{ "id": 4283107, "name": "NILES TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 219, Cook County, Illinois, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al., Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Niles Township High School District 219 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board", "decision_date": "2008-12-15", "docket_number": "No. 1-08-1158", "first_page": "58", "last_page": "77", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "387 Ill. App. 3d 58" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "369 Ill. App. 3d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4267077 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124", "parenthetical": "Cook County" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/369/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 898", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5666957 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "911", "parenthetical": "Plainfield" }, { "page": "911" }, { "page": "911" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/143/0898-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3614210 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55", "parenthetical": "Consolidated" }, { "page": "55" }, { "page": "56", "parenthetical": "\"the confidentiality aspect of the Tabor nexus' test *** must relate specifically to the field of labor relations\"" }, { "page": "62-63" }, { "page": "61" }, { "page": "61", "parenthetical": "\"the labor-nexus test is designed to protect against the premature disclosure of bargaining positions\"" }, { "page": "61-63" }, { "page": "60-61" }, { "page": "61" }, { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738696 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525", "parenthetical": "holding that \"the Board's decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence\"" }, { "page": "528", "parenthetical": "\"[t]he reasonable expectation test should only be applied where the responsibilities may be reasonably expected but have not yet been assumed\"" }, { "page": "523" }, { "page": "523" }, { "page": "523", "parenthetical": "recommending disciplinary action does not count as formulating, determining or effectuating labor relations policies" }, { "page": "523", "parenthetical": "the employee must have \"authorized access\" to information \"specifically related to the collective-bargaining process\"" }, { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "866 F.2d 228", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10524912, 10524961 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233", "parenthetical": "for an appellate court to reverse under a clearly erroneous standard, the decision must \" 'strike us as wrong with the force of five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/866/0228-01", "/f2d/866/0228-02" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29956 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 830", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4264060 ], "weight": 17, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833", "parenthetical": "Wilmette" }, { "page": "833" }, { "page": "838" }, { "page": "838" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "836" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "838" }, { "page": "838" }, { "page": "836" }, { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/366/0830-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291554 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 1036", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 486833 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1042" }, { "page": "1044" }, { "page": "1044" }, { "page": "1042" }, { "page": "1042" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/1036-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 Ill. App. 3d 892", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 7328887 ], "weight": 18, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "898-99", "parenthetical": "Glenview" }, { "page": "899" }, { "page": "899" }, { "page": "899" }, { "page": "899" }, { "page": "904" }, { "page": "904" }, { "page": "899" }, { "page": "898" }, { "page": "904" }, { "page": "898", "parenthetical": "\"the employee's access to the information must be authorized\"" }, { "page": "902", "parenthetical": "computer employee did not have authorized access to collective bargaining documents, where she had not been asked to troubleshoot those documents" }, { "page": "901-02", "parenthetical": "cleaning person who emptied a superintendent's wastebasket was not a confidential employee" }, { "page": "903-04", "parenthetical": "access must be actual and in the regular course of duties" }, { "page": "901, 905", "parenthetical": "substantial amount of time includes \"more than a year\"" }, { "page": "901-02" }, { "page": "903", "parenthetical": "a computer employee was not a confidential employee, even though she \"theoretically could have access to confidential collective-bargaining information\" (emphasis in original" }, { "page": "903-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/374/0892-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 Ill. App. 3d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4267194 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143" }, { "page": "136" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "142-43" }, { "page": "137" }, { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/369/0128-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1311, "char_count": 47860, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14380027561452424 }, "sha256": "192ca7ef342987850b67ef69e584a1f853d5b0d1f88fa7f9c72148feb8093019", "simhash": "1:11ae05d6224afc65", "word_count": 7676 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:05:00.567552+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "NILES TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 219, Cook County, Illinois, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al., Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe issue in the case at bar is whether two employees are \u201cconfidential employee[s]\u201d as defined by the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (the Act) (115 ILCS 5/2(n) (West 2006)). The Act permits educational employees to organize, but it excludes confidential employees from the collective bargaining unit. 115 ILCS 5/2(b) (West 2006).\nThe two employees at issue are: (1) a systems and networking engineer (SN engineer); and (2) a world-wide web communications assistant (WW assistant). The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board already ruled that these two employees were not confidential employees, and it is this decision that the school district asks us to review.\nBACKGROUND\nThe petitioner is the Niles Township High School District 219, Cook County, Illinois (the District). In its petition to this court, the District challenged the classification of two of its employees as not confidential. The two respondents are the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (the Board), and the Niles Township Support Staff, Local 1274, IFT/AFT, AFL-CIO (the Union). The Board was the entity that ruled that the two employees were not confidential employees, thereby allowing them to become part of the Union.\nConfidential employees are those employees (1) who assist management with respect to labor-relations policy; or (2) who have access to collective bargaining information. 115 ILCS 5/2(n) (West 2006). Thus, this background section will provide only those facts about the two employees that relate to their assistance or access. In addition, for the first test, the District must show that the supervisor whom the employee assists is someone who \u201cformulate[s], determine[s] and effectuate[s]\u201d management policies with regard to labor relations. 115 ILCS 5/2(n) (West 2006). In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the employees\u2019 supervisors fit this definition. Thus, this background will provide only those facts about the supervisors that relate to the employees\u2019 assistance and access.\nProcedural History\nOn May 30, 2003, the District submitted a petition to the Board, asking the Board to remove three existing computer positions from an existing bargaining unit because they were confidential positions. The three positions were the two positions at issue in this appeal, as well as the position of \u201cProgrammer Analyst.\u201d\nOn October 15, 2004, the administrative law judge issued a recommended decision, recommending that the petition be dismissed for several reasons. The judge found that: (1) the three positions were neither newly created nor substantially altered since the creation of the existing bargaining unit in 1999; (2) the claimed alteration, even if substantial, rendered the petition untimely, as measured from the alteration date of May 2001; (3) even if the alteration was substantial and the petition was timely, the alteration did not create genuine doubt as to whether the position should remain in the bargaining unit, because the employees\u2019 alleged access to collective bargaining information was not authorized.\nOn November 1, 2004, the District filed exceptions to the administrative law judge\u2019s recommended decision. In particular, the District claimed that a substantial alteration had occurred on January 6, 2003, when its Board of Education ratified an amendment to the District\u2019s computer use policy.\nOn June 16, 2005, the Board issued its final order, affirming the administrative judge\u2019s recommended decision. The Board refused to consider the alteration that the District claimed occurred on January 6, 2003, because evidence of it was not presented to the administrative law judge. Also, the District\u2019s current claim that, after January 6, 2003, the employees independently searched for violations of the District\u2019s computer use policy was contrary to the District\u2019s prior claim that these employees investigated only when directed to by the administration.\nThe Board also determined that \u201cunit clarification petitions seeking to exclude allegedly statutorily excluded employees from a bargaining unit must be filed within a reasonable period of time after the unit begins to include allegedly statutorily excluded employees.\u201d The Board found that because it \u201cconcluded that the unit clarification procedure was not appropriately employed, it [was] unnecessary *** to address whether the disputed employees [were] in fact confidential.\u201d\nOn November 13, 2006, the appellate court reversed the Board\u2019s decision and remanded with instructions that the Board must conduct an evidentiary hearing. Niles Township High School District 219 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 369 Ill. App. 3d 128, 143 (2006). In part I of the decision, we held that the District\u2019s rights to due process were violated, when it was not allowed to present evidence that its petition was filed within a reasonable period of time. Niles Township, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 136. In part II of the decision, we rejected the Board\u2019s determination that petitions had to be filed within a reasonable period of time. Niles Township, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 142. We held instead that there was no time limit. Niles Township, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 142-43.\nSince our holdings addressed only the timeliness rulings, we stated that we took no position on (1) whether the employees at issue were confidential employees or (2) whether their job duties had substantially changed. Niles Township, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 137. We instructed the trial court on remand to consider \u201cthe additional facts submitted by the District in its exceptions.\u201d Niles Township, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 137.\nEvidentiary Hearing\nOn July 23, 2007, the Board on remand held an evidentiary hearing, where the District presented five witnesses and introduced five exhibits. Two witnesses, Dr. Nanciann Gatta and Guy Ballard, were supervisors. Gatta was the District\u2019s assistant superintendent for human resources; and Ballard was the District\u2019s director of technology. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that both Gatta and Ballard \u201cformulate, determine and effectuate labor relations policy\u201d; and that the Union in its appellate brief accepted the ALJ\u2019s findings. Thus, Gatta\u2019s and Ballard\u2019s role with respect to labor relations policy is undisputed in this appeal.\nThe three remaining witnesses were employees in the contested positions: (1) Ms. Pat Giorgas, a world-wide web communications assistant; (2) Mr. Adnan Memon, a systems and networking engineer; and (3) Ms. Madeline Czervionke, a senior programmer analyst. The Board ruled that the third position was a confidential employee; but the Union did not challenge this classification on appeal. Since this position is not at issue on appeal, this order will not discuss facts concerning it.\nThe District\u2019s five exhibits were labeled A through E and were as follows: (A) instructions by the District to its employees concerning acceptable computer use, dated 2001 to 2007; (B) crisis management memoranda for the technology department, dated 2007; (C) the technology department\u2019s budgets for the years 2004-08; (D) the technology department\u2019s organizational chart, dated July 19, 2007; and (E) job descriptions for the contested positions, dated July 2007. All of the District\u2019s exhibits were admitted without objection, except for exhibit B, which was admitted over an objection as to relevance. The ALJ also had seven ALJ exhibits that were admitted without objection.\nAt the start of the hearing, the parties orally entered three stipulations: (1) that the District was \u201can educational employer within the meaning of Section 2 \u2014 A of the Act\u201d (115 ILCS 5/2(a) (West 2006)); (2) that the Union was \u201can employee organization within the meaning of Section 2 \u2014 C of the Act [(115 ILCS 5/2(c) (West 2006))], and an exclusive representative within the meaning of Section 2 \u2014 D of the Act\u201d (115 ILCS 5/2(d) (West 2006)); and (3) that \u201cthe bargaining unit is as set forth in the [Board\u2019s] opinion and order.\u201d\nWorld-Wide Web Communications Assistant\nThe job description in Exhibit E stated that the WW assistant was \u201cresponsible for the continuous development and maintenance of the District 219 web site to ensure information is current and meets District 219 standards and guidelines.\u201d\nAt the hearing, Ms. Pat Giorgas testified that she had been a WW assistant with the District for five years and that she reported to Ms. Chris Bush, a manager who supervised Giorgas and \u201cprogrammer analysts.\u201d Giorgas described her job duties as \u201cdevelop[ing], implement [ing], troubleshooting], [and] supporting] all the internal and external web sites of the school district, as well as any databases that go along with that.\u201d\nGiorgas testified that \u201cpart of [her] daily job routine\u201d was \u201cmaking sure that our teachers and staff follow the AUP policy.\u201d Giorgas explained that the \u201cAUP\u201d or \u201cAcceptable Use Policy,\u201d which she identified as Exhibit A, was \u201ca policy that our employees have to follow and sign-off [sic] [of] when they come into the school district to use our computer systems.\u201d With respect to the AUE her job was to \u201cmake[ ] sure that our staff or students or teachers don\u2019t post, you know, something bad onto the website that can affect us in a negative way.\u201d Giorgas did not draft or prepare the AUP\nGiorgas testified that there was an AUP in place when she started with the District in 2002 and that the AUP was enforced at that time but \u201c[pjrobably not to the extent as it was after it was revised.\u201d Giorgas helped to enforce the AUP by \u201cdo [ing] searches on [her] servers for various things that could possibly violate the AUP\u201d If she found a violation, she reported it either to her manager or the director of technology; but she was never at the meeting when the employee was accused, and never asked to present evidence. Giorgas testified that the programmer analyst and the network administrator also enforced the AUP When asked whether she assisted the school administration \u201cin a confidential capacity,\u201d Giorgas responded: \u201cI guess.\u201d\nGiorgas testified that she assisted with \u201cbackups\u201d of stored information, which was \u201ca mixture of everything on the server,\u201d and that there were no restrictions on her access to information. She read materials only when she needed to \u201ctroubleshoot.\u201d She implemented the program for attendance records, but she had \u201cnot done anything with [teacher] evaluations.\u201d Giorgas testified that there were sites that \u201cprobably do hold material that is confidential in nature\u201d but she had not read them. She testified that she had never had an occasion to read any documents of Dr. Gatta\u2019s on the web.\nGiorgas testified that different computer users had different levels of security access and that she determined the level \u201crelated to the web servers.\u201d As a result, she had the capability to control other users\u2019 access to specific materials. She had complete control over \u201cweb-related\u201d user names and passwords, and she had the capability to log on as another user without the user\u2019s knowledge. However, she could not read another person\u2019s e-mail. She also had the capability to access the web portions of the District\u2019s network, as well as \u201c[databases holding personnel and personal information of employees,\u201d without another person being able to detect her access. Giorgas testified that the network engineer would have access to other users\u2019 e-mail without their knowledge.\nGiorgas identified the District\u2019s Exhibit B as documents relating to \u201ccrisis management.\u201d She testified that this is \u201c[s]omething we\u2019ve put in place, just in case there was a crisis, we\u2019d be able to keep our school district up and running [o]r bring it back up in the fastest way possible.\u201d Giorgas was on the crisis management team, and her job obviously related to \u201cthe web server.\u201d When asked if she had seen before all the materials in Exhibit B, she replied \u201cI believe so.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Giorgas testified that the description for her job in Exhibit E \u201cpretty much\u201d described her duties. There were seven people in her \u201carea,\u201d and they all did troubleshooting. She testified that the other two positions at issue, the SN engineer and the senior programmer analyst, also had access to passwords. As far as backup materials were concerned, the SN engineer had \u201caccess to everything\u201d and the programmer analyst had \u201caccess to certain things.\u201d When asked if she had ever, in the five years she had been working for the District, opened files relating to collective bargaining policies, Giorgas first testified \u201cI don\u2019t know\u201d and then she asked \u201cwhat do you mean by collective bargaining?\u201d Counsel then defined \u201ccollective bargaining\u201d as negotiations with the Union and asked whether she would have \u201cany reason\u201d to read such a document. Giorgas testified: \u201cTo read it? No.\u201d\nAfter cross-examination, the ALJ asked Giorgas some questions to clarify her role. Giorgas testified that she had access to six or seven of the District\u2019s servers, but not all of them. One of the servers to which she had access was \u201cthe database server which holds all the Human Resource information,\u201d including teacher advancements and grievances. When asked whether she had ever been asked to look at documents on any server relating to \u201cnegotiations between the employer and the Union\u201d or to \u201cgrievances,\u201d she testified: \u201cI don\u2019t remember coming across any.\u201d\nSystems and Networking Engineer\nThe job description in Exhibit E stated that the SN engineer was \u201cresponsible for daily operations of systems, servers and networking tasks as delegated by the operations and networking administrator.\u201d The operations and networking administrator is Marcello Sanz, who is the immediate supervisor of Adnan Memon, the SN engineer.\nAdnan Memon, the District\u2019s SN engineer, testified that he had been in that position for six years and that he reported to the operations manager. He testified that his access was broader than that of Giorgas\u2019 access, and that he had \u201caccess to any and all kind of data, e-mail, backups, restores for data.\u201d Memon testified that his access to e-mail could be detected by other employees, but that his access to data could not be detected.\nMemon testified that he monitored the system for possible AUP violations as part of his \u201cday-to-day job.\u201d When he discovered a violation, he reported it to his supervisor. There were \u201cinstances\u201d where he was present when an employee was accused of violating the AUP\nMemon testified that he had seen collective bargaining information, but he had never been asked to read it, and he had never read it. He testified that he had never been asked to retrieve a document that related to negotiations or grievances.\nSupervisors\u2019 Testimony\nDr. Gatta testified that she was currently the District\u2019s assistant superintendent for human resources. Previously, she had been a teacher at the District and vice-president of the local teacher\u2019s union. Now, she served on the \u201cBoard of Education Policy Committee,\u201d which consisted only of herself and \u201cBoard of Education members.\u201d The committee made recommendations to the board of education concerning \u201cpolicies\u201d that would eventually be adopted as \u201cformal procedures.\u201d The administrator in charge of a particular department would then write administrative regulations to implement the board\u2019s policies.\nGatta testified that the individuals involved with collective bargaining were the \u201cattorneys at the Board of Education and the cabinet-level administration.\u201d The \u201ccabinet-level administration\u201d was \u201ca nine-person team\u201d consisting of \u201cthe superintendent, the assistant superintendents, and the principals, and *** the director of technology *** our community relations administrator, and our head of security.\u201d The cabinet shared computer \u201cfolders,\u201d including folders labeled \u201cstrike information\u201d and \u201cnegotiations.\u201d The negotiations folder contained \u201cevery single proposal,\u201d as well as \u2018[s]trike-throughs, spreadsheets, whatever [they] developed to look at as a team.\u201d\nGatta testified that the three employees at issue in the hearing all worked for the director of technology. Gatta testified that, recently, she had saved a file with the new teacher handbook and that she could not locate it, and that Giorgas had found it on the server. Gatta testified that \u201cGiorgas developed a database for HR [Human Resources] to use, which details all of our grievances, ULE] EEOC charges, anything of a legal nature related to HR.\u201d Gatta testified that while the three employees at issue could access her folders without her knowledge, they should not do that.\nGatta testified that Madeline Czervionke, a programmer analyst, told Gatta that the Union had asked Czervionke \u201cin the past to get some access to some data.\u201d However, Gatta did not know if the person seeking access was a Union official because the programmer did not tell Gatta who had asked. Gatta testified that the programmer did not access the data because \u201cshe knows that it\u2019s ethically wrong to access other people\u2019s drawers.\u201d\nGatta testified that during collective bargaining, she could ask one of the three employees at issue to put together spreadsheets. As an example, she testified that she could ask for a spreadsheet on sick days, such as how many sick days does the average employee use and how many sick days are in the \u201csick day bank.\u201d\nGatta testified that, after she learned of the Union\u2019s \u201cappeal after the Appellate Court decision,\u201d she sent the employees at issue \u201call memos that placed them back in the [bargaining] unit, paying Union dues, back on the salary schedules.\u201d\nGuy Ballard, the District\u2019s director of technology, testified that he had been in that position for eight years. He identified District\u2019s Exhibit D as the organizational chart of the technology department. Of the 25 people on the chart, 5 were excluded from the Union: (1) Ballard; (2) Ballard\u2019s secretary, Daphne Wilson; (3) Chris Busch, the applications administrator, to whom Pat Giorgas reported; (4) Phil Lacey, the manager of technology training; and (5) Marcello Sanz, the manager of operations and networking, to whom Adnan Memon reported.\nBallard testified that the three employees at issue worked at the District office, in offices adjacent to Ballard\u2019s office. Ballard identified Exhibit A as the District\u2019s authorized computer use policy (AUP); and Exhibit C as the technology budget. Ballard explained that the AUP \u201cwent through a radical review and change\u201d in 2003, when \u201cthe Union and the District negotiated the contents\u201d of the policy. Part of the policy provided that \u201c[a]nyone who can identify a security breach on the web server must notify the webmaster or building administrator.\u201d Ballard identified \u201cthe webmaster\u201d as Giorgas.\nBallard testified that Memon, the SN engineer, was in charge of backing up all the information on the networks and saving it to backup tapes. Approximately a year and a half ago, or the end of 2005, Ballard decided to create a crisis plan for the District so that they \u201ccould then have a way to bring the District back on line in the case of a catastrophic event.\u201d Ballard identified Exhibit B as \u201cthe Reader\u2019s Digest version *** or the executive summary of the crisis management meetings that we had.\u201d While developing the crisis management policy, Ballard received assistance from the three contested employees. In addition, each of these employees carried a \u201cthumb drive, to carry the essential documents that they would need to maintain their systems.\u201d A thumb drive is a USB drive that can be put on a key chain.\nBallard testified that he asked Giorgas, the WW assistant, to give him \u201ca chart of when the teachers had last updated their web pages,\u201d which Ballard testified was a major issue in the last negotiation between the parties. Delinquent teachers were given a certain time period within which to update; and if they failed to update, their supervisors were contacted.\nBallard testified that, during the last negotiation, his department prepared \u201ca plan to shut down the district in the case of a lockout or in case of a walkout *** to prevent inappropriate access to *** information during negotiations.\u201d Ballard asked Giorgas, the WW assistant, \u201cto prepare a bare bones web site and put it in a separate server\u201d; and he asked Memon, the SN engineer, \u201cto make a final back up of everything and one last backup on the day that we were closing negotiations.\u201d Ballard asked the programmer analyst, who is not at issue in this appeal, to relinquish all of her passwords, and Ballard changed them \u201cso everybody was essentially locked out of the system at that point.\u201d Ballard testified that when he locked these three employees out of their systems, they were \u201cupset\u201d and it created \u201cbad feeling.\u201d\nBoard\u2019s and ALJ\u2019s Decision\nOn September 26, 2007, the ALJ issued a detailed 26-page recommended decision, in which she found that the programmer analyst was a confidential employee, but that the WW assistant and the SN engineer were not confidential employees. The ALJ noted that the WW assistant and the SN engineer had never read any documents relating to negotiations. In contrast, the ALJ observed that programmer analyst had been \u201casked to prepare reports for negotiations, which may include spreadsheets stating the cost of giving a specified amount in negotiations.\u201d In addition, the ALJ quoted the programmer analyst\u2019s job description which stated that her duties included \u201c \u2018[d]evelop[ing] reports for Administration to use in collective bargaining.\u2019 \u201d\nOn October 10, 2007, the District filed its exceptions to the ALJ\u2019s recommended decision. In particular, the District argued that employee disciplinary and grievance matters related to collective bargaining, and that the WW assistant and SN engineer\u2019s participation in enforcing the District\u2019s computer use policy rendered them confidential employees.\nOn April 7, 2008, the Board issued its opinion and order, affirming the ALJ\u2019s recommended decision in its entirety. On May 6, 2008, the District filed a petition for review with this court, and this appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nAt issue on this appeal is the Board\u2019s finding that both the SN engineer and the WW assistant were not confidential employees under the Act. 115 ILCS 5/2(n) (West 2006).\nSince confidential employees are precluded from exercising the bargaining rights guaranteed by the Act, \u201ccourts must narrowly interpret the exclusion.\u201d Board of Education of Glenview Community Consolidated School District No. 34 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 374 Ill. App. 3d 892, 898-99 (2006) (Glenview); One Equal Voice v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 333 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1042 (2002). The party asserting the exclusion\u2014 normally the school district \u2014 has \u201cthe burden of producing sufficient evidence to support its position.\u201d Glenview, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 899.\nThe District appealed directly to this court, because a party seeking to contest a final order of the Board may do so only in an appellate court, and only in an appellate court \u201cof a judicial district in which the Board maintains an office.\u201d 115 ILCS 5/16(a) (West 2006). Since the Board maintains an office in Chicago, this appeal directly to the First Judicial District was proper. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. Illinois Education Labor Relations Board, 274 Ill. App. 3d 145, 153-54 (1995).\nStandard of Review\n\u201c[T]he Board\u2019s determination as to whether the facts establish that an employee is a confidential employee as defined by statute will not be reversed unless that determination was clearly erroneous.\u201d Glenview, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 899; Support Council of District 39, Wilmette Local 1274 v. Educational Labor Relations Board, 366 Ill. App. 3d 830, 833 (2006) (Wilmette). The clearly erroneous standard is highly deferential. Glenview, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 899; Wilmette, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 833. We will not reverse the board\u2019s determination about a confidential employee, unless our review of the entire record leaves us \u201c \u2018with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.\u2019 \u201d Glenview, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 899, quoting AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 393 (2001).\nThe appellate court has considered in two prior cases whether computer employees were \u201cconfidential employees,\u201d and reached opposite conclusions, based in part on the deferential standard of review. In Glenview, a \u201ctechnology administrative assistant\u201d was found not to be a confidential employee. Glenview, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 904. By contrast, in Wilmette, a \u201cnetwork manager\u201d was found to be a confidential employee. Wilmette, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 838. Thus, there is no bright-line rule for computer employees.\nIn part, the opposite conclusions of these two cases can be understood in terms of the deferential standard of review. In Glen-view, the Board found that the technology administrative assistant was not a confidential employee; and the appellate court affirmed the Board\u2019s ruling, as not clearly erroneous. Glenview, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 904. In Wilmette, the appellate court also affirmed the Board\u2019s ruling as not clearly erroneous, but in that case the Board had found that the network manager was a confidential employee. Wilmette, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 838. Thus, both cases were affirmations, based on a clearly erroneous standard of review.\nThus, the question for an appellate court is not how we would rule, if we had been standing in the Board\u2019s shoes, and writing in the first instance. The question for us is does the Board\u2019s decision stink like a \u201cdead fish.\u201d Glenview, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 899, quoting Parts & Electric Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Electric, Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988) (for an appellate court to reverse under a clearly erroneous standard, the decision must \u201c \u2018strike us as wrong with the force of five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish\u2019 \u201d).\nAlthough the parties agree that the proper standard of review is the \u201cclearly erroneous\u201d standard, there is also precedent for applying the standard of \u201cagainst the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d Chief Judge of the Circuit Court v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 153 Ill. 2d 508, 525 (1992) (holding that \u201cthe Board\u2019s decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence\u201d); Board of Education of Community Consolidated High School District No. 230 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 165 Ill. App. 3d 41, 55 (1987) (Consolidated) (also applying a standard of \u201ccontrary to the manifest weight of the evidence\u201d). Both standards are highly deferential. Under a \u201cmanifest weight\u201d standard, a reviewing court may still not \u201creweigh the evidence presented or make an independent determination of the facts.\u201d Consolidated, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 55. Thus, under either standard, the result is the same on the facts before us.\nTests for \u201cConfidential Employee\u201d Status\nTo be considered \u201cconfidential,\u201d the employee\u2019s position must qualify under either (1) the labor nexus test, or (2) the authorized access test. Wilmette, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 837. The two tests are taken from the definition of \u201cconfidential employee,\u201d contained in the Act:\n\u201c \u2018Confidential employee\u2019 means an employee, who (i) in the regular course of his or her duties, assists and acts in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine and effectuate management policies with regard to labor relations or who (ii) in the regular course of his or her duties has access to information relating to the effectuation or review of the employer\u2019s collective bargaining policies.\u201d 115 ILCS 5/2(n) (West 2006).\nThe labor nexus test is in clause (i) of the above-quoted section; the authorized access test is in clause (ii).\nThere is a third test, the reasonable expectations test, which is not at issue in this case. Wilmette, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 837; One Equal Voice, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 1044. This test asks whether there is a reasonable expectation that the employees at issue would perform confidential duties in a future collective bargaining process. Wilmette, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 837; One Equal Voice, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 1044. The reasonable expectations test applies only when a collective bargaining unit is not yet in place, but the employees at issue are expected to assume confidential responsibilities once the unit is established. Wilmette, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 837; Chief Judge, 153 Ill. 2d at 528 (\u201c[t]he reasonable expectation test should only be applied where the responsibilities may be reasonably expected but have not yet been assumed\u201d). Since a unit was already established in the case at bar, the employees\u2019 duties are not speculative and this test does not apply. Wilmette, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 837.\nBoth the labor nexus test and the authorized access test use the phrase \u201cin the regular course of his or her duties.\u201d 115 ILCS 5/2 (n) (West 2006). Interpreting this phrase, the appellate court has held that \u201ca person who performs confidential duties on a sporadic basis is still confidential.\u201d Board of Education of Plainfield Community Consolidated School District No. 202 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 143 Ill. App. 3d 898, 911 (1986) (Plainfield). Thus, even if the computer employees in the case at bar had only sporadic access or nexus, they would still be considered confidential employees, so long as their access or nexus was part of their normal duties. Plainfield, 143 Ill. App. 3d at 911.\nLabor Nexus Test\nUnder the labor nexus test, an employee is a \u201cconfidential employee\u201d if he or she \u201cin the regular course of his or her duties, assists and acts in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine and effectuate management policies with regard to labor relations.\u201d 115 ILCS 5/2(n) (West 2006).\nThe assistance must be \u201cin a confidential capacity,\u201d and the confidential capacity must relate specifically to \u201clabor relations.\u201d 115 ILCS 5/2(n) (West 2006); Consolidated, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 56 (\u201cthe confidentiality aspect of the Tabor nexus\u2019 test *** must relate specifically to the field of labor relations\u201d). In this context, labor relations does not include hiring, performance or promotion or \u201cmere access to personnel or statistical information,\u201d even if that information is confidential. Consolidated, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 62-63. The assistance must provide the employee with advance information about bargaining positions. Consolidated, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 61.\nIn the case at bar, the ALJ found that the Union conceded that Dr. Gatta, the assistant superintendent for human resources, and Mr. Ballard, the director of technology, formulated, determined and effectuated labor relations policy; and the Union in its appellate brief accepted the ALJ\u2019s findings. Thus that part of the labor nexus test can be taken as a given on this appeal.\nAfter reading the entire record, we cannot find that the Board was clearly erroneous, when it found that Giorgas and Memon were not confidential employees under the labor nexus test. The record provides plenty of support for the Board\u2019s decision. For five and six years, respectively, Pat Giorgas and Adnan Memon worked as the WW assistant and SN engineer for the district. During all those years, the collective bargaining process was alive and well. In fact, during that time, by all accounts, there had been intense negotiation about the computer use policy.\nYet, Giorgas testified that during her five years, she had never once read a collective bargaining document, she had never once been asked to look at any collective bargaining documents, and she had never once had an occasion to read any documents of Dr. Gatta\u2019s on the web. When asked about collective bargaining, Giorgas had to ask for a definition. Similarly, Memon testified that during his six years as the SN engineer, he also had never read any collective bargaining information, and he had never been asked to retrieve a document relating to negotiations.\nThe sole reason for excluding confidential employees is to prevent those employees from feeling torn between two masters: the employer, on the one hand, who wants confidentiality for its bargaining strategy; and the union, on the other hand, who wants to learn that strategy to gain an advantage. Chief Judge, 153 Ill. 2d at 523. Our supreme court has stated unequivocally that the sole \u201cpurpose of excluding confidential employees is to keep employees from \u2018having their loyalties divided\u2019 between their employer and the bargaining unit which represents them.\u201d Chief Judge, 153 Ill. 2d at 523. It is hard to see how Giorgas or Memon could have possibly felt torn about whether to expose their employer\u2019s strategy, when they themselves had no exposure to collective bargaining information during their entire five or more years of employment. Consolidated, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 61 (\u201cthe labor-nexus test is designed to protect against the premature disclosure of bargaining positions\u201d).\nNot only does the Board\u2019s decision comport with the purpose behind the statute, it also comports with the letter of the statute itself. The language of the statute requires the employee\u2019s assistance to be \u201cin a confidential capacity.\u201d 115 ILCS 5/2(n) (West 2006). When Giorgas was asked whether she assisted the school administration in a confidential capacity, the strongest answer that she could muster was \u201cI guess.\u201d Giorgas testified that there were web sites that \u201cprobably do hold material that is confidential in nature,\u201d but she had never read them. Memon testified that it was his job to \u201cbackup and restore\u201d data, which would include any confidential information on the server. However, the District, which had the burden of producing evidence, failed to ask Memon whether he ever read any confidential documents.\nIn addition to legislative purpose and statutory language, the Board\u2019s decision is also in line with case law. For example, in Wilmette, this court held that a network manager was a confidential employee, because that position was newly created and it was assumed that the manager would have to read confidential, collective bargaining documents in order to perform her duties. Wilmette, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 836. By contrast, in the case at bar, we do not have to guess. We know for a fact that Giorgas and Memon do not have to read collective bargaining documents to perform their duties, because they have never read them during their five or more years of employment. Thus, the logic of the Wilmette case compels us to find that Giorgas and Memon are not confidential employees.\nThe District claims that computer use was a subject of negotiation; that Giorgas and Memon help to enforce the computer use policy by looking for violations and reporting them; and that Giorgas and Memon thereby assist in formulating labor relations policy.\nPractically anything can be a subject of labor negotiations, from how many books a teacher is allowed to purchase to how many sick days she is permitted to take. The person who counts the books or the sick days does not thereby become a confidential employee, even though he or she is effectuating management policy. Similarly, the person who counts the number of times that a teacher uses her computer for an unauthorized use does not thereby become a confidential employee. Chief Judge, 153 Ill. 2d at 523 (recommending disciplinary action does not count as formulating, determining or effectuating labor relations policies). As already noted, access to information relating to hiring, performance, promotion, personnel or statistics does not turn an employee into a confidential one, for purposes of this statute. Consolidated, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 61-63.\nWhen asked how the employees at issue provided assistance during collective bargaining, Dr. Gatta replied that she could ask them to provide spreadsheets, such as a spreadsheet on sick days. Giorgas had implemented the computer program for attendance records. Back in the pen and ink days, this court held that secretaries with full and regular access to personnel records were not confidential employees. Consolidated, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 60-61. This result does not change simply because Giorgas now tracks attendance and sick days on a computer.\nThe sick day spreadsheet is completely different in character from the spreadsheets prepared by the programmer analyst; and this difference is part of the reason why the ALJ found the programmer analyst to be a confidential employee, while finding that the other two employees were not. As the ALJ found, the programmer analyst was asked to prepare \u201cspreadsheets stating the cost of giving a specified amount in negotiations,\u201d which gave her access to \u201cwhat amounts the District is considering offering.\u201d The sick sheet spreadsheet did not provide the same type of insight. Far from being clearly erroneous, the underlying decision recognized important differences and drew a Solomonic line.\nThe District also claimed in its appellate brief that Giorgas and Memon were \u201cinstrumental in developing\u201d the District\u2019s computer use policy, but the record does not support the District\u2019s claim. Giorgas specifically testified that she did not draft or prepare the District\u2019s computer use policy; and the District failed to ask Memon whether he drafted or prepared the District\u2019s computer use policy. The District\u2019s appellate brief claimed that the director of technology testified that he had utilized Giorgas\u2019s and Memon\u2019s \u201cknowledge\u201d in drafting the policy. However, the use of the word \u201cknowledge\u201d on the cited transcript page had nothing to do with Giorgas\u2019s and Memon\u2019s \u201cknowledge.\u201d Counsel asked whether the Union had \u201cknowledge that people would be monitoring the use of e-mails and what teachers put on,\u201d and the director responded affirmatively.\nThe District also claimed in its appellate brief that Giorgas and Memon routinely assisted the District in compiling information for both collective bargaining and employee grievance procedures, and cited in support the testimony of the director of technology. Again, the record does not support the District\u2019s claim. The director was asked a question that was compound in a couple of respects. First, it covered all three employees at issue in the hearing, while only two of those employees are at issue on this appeal. Second, the question asked about whether they had ever given the director information relating to either negotiations or grievance handling. When the director responded \u201croutinely,\u201d he may have meant primarily grievance handling or primarily the third employee not at issue on this appeal. His following comment supports the inference that he meant primarily grievance handling, because he went out of his way to add \u201c[pjarticularly in the case of grievances.\u201d\nThe District also claims that Giorgas and Memon are confidential employees because they are part of the crisis management team that would keep the District\u2019s computer systems running in a skeletal fashion during a crisis and would bring the District\u2019s computer systems back to their full-functioning capacity after the crisis was over. However, their assistance in that sphere must be severely limited, because when the director of technology actually did bring the computer system \u201cdown to its minimum, its bare necessity,\u201d and presumably then brought it back up, the director locked both Giorgas and Memon out of the system.\nAfter a careful review of the record, we conclude that there is plenty of support in it for the Board\u2019s conclusion that Giorgas and Memon were not confidential employees under the labor nexus test.\nAuthorized Access Test\nUnder the authorized access test, an employee is a \u201cconfidential employee,\u201d if \u201cin the regular course of his or her duties, [he or she] has access to information relating to the effectuation or review of the employer\u2019s collective bargaining policies.\u201d 115 ILCS 5/2(n) (West 2006). The access must be authorized; and the information must relate specifically to collective bargaining between labor and management. Wilmette, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 837. Examples of such information include the employer\u2019s bargaining strategy and actual collective bargaining proposals. Glenview, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 898. The access must also be in the regular course of the employee\u2019s duties. Glenview, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 904.\nAlthough the word \u201cauthorized\u201d does not appear in the statute, most cases that have interpreted this section of the statute have held that the access must be \u201cauthorized.\u201d Wilmette, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 837; Glenview, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 898 (\u201cthe employee\u2019s access to the information must be authorized\u201d); Chief Judge, 153 Ill. 2d at 523 (the employee must have \u201cauthorized access\u201d to information \u201cspecifically related to the collective-bargaining process\u201d); County of Cook v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, 369 Ill. App. 3d 112, 124 (2006) (Cook County), One Equal Voice, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 1042.\nThe authorization part is so important that the name of the test is \u201cthe authorized access test.\u201d Wilmette, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 837; Chief Judge, 153 Ill. 2d at 523; Cook County, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 124; One Equal Voice, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 1042. Thus, the issue is not what access an employee is capable of exercising, but what access the employer intends for the employee to exercise. Cook County, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 125 (employees were not confidential, although they had \u201cthe means to access information related to collective bargaining,\u201d since the employer did not authorize it). Put simply, the issue is not capability but authorization.\nThere is no question that Giorgas and Memon had a lot of capability. Giorgas testified that she had the capability to access the web portions of the District\u2019s network, as well as databases holding personnel and personal information of employees, without another person being able to detect her access. Memon testified that his capability to access data was even greater than Giorgas\u2019 access.\nAuthorization is a different story. Dr. Gatta, the assistant superintendent for human resources, testified that, while Giorgas and Memon had the capability of accessing Gatta\u2019s files without Gatta\u2019s knowledge, they were not authorized to do that. Giorgas testified that she did not recall ever being asked, and thus authorized, to look at documents on any server relating to negotiations between the District and the Union, or relating to grievances. Giorgas testified that she had no reason to read such documents and that she had never read any of Dr. Gatta\u2019s documents on the web. Glenview, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 902 (computer employee did not have authorized access to collective bargaining documents, where she had not been asked to troubleshoot those documents).\nWhen Memon was asked on direct examination whether his access to the District\u2019s systems was \u201cauthorized,\u201d he responded \u201cyes.\u201d However, on cross-examination, when Memon was asked if he would read a confidential letter authored by Dr. Gatta, Memon testified that he would read the document only if he was instructed to do so. Memon also testified that he had never been asked to read or to retrieve a document relating to collective bargaining.\nGiorgas\u2019 and Memon\u2019s role was, in some ways, similar to the cleaning person who could open other people\u2019s desk drawers at night: while both the computer person and the cleaning person had the capability to read documents, neither was authorized to do so. Glenview, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 901-02 (cleaning person who emptied a superintendent\u2019s wastebasket was not a confidential employee). Dr. Gatta used the same analogy when she testified. Dr. Gatta explained that although the Union had asked a programmer to access files, the programmer did not do it, because \u201cshe knows that it\u2019s ethically wrong to access other people\u2019s drawers.\u201d\nIn addition to authorization, we must also consider actual access. Glenview, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 903-04 (access must be actual and in the regular course of duties). When a position has existed for a substantial amount of time, the Board will weigh heavily the employee\u2019s actual access to collective bargaining material. Glenview, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 901, 905 (substantial amount of time includes \u201cmore than a year\u201d). If a computer person testifies that she has not read collective bargaining documents, then any access would be the result of mere chance. Glenview, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 901-02. In the case at bar, we know that chance is pretty slim, since Giorgas and Memon testified that they had never read or retrieved collective bargaining information in five years\u2019 time. Such theoretical access is insufficient. Glenview, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 903 (a computer employee was not a confidential employee, even though she \u201ctheoretically could have access to confidential collective-bargaining information\u201d (emphasis in original). While sporadic access is sufficient, sporadic means sometimes, not never. Plainfield, 143 Ill. App. 3d at 911.\nThe access would also have to be a part of their regular duties. 115 ILCS 5/2(n) (West 2006); Glenview, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 903-04. Access was certainly not part of Giorgas\u2019 and Memon\u2019s regular duties where it did not happen in five years or more.\nOur case is distinguishable from Wilmette, where the network manager was found to have access. Wilmette, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 838. First, as noted above, the posture on review was different, since in Wilmette, the Board had already found that the manager was confidential, and we could not find that this decision was clearly erroneous. Wilmette, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 838. Second, also as noted above, the position was newly created, so the court was forced to speculate on whether the employee would be required, and thus authorized, to read documents; whereas in our case, after five years, no speculation is needed. Wilmette, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 836. Third, in Wilmette, it was envisioned that the network manager would perform cost projections, relating specifically to negotiations with the union. Wilmette, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 833. By contrast, there is no evidence in our case that Giorgas or Memon performed such projections.\nBased on the lack of authorization, the lack of actual access and the lack of access during regular duties, we cannot find that the Board was clearly erroneous when it concluded that Giorgas and Memon were not confidential employees under the authorized access test.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the Board is affirmed. We cannot find that the Board\u2019s decision was clearly erroneous or against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nAffirmed.\nWOLFSON and HALL, JJ., concur.\nin its appellate brief, the District cited page 61 of Consolidated for the proposition that personnel information, such as discipline of employees, handling of employee grievances and overseeing responses to unfair labor practices, were considered \u201clabor relations\u201d policies under the statute. Consolidated, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 61. The cited page indicated just the opposite. The cited page stated that although the secretaries at issue acted in a confidential capacity with respect to such personnel matters as employee discipline, that did not mean that they were confidential employees within the meaning of the Act. Consolidated, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 61.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Scariano, Himes & Petrarca, Chtrd., of Chicago Heights (Anthony G. Scariano, Kimberly Payne, and John A. Heintz, of counsel), for petitioner.", "Cornfield & Feldman, of Chicago (Gilbert Feldman, of counsel), for respondent Niles Township Support Staff, Local 1274.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (John P. Schmidt, of counsel), for respondent Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NILES TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 219, Cook County, Illinois, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 08\u20141158\nOpinion filed December 15, 2008.\nScariano, Himes & Petrarca, Chtrd., of Chicago Heights (Anthony G. Scariano, Kimberly Payne, and John A. Heintz, of counsel), for petitioner.\nCornfield & Feldman, of Chicago (Gilbert Feldman, of counsel), for respondent Niles Township Support Staff, Local 1274.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (John P. Schmidt, of counsel), for respondent Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board." }, "file_name": "0058-01", "first_page_order": 74, "last_page_order": 93 }