{ "id": 4281925, "name": "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF CHICAGO, d/b/a Enterprise Rent-A-Car, Defendant-Appellant (Lesean Doby et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Enterprise Leasing Co.", "decision_date": "2008-11-21", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201407\u20142589", "first_page": "945", "last_page": "955", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "386 Ill. App. 3d 945" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243917 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" }, { "page": "150-51" }, { "page": "151" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 25346 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714-15" }, { "page": "716" }, { "page": "716" }, { "page": "716" }, { "page": "716-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/338/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5703875 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" }, { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060027 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128-29" }, { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864529 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243-44" }, { "page": "243-44" }, { "page": "241-42" }, { "page": "245" }, { "page": "245" }, { "page": "245-46" }, { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5730488 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "334" }, { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448460 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" }, { "page": "153" }, { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209971 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777543 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0384-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 868, "char_count": 23504, "ocr_confidence": 0.835, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14374467391728243 }, "sha256": "9248e3262ce9e4bafb74b5868c58b7b720bb9b6cca26d02cc59ea0762cc832d6", "simhash": "1:4beb208a67789ca2", "word_count": 3849 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:01:11.295177+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF CHICAGO, d/b/a Enterprise Rent-A-Car, Defendant-Appellant (Lesean Doby et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that it had no duty to defend or indemnify defendant Constance Taylor or defendant Lesean Doby in an underlying action filed against them by defendant Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago, d/b/a Enterprise Rent-A-Car (Enterprise). The underlying action arose out of Taylor\u2019s and Doby\u2019s alleged failure to make payments to Enterprise for collision damage to a vehicle that Taylor rented from Enterprise and Doby was driving at the time of an accident. The trial court granted State Farm\u2019s motion for summary judgment and found no duty to defend Taylor or Doby in the underlying action.\nEnterprise appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that State Farm had no duty to defend Taylor or Doby because provisions in the policy mandate coverage, and State Farm should be barred under the doctrine of estoppel from denying liability and physical damages coverage to Taylor and Doby for breaching its duty to defend.\nThe record discloses the following facts. On September 8, 2003, Constance Taylor rented a 2003 Land Rover Discovery from Enterprise. The rental agreement offered, for an additional fee, an optional collision damage waiver (CDW). The CDW covered the renter\u2019s \u201cfinancial responsibility for damage to the rental vehicle.\u201d The rental agreement advised the renter \u201cto carefully consider whether to sign [the waiver declining CDW] if you have rental vehicle collision coverage provided by your credit card or collision insurance on your own vehicle. Before deciding to purchase the [CDW], you may wish to determine whether your own vehicle insurance affords you coverage for damage to the rental vehicle and the amount of the deductible under your own insurance coverage.\u201d The rental agreement provided that the CDW may be voided for several reasons, including \u201c[d]amage or loss occurring while the rental vehicle is operated by a driver not permitted under the rental agreement.\u201d The rental agreement indicated that Taylor opted to add the CDW coverage. The rental agreement also had a section in which the renter could include an \u201cadditional authorized driver.\u201d However, Taylor did not list another driver and the agreement provided that no other drivers were permitted \u201cwithout owner\u2019s approval.\u201d The agreement also showed that the rental vehicle was not permitted to leave Illinois.\nAt the time of the rental, Taylor held an automobile insurance policy with State Farm. The vehicle covered on the policy was a 1998 Chevrolet Cavalier. No additional insureds or insured vehicles were listed on the policy.\nDespite the aforementioned provisions in the rental agreement, on September 10, 2003, Lesean Doby was driving the rented Discovery in Michigan when an accident occurred on Interstate 94 East. According to an accident report, the driver swerved to avoid a deer and lost control of the car, causing it to roll over and land in a ditch. The estimated damage to the Discovery was $35,434.44, and the vehicle was valued at $27,700. Taylor\u2019s CDW was voided under the rental agreement because the accident occurred when Doby was driving the Discovery. Enterprise made payment demands of Taylor and Doby for $28,430, equal to the value of the vehicle at the time of the accident plus towing costs.\nIn October 2003, Enterprise contacted State Farm advising it that Taylor had voided the CDW and was responsible for all damages from the claim. In January 2004, State Farm sent Taylor a letter denying coverage because Taylor was not driving or occupying the rental car at the time of the accident.\nIn October 2004, Enterprise filed its complaint in the underlying litigation based on the damage sustained by the Discovery in the September 2003 accident. Count I was against Taylor for breach of contract, count II was against Doby for negligence and property damage, and count III was against Doby for conversion. Both Taylor and Doby failed to appear in the action and default orders were entered against them. In October 2005, Enterprise wrote to State Farm to advise it of Taylor\u2019s default and to demand that it defend her in the action.\nIn January 2006, State Farm appeared in the underlying action to represent Taylor and sent a letter advising Enterprise that it reserved its right to deny coverage. Shortly thereafter, State Farm filed its complaint in the instant declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that it owed no coverage to Taylor or Doby. Enterprise filed a counterclaim asking for a declaration that coverage existed under the State Farm policy.\nState Farm filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that there was no coverage for the underlying action because Taylor was not using the vehicle at the time of the accident and Doby did not meet the liability coverage section\u2019s definition of an \u201cinsured.\u201d Further, there was no coverage for damages to the vehicle under the physical damages coverage because Doby also does not meet that section\u2019s definition of an \u201cinsured.\u201d In response, Enterprise asserted that the omnibus clause applied because Doby drove the vehicle with Taylor\u2019s permission. Enterprise also contended that State Farm waived its right to deny coverage because it failed to timely defend Taylor and Doby in the underlying action. In July 2007, the trial court granted State Farm\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nThis appeal followed.\n\u201cThe construction of an insurance policy and a determination of the rights and obligations thereunder are questions of law for the court which are appropriate subjects for disposition by way of summary judgment.\u201d Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 391 (1993). Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits and exhibits, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, indicate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 2004). We review cases involving summary judgment de novo. Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 349 (1998).\nOur primary objective in construing the policy language is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed by the words of the contract. Central Illinois Light Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d 141, 153 (2004). An insurance contract is to be construed as a whole, giving effect to every provision because it must be assumed that every provision was intended to serve a purpose. Central Illinois Light Co., 213 Ill. 2d at 153. \u201cIf the words used in the policy are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning.\u201d Central Illinois Light Co., 213 Ill. 2d at 153. \u201cA contract term is ambiguous if it can reasonably be interpreted in more than one way due to the indefiniteness of the language or due to it having a double or multiple meaning.\u201d William Blair & Co. v. FI Liquidation Corp., 358 Ill. App. 3d 324, 334 (2005). \u201cA contract is not ambiguous, however, if a court can ascertain its meaning from the general contract language.\u201d William Blair, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 334. \u201c[T]he mere fact that the parties disagree as to the meaning of a term does not make that term ambiguous.\u201d William Blair, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 334.\nOn appeal, Enterprise argues that the trial court erred in granting State Farm\u2019s motion for summary judgment because State Farm had a duty to provide coverage under the omnibus clause of its policy, and State Farm should be estopped from denying coverage for failure to defend Taylor and Doby under a reservation of rights. \u201cA provision in an automobile insurance policy extending liability coverage to persons who use the named insured\u2019s vehicle with his or her permission is commonly referred to as an omnibus clause.\u201d State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group, 182 Ill. 2d 240, 243-44 (1998).\nSpecifically, Enterprise focuses its argument on the \u201comnibus\u201d provision in the State Farm policy and relies on the provisions of the Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law (Financial Responsibility Law) (625 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 100 et seq. (West 2002)) as the basis for its argument that State Farm is required to provide coverage for the damage to the Discovery.\n\u20222 Section 7 \u2014 601(a) of the Financial Responsibility Law provides:\n\u201cNo person shall operate, register or maintain registration of, and no owner shall permit another person to operate, register or maintain registration of, a motor vehicle designed to be used on a public highway unless the motor vehicle is covered by a liability insurance policy.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 601(a) (West 2002).\nFor most vehicles, section 7 \u2014 203 requires that the policy limits must be at least $20,000 per person or $40,000 per accident for personal injury or death and at least $15,000 for property damage. 625 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 601(a), 7 \u2014 203 (West 2000).\nSection 7 \u2014 317(b) lists the requirements of an owner\u2019s policy, including the omnibus clause.\n\u201c(b) Owner\u2019s Policy. \u2014 Such owner\u2019s policy of liability insurance:\n1. Shall designate by explicit description or by appropriate reference, all motor vehicles with respect to which coverage is thereby intended to be granted;\n2. Shall insure the person named therein and any other person using or responsible for the use of such motor vehicle or vehicles with the express or implied permission of the insured;\n3. Shall insure every named insured and any other person using or responsible for the use of any motor vehicle owned by the named insured and used by such other person with the express or implied permission of the named insured on account of the maintenance, use or operation of any motor vehicle owned by the named insured, within the continental limits of the United States or the Dominion of Canada against loss from liability imposed by law arising from such maintenance, use or operation, to the extent and aggregate amount, exclusive of interest and cost, with respect to each motor vehicle, of $20,000 for bodily injury to or death of one person as a result of any one accident and, subject to such limit as to one person, the amount of $40,000 for bodily injury to or death of all persons as a result of any one accident and the amount of $15,000 for damage to property of others as a result of any one accident.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) 625 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 317(b) (West 2002).\n\u201cProvisions such as this, which extend liability coverage to persons who use the named insured\u2019s vehicle with his or her permission, are commonly referred to as \u2018omnibus clauses.\u2019 Where, as in Illinois, an omnibus clause is required by statute to be included in motor vehicle liability policies, our court has held that such a clause must be read into every such policy.\u201d Progressive Universal Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 2d 121, 128-29 (2005), citing Universal Underwriters, 182 Ill. 2d at 243-44. \u201cThe principal purpose of this state\u2019s mandatory liability insurance requirement is to protect the public by securing payment of their damages.\u201d Progressive, 215 Ill. 2d at 129.\nIn Universal Underwriters, Rodney Luckhart took a test-drive in a vehicle owned by Joyce Pontiac GMC, Jeep-Eagle and Toyota (Joyce Pontiac). While on the test-drive, Luckhart negligently collided with another vehicle, causing injuries to the occupants. State Farm, as Luckhart\u2019s insurer, settled the claims of the injured occupants and then sought recovery from Universal Underwriters Group (Universal), the insurer for Joyce Pontiac. Universal denied the claim, asserting that the policy issued to Joyce Pontiac afforded no coverage to Luck-hart. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court held in favor of State Farm. Universal Underwriters, 182 Ill. 2d at 241-42.\nOn appeal to the supreme court, Universal argued that Luckhart was not required to be covered by the dealer\u2019s policy. The supreme court disagreed and found that a car dealer\u2019s liability policy must provide coverage for test-drivers. The court discussed the mandatory insurance requirements in Illinois and pointed out that the omnibus clause \u201capplies to the mandatory insurance requirement set forth in section 7 \u2014 601(a).\u201d Universal Underwriters, 182 Ill. 2d at 245. Universal contended that Joyce Pontiac was exempt from the mandatory insurance requirements under section 7 \u2014 601(a) because it qualified for \u201ca statutory exemption for \u2018vehicles complying with laws which require them to be insured in amounts meeting or exceeding the minimum amounts required under [section 7 \u2014 601].\u2019 625 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 601(b)(6) (West 1996).\u201d Universal Underwriters, 182 Ill. 2d at 245. Joyce Pontiac was required to carry liability coverage of at least $100,000/$300,000/$50,000, exceeding the required minimum amounts under section 7 \u2014 203. However, the supreme court concluded that \u201cthe exemption which Universal cites applies only when the insurance required by law provides the type of coverage required under the mandatory insurance statute. Hence, the insurance must contain an omnibus clause insuring those driving a vehicle with the owner\u2019s permission. Thus, regardless of whether the exemption applies, the garage policy must still cover Luckhart\u2019s liability.\u201d Universal Underwriters, 182 Ill. 2d at 245-46.\nHere, Enterprise is asking this court to extend the omnibus clause to include a rental vehicle in addition to the named insured\u2019s owned vehicles. Enterprise points to the phrase \u201cusing or responsible for the use of\u201d that is used in section 7 \u2014 317(b) and argues that the legislature intended this phrase to encompass rental vehicles. However, Enterprise ignores the rest of the statute.\n\u201cThe cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.\u201d In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 246 (2006). \u201cThe best evidence of legislative intent is the language of the statute, and when possible, the court should interpret the language of a statute according to its plain and ordinary meaning.\u201d In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d at 246.\nSubsection 7 \u2014 317(b)(1) requires a description of the covered vehicle, i.e., the owned vehicle (625 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 317(b)(1) (West 2002)), and subsection 7 \u2014 317(b)(2) refers to persons \u201cusing or responsible for the use of such motor vehicle or vehicles\u201d with the owner\u2019s permission (emphasis added) (625 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 317(b)(2) (West 2002)). The word \u201csuch\u201d is being used as an adjective to describe the type of motor vehicle. When read in context with subsection (b)(1), it is clear that this subsection is not referring to all vehicles; rather, it is referencing the vehicle or vehicles intended to be covered, as required in subsection (b)(1). Subsection (b)(3), which Enterprise also cites, clearly states that it applies to \u201cany motor vehicle owned by the named insured,\u201d and the rental vehicle was not owned by Taylor. (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 317(b)(3) (West 2002).\nSection 7 \u2014 317(b) clearly refers to the named insured\u2019s vehicle or vehicle on the policy. If the legislature had intended this section to apply to nonowned rental vehicles, it would not have used language that specifically referred to the owned vehicles on the policy. This language indicates a narrow application of the statute. For this court to agree with Enterprise\u2019s interpretation, we would have to ignore the precise language used in the statute. We decline to do so.\nFurther, certain types of vehicles are exempt from the mandatory insurance requirements of section 7 \u2014 601(a), and specifically, we find the exception in subsection 7 \u2014 601(b)(6) to be pertinent to our analysis. See 625 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 601(b) (West 2002). Though not cited by either party, we find the Fifth District\u2019s decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Hertz Claim Management Corp., 338 Ill. App. 3d 712 (2003), in which the court concluded that rental vehicles fall within the exception under section 7 \u2014 601(b), to be persuasive. There, State Farm\u2019s insured, Michael Kauling, rented a vehicle from ADRI/Auffenberg Ford to drive while his car was being repaired. Kauling declined to purchase a liability insurance supplement at the time of the rental. Later, Kauling was involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving the rental vehicle insured by the defendants. A subsequent claim was made against the driver for injuries and property damage sustained by the other involved driver. There was a discrepancy in multiple documents as to which insurer was required to provide primary coverage. State Farm filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the defendants\u2019 liability coverage was primary and its was secondary. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Hertz, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 714-15.\nOn appeal, State Farm argued that Illinois law required a vehicle owner\u2019s insurance to provide primary coverage in all cases, but the defendants contended that this requirement was imposed by the Financial Responsibility Law, which is inapplicable to rental vehicles. The reviewing court discussed the mandates under section 7 \u2014 601(a) of the Financial Responsibility Law and the omnibus provision, but pointed out that \u201c[a]mong the vehicles exempted from the requirements of section 7 \u2014 601(a) are those in compliance with other statutes that require insurance in amounts meeting or exceeding those required by section 7 \u2014 601(a). 625 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 601(b)(6) (West 2000).\u201d Hertz, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 716. The Hertz court noted that the supreme court has held that this exception applies only if the other statute requires the same type of insurance required by section 7 \u2014 601(a). Hertz, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 716, citing State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group, 182 Ill. 2d 240, 245 (1998). The court then turned to the chapter of the Illinois Vehicle Code dealing with rental vehicles.\nSection 9 \u2014 101 requires all owners of for-rent motor vehicles to provide proof of financial responsibility to the Secretary of State. 625 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 101 (West 2002). Proof of financial responsibility may come in one of three forms: (1) a bond, (2) an insurance policy, or (3) a certificate of self-insurance issued by the Director of the Illinois Department of Insurance. 625 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 102 (West 2002). The bond shall be in the amount of $100,000 and executed by an authorized surety individual or company. 625 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 103 (West 2002). Section 9 \u2014 105 sets out the requirements for an insurance policy. Under that section, owners of for-rent vehicles must secure a policy insuring the operator of the rented motor vehicle against liability for bodily injury in the minimum amount of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per occurrence. 625 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 105 (West 2002). Further, section 9 \u2014 105 provides that this coverage is applicable to \u201cthe customer or against any person operating the motor vehicle with the customer\u2019s express or implied consent.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 105 (West 2002). Any person who violates this chapter of the Illinois Vehicle Code is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. 625 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 110 (West 2002).\nAfter considering these provisions, the Hertz court concluded that \u201c[b]ecause the rental car insurance law requires rental cars to be insured in amounts exceeding those required by sections 7 \u2014 601(a) and 7 \u2014 203 and contains an omnibus clause identical to that found in section 7 \u2014 317(b)(2), we find that rental cars fall within the exception provided by section 7 \u2014 601(b)(6).\u201d Hertz, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 716. The reviewing court went on to find that section 9 \u2014 105 does not require a car rental agency to provide primary coverage and that a driver and a car rental agency may contractually agree that the driver\u2019s policy provides primary coverage. Hertz, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 716-18.\nAlthough this case is not directly on point, it lends support to our conclusion that the legislature did not intend for the Financial Responsibility Law to be applicable to rental vehicles. As we previously discussed, section 7 \u2014 317(b) was drafted with specific language that refers to owned vehicles of the named insured that are intended to be covered on the policy. It does not account for nonowned rental vehicles. The legislature designated a separate chapter in the Illinois Vehicle Code for rental vehicles and the required level of insurance, which exceeds that required for individuals. The legislature\u2019s choice to treat the owned vehicles separate from rental vehicles shows that it did not intend for the Financial Responsibility Law to be applicable to rental vehicles. For these reasons, Enterprise\u2019s argument on appeal fails. The omnibus provisions in State Farm\u2019s policy do not apply to the situation present in this case. Therefore, the trial court properly held that State Farm has no duty to defend or indemnify Taylor or Doby for the damage to the Discovery.\nFinally, Enterprise contends that State Farm should be estopped from denying coverage because it did not defend Doby and did not issue a clear reservation of rights as to its defense of Taylor in the underlying litigation.\n\u201cThe general rule of estoppel provides that an insurer which takes the position that a complaint potentially alleging coverage is not covered under a policy that includes a duty to defend may not simply refuse to defend the insured.\u201d Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d 127, 150 (1999). \u201cRather, the insurer has two options: (1) defend the suit under a reservation of rights or (2) seek a declaratory judgment that there is no coverage. If the insurer fails to take either of these steps and is later found to have wrongfully denied coverage, the insurer is estopped from raising policy defenses to coverage.\u201d Ehlco, 186 Ill. 2d at 150-51. Here, State Farm did both. It provided a defense of its insured under a reservation of rights and filed the instant declaratory judgment action.\nHowever, even if State Farm\u2019s actions were untimely, the estoppel doctrine still does not apply. The estoppel doctrine only applies when an insurer has breached its duty to defend. \u201cApplication of the estoppel doctrine is not appropriate if the insurer had no duty to defend, or if the insurer\u2019s duty to defend was not properly triggered. These circumstances include where the insurer was given no opportunity to defend; where there was no insurance policy in existence; and where, when the policy and the complaint are compared, there clearly was no coverage or potential for coverage.\u201d Ehlco, 186 Ill. 2d at 151.\nAs we have already concluded that there is no coverage under the State Farm policy, State Farm did not breach its duty to defend Taylor and Doby in the underlying action. The trial court properly rejected Enterprise\u2019s estoppel argument.\nBased on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019MALLEY, EJ., and CAHILL, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Samuel A. Shelist, of Shelist Law Firm LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jennifer L. Medenwald, of Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF CHICAGO, d/b/a Enterprise Rent-A-Car, Defendant-Appellant (Lesean Doby et al., Defendants).\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 07\u20142589\nOpinion filed November 21, 2008.\nSamuel A. Shelist, of Shelist Law Firm LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJennifer L. Medenwald, of Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0945-01", "first_page_order": 963, "last_page_order": 973 }