{ "id": 4281686, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHAKINA FEAZELL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Feazell", "decision_date": "2007-10-31", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201405\u20141065", "first_page": "55", "last_page": "67", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "386 Ill. App. 3d 55" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "694 N.E.2d 1068", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1075" }, { "page": "1075" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222606 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" }, { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "626 N.E.2d 1104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1112" }, { "page": "1112-13" }, { "page": "1113" }, { "page": "1113" }, { "page": "1112" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2978938 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" }, { "page": "527" }, { "page": "527" }, { "page": "528" }, { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/254/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 U.S. 673", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6207521 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" }, { "page": "685" }, { "page": "1437" }, { "page": "681" }, { "page": "684" }, { "page": "1436" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/475/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "817 N.E.2d 968", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "974-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 1080", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5458108 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1086" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/1080-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 27, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "1359" }, { "page": "51" }, { "page": "192" }, { "page": "1364" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "1374" }, { "page": "68-69" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "1374" }, { "page": "51" }, { "page": "192" }, { "page": "1364" }, { "page": "51" }, { "page": "192" }, { "page": "1364" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "1374" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "1374" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "830 N.E.2d 467", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" }, { "page": "474" }, { "page": "474" }, { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060336 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "179" }, { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 N.E.2d 471", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 Ill. App. 3d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5221987 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/228/0107-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1161, "char_count": 32558, "ocr_confidence": 0.83, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.321421811589117e-08, "percentile": 0.3354587468226912 }, "sha256": "8c3e66e21da9fc0ea3c1629e295650cf85c069cf61cbb04fbf76f620ef5c5457", "simhash": "1:2f085d322fc5a7c3", "word_count": 5478 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:01:11.295177+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHAKINA FEAZELL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant Shakina Feazell (Feazell) was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and armed vehicular hijacking and sentenced to 35 years\u2019 imprisonment with two concurrent 10-year terms. This appeal follows. Feazell now argues that: (1) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by making prejudicial references to the victim\u2019s children and calling her a liar, manipulator, junkie and con; (2) the trial court erred by admitting the testimonial statements of codefendant Dion Banks, in violation of the sixth amendment confrontation clause; (3) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a sidebar or motion the court for a new trial after the State introduced alleged hearsay evidence; (4) she cannot be convicted of both armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking because both crimes arise from one single act; and (5) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request specific jury forms for the various instructions of murder.\nBACKGROUND\nThe State offered the testimony of 11 witnesses to establish that the defendant knowingly participated in the armed vehicular hijacking, armed robbery and murder of Rose Newburn. For the purpose of simplicity, most of the testimony will be related in the context of the defendant\u2019s account of the events.\nShakina Feazell was 25 years old and Dion Banks was 40 years old when they met at a drug rehabilitation clinic where both were undergoing treatment. The pair began dating while undergoing treatment for their respective drug addictions. Shortly after leaving the drug rehabilitation program, both Feazell and Banks relapsed and began using illegal drugs again. Feazell testified that a few months after the relationship began, Banks began to physically abuse her. The abuse occurred especially when Banks lacked sufficient funds to purchase cocaine.\nOn March 23, 2001, Feazell and Banks spent the night at a friend\u2019s house. Both got high on drugs and slept overnight in a spare bedroom of the house. Feazell testified that when she awoke, Banks was gone and she was locked inside the bedroom. Feazell said that Banks locked the door from the outside and left her without a phone, food, water, or bathroom access. Banks opened the door when he returned to the house. Feazell testified that Banks informed her that they were going to Ford City Mall to get a present for Banks\u2019 niece. However, Feazell testified that she believed the two were going to shoplift items from the mall. The two traveled to the mall in a stolen Toyota Corolla; however, Feazell testified that she did not know the vehicle was stolen and that Banks previously claimed the car was owned by his uncle.\nBanks drove to Ford City Mall and parked in a space next to a green Dodge Intrepid. The Dodge Intrepid was occupied by Rose New-burn and her two children, five-year-old Tyrone Newburn and four-year-old Quincy Newburn. Rose Newburn was in the driver\u2019s seat while Tyrone and Quincy were sitting in the backseat. Feazell testified that after Banks parked the car, he said that the car he wanted was right there (indicating the green Intrepid occupied by the Newburn family). Banks quickly exited the Toyota Corolla and told Feazell to move over from the passenger\u2019s seat into the driver\u2019s seat of the Toyota. Feazell complied with the request. Banks then pulled out a gun, approached the Intrepid, and shouted, \u201c[G]et the fuck out [of] the car.\u201d Feazell testified that she did not know Banks possessed a gun. As Rose Newburn was reaching into the back of the vehicle, Banks shot through the window. Tyrone Newburn, who was five years old at the time of the incident, testified that Banks reached inside the vehicle, threw his mother to the ground and shot her. Rose Newburn ultimately bled to death because a bullet punctured an artery in her thigh.\nBanks then entered the Intrepid and drove away, instructing Feazell to follow him in the Toyota. Both Tyrone and Quincy Newburn were still in the backseat of the vehicle when Banks drove away from the scene. Before exiting the mall, Banks let Quincy and Tyrone New-burn out of the car. The boys ran back to where their mother lay in the parking lot. Banks and Feazell drove out of the mall in the stolen vehicles. Feazell testified that she was afraid of Banks and had no choice but to follow him in the Toyota as he told her to do. Feazell followed Banks east on 79th Street in the Toyota Corolla. Feazell stated that Banks was driving at a high rate of speed and swerved in and out of traffic. Feazell testified that she then decided to cause a car accident in the hope of attracting the police.\nFeazell rear-ended a white car. Joseph Harrison and his pregnant wife Retrina Smith were the occupants of the white car. Harrison testified that Banks had passed his vehicle before Feazell hit his car. After Feazell bumped into the rear of his vehicle, Harrison walked to the rear of his vehicle to inspect the damage. Harrison testified that he attempted to converse with Feazell about the damage to his vehicle but Feazell refused to open her window or respond to his questions. Banks apparently observed the accident and drove in reverse to the scene of the crash. Harrison testified that as he tried to speak with Feazell, Banks jumped out of the Intrepid and asked, \u201c[W]hat the fuck was going on?\u201d Harrison waved Banks off while trying to speak with Feazell, who was in the Corolla. Banks instructed Feazell to drive away and returned to his vehicle. Feazell followed Banks\u2019 directions and drove away from the scene of the crash. Harrison then returned to his vehicle and followed Feazell. Banks, Feazell, and Harrison all began to travel east on 79th Street. Harrison overtook Banks and Feazell at the intersection of 79th Street and Western Avenue. Harrison drove alongside Feazell\u2019s vehicle and began to shout at her. Banks\u2019 vehicle was on the other side of Feazell\u2019s car. Feazell ignored Harrison and began to tell Banks what Harrison just shouted at her. Harrison testified that Banks shouted, \u201cF him and pull off when the light turns green.\u201d When the light turned green, Feazell drove away and Harrison continued to follow her vehicle. Harrison testified that Banks then drove alongside his car and shot at him twice. Harrison then stopped following Feazell and drove away in the opposite direction.\nAccording to Feazell, after Banks shot at Harrison, Banks caught up with her and asked what she was trying to do. Feazell told him that she was very nervous and Banks told her to keep up with him in traffic. Feazell testified that she continued to follow Banks as he turned into the parking lot of a liquor store. Banks exited the Intrepid, took the keys from the Toyota driven by Feazell, and entered the liquor store, leaving Feazell in the Toyota. When Banks left the liquor store, he returned the Toyota\u2019s keys to Feazell and instructed her to continue following him. Feazell followed Banks into a gas station. Banks then handed Feazell Rose Newburn\u2019s purse and wallet, telling her to use Newburn\u2019s credit card to pay for gas. Feazell attempted to use the credit card but the transaction was declined. Feazell claims that Banks asked her if she knew of a place where he could \u201cget rid of the [Intrepid].\u201d Feazell told Banks that she knew of a chop shop on the west side of Chicago. Feazell testified that she did not know the location of a chop shop, but bed to Banks so she could return to that area. Feazell said she felt safer on the west side because her mother, sister, and most of her family lived in that area.\nFeazell testified that Banks followed her on the expressway until he signaled her to exit. Feazell then exited the expressway at Homan Avenue. She stopped the vehicle at a vacant lot at Jackson and Lotus Avenues. Banks approached the car and instructed her to open the door. Feazell said she refused to open the door and Banks became irate. According to Feazell, she told him she was afraid to open the door because he might hit her. Feazell said she was nervous and scared and began to apologize profusely to Banks. Banks replied: \u201cIf I wanted to kill you or anything, I could just shoot you through the window.\u201d Feazell then opened the car door and Banks hit her legs several times. The two then drove to her mother\u2019s house. When they arrived, no one was at home. They then went to the residence of Feazell\u2019s sister, Yolanda. Yolanda testified at trial that Feazell was smiling but appeared nervous when they first greeted each other. Yolanda stated on cross-examination that she speculated whether Feazell was \u201chigh.\u201d Feazell testified that she could not tell her sister that she was in danger because Banks was standing right next to them. Feazell testified that Banks began to brag to Yolanda about the Intrepid, but failed to mention that the car was stolen. Banks also offered Yolanda a ride in the Intrepid, but she declined. Banks and Feazell then left Yolanda\u2019s home in separate vehicles as they had arrived.\nFeazell testified that they drove to a White Castle restaurant parking lot where Banks attempted to sell Rose Newburn\u2019s cellular phone and camera. After Banks could not sell the phone, he demanded that Feazell take him to a chop shop. Feazell told Banks that a chop shop was located on Lake Street. As Banks followed Feazell through the streets, she crashed into two cars parked on the street in front of the Garfield Park fieldhouse. Feazell again alleged that she intentionally caused the car accidents to attract the police. The last car that Feazell hit flipped over and Feazell\u2019s air bag deployed. Feazell\u2019s car stopped and she crawled out of the car and lay on the pavement. Feazell testified that she was not really hurt but had a cut on her lip and a bump on her head. Steve Kelly (Kelly) was outside the Garfield Park field-house when he heard the car crash. He observed children running toward the accident site and ran to the cars to offer assistance. Kelly approached Feazell and called for emergency assistance. Banks soon arrived and asked Feazell if she was okay. Kelly testified that he told Banks that an ambulance was on the way, but Banks ordered Feazell to get up and said that he was going to take her to the hospital. Kelly stated that Feazell was saying \u201cno, no, no\u201d as Banks picked her up. Banks then asked Kelly for directions to the nearest hospital, and both Banks and Feazell left the scene in the Intrepid.\nFeazell testified that as Banks drove her away from the accident, she began to apologize for the crash. Banks began to hit her on the side of her face and then he put the gun to her head. She grabbed the gun but Banks threatened to shoot her if she did not let it go. He then stopped the car and began to beat her. Feazell testified that after Banks beat her, he told her they were going to the Dan Ryan Woods at 87th and the Dan Ryan Expressway. At that point, the police began pursuing the Intrepid and the car slammed into a pillar. Banks fled on foot and Feazell was arrested in the car. Banks was later apprehended and arrested.\nBanks was tried separately before a jury, found guilty of first degree murder and given the death penalty. He did not testify at Feazell\u2019s trial.\nDuring Feazell\u2019s trial, the State called multiple witnesses to the stand, including Detective Edward Winstead, who testified to the following during direct examination:\n\u201cQ. What is said to Shakina Feazell at that time [during interrogation]?\nA. I told Shakina Feazell that she wasn\u2019t telling the whole truth, that I talked to [Banks] and that they had gone to Ford City specifically to get a new car, that the car that they were driving had been stolen, and they had it too long, it was time to switch cars. She maintained that she didn\u2019t know the car she was in was stolen. I said he said she was there when\u2014\nMS. JOHNSON: Objection.\nTHE COURT: Sustained.\nMR. RODGERSf:] Are these things that you are telling to Shakina Feazell?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Is she responding to these things?\nA. She\u2019s saying, no, I didn\u2019t know it was stolen, and I said he told me you drove\u2014\nMS. JOHNSON: Objection.\nTHE COURT: That\u2019s what you said to her?\nTHE WITNESS: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: Okay, objection overruled.\nMR. ROGERS[:] Go ahead.\nA. I said he said that you drove him in your Chevy when he stole the car from a man in a gas station, this would be their original car, [a] Toyota at 79th and Western, about three weeks before. I said you told us you didn\u2019t know he had a gun. He said you definitely knew he had a gun.\nMS. JOHNSON: Objection.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\nTHE WITNESS: You were living with him, and I quoted him, you had seen the gun a million times. In fact, he kept it under his pillow at night.\nMS. JOHNSON: Objection.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\nMR. RODGERS[:] What does the defendant say to you?\nA. She said, \u2018No, I didn\u2019t know he had the gun.\u2019 I said the other thing is you knew you were going there to car jack to get a new car, to trade cars. She said, \u2018No, I went there to shoplift at Old Navy store.\u2019 She said, \u2018No, he said he was going to get a new car,\u2019 and I said, \u2018How was he going to get the car?\u2019 I said, \u2018What would you do if you were in a car and some guy said get out and give me the car?\u2019 She said, T wouldn\u2019t do it.\u2019 I said, \u2018How about if you had a gun,\u2019 and she said, T would do it.\u2019 She said, \u2018When we got to the parking lot,\u2019 she said, \u2018It was a green Intrepid, and he said I\u2019m going to take that car,\u2019 and she said he pulled over next to it, and she said, T saw two little boys in the back seat. I was thinking, boy, I hope they don\u2019t get hurt.\u2019 So I said, \u2018How were they going to get hurt?\u2019 She said, \u2018well, I didn\u2019t know he had a gun.\u2019 And I asked her, \u2018What were you going to do with the car,\u2019 and she said, \u2018We were going to take the car and drive to the west side and try to sell it for money for drugs.\u2019\nQ. After she tells you that, did you ask her for anything?\nA. She was requested [sic] if she would give video or at least a court-reported statement of what she just told us, and she said she would.\nQ. And did she eventually give one?\nA. No, she changed her mind and decided not to.\nQ. One last thing, at one point, did she talk about being afraid of Dion Banks?\nA. The very last thing that she said, I asked her why she stayed with him. She said, \u2018Well, I was afraid of him.\u2019\nQ. This is after he had done what he had done?\nA. Yes, that was probably the last part of our conversation.\nQ. Did she say when it was that she began [to be] afraid of Dion Banks?\nA. When she got to the west side.\nQ. To the west side of Chicago?\nA. Yes.\nMR. RODGERS: Nothing further, Judge.\u201d\nThe jury ultimately convicted Feazell of first degree murder, armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking. Feazell received two concurrent 10-year terms consecutive to a 35-year term for murder. Feazell now appeals her conviction.\nPROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT\nFeazell first alleges prosecutorial misconduct based on certain statements made by the prosecution during the trial. After examining the posttrial motion, we find that Feazell failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal. A defendant\u2019s failure to raise an issue in a written motion for a new trial generally constitutes a waiver of that issue; however, the plain-error doctrine is applied where the evidence is closely balanced or substantial rights are affected. People v. MacFarland, 228 Ill. App. 3d 107, 118, 592 N.E.2d 471, 479 (1992). \u201cThe plain-error doctrine *** allows a reviewing court to reach a forfeited issue affecting substantial rights in two circumstances.\u201d People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178, 830 N.E.2d 467, 474 (2005). \u201cFirst, where the evidence in a case is so closely balanced that the juiy\u2019s guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and not the evidence, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error in order to preclude an argument that an innocent person was wrongly convicted.\u201d Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 178, 830 N.E.2d at 474. \u201cSecond, where the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, and thus a fair trial, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error in order to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.\u201d Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 179, 830 N.E.2d at 474.\nUnder the plain-error test, we must see whether the evidence was so closely balanced that the jury\u2019s guilty verdict resulted from the prosecutor\u2019s comments and not the evidence presented at trial. Feazell contends that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by labeling her a liar, junkie, manipulator, and con and by referencing Rose Newburn\u2019s children during its closing arguments. During the trial, the State presented evidence demonstrating that Feazell lied to the police about her identity, was a convicted shoplifter, and was an admitted drug abuser. Testimony was presented from several people who witnessed Feazell\u2019s participation in the criminal activity throughout the streets of Chicago. Feazell herself testified that she lied to the police about her identity, went to Ford City Mall to shoplift, and had a drug abuse problem. Feazell also testified that she did not have any knowledge of Banks\u2019 plans to steal Newburn\u2019s vehicle and that her fear of Banks prevented her from leaving him and notifying the police as they traveled around the city. The State\u2019s comments are supported by the evidence produced at trial, including testimony given by Feazell. Even assuming some impropriety, the evidence is not so closely balanced that the jury would have convicted Feazell as a result of the prosecutor\u2019s comments and not the evidence presented at trial. Thus, the issue of prosecutorial misconduct is waived under the plain-error doctrine.\nDION BANKS\u2019 STATEMENTS INTRODUCED THROUGH WINSTEAD\nFeazell next contends that she,was denied the right to confront Banks when his testimony was improperly allowed into evidence through Detective Winstead. At issue is whether Winstead\u2019s testimony contained improperly admitted hearsay evidence that violated Feazell\u2019s sixth amendment rights. During the trial, Winstead testified about the contents of an interrogation session he had with Feazell while she was in police custody. Winstead testified that he confronted Feazell with Banks\u2019 statements after Feazell lied about her identity, minimized her role in the crime, and denied having prior knowledge of the vehicular hijacking or Banks\u2019 possession of a gun. Over defense counsel\u2019s general objections, Winstead testified to statements given by Banks under interrogation. Feazell argues that those statements were devastating to her defense. Winstead\u2019s testimony included statements that implicated Feazell in the original theft of the Toyota Corolla, which the pair used to drive to Ford City Mall. We note that the theft of the Toyota was not at issue in the trial. There were also statements from Dion Banks alleging that Feazell knowingly participated in the vehicular hijacking of the Intrepid and had knowledge of the gun that he used in the crime. Feazell argues that she is entitled to a new trial because Winstead\u2019s testimony contained improperly admitted hearsay statements that violated her sixth amendment rights. In summary, Feazell argues that Banks testified against her through Winstead and she had no opportunity to confront Banks.\nFeazell points out that the trial court erred when it allowed Detective Winstead to testify to the substantive contents of his discussion with her during interrogation because the statements violated the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment and the precedent set by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). Feazell contends that Winstead\u2019s testimony was substantive and does not qualify as a nonhearsay statement or as a hearsay exception. Feazell argues that Banks\u2019 statement was the basis for the State\u2019s theory of accountability and absent the statement, all other evidence is insufficient to prove her knowledge of Banks\u2019 actions. Feazell claims that her own admission on the witness stand and criminal history only proved that she shoplifted to support her drug habit. Without the hearsay evidence, Feazell argues, the State\u2019s assertions regarding her knowledge of the crime and gun are uncorroborated by any other evidence. Feazell argues that Banks\u2019 statements were substantially prejudicial and thus denied her a fair trial.\nThe State argues that this issue is waived because it was not properly preserved for appeal and, in the alternative, that the statements qualify as either nonhearsay statements or hearsay exceptions. The State first argues that this issue should be reviewed under a plain-error doctrine because the defense failed to preserve the issue in a posttrial motion. Under the plain-error test, the State asserts that the evidence is not closely balanced and that there was sufficient evidence at trial demonstrating how Feazell was accountable for Banks\u2019 actions. The State argues that the wide scope of Feazell\u2019s involvement was illustrated through various witnesses, including Detective Winstead\u2019s testimony. Winstead testified to the conversation he had with Feazell in which she admitted having knowledge of Banks\u2019 intent to steal the victim\u2019s car before the commencement of the crime. Winstead also testified that Feazell stated that she saw the two small boys in the victim\u2019s car and \u201choped that no one got hurt,\u201d but also said that they were going to take the car and whatever was in it. Various State witnesses testified regarding Feazell\u2019s involvement in the crime throughout its various stages. The State also argues that the evidence proves that Feazell was present during the commission of the crime without opposing or disapproving it. The State also offered evidence that Feazell accepted the contents of the victim\u2019s purse and attempted to use her credit card at a gas station. The State contends that the evidence demonstrates that this case is not closely balanced and fails to meet the requirements of the plain-error test.\nThe State also argues that Detective Winstead\u2019s testimony falls under the police investigation exception to the hearsay rule. The State says that Winstead\u2019s statements were used to demonstrate the progression of the investigation. The State argues that Winstead\u2019s testimony demonstrates Feazell\u2019s shift in position and properly falls under the police investigation exception.\nLastly, the State contends that Winstead\u2019s statements also are nonhearsay statements used for the purpose of showing the effect on the listener\u2019s mind (Feazell) or to show why the listener subsequently acted the way she did. The State points out that Winstead testified that prior to Feazell\u2019s being confronted with Banks\u2019 statements, she lied about her identity and minimized her role in the crimes. Feazell\u2019s shift in position and truthfulness about her involvement only occurred after she was confronted with Banks\u2019 statements. The State argues that the statements were nonhearsay statements and properly admitted at trial.\nThis issue is reviewed under the plain-error doctrine because it was not properly preserved for appeal in a posttrial motion. As previously stated, the plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider a forfeited issue in order to preserve the integrity of the judicial process where the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, and thus a fair trial. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 178, 830 N.E.2d at 474.\n\u201cThe Sixth Amendment\u2019s Confrontation Clause [of the United States Constitution] provides that \u2018[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . ., to be confronted with the witnesses against him.\u2019 \u201d Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 187, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1359 (2004). The confrontation clause applies to witnesses who bear testimony against the accused. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 192, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. Where testimonial evidence is at issue, the sixth amendment demands unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 203, 124 S. Ct. at 1374. Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually provides: confrontation. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 203, 124 S. Ct. at 1374. \u201cAn accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.\u201d Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 192, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. However, an exception to the hearsay rule allows an officer to testify for the purpose of establishing how the investigation was conducted and cannot be used to place into evidence the substance of any out-of-court statement or conversations offered for the truth of their contents. People v. Jura, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1086, 817 N.E.2d 968, 974-75 (2004). \u201c[T]he denial of the opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness does not fit within the limited category of constitutional errors that are deemed prejudicial in every case.\u201d Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 682, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674, 685, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (1986). An otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 684, 106 S. Ct. at 1436.\n\u201c[A] police officer may reconstruct the steps taken in a crime\u2019s investigation and may describe the events leading up to the defendant\u2019s arrest where such testimony is necessary *** to fully explain the State\u2019s case to the jury.\u201d People v. Trotter, 254 Ill. App. 3d 514, 527, 626 N.E.2d 1104, 1112 (1993). \u201c[T]here is a distinction between an officer testifying to the fact that he spoke to a witness without disclosing the contents of that conversation and an officer testifying to the contents of the conversation.\u201d Trotter, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 527, 626 N.E.2d at 1112-13. \u201cUnder the investigation procedure exception, the officer\u2019s testimony must be limited to show how the investigation was conducted, not to place into evidence the substance of any out-of-court statement or conversations for the purpose of establishing the truth of their contents.\u201d Trotter, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 527, 626 N.E.2d at 1113. \u201cIf such testimony is presented, the trial court must instruct the jury that the testimony was introduced for the limited purpose of explaining what caused the police to act and that they were not to accept the statement as true.\u201d Trotter, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 528, 626 N.E.2d at 1113.\nAn out-of-court statement may also be introduced to prove the statement\u2019s effect on the listener\u2019s mind or offered to show why the listener subsequently acted as he or she did. People v. Thomas, 296 Ill. App. 3d 489, 499, 694 N.E.2d 1068, 1075 (1998). This type of statement is not hearsay and is admissible in a trial. People v. Thomas, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 499, 694 N.E.2d at 1075.\nWe find that in this case, the trial court violated Feazell\u2019s right to confrontation under the sixth amendment and the precedent set in Crawford v. Washington by admitting Banks\u2019 comments into evidence through the testimony of Detective Winstead. The Supreme Court held in Crawford v. Washington that \u201c[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.\u201d Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at 51, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 192, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. Banks\u2019 statements were garnered during his interrogation by Winstead and relayed to Feazell during her interrogation session with Winstead. Banks\u2019 statements are clearly testimonial in nature. The United States Supreme Court has clearly said that this type of statement cannot be introduced against the defendant when the defense has not had the opportunity to confront the out-of-court declarant. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 203, 124 S. Ct. at 1374. The out-of-court declarant must be confronted by the defense to yield some indicia of reliability. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 203, 124 S. Ct. at 1374. Banks\u2019 statements are the statements of one codefendant under the pressure of interrogation against another codefendant. Without anything more, Banks\u2019 statements bear no indicia of reliability.\nBanks\u2019 statements also do not qualify under the police investigation exception because Detective Winstead testified to the substantive contents of the statements made during the interrogation. Although the court held in People v. Trotter, 254 Ill. App. 3d 514, 527, 626 N.E.2d 1104, 1112 (1993), that \u201ca police officer may reconstruct the steps taken in a crime\u2019s investigation,\u201d the court distinctly held that the officer\u2019s testimony must be limited to show how the investigation was conducted and not place into evidence the substance of any out-of-court statement or conversations for the purpose of establishing the truth of their contents. Had Winstead merely stated that he confronted Feazell with Banks\u2019 statement, then he would have been within the boundaries of the exception. However, he went much further. He, in effect, placed Banks\u2019 version of the events and Feazell\u2019s alleged knowledge of those events squarely before the jury. There were also no limiting instructions from the court. The jury was simply given Banks\u2019 version of the events through the testimony of Winstead. The substantive statements were inadmissible hearsay and should never have been allowed.\nWe also reject the State\u2019s contention that Bank\u2019s statements were used to prove the effect of the statements on Feazell\u2019s mind or offered to show why Feazell subsequently acted as she did. The State has failed to establish how Feazell\u2019s behavior, actions or cooperation changed after hearing Banks\u2019 statements. All the State has demonstrated is that Feazell answered questions presented to her during the interrogation process.\nFeazell argues that since Banks was not subject to cross-examination, the admission of his statement violated the confrontation clause. We agree. Further, we find that the error was so serious as to deny her the fundamental right to a fair trial. Indeed, Banks\u2019 testimony was a powerful force for the State and was an integral part of its case. Thus, we find that the trial court has committed plain error under the doctrine set forth in Herron. The trial court\u2019s admission of Banks\u2019 testimonial statements against Feazell through Detective Winstead fell squarely within the ruling outlined in Herron. The statements served as direct impeachment testimony to Feazell\u2019s version of the events and severely contradicted what she told the jury. Although the State contends that this was merely harmless error, its argument is not convincing and fails to adequately address the constitutional arguments raised by Feazell in her assertion that she had a right to confront Banks. Without Banks\u2019 testimony, there was no other evidence that contradicted Feazell\u2019s version of the events. This is particularly damaging because Feazell was convicted of knowing murder and, as the State all but conceded during oral arguments, no other direct evidence was offered by the State establishing that Feazell knew Banks possessed a gun.\nBanks\u2019 statements were unreliable as substantive evidence because Feazell did not have the opportunity to confront him. This is the exact type of testimonial statement that Crawford aims to prevent from being introduced against a defendant. Banks\u2019 statement falls squarely within the four corners of Crawford and the admission of the statement was error. This error is such that to preserve the integrity of the judicial process, we must reverse Feazell\u2019s conviction and remand for a new trial. In light of our ruling on this issue, we need not reach the other issues raised by the defendant.\nReversed and remanded.\nGREIMAN and THEIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Jessica D. Thomlinson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Michelle Katz, Susan R. Schierl Sullivan, Veronica Calderon Malavia, and Tasha-Marie Kelly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHAKINA FEAZELL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 05\u20141065\nOpinion filed October 31, 2007.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Jessica D. Thomlinson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Michelle Katz, Susan R. Schierl Sullivan, Veronica Calderon Malavia, and Tasha-Marie Kelly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0055-01", "first_page_order": 73, "last_page_order": 85 }