{ "id": 4283348, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Johnson", "decision_date": "2009-01-05", "docket_number": "No. 3-07-0255", "first_page": "768", "last_page": "774", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "387 Ill. App. 3d 768" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "487 F.2d 101", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 217388 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/487/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5811588 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131032 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3602394 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346-47" }, { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 1001", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3950690 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1004" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/1001-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5464950 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" }, { "page": "266-67" }, { "page": "265" }, { "page": "266" }, { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3750300 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" }, { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3602394 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 1001", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3950690 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1003" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/1001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 657, "char_count": 13073, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.207966869300525e-08, "percentile": 0.32794730503593067 }, "sha256": "9623599cb01896afd7b4a7640991b7b9fd18918e74317808ae17f785243321b0", "simhash": "1:ad72bee2574e6db3", "word_count": 2171 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:05:00.567552+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LYTTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant Anthony Johnson was convicted of attempted robbery and aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 4(a), 18 \u2014 1(a), 12 \u2014 4(b)(8) (West 2000)). The trial court sentenced him to eight years in prison. He appealed, and we reversed and remanded for a retrospective hearing to determine whether it was necessary to require defendant to wear an electronic security belt as a restraining device at trial. People v. Johnson, 356 Ill. App. 3d 208 (2005). On remand, the trial court concluded that the security belt was necessary. Defendant appeals that decision, arguing that it was an abuse of discretion. We agree and reverse and remand for a new trial.\nDefendant attempted to rob a female employee at a Subway restaurant by threatening to shoot her if she refused to give him money from the store\u2019s cash register. He was arrested and charged with attempted robbery and aggravated battery.\nPrior to defendant\u2019s testimony at trial, defense counsel asked that defendant\u2019s electronic security belt be removed. The trial court denied the request, stating that defendant needed to remain in the belt because he had prior convictions of \u201caggressive types of crimes.\u201d\nOn direct appeal, defendant argued that the judge violated his right to due process by requiring him to wear the stun belt during trial where there was no showing of a manifest need to restrain him. We agreed and remanded the cause to allow the trial court to conduct a retrospective hearing to determine whether the use of the security device was necessary using the 13 factors enumerated in People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261 (1977). Johnson, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 212.\nAt the hearing on remand, the State argued that restraining defendant was justified based on defendant\u2019s prior criminal history, which included convictions for robbery, theft, aggravated robbery, and burglary. The State also argued that the belt was necessary to restrain defendant based on the seriousness of the charges in this case and defendant\u2019s physical stature. The prosecutor described defendant as \u201cfit\u201d at the time of trial. He estimated that defendant weighed 195 pounds and stood 5 feet 7 inches tall.\nIn response, defense counsel claimed that the decision to use the electronic security belt had been unilaterally made by the Will County sheriffs office. Counsel further argued that the belt was unjustified because defendant had not been violent or disruptive during the proceedings, none of his past offenses indicated that he was an escape risk, and he was not involved with a codefendant at large who might have tried to rescue him. Both parties agreed that there were no spectators in the courtroom during the trial.\nThe trial judge found that defendant\u2019s Class 3 felony charges were \u201cvery serious charges\u201d and that his criminal history was \u201csignificant.\u201d The judge also recalled that the complaining witness was a \u201cvery young, very tiny Asian girl\u201d who was \u201cpetrified\u201d of defendant during her testimony. The trial court then concluded that the electronic security belt did not create prejudice to the jury and was properly used to restrain defendant at trial.\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, defendant maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that it was necessary to restrain defendant using an electronic security belt. Defendant argues that, in this case, there was no showing of a \u201cmanifest need\u201d for the restraint at trial.\nShackling of the accused should be avoided if possible because (1) it tends to prejudice the jury against the accused, (2) it restricts his ability to assist his counsel during trial, and (3) it offends the dignity of the judicial process. People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261 (1977). \u201cAn accused should never be placed in restraints in the presence of a jury \u2018 \u201cunless there is a showing of a manifest need for such restraints.\u201d \u2019 [Citation.]\u201d People v. Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1004 (2004).\nA defendant may be shackled when there is a reason to believe that he may try to escape or that he may pose a threat to the safety of people in the courtroom or if it is necessary to maintain order during the trial. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266. The decision to shackle a defendant is left to the discretion of the trial court, and the court may select the physical restraints most suitable in light of all the circumstances. People v. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340 (2006). An electronic safety belt is no less a restraint than shackles or handcuffs. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d at 346-47. Thus, the use of electronic safety belts in the courts of this state is warranted \u201conly where there has been a showing of manifest need for the restraint.\u201d Allen, 222 Ill. 2d at 347.\nThe trial judge must state for the record his reasons for allowing the defendant to remain shackled and must give the defendant\u2019s attorney an opportunity to present reasons why the defendant should not be shackled. People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144 (1999). The possibility of prejudicing a jury is not the only reason why courts should not allow shackling of an accused absent the strong necessity for doing so. Even where there is no jury, an unnecessary restraint is impermissible because it hinders the defendant\u2019s ability to assist his counsel, runs afoul of the presumption of innocence, and demeans both the accused and the judicial proceeding. In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d 33 (1977).\nFactors the trial court should consider in making a \u201cmanifest need\u201d determination include (1) the seriousness of the present charge against the defendant, (2) the defendant\u2019s temperament and character, (3) the defendant\u2019s age and physical characteristics, (4) the defendant\u2019s past record, (5) any past escapes or attempted escapes by the defendant, (6) evidence of a present plan of escape by the defendant, (7) any threats by the defendant to harm others or create a disturbance, (8) evidence of self-destructive tendencies on the part of the defendant, (9) the risk of mob violence or of attempted revenge by others, (10) the possibility of rescue attempts by any co-offenders still at large, (11) the size and mood of the audience at trial, (12) the nature and physical security of the courtroom, and (13) the adequacy and availability of alternative remedies. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266-67.\nHere, defendant was charged with aggravated battery and attempted robbery. While any felony is a serious crime, there was nothing in the nature of the charges against this defendant that indicated that his temperament or character made him more likely to attempt escape or disrupt the proceedings. Defendant\u2019s criminal history included multiple offenses for theft and robbery but no offenses that would indicate he posed any more of an escape risk than any felony defendant with similar criminal histories. The PSI states that defendant was 35 years old, stood 5 feet 5 inches tall, and weighed approximately 180 pounds at trial. Without more, these physical characteristics do not appear oppressive or alarming, even assuming defendant was physically fit. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that defendant planned an escape or was disruptive during the proceedings. In addition, defendant did not commit the crime with the aid of a codefendant who might now come to his rescue. There are no codefendants at large. Further, the record does not reveal any self-destructive or violent tendencies on the part of the defendant. The parties agreed that there were no spectators in the gallery. Thus, the size and mood of the audience is not a factor to consider. Last, alternatives were available. Defense counsel stated that prior to the use of the electronic belts, the courtroom employed deputies to secure the courtroom. Nothing suggests those deputies could no longer perform that duty. Given these facts, we cannot say that the trial court\u2019s conclusion was proper.\nThe manifest need standard set forth in Boose is designed to allow the use of restraints only in exceptional cases. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 265. There must be some connection between the factors enumerated by the trial court and the belief that the accused may try to escape or that he poses a threat to the safety of the courtroom. See Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266, citing Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1970). Without that connection, Boose essentially becomes meaningless.\nIn this case, the State argues that factors such as the violent nature of the charged offenses and defendant\u2019s prior convictions support the trial court\u2019s ruling. Those factors, however, were the same factors the trial court relied on when it initially determined that the electronic security belt was necessary. In defendant\u2019s first appeal, this court held that the consideration of those factors alone did not justify the use of restraints. See Johnson, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 211, citing Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 268. Nothing has changed. No further evidence was presented to the trial court. We continue to find no meaningful connection between the arguments offered and the manifest need to restrain defendant at trial.\nThus, we find the trial court\u2019s ruling to be an abuse of discretion. Forcing defendant to wear an electronic security belt without demonstrating a manifest need for the restraint violated defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial. Therefore, defendant must be granted a new trial.\nCONCLUSION\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nMcDADE, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LYTTON" }, { "text": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE,\ndissenting:\nI would remand for another hearing because I am still not convinced that the trial judge applied the Boose analysis. Although the Boose factors were argued by counsel on remand, the judge said he had \u201calways taken the position\u201d that Boose did not apply to electronic security belts and that the appellate court had \u201cignore[d] the obvious difference between visible shackles and a concealed security device.\u201d The judge expressed this view several times, suggesting that appellate judges would agree if they had any experience in the real world of criminal trials. The following remarks are illustrative:\n\u201cThe judges, who have no history in the court system, who have addressed this under People versus Martinez, want to look at this as an issue of well, it really in their opinion offends the dignity of the judicial process, which they have never been involved in. I find it very interesting that they have never tried \u2014 picked a jury, tried a case, tried an Aggravated Battery, seen a victim shake on the witness stand, cry on the witness stand, and yet they are going to tell the trial court what and what doesn\u2019t offend the dignity of the trial process.\nSo all that aside, I don\u2019t think \u2014 I did everything I could not to prejudice the jury. I have not heard anything that would lead me to believe that the defendant\u2019s abilities to assist his counsel during trial was in any way impaired or restricted by the presence of the device, and I take offense at any reference that the use of the device offends the dignity of the judicial process for the reasons I stated previously.\u201d\nIt appears that instead of following our instructions, the judge used the remand hearing as a forum to express his disagreement with the instructions. Although he mentioned two factors relevant to Boose (seriousness of the charge and criminal history), he had already done that when the case was before us on direct appeal.\nI have been a trial judge. I have picked a jury. I have seen crime victims testify. This experience actually accounts for my belief that Boose violations should be remedied through retrospective hearings instead of outright reversal. In People v. Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d 1001 (2004), the evidence revealed that the Will County sheriff had a policy of requiring all felony defendants to wear an electronic security belt in the courtroom. The trial judge deferred to this policy, stating that \u201che did not want to disrupt the sheriff\u2019s standard operating procedure.\u201d Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 1003. Such deferral was improper because a trial judge must control his or her own courtroom procedures. See People v. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340 (2006). The purpose of a retrospective Boose hearing is to afford judges an opportunity to fix this impropriety without undoing an entire trial.\nThe instant judge obviously disagrees with our application of Boose to electronic security belts. Nevertheless, as our supreme court has held, Boose does apply. See Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340. Since I do not believe the judge has yet followed the applicable standard, I would remand once again for compliance.", "type": "dissent", "author": null } ], "attorneys": [ "Fletcher P. Hamill (argued), of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "James Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Terry A. Mertel and Justin A. Nicolosi (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3 \u2014 07-\u20140255\nOpinion filed January 5, 2009.\nHOLDRIDGE, J., dissenting.\nFletcher P. Hamill (argued), of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nJames Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Terry A. Mertel and Justin A. Nicolosi (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0768-01", "first_page_order": 784, "last_page_order": 790 }