{ "id": 4281370, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIYEZ RAMON OWENS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Owens", "decision_date": "2008-12-19", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201407\u20140838", "first_page": "765", "last_page": "773", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "386 Ill. App. 3d 765" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "817 N.E.2d 511", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520", "parenthetical": "\"An attorney *** who determines that defendant's claims are meritless cannot in good faith file an amended petition on behalf of defendant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444097 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205", "parenthetical": "\"An attorney *** who determines that defendant's claims are meritless cannot in good faith file an amended petition on behalf of defendant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 N.E.2d 1321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1323" }, { "page": "1325" }, { "page": "1325" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2979399 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" }, { "page": "289" }, { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/254/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 N.E.2d 1230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1232", "parenthetical": "adding whether to submit an instruction on a lesser-included offense to the list" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ill. 2d 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477542 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229", "parenthetical": "adding whether to submit an instruction on a lesser-included offense to the list" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/162/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "604 N.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281", "parenthetical": "articulating the first four" }, { "page": "281", "parenthetical": "explaining that such matters include what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept, and what motions should be made" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5602986 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54", "parenthetical": "articulating the first four" }, { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "846 N.E.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" }, { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4262792 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" }, { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "725 N.E.2d 1258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1264-65", "parenthetical": "noting that intent may be inferred from the defendant's acts as well as the circumstances surrounding the criminal act" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224780 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266", "parenthetical": "noting that intent may be inferred from the defendant's acts as well as the circumstances surrounding the criminal act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "845 N.E.2d 598", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3598282 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/219/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "891 N.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "876" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3615142 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/229/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "860 N.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" }, { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604853 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" }, { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0187-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 887, "char_count": 19379, "ocr_confidence": 0.841, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14371822449880284 }, "sha256": "c66aa625e9a76a907f658ab8eba5f8cf9fcf5478dbb3b5b8ebe7fccae6110ea8", "simhash": "1:1a728ca6b2ad1fca", "word_count": 3216 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:01:11.295177+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIYEZ RAMON OWENS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a May 2007 trial, a jury convicted defendant, Diyez Ramon Owens, of two counts of armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 2(a) (West 2004)) and two counts of aggravated robbery (720 ILCS 5/18\u2014 5(a) (West 2004)). In September 2007, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent 10-year prison terms on each armed-robbery count.\nDefendant appeals, arguing that (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery and (2) he was denied effective assistance of posttrial counsel. We disagree and affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn December 2006, the State charged defendant with armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 2(a) (West 2004)) and aggravated robbery (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 5(a) (West 2004)). In January 2007, the grand jury charged defendant with an additional count of (1) armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 2(a) (West 2004)) and (2) aggravated robbery (720 ILCS 5/18\u2014 5(a) (West 2004)).\nA. The Evidence Presented at Defendant\u2019s Trial\nAt defendant\u2019s May 2007 trial, the State presented evidence that in September 2004, defendant, Tommy Slaton, Damoni demon, and Johnnie Bankston robbed a Mac\u2019s convenience store at gunpoint. (Slayton, demon, and Bankston are not parties to this appeal.)\nThe general manager of Mac\u2019s, Joseph Jantze, testified that (1) the armed robbers took a total of more than $8,800 from the store register, safe, and automatic teller machine (ATM), and (2) a surveillance camera captured the 2\u00bd-minute robbery.\nMac\u2019s employees Patricia Smith and Dorothy Tucker \u2014 both of whom had a criminal record \u2014 were working the night of the robbery. Smith testified, in pertinent part, that (1) at least two men came into the store wearing ski masks, hoods, and gloves and (2) one of the men ordered her and Tucker to the floor at gunpoint. Later, one of the men ordered Smith to get up and put the money from the store\u2019s cash register into a bag. However, Smith acknowledged that she could not positively identify any of the men. Tucker did not testify and was later convicted for her participation in the robbery. (Tucker is not a party to this appeal.)\nSmith\u2019s boyfriend, Larry Coleman \u2014 who also had a criminal record \u2014 was in the store at the time of the robbery. Coleman testified that he saw (1) three or four men come into the store wearing dark clothes and hoods and (2) at least two of the men were armed with pistols and one man was armed with a metal pipe.\nSchmond Simmons, a Mac\u2019s customer, testified that his back was to the door when the men entered Mac\u2019s but that he went to the ground when he saw a \u201cguy dressed in all dark clothing with a gun in his hand.\u201d Simmons recalled that one of the men searched him and took money from his pockets.\nJeff Goforth, who lived across the street from Mac\u2019s at the time of the robbery and also had a criminal record, testified that he (1) saw four men run into the store, (2) saw the customers disappear onto the floor, (3) told his girlfriend to call the police, (4) ran across the street to warn other prospective customers to stay outside the store, (5) saw four men with ski masks leave the store, and (6) could tell that the men were African-American because he could see their skin color through the eye and mouth holes in their masks.\nSlayton pleaded guilty to armed robbery in connection with the Mac\u2019s robbery and agreed to testify against defendant in exchange for a six-year sentence. Slayton testified that (1) Clemon, his roommate, approached him about committing a robbery; (2) Amanda Hodel, the mother of Bankston\u2019s child, came over; (3) Clemon went to Hodel\u2019s car, gave him a ski mask and a pipe wrench, and said, \u201ccome on\u201d; (4) he, Hodel, Clemon, Bankston, and defendant drove to Mac\u2019s and parked beside the store; (5) he, Clemon, Bankston, and defendant went into the store wearing ski masks, while Hodel waited in the car; (6) the four men robbed the store and drove away; (7) a short time later, the group ditched the car and ran toward demon\u2019s house; (8) he dropped the ATM box, pipe wrench, and ski mask as he ran; (9) he stayed with friends for a while before returning to demon\u2019s house; and (10) he went back to retrieve the ATM box, the proceeds from which the group later divided.\nAbe McDaniel, an acquaintance of Tucker, testified that (1) he was in the Chestnut Health Systems rehabilitation center (hereinafter Chestnut) in January 2005; (2) while in Chestnut, he was defendant\u2019s roommate; and (3) defendant told him that he had robbed Mac\u2019s with Bankston, Slayton, and Clemon.\nHodel \u2014 who also had a criminal record \u2014 testified that (1) on the day of the Mac\u2019s robbery, she borrowed her friend\u2019s car; (2) on her way to buy dog food, she stopped by demon\u2019s house to see whether Bankston wanted to go; (3) Clemon, Bankston, Slayton, and defendant were at demon\u2019s house and asked her if she would take them to Mac\u2019s; (4) she agreed to take the group to Mac\u2019s and let Clemon drive; (5) the group parked outside Mac\u2019s and sat in the car for a long time before she left to use the restroom; (6) when she returned, the group told her that they were waiting for someone; (7) a short time later, the group left to get a drink; (8) because she had been waiting a while for them to return, she went to see what was taking so long; (9) she was stopped at the front of Mac\u2019s by a man who told her that Mac\u2019s was being robbed; (10) she watched as the group left the store, got into the car, and drove away; (11) she went to demon\u2019s house sometime later; (12) Clemon gave her a pack of cigarettes and $200 in cash but did not tell her why he was doing so; and (13) she did not receive any other money from the robbery.\nBankston also pled guilty to armed robbery in connection with the Mac\u2019s robbery and agreed to testify against defendant in exchange for a six-year sentence. Bankston testified that (1) Hodel was the mastermind behind the robbery and provided the guns and transportation; (2) Hodel told them that she would go into the store and if she came out empty-handed, that was a signal that the store was empty; (3) Hodel went into the store and came out empty-handed; (4) he, Clemon, Slayton, and defendant, knowing that was the signal to start the robbery, went into the store; and (5) after the robbery, they each gave Hodel $200.\nDefendant testified that (1) he was not involved in the Mac\u2019s robbery; (2) he was not all that familiar with Hodel, Clemon, Bankston, or Slayton; and (3) although he was McDaniel\u2019s roommate at Chestnut, he did not tell McDaniel anything about a robbery.\nThe jury thereafter convicted defendant of two counts of armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 2(a) (West 2004)) and two counts of aggravated robbery (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 5(a) (West 2004)).\nB. Sentencing\nIn July 2007, the trial court appointed defendant a new attorney in response to defendant\u2019s pro se letter alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After meeting with defendant and reviewing all the discovery materials and some of the trial transcripts, defendant\u2019s new counsel filed a motion for a new trial. Following a September 2007 evidentiary hearing, the court denied defendant\u2019s motion.\nAt defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing, defense counsel (1) corrected inaccuracies in defendant\u2019s presentence investigation report and (2) presented, in mitigation, a letter defendant had written. Defense counsel recommended that the trial court sentence defendant to six years in prison because Slayton, Bankston, and Tucker were sentenced to six years in prison, despite Slayton\u2019s and Bankston\u2019s \u201csignificant criminal histories\u201d and Tucker went to trial on her charge. Defense counsel also asked the court to consider that defendant (1) suffered from depression and had issues with cocaine and cannabis abuse; (2) had a learning disability; (3) successfully completed (a) residential treatment, (b) outpatient treatment, and (c) domestic-violence classes; and (4) had a relationship with his three children.\nThe State recommended that the trial court sentence defendant to 20 years in prison. The court rejected the State\u2019s recommendation, in part, because defendant\u2019s involvement was similar to that of Slayton and Bankston, who each received six years in exchange for their guilty pleas. The court found that (1) Hodel was \u201cgiven a pass\u201d; (2) Tucker also received a six-year prison term; (3) \u201cjustice and equity\u201d required that defendant receive a sentence similar to that of his codefendants; (4) the minimum six-year sentence would be inappropriate, however, given defendant\u2019s criminal history; (5) because defendant\u2019s conduct threatened serious harm, the sentence imposed needed to deter others from committing similar offenses; (6) defendant\u2019s term in prison might impose excessive hardship on his dependants; and (7) defendant\u2019s participation in anger-management and other programs were positive factors in mitigation.\nThe trial court thereafter vacated defendant\u2019s aggravated-robbery convictions as lesser-included offenses of armed robbery and sentenced him to concurrent 10-year prison terms on each armed robbery count.\nC. Postsentencing\nAfter sentencing defendant, the trial court admonished him pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 605(a)(3) (210 Ill. 2d R. 605(a)(3)). The court then called a brief recess to give defendant an opportunity to confer privately with defense counsel regarding his options. Following the recess and private conference, the court asked defense counsel \u201cwhat, if any, decision\u201d defendant had made respecting his right to appeal. Defense counsel replied as follows:\n\u201cJudge, we had some preliminary discussions of this prior to anything we\u2019ve done here today. And I just was confirming with him that we were going to proceed on that path. At this time I believe [defendant] would waive the issues of sentencing and will not be asking to file a motion to reconsider sentence but will be asking for the clerk to file a motion with the court to appeal.\u201d\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Defendant\u2019s Claim That the State Failed To Prove Him Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt\nDefendant argues that the State failed to prove that he committed armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, defendant contends that the evidence the State presented placing him at the scene of the robbery was contradictory testimony from criminals and codefendants who testified to avoid incarceration. We disagree.\nWhen reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, the reviewing court\u2019s function is not to retry the defendant. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 242, 860 N.E.2d 178, 217 (2006). Rather, the reviewing court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime upon which the defendant was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 272, 891 N.E.2d 865, 876 (2008). The reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact. People v. Jones, 219 Ill. 2d 1, 33, 845 N.E.2d 598, 616 (2006). \u201cThe weight to be given the witnesses\u2019 testimony, the credibility of the witnesses, resolution of inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence, and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the testimony are the responsibility of the trier of fact.\u201d Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d at 242, 860 N.E.2d at 217.\nTo sustain a conviction for armed robbery, the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused (1) took property from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 1 (West 2004)) and (2) carried on or about his person or was otherwise armed with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 2(a)(2) (West 2004)). When a person engages in a common criminal design to commit a crime such as armed robbery, he is responsible for that other person\u2019s criminal conduct in furtherance of that goal. See People v. Perez, 189 Ill. 2d 254, 266, 725 N.E.2d 1258, 1264-65 (2000) (noting that intent may be inferred from the defendant\u2019s acts as well as the circumstances surrounding the criminal act).\nIn this case, the State presented evidence that (1) four men took approximately $8,800 from Simmons and Smith, and (2) at least two of the men were armed with handguns, while one was wielding a metal pipe. Slayton, Hodel, and Bankston each testified that defendant was one of the four men. Although all three of these witnesses\u2019 testimony varied to some degree, their testimony was consistent on the following points: (1) Clemon, Hodel, Slayton, Bankston, and defendant rode to Mac\u2019s together from demon\u2019s house and (2) Clemon, Slayton, Bankston, and defendant went into Mac\u2019s with the intent to commit an armed robbery. Moreover, McDaniel testified that defendant admitted to him that he participated in the armed robbery while the two were roommates at Chestnut.\nThe jury was fully aware that (1) Slayton and Bankston cooperated with the State to secure a reduced sentence for their role in the armed robbery; (2) Hodel agreed to testify in an effort to avoid being charged at all; and (3) McDaniel tried \u2014 to no avail \u2014 to make a deal with the State in exchange for his testimony. Considering the jury was fully aware of these witnesses\u2019 backgrounds and potential motives, we conclude that it was in a position to competently judge their credibility and draw reasonable inferences therefrom.\nB. Defendant\u2019s Claim That Posttrial Counsel Was Ineffective for Waiving Any Challenge to Potential Sentencing Issues\nDefendant next argues that his posttrial counsel was ineffective for waiving any challenge to potential sentencing issues. Specifically, defendant contends that his posttrial counsel\u2019s failure to file a motion to reconsider sentence was tantamount to not being represented at all. We disagree.\nBecause the time of filing a motion to reconsider sentence is considered a \u201ccritical stage\u201d of a criminal proceeding, a defendant is entitled to consult with counsel to determine whether such a motion should be filed. People v. Bailey, 364 Ill. App. 3d 404, 408, 846 N.E.2d 147, 150 (2006). However, it does not follow that counsel is per se ineffective for failing to file a motion to reconsider sentence when, in counsel\u2019s judgment, such a filing would be frivolous. Bailey, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 408, 846 N.E.2d at 150.\nA defendant retains sole discretion in a criminal case to decide\u2014 after consultation with his attorney \u2014 (1) what plea to enter, (2) whether to waive a jury trial, (3) whether to testify, (4) whether to appeal, and (5) whether to submit an instruction on a lesser-included offense. See People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 54, 604 N.E.2d 275, 281 (1992) (articulating the first four); see also People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d 224, 229, 642 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (1994) (adding whether to submit an instruction on a lesser-included offense to the list). \u201cBeyond these *** decisions, however, trial counsel has the right to make the ultimate decision with respect to matters of tactics and strategy after consulting with his client.\u201d Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54, 604 N.E.2d at 281 (explaining that such matters include what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept, and what motions should be made).\nFor example, when cross-examining a State witness, defense counsel is not required to explain to defendant counsel\u2019s tactical judgment on how best to challenge the witness\u2019s testimony. Defendant possesses no right to be consulted about counsel\u2019s tactical judgment nor to reject it in favor of some other strategy more to defendant\u2019s liking. Likewise, the decision not to file a motion to reconsider sentence\u2014 thereby waiving any later challenge to a defendant\u2019s sentence \u2014 is similarly a matter left ultimately to counsel\u2019s professional judgment and discretion.\nDefendant cites the Second District\u2019s decision in People v. Brasseaux, 254 Ill. App. 3d 283, 660 N.E.2d 1321 (1996), for the proposition that defense counsel is required at a posttrial hearing to \u201censure that the trial court made an appropriate reconsideration of the sentence.\u201d Defendant then tries to turn this rather unremarkable proposition into a contention that Brasseaux requires counsel to file a motion to reconsider sentence in every case, even if counsel believes the motion to be groundless. We are not persuaded that Brasseaux stands for this proposition, but if it does, we decline to follow it.\nIn Brasseaux, the defendant was appointed new counsel to represent him at a hearing that was set in response to the defendant\u2019s pro se filing labeled \u201cMotion to Reconsider Sentence.\u201d Brasseaux, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 286, 660 N.E.2d at 1323. The defendant was not present at the hearing on his pro se motion and his newly appointed counsel, without contacting the defendant to discuss the viability of his claims, failed to amend the defendant\u2019s motion \u2014 which was otherwise deficient. Brasseaux, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 289, 660 N.E.2d at 1325. On review, the court held that counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with the defendant when, given the facts of that case, a reasonable probability existed that the result would have been different had all the defendant\u2019s issues been presented to the court. Brasseaux, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 289, 660 N.E.2d at 1325.\nHere, unlike the attorney in Brasseaux, trial counsel exercised her professional judgment about the groundless nature of any postsentencing motion after consulting with her client. Specifically, counsel explained to the trial court \u2014 after the court had called a brief recess to give defendant an opportunity to confer privately with counsel \u2014 that (1) she had previously discussed the issue with defendant, (2) he had confirmed his earlier decision during the recess, and (3) they were not going to contest his sentence.\nTo clarify our holding, we reject any notion that counsel is ever required to file a nugatory motion, particularly when, as here, the record reveals that counsel had (1) previously considered the issue and (2) discussed it with her client just before deciding not to pursue such a motion. See People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192, 205, 817 N.E.2d 511, 520 (2004) (\u201cAn attorney *** who determines that defendant\u2019s claims are meritless cannot in good faith file an amended petition on behalf of defendant\u201d).\nIn closing, we commend the trial court for giving counsel the time and opportunity to discuss this issue with her client at the posttrial hearing, although the court was not required to do so because the decision whether to file a postsentencing motion was for counsel to make in her discretion.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment. As part of our judgment, we award the State its $50 statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal.\nAffirmed.\nTURNER and APPLETON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, Gary R. Peterson, and Colleen Morgan, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "William A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIYEZ RAMON OWENS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 07\u20140838\nOpinion filed December 19, 2008.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Gary R. Peterson, and Colleen Morgan, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nWilliam A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0765-01", "first_page_order": 783, "last_page_order": 791 }