{ "id": 4279751, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONTE M. CLAUSELL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Clausell", "decision_date": "2008-10-31", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201407\u20140997", "first_page": "1079", "last_page": "1083", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "385 Ill. App. 3d 1079" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "600 N.E.2d 1234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1235" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 Ill. App. 3d 983", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5782254 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "985" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/236/0983-01" ] }, { "cite": "624 N.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 Ill. App. 3d 816", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2965727 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "819" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/252/0816-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 N.E.2d 1250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1253" }, { "page": "1255" }, { "page": "1255" }, { "page": "1255" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5195667 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" }, { "page": "34" }, { "page": "34" }, { "page": "34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/233/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "892 N.E.2d 1018", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1030-31", "parenthetical": "finding that where the plaintiff was entitled to seek and recover the reasonable value of her medical expenses, her recovery was not limited by the amount paid by insurance" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3615220 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412-14", "parenthetical": "finding that where the plaintiff was entitled to seek and recover the reasonable value of her medical expenses, her recovery was not limited by the amount paid by insurance" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/229/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 N.E.2d 1008", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1010" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 Ill. App. 3d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2461914 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/200/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "753 N.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171592 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "695 N.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222590 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0669-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 509, "char_count": 9383, "ocr_confidence": 0.81, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14365335585202071 }, "sha256": "405c00e962acf2c36069fb1098a63abaaa70211c056822c15420a5f041e3ef73", "simhash": "1:30a23a6ebb49a5b4", "word_count": 1531 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:58:06.429737+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONTE M. CLAUSELL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn September 2007, a jury acquitted defendant, Donte M. Clausell, of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(b)(8) (West 2006)) and convicted him of robbery (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 1 (West 2006)) and burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 1(a) (West 2006)). In October 2006, the trial court sentenced defendant to 36 months\u2019 probation and ordered him to pay restitution. Defendant appeals, arguing the imposition of restitution was improperly based on the acquitted aggravated-battery charge. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nJustin Davis testified he was standing by his vehicle when a white four-door vehicle approached. Davis explained three black males dressed in baggy pants and long white shirts got out and asked him \u201cwhere the green was.\u201d Davis testified he assumed they wanted money or drugs. Davis turned to leave but was struck in the neck from behind and fell to the ground unconscious.\nDavis woke lying on his back with one of the men standing on his face. A second man was searching through his pockets. A third man was searching his vehicle. Davis testified the man standing on his face told Davis he would \u201cstomp [his] face in\u201d if he moved. The men took Davis\u2019s cellular phone, wallet, and keys. The men unlocked the vehicle\u2019s trunk and removed four speakers. The men placed the speakers in their vehicle and left.\nDavis called the police and provided a description of the men, a description of the vehicle, and the vehicle\u2019s license-plate number.\nAccording to City of Quincy, Illinois, police officer Chad Liesen\u2019s testimony, police found the vehicle approximately an hour later. Defendant and two other men were inside the vehicle. All three men were dressed in baggy shorts and long white shirts. Liesen testified Davis\u2019s speakers were located in the backseat and trunk.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of robbery and burglary but not guilty of aggravated battery.\nAt sentencing, the State requested restitution for Davis\u2019s medical bills. Defense counsel argued against such restitution because the injuries were caused by the aggravated battery and defendant was found not guilty of the aggravated-battery charge. The State argued that the use of force for the robbery was sufficient to justify restitution. Davis reported suffering a concussion. The trial court acknowledged defendant was acquitted of aggravated battery but found the record afforded a sufficient basis to order restitution for Davis\u2019s medical bills based on the force used in the robbery. The court ordered defendant to pay restitution of $2,541.06 for Davis\u2019s medical expenses.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nOn appeal, defendant argues the trial court improperly ordered him to pay restitution for medical expenses because Davis\u2019s medical bills resulted from the acquitted aggravated-battery charge. The State argues the restitution order was based on defendant\u2019s robbery conviction. We agree with the State.\nA. Standard of Review\n\u201cA restitution order will not be reversed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.\u201d In re M.Z., 296 Ill. App. 3d 669, 673, 695 N.E.2d 587, 589 (1998).\nB. The Restitution Order Was Proper\n\u201cIt is well established that a court may not impose restitution for charges upon which a defendant is acquitted.\u201d People v. Owens, 323 Ill. App. 3d 222, 234, 753 N.E.2d 513, 523 (2001). In addition, the trial court may not \u201corder restitution of sums extraneous to the charges before it.\u201d People v. Thompson, 200 Ill. App. 3d 23, 26, 557 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (1990). However, a defendant may be ordered to make restitution for injuries proximately caused by the same criminal conduct of defendant as that of which he was convicted (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20146(b) (West 2006)).\nSection 5 \u2014 5\u20146 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20146 (West 2006)) requires the trial court to order restitution in accordance with that section for all convictions resulting from offenses in violation of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 1 through 47 \u2014 25 (West 2006)) in which a person received an injury to his or her person as a result of the defendant\u2019s criminal act. Under subsection (a) of that section, the court shall determine at the sentencing hearing \u201cwhether the defendant should be required to make restitution in cash, for out-of-pocket expenses, damages, losses, or injuries found to have been proximately caused by the conduct of the defendant.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20146(a) (West 2006).\nThe trial court calculated the $2,541.06 restitution order for Davis\u2019s medical expenses as follows: $290.50 for Clinical Radiology; $10 for a prescription; and $2,240.56 to Blessing Hospital, $1,833.39 of which was covered by insurance. See Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill. 2d 393, 412-14, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1030-31 (2008) (finding that where the plaintiff was entitled to seek and recover the reasonable value of her medical expenses, her recovery was not limited by the amount paid by insurance).\nThe aggravated-battery charge alleged defendant \u201cor one for whose conduct he is legally responsible, struck *** Davis in the head with his fist.\u201d The robbery charge alleged defendant \u201cor one for whose conduct he is legally responsible, took property, being keys and a cell phone, from the person of *** Davis, by the use of force.\u201d Defendant argues that because the blow to the head was the basis for the aggravated-battery charge, of which defendant was acquitted, any restitution based on that charge is void.\nIn support of that position, defendant cites People v. Chapin, 233 Ill. App. 3d 28, 597 N.E.2d 1250 (1992). However, Chapin is distinguishable. In Chapin, the jury acquitted defendant of theft by deception of $6,000 and found him guilty of theft by deception of $4,600. Chapin, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 32, 597 N.E.2d at 1253. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred when it ordered him to pay $10,600 in restitution. Chapin, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 34, 597 N.E.2d at 1255. The Third District found the $6,000 restitution order was void as defendant was only convicted of theft by deception of $4,600. Chapin, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 34, 597 N.E.2d at 1255. The court found the trial court was not permitted to order restitution of sums extraneous to the charges before it. Chapin, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 34, 597 N.E.2d at 1255.\nIn contrast here, the trial court did not order restitution for sums extraneous to the charges. The injuries Davis incurred were based on the robbery charge of which defendant was convicted. Defendant was charged with robbery for taking Davis\u2019s keys and cellular phone by force. The court acknowledged defendant was acquitted of aggravated battery but still found restitution was justified based on the force used for the robbery. According to Davis\u2019s testimony, one of the men struck him in the head causing him to fall to the ground. One of the men then held Davis on the ground by placing his foot on Davis\u2019s head, covering his nose and cheek. Davis also testified the pressure exerted on his head was hurtful and made him feel his head could have been stomped into the ground.\nDefendant contends the medical expenses relate solely to the initial blow to Davis\u2019s head, which formed the basis for the aggravated-battery charge. Defendant argues while the aggravated battery caused Davis\u2019s concussion, the force used in the robbery \u201cdid not even cause a bloody nose.\u201d In addition, defendant contends \u201cthe only injury Davis reported and police observed was redness and swelling behind [his] right ear from the initial blow to the head.\u201d However, defendant presented no evidence Davis\u2019s injuries were exclusively caused by the initial blow recited in the aggravated-battery charge.\nEven assuming arguendo that Davis\u2019s injuries resulted exclusively from the initial blow, the fact defendant was acquitted of the aggravated-battery charge is not determinative as \u201c [restitution may properly be ordered for all losses proximately caused by the same criminal acts of the defendant.\u201d People v. Gallinger, 252 Ill. App. 3d 816, 819, 624 N.E.2d 399, 401 (1993), citing People v. Hernandez, 236 Ill. App. 3d 983, 985, 600 N.E.2d 1234, 1235 (1992).\nIn this case, the initial strike is proximately related to the robbery. Here, defendant was engaged in a single course of conduct. The blow to Davis\u2019s head reasonably could be seen to have been used to disable Davis and allow the robbery to commence. As a result, Davis\u2019s injuries were proximately caused by defendant\u2019s criminal conduct for which he was convicted.\nAccordingly, the trial court\u2019s restitution order can stand solely on defendant\u2019s robbery conviction. As a result, we find the court did not err in ordering restitution for Davis\u2019s medical costs.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment. As part of our judgment, we grant the State its $50 statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal.\nAffirmed.\nKNECHT and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary R. Peterson and Jacqueline L. Bullard, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Jonathan H. Barnard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Quincy (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Perry L. Miller, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONTE M. CLAUSELL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201407\u20140997\nOpinion filed October 31, 2008.\nGary R. Peterson and Jacqueline L. Bullard, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJonathan H. Barnard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Quincy (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Perry L. Miller, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1079-01", "first_page_order": 1095, "last_page_order": 1099 }