{ "id": 4284035, "name": "ARNOLD DAY, Plaintiff Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Day v. City of Chicago", "decision_date": "2009-02-09", "docket_number": "No. 1-08-1164", "first_page": "70", "last_page": "80", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 70" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "938 F. Supp. 21", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5650588 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/938/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 F. Supp. 2d 34", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9295481 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/293/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 F. Supp. 2d 28", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9264136 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/307/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "799 N.E.2d 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3777884 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "808 N.E.2d 56", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4023277 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" }, { "page": "202" }, { "page": "202" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/348/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 N.E.2d 1110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2507523 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/192/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "791 N.E.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609706 ], "weight": 14, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "469-70" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "680 N.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544890 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "407-08" }, { "page": "408" }, { "page": "408" }, { "page": "413" }, { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "871 N.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "374 Ill. App. 3d 990", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 7328950 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "994" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/374/0990-01" ] }, { "cite": "799 N.E.2d 273", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 975002 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" }, { "page": "368" }, { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0359-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 954, "char_count": 24182, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5689724102991946e-07, "percentile": 0.6783453398248315 }, "sha256": "e73e434ed5c039d9b3025f07193097e84c8909dd7ed078fc2397f583a662e47d", "simhash": "1:53bb47fe240efa26", "word_count": 3809 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:04:57.079883+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ARNOLD DAY, Plaintiff Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn 1994, the plaintiff Arnold Day was convicted of the 1991 murder of Gerrod Irving and is currently serving a 60-year prison sentence. Plaintiff maintains he was wrongfully convicted, alleging the only evidence linking him to Irving\u2019s murder is a confession plaintiff gave to Chicago police department detectives Kenneth Boudreau and William Foley after he was physically tortured.\nOn May 3, 2007, plaintiff submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 (West 2006)) request to the Chicago Police Department, seeking:\n\u201cany and all documents prepared in connection with RD No. P223384, including but not limited to: police reports, arrest reports, rap sheets, \u2018street files\u2019 also known as office unit working files, general progress notes, contact analysis reports, investigative files, major crime worksheets, inventory slips, plats, maps or diagrams, evidence technician reports, and lab reports.\u201d\nOn May 24, 2007, the Chicago police department (CPD) responded by refusing to produce any of the documents, with the exception of heavily redacted copies of plaintiffs arrest report and the \u201cGeneral Offense Case Report.\u201d Among the items redacted from the General Offense Case Report are: the complete narrative portion of the document; any information regarding the investigation of Irving\u2019s murder; Irving\u2019s home phone number; portions of Irving\u2019s home address; and portions of the address where Irving\u2019s murder occurred. The CPD explained portions of the General Offense Case Report were redacted under sections 7(l)(b) and (l)(c) of the FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7(l)(b), (l)(c) (West 2006)) because the \u201ccriminal investigation is ongoing.\u201d The CPD explained the remaining documents were exempt from disclosure under sections 7(l)(b), (l)(c), (l)(d), and (l)(f) of the FOIA. See 5 ILCS 140/7(1) et seq, (West 2006).\nFollowing denial of his administrative appeal to the CPD, plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court against the City and the CPD superintendent under the FOIA. The City responded to plaintiff\u2019s complaint by filing a section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(9) (West 2006)) motion to dismiss. In the memorandum in support of its motion, the City contended: (1) it offered to produce all nonexempt documents to plaintiff; (2) the documents it withheld were exempt from production under section 7(l)(c) because there was an ongoing criminal investigation \u201cas to certain aspects of the investigation other than Mr. Day\u2019s arrest and conviction\u201d; (3) the withheld documents were exempt from production under section 7(l)(b)(v) because they contained information \u201crevealing the identity of persons who provided information\u201d to the CPD; and (4) the withheld documents were exempt from production under section (l)(d) and (l)(f) because \u201copinions and recommendations are expressed and actions are formulated by the CPD personnel and/or the state\u2019s attorney working on the investigation.\u201d Affidavits from three CPD employees were attached in support of the memorandum.\nFollowing a hearing, which consisted only of arguments by counsel, the trial court held \u201cdefendant has provided a detailed explanation for their exemptions under the FOIA Act, specifically that this is an ongoing investigation and that personal privacy concerns are raised,\u201d and that the records plaintiff sought \u201cfall within the exemptions that have been argued and outlined in this presentation.\u201d Despite plaintiff\u2019s request, the trial court did not conduct an in camera review of the redacted and withheld documents. The trial court denied plaintiff\u2019s motion to reconsider. We reverse the order dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint and remand with instructions.\nDECISION\nSection 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure permits involuntary dismissal where the claim asserted against the defendant \u201cis barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(9) (West 2006); Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 207 Ill. 2d 359, 367, 799 N.E.2d 273 (2003). A reviewing court must interpret all of the pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Van Meter, 207 Ill. 2d at 368. Our review of a section 2 \u2014 619 dismissal is de novo. Van Meter, 207 Ill. 2d at 368.\nPlaintiff contends the trial court erred in finding the requested documents fell within the FOIA exemptions argued and listed by the City in its motion to dismiss. Specifically, plaintiff contends the City failed to satisfy its burden to show the requested documents were actually exempt from disclosure under section 7 of the FOIA. Each of the claimed exemptions will be addressed. We note the documents at issue were created at Area 2, a police department headquarters subject to past and present investigations of illegal methods of interrogation.\nThe FOIA\u2019s purpose is to open governmental records to the light of public scrutiny. BlueStar Energy Services, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 374 Ill. App. 3d 990, 994, 871 N.E.2d 880 (2007). Public records are presumed to be open and accessible. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 407, 680 N.E.2d 374 (1997). Although the FOIA outlines several exemptions to disclosure, those exemptions are read narrowly. Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 407. \u201cThus, when a public body receives a proper request for information, it must comply with that request unless one of the narrow statutory exemptions set forth in section 7 of the Act applies.\u201d Illinois Education Ass\u2019n v. Illinois State Board of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 463, 791 N.E.2d 522 (2003); Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 407-08.\nIf a public body seeks to invoke one of the section 7 exemptions as grounds for refusing disclosure, \u201c \u2018it is required to give written notice specifying the particular exemption claimed to authorize the denial.\u2019 \u201d Illinois Education Ass\u2019n, 204 Ill. 2d at 464, quoting Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 408. If the party seeking disclosure challenges the public body\u2019s denial in circuit court, the public body has \u201cthe burden of proving that the records in question fall within the exemption it has claimed.\u201d Illinois Education Ass\u2019n, 204 Ill. 2d at 464. \u201c \u2018To meet this burden and to assist the court in making its determination, the agency must provide a detailed justification for its claim of exemption, addressing the requested documents specifically and in a manner allowing for adequate adversary testing.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) Illinois Education Ass\u2019n, 204 Ill. 2d at 464, quoting Baudin v. City of Crystal Lake, 192 Ill. App. 3d 530, 537, 548 N.E.2d 1110 (1989).\nUnder section 11(f) of the FOIA, the circuit court \u201cshall conduct such in camera examination of the requested records as it finds appropriate to determine if such records or any part thereof may be withheld under any provision of this Act.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/11(f) (West 2006); Illinois Education Ass\u2019n, 204 Ill. 2d at 469. Our supreme court has interpreted this section to mean \u201cthe circuit court need not conduct in camera review where the public body meets its burden of showing that the statutory exemption applies by means of affidavits.\u201d Illinois Education Ass\u2019n, 204 Ill. 2d at 469. Affidavits will not suffice, however, \u201cif the public body\u2019s claims are conclusory, merely recite statutory standards, or are too vague or sweeping.\u201d Illinois Education Ass\u2019n, 204 Ill. 2d at 469.\nI. Ongoing Criminal Investigation Exemption\nThe City contends the documents at issue were exempt under section 7(l)(c)(i) and (l)(c)(viii) of the FOIA because disclosure would obstruct an ongoing criminal investigation into Irving\u2019s murder. The plaintiff counters the City did not adequately show the purported criminal investigation was actually \u201congoing.\u201d\nSection 7(l)(c)(i) exempts records where disclosure would \u201cinterfere with pending or actually *** contemplated law enforcement proceedings conducted by any law enforcement or correctional agency.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/7(l)(c)(i) (West 2006). Section 7(l)(c)(viii) exempts records where disclosure would \u201cobstruct an ongoing criminal investigation.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/7(1) (c) (viii) (West 2006).\nIn Illinois Education Ass\u2019n, the issue presented was whether material the Illinois State Board of Education (Board) provided to the Illinois Attorney General was protected from disclosure under the attorney-client exemption to the FOIA. The supreme court held the affidavits submitted in support of the exemption were merely conclusory and inadequate to sustain the Board\u2019s burden of proof. Illinois Education Ass\u2019n, 204 Ill. 2d at 469.\nThe supreme court held that in meeting its burden to demonstrate an exemption is applicable, a public body may not:\n\u201csimply treat the words \u2018attorney-client privilege\u2019 or \u2018legal advice\u2019 as some talisman, the mere utterance of which magically casts a spell of secrecy over the documents at issue. Rather, the public body can meet its burden only by providing some objective indicia that the exemption is applicable under the circumstances.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Illinois Education Ass\u2019n, 204 Ill. 2d at 470.\nGiven the inadequacy of the Board\u2019s affidavits and the circuit court\u2019s failure to conduct an in camera review of the documents, the supreme court was compelled to conclude the circuit court had an insufficient basis to grant summary judgment for the Board. Illinois Education Ass\u2019n, 204 Ill. 2d at 469-70.\nThe three affidavits submitted by the City in this case were entirely conclusory and inadequate to sustain the City\u2019s burden to show the requested documents and the redacted portions of the general case and arrest reports were exempt because disclosure would \u201cobstruct an ongoing criminal investigation.\u201d Nothing in any of the affidavits tells us when the documents at issue were created or when the last entry was made.\nMatthew Sandoval, the freedom of information officer in the records inquiry and customer service section of the CPD, swore he:\n\u201cconducted a search to determine whether the documents requested by [plaintiffs counsel] related to an ongoing investigation. I did this by reviewing the file associated with RD No. P \u2014 223384. I determined from reviewing the files associated with RD No. P \u2014 223384 that the investigation is still ongoing, as to certain aspects of the investigation other than Mr. Day\u2019s arrest and conviction.\u201d\nJames McCarthy, an attorney in the office of legal affairs of the CPD, swore:\n\u201cOn September 7, 2007,1 wrote a letter on behalf of CPD Interim Superintendent Dana V Starks, denying Mr. Day\u2019s corrected appeal of both the redacted information in the General Case Report and the Arrest Report, and the remaining documents in their entirety, for the same reasons stated in CPD\u2019s previous correspondence, and based on the following FOIA exemptions: 58 ILCS 140/7(1) (c)(viii), 5 ILCS 140/7(l)(b)(v), 5 ILCS 140/7(l)(d), and 5 ILCS 140/7(l)(f).\u201d\nChicago police lieutenant James Gibson, commanding officer of the detective division support section, swore:\n\u201cI have reviewed various CPD records associated with RD No. P \u2014 223384, which involved a homicide. I have determined that although the case has resulted in the arrest and conviction of Arnold Day, there is still an ongoing criminal investigation because the case has not been cleared.\u201d\nLieutenant Gibson said the documents the CPD either redacted or withheld in their entirety contained: \u201cinformation identifying witnesses including their names, addresses, and social security numbers; descriptions of the suspects; descriptions of the evidence; and information on the progress of the investigation.\u201d Lieutenant Gibson said the release of the information could:\n\u201cvery well interfere with the criminal investigation, which is ongoing. Suspects in this crime could become aware of the status of the investigation, the degree of knowledge that police have as to their involvement, and the type of evidence that exists which could incriminate them.\u201d\nLieutenant Gibson said adequately redacting the withheld documents is not possible because there is no way to \u201ccompletely ensure that any disseminated information would not be harmful, because seemingly innocuous information may prove valuable to an at-large perpetrator in discerning the nature of the ongoing police investigation.\u201d\nHere, as did the Board in Illinois Education Ass\u2019n, the City attempts to use the term \u201congoing criminal investigation\u201d in its affidavits as some sort of magic talisman, the invocation of which \u201ccasts a spell of secrecy over the documents at issue.\u201d See Illinois Education Ass\u2019n, 204 Ill. 2d at 470. Nothing in McCarthy\u2019s, Sandoval\u2019s, or Lieutenant Gibson\u2019s affidavit adequately explains why the investigation of Irving\u2019s murder of more than 17 years ago is considered \u201congoing.\u201d Plaintiff was convicted of the murder 14 years ago.\nThe three affiants also fail to explain how disclosure of any of the documents at issue would specifically obstruct the remaining investigation of Irving\u2019s murder. It is impossible to tell from the affidavits whether the investigation into aspects of the crime \u201cother than Mr. Day\u2019s arrest and conviction\u201d is actually \u201cpending,\u201d as required by section 7(l)(c)(i). See 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(c)(i) (West 2006).\nAlthough Lieutenant Gibson said \u201cseemingly innocuous information may prove valuable to an at-large perpetrator in discerning the nature of the ongoing police investigation,\u201d he never suggested in his affidavit that a specific living \u201cat-large perpetrator\u201d is currently under active investigation. Simply saying there is an \u201congoing criminal investigation because the case has not been cleared,\u201d with little additional explanation, is not \u201cobjective indicia\u201d sufficient to show the ongoing investigation exemption applies. See Illinois Education Ass\u2019n, 204 Ill. 2d at 470.\nThe sweeping generalities found in McCarthy\u2019s, Sandoval\u2019s, and Lieutenant Gibson\u2019s affidavits are not the type of \u201cdetailed justifications\u201d that lend themselves to \u201cadequate adversary testing\u201d necessary to support the claimed ongoing-investigation exemption. See Illinois Education Ass\u2019n, 204 Ill. 2d at 464. We do not see the \u201cdetailed explanation\u201d found by the trial court.\nII. Personal Privacy Exception\nPlaintiff next contends the trial court erred in granting the City\u2019s motion to dismiss based on the personal privacy exemption. See 5 ILCS 140/7(l)(b)(v) (West 2006).\nSection 7(l)(b)(v) of the FOIA exempts from inspection and copying:\n\u201cInformation that, if disclosed, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy ***. *** Information exempted under this subsection (b) shall include but is not limited to:\n(v) information revealing the identity of persons who file complaints with or provide information to administrative, investigative, law enforcement or penal agencies.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/ 7(l)(b)(v) (West 2006).\nThe City\u2019s affidavits alleged disclosure of the requested documents would reveal complainants\u2019 and witnesses\u2019 personal information and therefore were exempt. Specifically, the affiant Lieutenant James Gibson swore:\n\u201cThe release of [the requested information] would *** constitute an invasion of privacy of the witnesses involved. These documents contain the name, address and descriptive information including social security number of each person who has come forward to police regarding this crime. In my professional experience in conducting and supervising criminal investigations, one of the most difficult dimensions of an investigation is garnering and maintaining the support and cooperation of witnesses. Absolute confidentiality and privacy are necessary when working with witnesses or potential witnesses, due to a fear of reprisal. This level of trust is extremely difficult to achieve and maintain for investigation. This trust could be compromised with the undue release of their identity and personal information.\u201d\nLieutenant Gibson continued:\n\u201cThere is no way to adequately redact these documents in such a manner as to guarantee the absolute privacy and safety of potential witnesses. There is no way to completely ensure that any disseminated information would not be harmful, because seemingly innocuous information may prove valuable to an at-large perpetrator in discerning the nature of the ongoing police investigation.\u201d\nPlaintiff contends the City waived application of the personal privacy exemption because the requested documents were produced during his criminal trial without any expectation of privacy.\nIf the public body can prove a requested documents falls within the exemption included in section 7(l)(b)(v), \u201cthe document shall be per se exempt from inspection and copying and \u2018no further inquiry by the court is necessary.\u2019 \u201d Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety v. City of Chicago, 348 Ill. App. 3d 188, 199, 808 N.E.2d 56 (2004), quoting Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 408. However, \u201c \u2018voluntary disclosure in one situation can preclude later claims that records are exempt from release to someone else.\u2019 \u201d Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 202, quoting Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 413.\nIn Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, the court recognized waiver \u201cmust not be mechanically applied whenever there is disclosure of information but, rather, requires consideration of the circumstances related to the disclosure, including the purpose and extent of disclosure as well as the confidentiality surrounding the disclosure.\u201d Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 202. Because disclosure was made for consultation purposes and to a single entity which treated the names and addresses as confidential, the court held disclosure \u201cdid not waive the section 7(l)(b)(v) per se exemption.\u201d Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 203. Here, no similar expectation of confidentiality would exist if the City had produced the requested documents during discovery in the plaintiffs criminal trial.\nWhile the record is not clear on exactly what discovery the plaintiff received at the time of his criminal case, experience tells us we would not be wrong to assume unexpurgated copies of the case and arrest reports were produced.\nAlthough at least some of the documents were disclosed by the City, through the office of the State\u2019s Attorney, in the course of discovery in plaintiffs criminal trial, we do not know the contents or circumstances of that disclosure. See Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 413. Therefore, we cannot consider \u201cthe circumstances related to the disclosure, including the purpose and extent of the disclosure as well as the confidentiality surrounding the disclosure.\u201d Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 202. Any determination regarding whether waiver of the exemption applies would be premature at this point. On remand, we assume the plaintiff will have the opportunity to develop his argument should that become necessary, and the City will be able to respond.\nIII. Deliberative Process Exemption\nPlaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting the City\u2019s motion to dismiss based on the \u201cdeliberative process\u201d exemption. See 5 ILCS 140/7(l)(f) (West 2006).\nSection 7(1) (f) of the FOIA exempts from inspection and copying:\n\u201cPreliminary drafts, notes, recommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or actions are formulated, except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record shall not be exempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/7(l)(f) (West 2006).\nOur court has determined this exemption is the equivalent of the federal \u201cdeliberative process\u201d exemption, which applies to \u201cpredecisional materials used by a public body in its deliberative process.\u201d Harwood v. McDonough, 344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 247, 799 N.E.2d 859 (2003).\nIn its memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss, the City contended \u201coffice unit or working files, general progress notes, contact analysis reports, investigative files and major crime worksheets\u201d were exempt from the FOIA request \u201cbecause within each of these, opinions and recommendations are expressed and actions are formulated by the [Chicago Police Department] personnel and/or the state\u2019s attorney working on the investigation.\u201d However, none of the affidavits demonstrates which, if any, of the requested documents includes opinions or formulated policies or actions. We are not persuaded by the City\u2019s generalized argument in its brief that \u201coffice unit or working files, general progress notes, contact analysis reports, investigative files and major crime worksheets\u201d necessarily contain analysis and opinions. Assuming any of the documents do include opinions or formulated policies or actions, the excludable portions can be redacted. The documents need not be withheld in their entirety.\nThe cases cited by the City, Dorsett v. United States Department of Treasury, 307 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2004), Jackson v. United States Attorneys Office, 293 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and Jimenez v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 938 F. Supp. 21 (D.C. Cir. 1996), do not apply here. In Dorsett, the documents at issue were exempt because they contained federal Secret Service opinions and evaluations regarding the level of threat posed by specified individuals. Dorsett, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 37-38. In Jackson, the document at issue was exempt as work-product and deliberative process material because it contained the Assistant United State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s investigative notes which detailed the theory of the case and litigation strategy. Jackson, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 40-41. In Jimenez, the information requested was exempt because it contained communications between the United State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office and federal and state agencies in their assessment of whether to bring charges against the defendant. Jimenez, 938 F. Supp. at 28-29.\nFor the reasons we have set out above, we conclude the trial court erred in granting the City\u2019s motion to dismiss. Our examination of the three affidavits does not elicit a single fact that would support an exemption under the Act.\nThese affidavits are one-size-fits-all, generic and conclusory. We do not see how the trial court could determine the merit of the City\u2019s motion to dismiss without examining the documents sought by the plaintiff.\nThe trial court could not know when the documents were prepared, by whom they were prepared, or why they were prepared. It would have to accept the \u201congoing investigation\u201d label without any factual support, ignoring the fact that the plaintiff was convicted in 1994 and the murder he was charged with committing occurred in 1991. That is rubber stamp judicature. We decline to take part in it.\nThe City is asking us, as it did the trial court, to take the affiants\u2019 word for it. For us to do so would be an abdication of our responsibility.\nCONCLUSION\nWe reverse the trial court\u2019s order granting the motion to dismiss. We remand this cause to the trial court for an in camera inspection of the documents, which should be sealed for, and made part of, the record. In Illinois Education Ass\u2019n, the supreme court said: \u201c[W]e believe that in camera review by the circuit court is the most effective way for the public body to objectively demonstrate that the exemption claimed does, in fact, apply.\u201d Illinois Education Ass\u2019n, 204 Ill. 2d at 471. We instruct the trial court to examine each document to determine what portions, if any, are exempt under the claimed exemptions and to make appropriate findings. The trial court\u2019s findings are to be part of the record. After examining the documents, the trial court may enter any order it believes is appropriate.\nReversed and remanded.\nR. GORDON, PJ., and GARCIA, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jon Loevy, Russell Ainsworth, Gayle Horn, and Tara Thompson, all of Loevy & Loevy, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Benna Ruth Solomon, Myriam Zreczny Kasper, and Kerrie Maloney Laytin, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ARNOLD DAY, Plaintiff Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 08\u20141164\nOpinion filed February 9, 2009.\nJon Loevy, Russell Ainsworth, Gayle Horn, and Tara Thompson, all of Loevy & Loevy, of Chicago, for appellant.\nMara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Benna Ruth Solomon, Myriam Zreczny Kasper, and Kerrie Maloney Laytin, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0070-01", "first_page_order": 86, "last_page_order": 96 }