for review, a defendant must object both at trial and in a posttrial motion. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 470; Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 564. Defendant did not object either at trial or in a posttrial motion.\nOn appeal, defendant claims that the repetition violated \u201cthe evidentiary rule\u201d against \u201crepetition of a prior consistent statement.\u201d The defense is confusing apples with oranges, or more specifically, inconsistent statements with consistent ones. The defense is absolutely right that there is a long-established evidentiary rule against admission of a prior consistent statement, unless there has been a charge of recent fabrication or a motive to testify falsely. People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487, 501 (1983); People v. Montgomery, 254 Ill. App. 3d 782, 792 (1993); People v. Terry, 312 Ill. App. 3d 984, 995 (2000). However, at issue here are prior inconsistent statements, or statements inconsistent with the witness\u2019s trial testimony. People v. Harvey, 366 Ill. App. 3d 910, 913-15, 922 (2006) (evidence was not \u201ccumulative\u201d when trial court admitted as prior inconsistent statements both grand jury testimony and prior written statements for each witness).\nConsistency is measured against a witness\u2019s trial testimony: inconsistent statements are inconsistent with trial testimony; consistent statements are consistent with it, Terry, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 995 (a witness\u2019s prior statement is \u201cconsistent\u201d if it is \u201cconsistent with his trial testimony\u201d); People v. Smith, 139 Ill. App. 3d 21, 32 (1985) (consistent means \u201charmonizing with his [trial] testimony\u201d). The rule against admission of consistent statements exists because they needlessly bolster the witness\u2019s trial testimony. Montgomery, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 792; Terry, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 995. Obviously, inconsistent statements cannot bolster a witness\u2019s trial testimony. Thus, application of the rule makes no sense here.\nTo the extent that we want to apply the underlying logic of the rule to the case at bar, the rule has an exception for recent fabrication, which is what the state was contending happened here. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d at 501; Montgomery, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 792. Thus the rule cited by the defense, to the extent that we can stretch it to apply it to these facts, actually favors the state\u2019s argument.\nDefendant also claims, in one line without any citation to the record, that \u201clarge portions of the prior statements were consistent with Williams\u2019 trial testimony.\u201d In essence, defendant claims, without citing any legal authority, that the trial court should have sua sponte redacted the statements. It is unnecessary for us to consider a point in an appellate brief that is unsupported by citation to legal authority or the factual record. This court has repeatedly held that a party waives a point by failing to argue it on appeal. Roiser v. Cascade Mountain, Inc., 367 Ill. App. 3d 559, 568 (2006) (by failing to offer supporting legal authority or \u201cany reasoned argument,\u201d plaintiffs waived consideration of their theory for asserting personal jurisdiction over defendants); People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 332 (2005) (\u201cpoint raised in a brief but not supported by citation to relevant authority *** is therefore forfeited\u201d); In re Marriage of Bates, 212 Ill. 2d 489, 517 (2004) (\u201cA reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with relevant authority cited\u201d); Ferguson v. Bill Berger Associates, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 3d 61, 78 (1998) (\u201cit is not necessary to decide this question since the defendant has waived the issue\u201d by failing to offer case citation or other support as Supreme Court Rule 341 requires); 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7) (argument in appellate brief must be supported by citation to legal authority and factual record).\nFor the reasons stated above, we find no merit in defendant\u2019s \u201crepetition\u201d claims.\n6. Correction of Mittimus\nBoth the State and the defense agree that the mittimus must be corrected. The \u201cOrder of Commitment and Sentence\u201d stated that defendant was entitled to receive credit for 1,657 days actually served as of March 2, 2006, the date of the order. However both the State and the defense agree that defendant had actually served 1,687 days as of that date. Accordingly, the order must be corrected to state that defendant is entitled to receive credit for 1,687 days served as of March 2, 2006. \u201cPursuant to Supreme Court Rule 615 (134 Ill. 2d R. 615), a reviewing court on appeal may correct the mittimus at any time, without remanding the cause to the trial court.\u201d People v. Jones, 371 Ill. App. 3d 303, 310 (2007).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence are affirmed, and the mittimus is corrected to show that defendant is entitled to receive 1,687 days for time considered served.\nAffirmed.\nCAHILL and GARCIA, JJ., concur.\nAlthough defendant did not testify at the suppression hearing, he later testified at trial. But he did not testify that he asserted his right to counsel in his attorney\u2019s presence. Defendant testified about his attorney\u2019s visit to the police station: \u201cThen eventually, a lawyer showed up, talked to me, let me use the phone, call my mother and he told me not to talk and then, then he left.\u201d Defendant testified that he asserted his right to counsel later, when he met with an assistant State\u2019s Attorney. He testified: \u201cI told her that I wanted my lawyer there when I talked and she waved me off.\u201d\nIn his posttrial motion, defendant claimed that the \u201cAssistant State\u2019s Attorney made prejudicial, inflammatory and erroneous statements in closing argument designed to arouse the prejudices and passions of the jury, thereby prejudicing the defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial.\u201d We do not have to rule whether this claim was sufficiently specific, because defendant failed to object at trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Marion Buckley, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Michelle Katz, and Tasha-Marie Kelly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRANCE JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201406\u20140833\nOpinion filed September 8, 2008.\nRehearing denied October 16, 2008.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Marion Buckley, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Michelle Katz, and Tasha-Marie Kelly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0585-01", "first_page_order": 601, "last_page_order": 625 }