{ "id": 4281117, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES PARKER, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Parker", "decision_date": "2007-10-09", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201406\u20141637", "first_page": "40", "last_page": "46", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "386 Ill. App. 3d 40" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974984 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604994 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148" }, { "page": "148" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 U.S. 164", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172884 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" }, { "page": "249-50" }, { "page": "993" }, { "page": "170" }, { "page": "249" }, { "page": "993" }, { "page": "166" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "991" }, { "page": "177" }, { "page": "253" }, { "page": "996" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 U.S. 177", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6214176 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179-80" }, { "page": "2796-97" }, { "page": "189" }, { "page": "2801" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/497/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 U.S. 103", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3275967 ], "weight": 18, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" }, { "page": "218" }, { "page": "1520" }, { "page": "106" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "1518-19" }, { "page": "121" }, { "page": "226" }, { "page": "1527" }, { "page": "121" }, { "page": "227" }, { "page": "1527" }, { "page": "122" }, { "page": "227" }, { "page": "1527" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/547/0103-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 579, "char_count": 12599, "ocr_confidence": 0.827, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.087085966315723e-08, "percentile": 0.3783890489368299 }, "sha256": "19a216c8572b363f01bcb1ec9a3202707a4ebbd360e58ae21a793fcc41d446fd", "simhash": "1:c8c81b0d335efbc5", "word_count": 2142 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:01:11.295177+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES PARKER, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARNEZIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)) from a circuit court order granting defendant James Parker\u2019s motion to suppress physical evidence obtained when police entered and searched his house without a warrant but with the consent of his live-in girlfriend, Diana Grisham. On appeal, the State contends that police had valid consent to search the premises because Grisham signed a consent-to-search form, defendant was not physically present when she gave that consent, and he did not expressly object to the search. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the trial court\u2019s ruling on defendant\u2019s motion and remand this case for further proceedings.\nDefendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. He subsequently filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence in which he claimed that he was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by police for the sole purpose of conducting a narcotics investigation. Defendant argued that the officers did not have a valid reason to stop the vehicle and that the search and seizure were unlawful because police lacked a search or arrest warrant, no exigent circumstances existed, the search was not incident to or contemporaneous with a valid arrest, and consent was given as a submission to a show of authority. Defendant further argued that because the search and seizure were illegal, the alleged illegal substance recovered from his person and any statements he made to police should be excluded from evidence.\nAt a hearing on his motion, defendant testified, contrary to the facts in his motion, that about 12:10 a.m. on February 26, 2006, he was sleeping in his bed with his 11-month-old daughter when he awoke and saw three or four police officers in his bedroom pointing their guns at him and his baby. One of the officers held a piece of paper in front of his face and explained to him that it was a consent form that Grisham had signed giving them permission to search the house. Defendant denied that he consented to the search and said that the police did not show him a search or arrest warrant. Defendant testified that police brought him to his front room, then searched his house and found crack cocaine.\nDefendant further testified that he and Grisham had lived together in the house for two years and that they shared the bedroom and dresser drawer from which police recovered drugs and money. Defendant acknowledged that while he was sleeping in the bedroom, he was only a few feet away from the dresser.\nAfter the defense rested, the State announced that it was going to call Chicago police officer Smith to testify, at which time the trial court intervened stating, \u201c[m]aybe I can cut this short.\u201d Pursuant to the court\u2019s questioning, the State acknowledged that the officer would testify that defendant was sleeping and that only Grisham consented, but it asserted that the testimony would also show that defendant never objected to the search and that Supreme Court case law supported the State\u2019s argument. The trial court ruled that it was granting defendant\u2019s motion based on Supreme Court case law holding that one person cannot consent for another. The court found that to require someone who is sleeping to object to another\u2019s consent goes against the spirit of the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling. It further stated that one person cannot consent to a search of a home when another person is inside, and it found that where defendant was sleeping, he did not have an opportunity to consent or object to the search.\nThe State argued that defendant had an opportunity to object when the officers woke him, to which the court replied that its ruling could be appealed and suggested that it might \u201cget some direction from the Appellate Court.\u201d The court further found that defendant did not have to assert an objection, that his consent had to be shown, and that the United States Supreme Court had held that one person cannot consent over another\u2019s objection. The trial court stated that the \u201cstipulated facts\u201d in this case were that defendant\u2019s live-in girlfriend signed a consent form, that defendant was sleeping when she gave her consent, that he did not consent to the search, and that he did not object to the search because he was sleeping. The court then ruled that the police could not rely on Grisham\u2019s consent to search a room where defendant was located without his permission.\nThe State asked if defense counsel would stipulate to the police officer\u2019s testimony, including that defendant was found asleep, he was woken and taken to the living room, and at no time did he object or say that he was not consenting to the search of the shared bedroom. The court responded that it had already stated the findings of fact and that there was a stipulation, to which defense counsel replied \u201c[t]hat\u2019s correct.\u201d The State clarified that the stipulation included that defendant had never objected after being woken, and counsel replied, \u201c[rjight. They were already in the house when he was woken up.\u201d The trial court again stated that defendant could not object because the officers were already inside the house conducting the search and granted defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence.\nOn appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred when it granted defendant\u2019s motion because the police had secured a valid consent to search the premises when Grisham, who lived in the home with defendant, voluntarily signed a consent-to-search form. The State asserts that the trial court misinterpreted the United States Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 164 L. Ed. 2d 208, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006), and that the instant case is factually distinct from Randolph because, here, defendant was not physically present when Grisham gave her consent to search, and defendant never voiced an objection to the search. The State requests this court to reverse the trial court\u2019s ruling on defendant\u2019s motion and to remand the case for trial.\nDefendant contends that the search was unreasonable because he was awoken and seized at gunpoint by police, informed that they had consent to search, then removed from the room, depriving him of an opportunity to object to the search. The State replies that it is uncontested that Grisham gave police a valid consent to search the house and that defendant\u2019s argument is against Supreme Court precedent set by Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, Ill L. Ed. 2d 148, 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990), and United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 94 S. Ct. 988 (1974).\nOur review of the trial court\u2019s ruling on defendant\u2019s motion to quash and suppress presents questions of both fact and law. People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 148 (2006). The court\u2019s factual findings will not be disturbed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, while the court\u2019s ruling on the motion is a question of law which we review de novo. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d at 148.\nThe fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, which applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment, protects all citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures in their homes. U.S. Const., amend. IV Generally, police must obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause before they can search a person\u2019s home (People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d 231, 243 (2003)), and searches conducted without such a warrant are presumptively unreasonable (Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 218, 126 S. Ct. at 1520). An exception to this rule exists where police obtain voluntary consent to search the home from either the defendant or from a third party who possesses common authority over the premises. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 249-50, 94 S. Ct. at 993.\nThe Supreme Court has held that when one person who has common authority over the premises consents to a search, his consent is valid against an absent, nonconsenting person who shares that authority. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 249, 94 S. Ct. at 993. However, although a cotenant gives his consent, a search will be found unreasonable as to a defendant who was physically present at the scene and expressly stated his refusal to allow police to enter and search the premises. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 217, 126 S. Ct. at 1518-19.\nIn Matlock, the defendant was arrested in his front yard and placed in a police car, after which his live-in girlfriend gave police her consent to search the bedroom they shared, in which evidence was recovered. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 247, 94 S. Ct. at 991. The Supreme Court found that the cotenant\u2019s voluntary consent to the search made it reasonable as to the defendant, who was not present to object to the search, although he was in a nearby squad car. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 177, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 253, 94 S. Ct. at 996.\nIn Rodriguez, the defendant was asleep in the bedroom when his apparent live-in girlfriend gave police her consent to enter the apartment to arrest him for assaulting her, at which time police recovered drugs and related paraphernalia that was in plain view. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179-80, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 155-56, 110 S. Ct. at 2796-97. The Court found that if the police reasonably believed that the woman had the authority to consent, then their entry into the apartment was reasonable. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 189, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 161, 110 S. Ct. at 2801.\nReflecting on its prior decisions in Matlock and Rodriguez, the Randolph Court acknowledged:\n\u201c[W]e are drawing a fine line; if a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door and objects, the co-tenant\u2019s permission does not suffice for a reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 226, 126 S. Ct. at 1527.\nHere, we find that the warrantless search of defendant\u2019s home was reasonable and did not violate his fourth amendment rights where police had secured a voluntary consent to search the premises from the cotenant in defendant\u2019s absence. Similar to the defendant in Rodriguez, defendant in this case was sleeping in the bedroom when Grisham, his live-in girlfriend, gave police her consent to enter and search the home that they shared. Although defendant was present nearby, he was not present at the threshold colloquy where Grisham gave her voluntary consent. Due to his absence at that point, defendant could not object when police entered his home and began their search. Following the reasoning of the Randolph Court, defendant \u201clost out\u201d on his opportunity to do so. We further note that the record contains no evidence that defendant ever expressly voiced an objection to the search, even after being confronted by police in the bedroom.\nIn addition, we reject defendant\u2019s argument that the search was unreasonable because he was deprived of his opportunity to object. In order for defendant to override Grisham\u2019s consent, it was necessary for him to be present \u201cat the door\u201d and expressly object to the search when police entered his home. There is no evidence in the record that the police removed him from the \u201centrance\u201d to avoid his possible objection. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 227, 126 S. Ct. at 1527. Moreover, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion that the police should be required \u201cto find a potentially objecting co-tenant before acting on the permission they ha[ve] already received,\u201d as doing so would turn eveiy \u201ccotenant consent\u201d case into an examination of the adequacy of the efforts of police to consult with a potential objector. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 227, 126 S. Ct. at 1527. Accordingly, we find that defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence should have been denied.\nFor these reasons, we reverse the ruling of the circuit court of Cook County and remand this case for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nTHEIS and CUNNINGHAM, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARNEZIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Julie A. Hull, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Veronica Calderon Malavia, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES PARKER, Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 1 \u2014 06\u20141637\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nOpinion filed October 9, 2007.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Julie A. Hull, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Veronica Calderon Malavia, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0040-01", "first_page_order": 58, "last_page_order": 64 }