{ "id": 4282724, "name": "THE VILLAGE OF MONTGOMERY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AURORA TOWNSHIP et al., Defendants-Appellants (The City of Aurora, Defendant-Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Village of Montgomery v. Aurora Township", "decision_date": "2008-12-10", "docket_number": "Nos. 2-07-0539, 2-07-0632 cons.", "first_page": "353", "last_page": "366", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "387 Ill. App. 3d 353" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 3d 1073", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3441826 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1079", "parenthetical": "noting that conclusory statements lacking factual basis are insufficient to create an issue of fact so as to defeat a motion for summary judgment" }, { "page": "1079" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/132/1073-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5735833 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415", "parenthetical": "noting that statutes must be applied according to their plain language" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. App. 3d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3391903 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/53/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5795072 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 Ill. 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3441827 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374-75" }, { "page": "374-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/253/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 950", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5262744 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "954-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/0950-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Ill. App. 3d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2434607 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/241/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5573989 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" }, { "page": "340-41" }, { "page": "340-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3648492 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. App. 3d 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3647153 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/154/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451063 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42-43" }, { "page": "43" }, { "page": "43" }, { "page": "43" }, { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5286053 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209-10" }, { "page": "205-08" }, { "page": "208" }, { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/56/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3439327 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" }, { "page": "329" }, { "page": "332-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405227 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706055 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/227/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 1051", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352923 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1055" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/1051-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Ill. 2d 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12132044 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/2/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3448906 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" }, { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0486-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1052, "char_count": 35960, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.89950402824256e-08, "percentile": 0.30820503434756236 }, "sha256": "be1b4eb511c1a1b46e04b5cb3f7094481ca272730c68449e1ae3eaac7e958b32", "simhash": "1:9b96d0d6c91855f8", "word_count": 5625 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:05:00.567552+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE VILLAGE OF MONTGOMERY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AURORA TOWNSHIP et al., Defendants-Appellants (The City of Aurora, Defendant-Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HUTCHINSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this consolidated appeal, defendants, Aurora Township (the Township) and Fred Burgess, in his official capacity as Aurora Township highway commissioner (the Commissioner), appeal from the trial court\u2019s order denying the Township\u2019s motion to dismiss and granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, the Village of Montgomery (Montgomery), and defendant, the City of Aurora (Aurora). In granting summary judgment, the trial court found that the Township owned the Ashland Avenue Bridge (the bridge) spanning the Fox River in southern Kane County, and further found that the Commissioner had the obligation to maintain the bridge. On appeal, the Township contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss, because it was not a proper party to this action. Additionally, the Commissioner contends that the trial court erred in granting Montgomery and Aurora\u2019s joint motion for summary judgment and in denying his cross-motion for summary judgment. We affirm.\nOn December 11, 2006, Montgomery commenced the instant proceeding by filing a complaint for declaratory judgment. As amended, the complaint named the Township, the Commissioner, and Aurora as defendants and requested the trial court to determine and adjudicate the rights, obligations, and liabilities of the parties as they related to the bridge. The complaint alleged that the bridge was located in unincorporated Kane County, between the corporate limits of Montgomery and Aurora, and was wholly within the Township\u2019s boundaries. The complaint alleged that the Township constructed the bridge in 1967 and 1968 and continued to maintain the bridge between 1968 and 2005. The complaint alleged that, in 2005, the Commissioner sent a letter to the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT), indicating that the bridge was not within the Township\u2019s jurisdiction. The complaint alleged that, since that time, the Township had refused to maintain and clear snow from the bridge, creating an unsafe condition for motorists. Montgomery requested the trial court to declare that it did not own the bridge and that it had no obligation to maintain the bridge.\nOn January 11, 2007, the Township moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Procedure Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(9) (West 2006)). The Township asserted that Montgomery\u2019s complaint against it was barred because townships have no statutory authority over roads and bridges. See Burnidge Brothers Almora Heights, Inc. v. Wiese, 142 Ill. App. 3d 486, 492 (1986).\nOn March 2, 2007, Montgomery and Aurora jointly moved for summary judgment. In their motion, they argued that, prior to the construction of the bridge, Aurora had disconnected from its southern corporate boundaries the land on which the bridge was to be built. Additionally, prior to construction, Montgomery annexed land immediately south of the planned bridge. Montgomery and Aurora argued that at no time after the construction of the bridge had they annexed the land upon which the bridge was constructed. They argued that the Township had constructed the bridge in 1967 and 1968 and had maintained the bridge since that time until 2005. Montgomery and Aurora argued that, in 1997, the Township had also repaired and completely refurbished the bridge. Montgomery and Aurora also argued that, in 2005, the Township stopped maintaining the bridge and has since insisted that either Montgomery or Aurora owns the bridge and is responsible for its maintenance and operation. They requested the trial court to enter summary judgment in their favor and declare that the Township owned the bridge and was responsible for its repair and maintenance.\nIn support of their joint motion for summary judgment, Montgomery and Aurora attached: (1) a photocopy of Montgomery Ordinance No. 138 (eff. March 3, 1958), annexing to the municipality parcels of land immediately to the south of the present location of the bridge; (2) a photocopy of Aurora Ordinance No. 3317 (eff. May 15, 1961), disconnecting from the southern boundary of the municipality certain parcels of land on which the bridge is presently located; (3) the affidavit of Aurora city clerk Cheryl M. Vonhoff, indicating that her \u201csearch of the City records revealed no ordinance or records wherein the City of Aurora reannexed territory that was disconnected from the City by Ordinance No. 3317\u201d; (4) the affidavit of Aurora\u2019s former director of public property, Rosario DeLeon, indicating that the bridge was not within Aurora\u2019s corporate limits; (5) photocopies of intergovernmental agreements between Aurora and the Township dated November 20, 2001, and October 28, 2004, indicating that Aurora would plow and salt the bridge even though it fell within the Township\u2019s jurisdiction; (6) the affidavit of Montgomery public works director Michael Pubentz, averring that the bridge was not within the Montgomery corporate limits and that, prior to 2006, the Township had maintained the bridge with the assistance of Aurora.\nMontgomery and Aurora also attached the affidavit of Edward Wilmes, who was Aurora Township highway commissioner between 1993 and 2001. In his affidavit, Wilmes averred that the bridge was constructed by the Aurora Township road district in 1967 and 1968. Wilmes averred that, during his time as highway commissioner, his responsibilities included maintaining the bridge and removing snow and ice from the bridge. Wilmes averred that, during each year of his term, he entered into an agreement with Aurora, whereby Aurora agreed to clear snow from the bridge on the Township\u2019s behalf. Wilmes averred that Aurora had \u201cdisconnected the territory upon which the [b]ridge was ultimately built so that the [bjridge could be built by the Township (as, after disconnection, the territory was unincorporated).\u201d Wilmes averred that, after construction of the bridge and until the end of his term as highway commissioner, the Aurora Township road district continued to own and maintain the bridge, and there was no attempt by any municipality to annex the bridge. Wilmes averred that neither Aurora nor Montgomery owned the bridge or had any obligation to maintain it. Wilmes averred that the Aurora Township road district rebuilt the bridge in 1997 at a cost of approximately $1.2 million. Following the reconstruction of the bridge in 1997, plaques were affixed to the bridge indicating the Township\u2019s ownership of the bridge. The parties later deposed Wilmes, at which time he affirmed the statements contained in his affidavit.\nAlso attached to the motion for summary judgment was a jurisdictional boundary line agreement executed by Aurora and Montgomery on March 9, 1990. Paragraph 9 of the agreement provided as follows:\n\u201cIn the event Aurora enters into an agreement with Aurora Township with respect to major repairs, reconstruction or replacement of the Ashland Avenue Bridge, Montgomery shall reimburse Aurora for 25% of the total costs for such major repairs, reconstruction or replacement. In the event Montgomery is requested to financially participate in such major repairs, reconstruction or replacement, Montgomery shall be notified of such proposed work and has the right to participate in the decision as to the necessity, nature and extent of such work. In any event, all ordinary repairs and maintenance to said bridge shall not be the responsibility of Montgomery.\u201d\nOn March 6, 2007, the Commissioner filed an answer to Montgomery\u2019s complaint, denying all material allegations. The Commissioner also filed four affirmative defenses to Montgomery\u2019s suit. The Commissioner\u2019s first affirmative defense alleged that Aurora Ordinance No. 3317, disconnecting the land on which the bridge was built, was void because \u201cthe Illinois Municipal Code precludes disconnection from a municipality by a municipal entity.\u201d The Commissioner alleged that the land disconnected by the ordinance was owned by a municipal entity known as the \u201cFox River Valley Pleasure Driveway and Park District.\u201d The Commissioner also alleged that Montgomery Ordinance No. 130 (eff. October 7, 1957), which also purported to disconnect land owned by the Fox River Valley Pleasure Driveway and Park District and on which the bridge was built, was similarly void.\nThe Commissioner\u2019s second affirmative defense alleged that the Township\u2019s repair of the bridge in 1997 was contingent upon Aurora and Montgomery taking jurisdiction over the bridge after the completion of the repairs. In support of this allegation, the Commissioner attached a February 14, 1996, letter that former highway commissioner Wilmes wrote to Montgomery\u2019s administrator, which provided, in relevant part:\n\u201cThank you for taking time to discuss the Ashland Avenue bridge rehabilitation project this morning.\n% :ji %\nFunding of the project solely by [the Township] is contingent upon [the Township] being relieved from ownership, maintenance, legal and financial obligations, past, present, and future, relative to [the bridge], intersections, park accesses and any appurtenances there unto as have existed, exist, or may exist in the future.\nFurther, it must be resolved by the three entities that ownership shall be conveyed to [Aurora], and the Aurora/Montgomery boundary agreement shall govern all future maintenance.\nShould any further clarification or additional discussion be required, please notify me at once. Again, I thank you for making this project and transfer possible.\u201d\nThe Commissioner alleged that Aurora and Montgomery never objected to the terms of this correspondence and that they have waived any right to disclaim ownership of or responsibility for the bridge.\nThe Commissioner\u2019s third affirmative defense alleged that IDOT \u201chas examined ownership of the [bridge] and has made a determination that the [bridge] lies within the corporate limits of Montgomery.\u201d In support of this allegation, the Commissioner attached a July 30, 2004, letter written by IDOT engineer Chuck Ingersoll, which provided, in relevant part:\n\u201cThis is in response to your request for verification as to whether Aurora Township is responsible for the Ashland Avenue Bridge *** over the Fox River in Aurora, Illinois (Kane County).\nYou had brought to our attention that [the bridge] had been annexed by a municipality, yet our structure information database still indicated that [the bridge was] Aurora Township\u2019s responsibility. Pursuant to statute 605 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 203 of the Illinois Road and Bridge Laws, a township cannot have jurisdiction over streets in municipalities. Whenever a municipality annexes a highway and/or structure that was under township responsibility, this highway or structure automatically becomes the responsibility of the annexing municipality.\nOur records indicate that [the bridge is] within the city limits of a municipality. Therefore, Aurora Township has no responsibility regarding [the bridge].\u201d\nThe Commissioner also provided a 2005 IDOT internal memorandum that stated that \u201cMontgomery owns a small section of Ashland which includes [the bridge]\u201d and that \u201ceverything points to Montgomery owning [the bridge].\u201d\nRelying on Aurora\u2019s and Montgomery\u2019s pleadings, the Commissioner\u2019s fourth affirmative defense alleged that Aurora had jurisdiction over the roadway on one side of the bridge and that Montgomery had jurisdiction over the roadway on the other side. The Commissioner alleged that the Township had no jurisdiction over any road leading to or from the bridge and that, under Illinois law, \u201cthe duty to maintain a bridge rests with the government responsible for maintaining a public roadway for which the bridge is a part.\u201d\nOn March 9, 2007, the Commissioner filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The Commissioner argued that Aurora\u2019s 1961 ordinance and Montgomery\u2019s 1957 ordinance purporting to disconnect the land on which the bridge was built were void because \u201ca municipal entity cannot disconnect from a municipality under the Illinois Municipal Code.\u201d The Commissioner argued that the entity seeking disconnection under these ordinances was the Fox River Valley Pleasure Driveway and Park District, which, as a municipal entity, could not avail itself of the disconnection procedure. The Commissioner further argued that, because Aurora and Montgomery had admitted that they have jurisdiction over the land on the opposite sides of the bridge, they must also have jurisdiction over the bridge itself as a matter of law. The Commissioner argued that Aurora and Montgomery could not divest themselves of responsibility for maintaining a bridge that was an integral part of the public roadway system within their municipal jurisdictions. The Commissioner also argued that no township road connected with the bridge and that the nearest township road under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner was more than one mile away.\nOn May 1, 2007, following a hearing, the trial court entered an order (1) denying the Township\u2019s motion to dismiss; (2) denying the Commissioner\u2019s cross-motion for summary judgment; and (3) granting Aurora and Montgomery\u2019s joint motion for summary judgment. The trial court\u2019s order further provided that \u201cthe Court declares that the ownership and control of the Ashland Avenue Bridge rests with the Aurora Township, and the obligation to maintain the bridge rests with the Aurora Township Highway Commissioner.\u201d Following the denial of the Commissioner\u2019s motion to reconsider, both the Township and the Commissioner filed timely notices of appeal. This court has consolidated the appeals for purposes of decision.\nInitially, we address appeal No. 2 \u2014 07\u20140632, in which the Township contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2- \u2014 619(a)(9) of the Procedure Code. The Township argues that it is not a proper party to this action because it has no statutory power or authority over roads and bridges. See Western Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of Cornwall, 2 Ill. 2d 560, 566 (1954); Wiese, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 492. The Township asserts that, under section 6 \u2014 201.8 of the Illinois Highway Code (the Highway Code) (605 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 201.8 (West 2006)), only the township highway commissioner has charge of roads and has the duty to repair and maintain them. An action may be dismissed pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) of the Procedure Code when it is barred by an affirmative matter that defeats the claim or avoids its legal effect. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(9) (West 2006); Turner v. Fletcher, 302 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1055 (1999). We review de novo the trial court\u2019s ruling on a section 2 \u2014 619 motion. Porter v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 227 Ill. 2d 343, 352 (2008).\nWe conclude that the Township is a proper party to this action and that the trial court did not err in denying its motion to dismiss. Although a township highway commissioner has sole statutory authority to repair and improve \u201cthe roads of his district\u201d (605 ILCS 5/6\u2014 201.8 (West 2006)), the township is nonetheless the owner of the roads within the township\u2019s road system (Hennings v. Centreville Township, 56 Ill. 2d 151, 154-55 (1974)) and must approve the budget presented by the highway commissioner to operate the township\u2019s roads and bridges and must audit the highway commissioner\u2019s accounts (60 ILCS 1/80 \u2014 15, 80 \u2014 60 (West 2006)). As such, the Township was properly named as a defendant to the instant action, which sought a declaration of the \u201crights, obligations, and liabilities of the parties as they pertain to the [b]ridge.\u201d Moreover, we note a number of similar cases in which townships were named as defendants. See City of Mattoon v. Paradise Township, 131 Ill. App. 3d 327 (1985); Andrews v. City of Springfield, 56 Ill. App. 2d 201 (1965). Here, the trial court\u2019s final order did not impose upon the Township any obligation that was contrary to its statutory authority. As noted above, although the trial court declared that the Township owned the bridge, it nonetheless ruled that the Commissioner was responsible for maintaining the bridge. We therefore affirm the trial court\u2019s order denying the Township\u2019s section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss.\nIn appeal No. 2 \u2014 07\u20140539, the Commissioner contends that the trial court erred in granting Aurora and Montgomery\u2019s joint motion for summary judgment and in denying his cross-motion for summary judgment. The Commissioner argues that the trial court improperly focused on what entity \u201cowned\u201d the bridge, when the appropriate inquiry should have been what entity had \u201cjurisdiction\u201d over the bridge. The Commissioner argues that he did not have jurisdiction over the bridge because it was part of the municipal street system of Aurora and Montgomery, whose municipal boundaries extended to either side of the bridge. The Commissioner relies upon IDOT\u2019s July 30, 2004, letter indicating that the bridge was within the boundaries of a municipality and was not the responsibility of the Township. The Commissioner additionally asserts that Aurora\u2019s and Montgomery\u2019s 1957 and 1961 ordinances disconnecting the land under the bridge from those municipalities were void and of no effect. The Township joins in many of the Commissioner\u2019s arguments.\nSummary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 2006). The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact but, rather, to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 42-43 (2004). In determining whether a genuine issue as to any material fact exists, a court must construe the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the opponent. Adams, 211 Ill. 2d at 43. Summary judgment is inappropriate where the material facts are disputed or where, the material facts being undisputed, reasonable persons might draw different inferences from the undisputed facts. Adams, 211 Ill. 2d at 43. Summary judgment is a drastic means of disposing of litigation and should be allowed only when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. Adams, 211 Ill. 2d at 43. This court reviews de novo a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Adams, 211 Ill. 2d at 43.\nAt the outset, we agree that the relevant question in the instant case is not what entity owns the bridge, but what entity has responsibility for maintaining the bridge. Streets and roadways are held by public entities in trust for the benefit of the public (Hawthorne Bank of Wheaton v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 154 Ill. App. 3d 661, 667 (1987)), and governmental entities have a corresponding duty to maintain the streets and roadways within their jurisdiction (Fountain Head Drainage District v. City of Champaign, 160 Ill. App. 3d 341, 346 (1987)). By statute and at common law, \u201cthe duty to maintain a bridge rests upon the government responsible for maintaining the public roadway of which the bridge is a part, be it a county or a road district *** and regardless of whether the bridge was built by that local government or by another governmental entity.\u201d County of Bureau v. Thompson, 139 Ill. 2d 323, 340 (1990). Therefore, the relevant inquiry on appeal is what governmental entity is responsible for maintaining the public roadway of which the bridge is a part. Thompson, 139 Ill. 2d at 340-41.\nSection 2 \u2014 103 of the Highway Code defines the township and district road system to include \u201call rural roads to which this Code applies *** and which are not a part of the State highway system, county highway system or municipal street system.\u201d 605 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 103 (West 2006). The Highway Code defines a rural road as \u201c[a]ny highway or road outside the corporate limits of any municipality.\u201d 605 ILCS 5/2\u2014 218 (West 2006). Meanwhile, section 2 \u2014 104 of the Highway Code defines the municipal street system as including \u201cexisting streets and streets hereafter established in municipalities which are not a part of the State highway system or county highway system, together with roads outside their corporate limits over which they have jurisdiction pursuant to this Code or any other statute.\u201d 605 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 104 (West 2006). The parties do not dispute that the roadway comprising the bridge is a part of neither the state highway system nor the county highway system. Hence, under the definitions provided by the Highway Code, if the bridge is not a part of a municipal street system, then it is a part of the township and district road system and is the responsibility of the Commissioner to maintain. 605 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 103 (West 2006); Andrews, 56 Ill. App. 2d at 209-10.\nBased upon our review of the record, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that the bridge is not a part of a municipal street system, and we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on behalf of Montgomery and Aurora. As detailed above, the record contains copies of municipal ordinances, enacted prior to the bridge\u2019s construction, by which Montgomery and Aurora disconnected the property under the bridge from their corporate boundaries. The record also contains affidavits from Aurora\u2019s former director of public property and Montgomery\u2019s public works director averring that the bridge is not within the corporate limits of either municipality. Based upon such evidence, the roadway of which the bridge is a part is not within Montgomery\u2019s or Aurora\u2019s governmental jurisdiction, and those municipalities have no corresponding statutory or common-law duty to maintain the bridge. See 605 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 104 (West 2006); Thompson, 139 Ill. 2d at 340-41.\nAdditionally, the materials accompanying the cross-motions for summary judgment plainly indicate that neither Montgomery nor Aurora has ever taken responsibility for maintaining the bridge. The Township\u2019s former highway commissioner, Edward Wilmes, averred that the Township constructed the bridge in 1967 and 1968 and maintained the bridge for nearly 40 years. Wilmes averred that Aurora and Montgomery originally disconnected the land under the bridge so that the Township could construct the bridge. The Township also rebuilt the bridge in 1997 at a cost of approximately $1.2 million. The record contains evidence demonstrating that plaques have been affixed to the bridge showing the Township\u2019s participation in the bridge\u2019s reconstruction. Although the record contains intergovernmental agreements reflecting that, during certain years, Aurora agreed to plow and salt the bridge on behalf of the Township, neither Aurora nor Montgomery ever executed a formal agreement to take over maintenance responsibility for the bridge. Lacking such an agreement or evidence that the bridge was otherwise within the boundaries of a municipality, the trial court properly determined that the Commissioner was responsible for maintaining the bridge. See 605 ILCS 5/2-\u2014 103 (West 2006).\nIn reaching this conclusion, we reject the Commissioner\u2019s argument that Montgomery\u2019s and Aurora\u2019s ordinances disconnecting the property on which the bridge was built were void and of no effect. The Township asserts that the municipalities had no authority under Illinois law to disconnect property owned by a municipal entity, here the Fox River Valley Pleasure Driveway and Park District. In support of his position, the Commissioner relies upon a line of cases holding that a municipality lacks authority to disconnect its own property, under section 7 \u2014 3\u20144 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 3\u20144 (West 2006)). See Citizens for Conservation v. Village of Lake Barrington, 241 Ill. App. 3d 471, 475-76 (1993); People ex rel. Town of Aurora v. City of Aurora, 222 Ill. App. 3d 950, 954-55 (1991). However, the Commissioner may not use the instant proceeding as a means to collaterally attack the validity of municipal ordinances disconnecting the land under the bridge. Questions of whether parcels have been legally disconnected or annexed can be tried only by quo warranto proceedings and cannot be raised collaterally. See People ex rel. Quisen berry v. Ellis, 253 Ill. 369, 374-75 (1912); East Side Fire Protection District v. City of Belleville, 221 Ill. App. 3d 654, 655-56 (1991); North Maine Fire Protection District v. Village of Niles, 53 Ill. App. 3d 389, 394-95 (1977). The Commissioner never sought review of the municipal ordinances by filing a quo warranto action, and he is precluded from raising the issue collaterally almost 50 years later. Instead, we presume the validity of the ordinances and conclude that they disconnected the property on which the bridge was built from the municipal boundaries. See Quisenberry, 253 Ill. at 374-75.\nThe Commissioner alternatively argues that, even assuming the validity of the ordinances, the legal description contained within Montgomery Ordinance No. 130 \u201cfailed to disconnect property adjacent to the bridge.\u201d The Commissioner asserts that Montgomery, therefore, has jurisdiction over property adjacent to the bridge. However, the Commissioner fails to cite any authority supporting his conclusion that Montgomery\u2019s jurisdiction over property adjacent to the bridge has relevance to the determination of jurisdiction over the bridge itself. As noted above, the relevant inquiry under section 2 \u2014 104 of the Highway Code is whether the bridge is within municipal boundaries. Hence, the relevant question is whether the land on which the bridge sits is within municipal boundaries, not whether the land adjacent to the bridge is within those boundaries. 605 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 104 (West 2006). Therefore, that Montgomery retained jurisdiction over property adjacent to the bridge does not alter our determination that the bridge falls within the Township\u2019s jurisdiction.\nThe Commissioner further argues that, even if the bridge is outside the corporate boundaries of Aurora and Montgomery, the bridge is nonetheless a part of a municipal street system. In making this argument, the Commissioner notes that section 2 \u2014 104 of the Highway Code provides that the municipal street system includes existing streets in the municipality \u201ctogether with roads outside [its] corporate limits over which [it has] jurisdiction pursuant to this Code or any other statute.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 605 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 104 (West 2006). The plain language of this section provides that roads outside a municipality\u2019s corporate limits are a part of its street system only where the municipality has jurisdiction over the roads under another provision of the Highway Code or other statute. Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006) (noting that statutes must be applied according to their plain language). Tellingly, the Commissioner cites no other provision of the Highway Code or other statute that would place the bridge under the jurisdiction of either Aurora or Montgomery. Lacking any statutory grant of jurisdiction, the bridge falls outside Aurora\u2019s and Montgomery\u2019s corporate limits and is not a part of a municipal street system under section 2 \u2014 104 of the Highway Code.\nThe lack of a statutory grant of jurisdiction extending Montgomery\u2019s or Aurora\u2019s jurisdiction beyond its corporate boundaries distinguishes this case from the authorities relied upon by the Commissioner. See City of Mattoon v. Paradise Township, 131 Ill. App. 3d 327 (1985); Andrews v. City of Springfield, 56 Ill. App. 2d 201 (1965). In both of these cases, municipalities were found to have maintenance responsibilities as to roadways outside their corporate boundaries. The roadways at issue provided access to lots adjoining a man-made lake constructed by the municipalities outside their corporate limits as part of a municipal system of water works and water supply. Mattoon, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 329; Andrews, 56 Ill. App. 2d at 205-08. The lake and water systems were constructed by the municipalities under an express grant of legislative authority. Mattoon, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 329; Andrews, 56 Ill. App. 2d at 208. Under these circumstances, the reviewing courts held that the roads accessing these properties were part of the municipal street systems under section 2 \u2014 104 of the Highway Code because the municipalities had jurisdiction over the roads by \u201cother statute.\u201d Mattoon, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 332-33; Andrews, 56 Ill. App. 2d at 210.\nUnlike in Mattoon and Andrews, neither Aurora nor Montgomery has statutory jurisdiction over the bridge. To the contrary, the evidence reflects that these municipalities have no legal relationship to the bridge that would extend their jurisdiction to include the bridge as part of their municipal street systems. The evidence demonstrates that the bridge was built by the Township on land outside Aurora\u2019s and Montgomery\u2019s corporate limits. Aurora and Montgomery have never annexed the land under the bridge, and it is evident that the Township has maintained and repaired the bridge since its initial construction.\nAdditionally, we reject the Commissioner\u2019s argument that genuine issues of material fact precluded the entry of summary judgment. The Commissioner asserts that evidence appearing in the record suggested the possibility that Aurora and Montgomery had entered into intergovernmental agreements to assume responsibility to maintain and repair the bridge. Specifically, the Commissioner relies upon the 1990 intergovernmental boundary line agreement between Aurora and Montgomery, which contained a provision relating to the municipalities\u2019 potential responsibilities in the event of the repair, reconstruction, or replacement of the bridge. The Commissioner further relies upon Wilmes\u2019s 1996 letter to Montgomery\u2019s administrator, stating that funding of the 1997 bridge reconstruction was contingent upon the transfer of bridge ownership to Aurora and Aurora\u2019s and Montgomery\u2019s assumption of repair and maintenance responsibilities.\nContrary to the Commissioner\u2019s assertions, however, these documents do not establish that Montgomery or Aurora did, in fact, agree to assume responsibility for the bridge. As noted above, the provision of the 1990 intergovernmental boundary line agreement between Aurora and Montgomery relating to maintenance of the bridge became effective only \u201c[i]n the event Aurora enters into an agreement with Aurora Township with respect to major repairs, reconstruction or replacement of the Ashland Avenue Bridge.\u201d The record contains no evidence reflecting that Aurora ever entered into an agreement with the Township regarding the bridge. Although Wilmes\u2019s 1996 letter reflected that the Township and the municipalities had entered into discussions regarding the transfer or maintenance of the bridge, no agreement on the matter was ever executed. Indeed, during his deposition, Wilmes specifically testified that his 1996 letter merely reflected a proposal discussed by the Township and the municipalities and that no formal agreement regarding the transfer or maintenance of the bridge was ever reached. Wilmes testified that, despite the failure to reach an agreement with the municipalities, the Township decided to repair the bridge due to the present availability of federal, state, and township funds to pay for the project. Based on such uncontroverted evidence from the Township\u2019s former highway supervisor, we find no issue of fact as to Montgomery\u2019s or Aurora\u2019s execution of an agreement to assume responsibility for the bridge.\nWe also reject the Commissioner\u2019s assertions that the July 30, 2004, letter written by IDOT engineer Chuck Ingersoll and IDOT\u2019s subsequent internal memorandum precluded the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment. As noted above, Ingersoll stated in his letter that IDOT\u2019s structure information database indicated that the bridge was the Township\u2019s responsibility. However, Ingersoll stated that, because the Township \u201chad brought to our attention that [the bridge] had been annexed by a municipality,\u201d he determined that the Township did not have responsibility for the bridge. Such correspondence fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to jurisdiction over the bridge, because it provides no factual basis from which we might conclude that the bridge was a part of a municipal street system. See Kosten v. St. Anne\u2019s Hospital, 132 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1079 (1985) (noting that conclusory statements lacking factual basis are insufficient to create an issue of fact so as to defeat a motion for summary judgment). Ingersoll stated that his determination was predicated upon information provided by the Township indicating that the land under the bridge had been annexed by a municipality. However, the record contains no evidence of such an annexation, and the Township has failed to produce the information that it provided to IDOT and upon which IDOT based its conclusion.\nSimilarly, the 2005 IDOT internal memorandum indicating that Montgomery owned the bridge lacks any verifiable basis. Although the memorandum states that Montgomery \u201cowned a small section of Ash-land which includes [the bridge],\u201d it provides no explanation of the basis for this determination. Accordingly, IDOT\u2019s determination regarding jurisdiction is unsupported and conclusory and provides no basis to suggest that the bridge is within the corporate limits of either Montgomery or Aurora. In view of the uncontroverted evidence presented by Aurora and Montgomery that the bridge is not within their corporate boundaries, the IDOT exhibits offered by the Commissioner failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to jurisdiction over the bridge. See Kosten, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 1079.\nIn closing, both the Township and the Commissioner assert that the bridge cannot be under their jurisdiction because Aurora and Montgomery have annexed the property on either side of the bridge, leaving the bridge surrounded by the two municipalities and isolated from any Township road by many miles. While we agree that the bridge may be heavily used by the residents of Aurora and Montgomery for travel between the two municipalities, such a circumstance, as well as the bridge\u2019s isolation from Township roads, does not render the bridge a part of a municipal street system under the plain language of section 2- \u2014 104 of the Highway Code. As already discussed, the municipal street system consists of the existing streets within the corporate limits and other streets over which a municipality has jurisdiction by statute. 605 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 104 (West 2006). Here, the record definitively establishes that the bridge is not contained within the corporate limits of Montgomery or Aurora and that neither municipality otherwise has statutory jurisdiction. Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that the bridge was not a part of a municipal street system and that the obligation to maintain the bridge rested with the Commissioner. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order granting Aurora and Montgomery\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denying the Commissioner\u2019s cross-motion for summary judgment.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.\nAffirmed.\nBURKE and SCHOSTOK, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HUTCHINSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Timothy P. Dwyer, of Law Office of Timothy P. Dwyer, of St. Charles, for appellant Fred Burgess.", "Michael C. Funkey and Allan V. Kickertz, both of Law Offices of Michael C. Funkey, P.C., of Aurora, for appellant Aurora Township.", "Gary K. Mickey and Dean M. Frieders, both of Mickey, Wilson, Weiler, Renzi & Andersson, P.C., of Aurora, for appellee Village of Montgomery.", "John C. Banbury, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of Aurora, for appellee City of Aurora." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE VILLAGE OF MONTGOMERY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AURORA TOWNSHIP et al., Defendants-Appellants (The City of Aurora, Defendant-Appellee).\nSecond District\nNos. 2 \u2014 07\u20140539, 2 \u2014 07\u20140632 cons.\nOpinion filed December 10, 2008.\nTimothy P. Dwyer, of Law Office of Timothy P. Dwyer, of St. Charles, for appellant Fred Burgess.\nMichael C. Funkey and Allan V. Kickertz, both of Law Offices of Michael C. Funkey, P.C., of Aurora, for appellant Aurora Township.\nGary K. Mickey and Dean M. Frieders, both of Mickey, Wilson, Weiler, Renzi & Andersson, P.C., of Aurora, for appellee Village of Montgomery.\nJohn C. Banbury, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of Aurora, for appellee City of Aurora." }, "file_name": "0353-01", "first_page_order": 369, "last_page_order": 382 }