{ "id": 4280911, "name": "SMALLEY STEEL RING COMPANY, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Harry Diaz, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Smalley Steel Ring Co. v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission", "decision_date": "2008-12-12", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201407\u20141050WC", "first_page": "993", "last_page": "997", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "386 Ill. App. 3d 993" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "514 N.E.2d 196", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "action for fraud alleging that the plaintiffs employer had fraudulently understated his wages, which resulted in an award that was substantially below the amount to which the plaintiff would otherwise have been entitled" }, { "page": "197-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3650301 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "749", "parenthetical": "action for fraud alleging that the plaintiffs employer had fraudulently understated his wages, which resulted in an award that was substantially below the amount to which the plaintiff would otherwise have been entitled" }, { "page": "749" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 N.E.2d 1145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1149" }, { "page": "1149" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295545 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 Ill. App. 3d 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4283180 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/387/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 N.E.2d 940", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "943" }, { "page": "943" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "375 Ill. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2536627 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" }, { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/375/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 N.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" }, { "page": "586" }, { "page": "590" }, { "page": "590" }, { "page": "590" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069036 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" }, { "page": "49" }, { "page": "56" }, { "page": "56" }, { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "844 N.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5736090 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0519-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 543, "char_count": 11448, "ocr_confidence": 0.838, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1437027795829023 }, "sha256": "e3cbd6ce08754bdf3f5ad716f2132b6d3938d48007979ba00c1e8cd2cddda557", "simhash": "1:936c818723e39a5f", "word_count": 1808 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:01:11.295177+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SMALLEY STEEL RING COMPANY, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS\u2019 COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Harry Diaz, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn August 31, 2004, claimant, Harry Diaz, filed an application for adjustment of claim pursuant to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2002)), seeking benefits from employer, Smalley Steel Ring Company. Following a hearing, the arbitrator determined claimant sustained injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment on July 9, 2004, and awarded him (1) 14 weeks\u2019 temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and (2) $21,543.52 for medical expenses. Later, on employer\u2019s motion, the arbitrator recalled his decision and reopened proofs. Following a second hearing, he reissued his decision and found claimant was not entitled to compensation under the Act.\nThe Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission (Commission) concluded the arbitrator erred by reopening proofs and issuing a second decision. It declared that the arbitrator\u2019s second decision was null and void and that his first decision was the final decision of the Commission. The circuit court of Lake County confirmed the Commission\u2019s decision. Employer appeals, arguing the Commission erred by finding the arbitrator did not have the statutory authority to recall his first decision, reopen proofs, and issue a second decision.\nThe parties are familiar with the evidence and we discuss it only to the extent necessary to put their arguments in context. On August 31, 2004, claimant filed his application for adjustment of claim, stating his name was Harry Diaz and alleging he injured his left upper extremity while pulling a rack at work. On January 31, 2005, an arbitration hearing was conducted in the matter. Employer requested a 30-day continuance, in part to obtain verification of claimant\u2019s identity. Employer asserted claimant provided a social security number that belonged to a person who died in New York on September 1, 2003. Claimant objected and the arbitrator denied employer\u2019s motion. The matter proceeded with an arbitration hearing.\nOn April 7, 2005, the arbitrator issued his decision, finding claimant proved he sustained accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment. He awarded claimant 14 weeks\u2019 TTD benefits and medical expenses, totaling $21,543.52. Neither party sought review with the Commission; however, on May 10, 2005, employer filed an emergency motion to recall the arbitrator\u2019s decision and reopen proofs. Employer alleged it discovered new evidence from one of claimant\u2019s coworkers that claimant\u2019s true identity was Alejandro Atilano and that he previously worked for Westech Automation System (Westech). Employer further alleged that on August 8, 2002, while working at Westech, claimant allegedly suffered a work-related injury to his left shoulder and underwent left-shoulder surgery. It stated claimant sought benefits under the Act for his injury and his claim was settled for 25% loss of use of his left arm.\nOn May 13, 2005, the arbitrator conducted a hearing on employer\u2019s motion. Despite receiving notice of the hearing, neither claimant nor his attorney appeared. At the conclusion of the hearing, the arbitrator granted employer\u2019s motion; recalled his April 7, 2005, decision; and reopened proofs.\nOn August 23, 2005, the arbitrator conducted a hearing and heard additional evidence in the matter. Again, notice was provided to claimant but neither claimant nor his attorney appeared at the hearing. On November 15, 2005, the arbitrator issued his second decision. He determined the additional evidence presented at the August 23, 2005, arbitration hearing showed claimant lied and gave false testimony at the initial arbitration hearing. The arbitrator also noted that medical records following claimant\u2019s July 2004 injury showed he lied to his treating physicians. He stated claimant was completely lacking in credibility and failed to prove he sustained accidental injuries that arose out of and in the course of his employment with employer. The arbitrator denied claimant\u2019s claim for compensation under the Act.\nClaimant sought review of the arbitrator\u2019s decision with the Commission. On October 30, 2006, the Commission issued its decision. It found the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to recall his first decision, reopen proofs, and reissue his decision. The Commission stated the arbitrator\u2019s first decision was the Commission\u2019s final decision and his second decision was null and void. The circuit court confirmed the Commission\u2019s decision.\nThis appeal followed.\nOn appeal, employer argues the Commission erred by finding the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to recall his initial decision, reopen proofs, and issue a second decision.\nThe issue raised in this case presents a question of law and is subject to de novo review. Cassens Transport Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 218 Ill. 2d 519, 524, 844 N.E.2d 414, 418-19 (2006).\nUnder the Act, unless a party files a petition for review of the arbitrator\u2019s decision within 30 days after the party\u2019s receipt of a copy of the decision and notification of when it was filed, the arbitrator\u2019s decision \u201cshall become the decision of the Commission and in the absence of fraud shall be conclusive.\u201d 820 ILCS 305/19(b) (West 2004). Section 19(f) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(f) (West 2004)) permits the arbitrator and the Commission to recall their respective decisions to correct clerical or computational errors.\nIn Wilson-Raymond Constructors Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 79 Ill. 2d 45, 49, 402 N.E.2d 584, 586 (1980), the employer filed a petition to recall the Commission\u2019s decision and requested reconsideration of the merits and to present further evidence. Its petition was filed prior to the expiration of the time frame within which it could seek judicial review of the Commission\u2019s decision. Wilson-Raymond, 79 Ill. 2d at 49, 402 N.E.2d at 586.\nThe supreme court, however, noted the Act contained no authorization for the filing of such a petition. Wilson-Raymond, 79 Ill. 2d at 56, 402 N.E.2d at 590. It stated that, although section 19(f) provided for petitions to recall in the event of clerical or computational errors, no such error was involved in the case. Wilson-Raymond, 79 Ill. 2d at 56, 402 N.E.2d at 590. Further, the court found that, \u201c[b]ecause there [was] no provision for recall [in the Act] other than that provided by section 19(f), [the employer\u2019s] petition to recall was a nullity.\u201d Wilson-Raymond, 79 Ill. 2d at 56, 402 N.E.2d at 590.\nHere, the arbitrator issued his initial decision on April 7, 2005. Prior to the expiration of the time within which employer could file a petition for review, it filed a motion to recall the arbitrator\u2019s decision and reopen proofs. Although Wilson-Raymond involved a petition to recall the Commission\u2019s decision rather than that of the arbitrator, the supreme court\u2019s reasoning in that case is no less applicable. Only section 19(f) of the Act specifically provides for recall of the arbitrator\u2019s or the Commission\u2019s decisions, and then only to correct clerical or computational errors. No such errors were present in this case and section 19(f) is inapplicable. No other provision of the Act provided for the filing of employer\u2019s motion or the arbitrator\u2019s actions in granting that motion, reopening proofs, and issuing a second decision. As in Wilson-Raymond, employer\u2019s motion and the arbitrator\u2019s second decision were nullities.\nAdditionally, as noted by the Commission, fraud is not a basis for extending the statutory authority of the arbitrator or the Commission. Sections 19(b) and 19(f) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(b), (f) (West 2004)) provide for the finality of the arbitrator\u2019s and the Commission\u2019s decisions, respectively, when further review has not been sought by either party within a particular time frame. Each section also provides for conclusive decisions \u201cin the absence of fraud.\u201d 820 ILCS 305/19(b), (f) (West 2004). In Michelson v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 375 Ill. 462, 469, 31 N.E.2d 940, 943 (1941), the supreme court declined to find that the legislature intended the \u201cin the absence of fraud\u201d language to give the Commission the authority to set aside its orders on the ground of fraud. It continued that, without express authority, the Commission was without jurisdiction to so act and the parties were \u201crelegated to a court of equity for relief under a charge of fraud.\u201d Michelson, 375 Ill. at 469, 31 N.E.2d at 943.\nThe Act expressly provides for recall of an arbitrator\u2019s decision in only one instance, i.e., to correct clerical or computational errors. The arbitrator did not have statutory authority to act and, therefore, was without jurisdiction to recall his decision, reopen proofs, and issue a second decision. The Commission was correct in its assessments and its decision should not be overturned on review.\nAs we stated in Ming Auto Body/Ming of Decatur, Inc. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 387 Ill. App. 3d 244, 254 (2008):\n\u201c[A] party may maintain an action before the circuit court to procure relief from a judgment of the Commission based on fraud. See [Roadside Auto Body, Inc. v. Miller, 285 Ill. App. 3d 105, Ill, 673 N.E.2d 1145, 1149 (1996)] (declaratory judgment action seeking to vacate, as fraudulent, a settlement agreement approved by the Commission); Daugherty v. National Union Electric Corp., 160 Ill. App. 3d 747, 749, 514 N.E.2d 196[, 197] (1987) (action for fraud alleging that the plaintiffs employer had fraudulently understated his wages, which resulted in an award that was substantially below the amount to which the plaintiff would otherwise have been entitled). In such circumstances, a court can review an otherwise conclusive decision by the Commission, even if the procedures and time limitations set forth in section 19(f)(1) have not been followed. 820 ILCS 305/19(f) (West 2002); Roadside Auto Body, Inc., 285 Ill. App. 3d at Ill[, 673 N.E.2d at 1149]; Daugherty, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 749[, 514 N.E.2d at 197-98].\u201d\nEmployer may seek recourse for claimant\u2019s fraudulent conduct. The appropriate forum for its allegations is in the circuit court. More specifically, we note, section 25 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/25 (West 2004)) expressly provides for criminal penalties and civil liability in the event of fraudulent workers\u2019 compensation claims. The record suggests claimant acted fraudulently in pursuing his workers\u2019 compensation claim, and employer should seek relief in the appropriate forum.\nWe note that the facts of this case present an unfortunate scenario. Although employer possessed strong evidence of fraud, the arbitrator lacked the statutory authority to act. Such deficiencies in the Act should be addressed by the legislature.\nIn retrospect, the issue would be properly before this court if employer\u2019s request for a continuance to verify claimant\u2019s social security number had been granted. It is also noted that that request informed claimant and his counsel of the asserted fraudulent conduct.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nRE. GORDON, GEOMETER, HOLDRIDGE, and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Emily E. Brog, of Wiedner & McAuliffe, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Edward Adam Czapla, of Paul W Grauer & Associates, of Schaumburg, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SMALLEY STEEL RING COMPANY, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS\u2019 COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Harry Diaz, Appellee).\nSecond District (Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission Division)\nNo. 2 \u2014 07\u20141050WC\nOpinion filed December 12, 2008.\nRehearing denied January 23, 2009.\nEmily E. Brog, of Wiedner & McAuliffe, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nEdward Adam Czapla, of Paul W Grauer & Associates, of Schaumburg, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0993-01", "first_page_order": 1011, "last_page_order": 1015 }