{ "id": 4283497, "name": "GEORGE H. RYAN, SR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RETIREMENT SYSTEM et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Ryan v. Board of Trustees", "decision_date": "2009-02-06", "docket_number": "No. 1-07-1601", "first_page": "161", "last_page": "169", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 161" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 716", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4258675 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718-19" }, { "page": "722" }, { "page": "722" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/361/0716-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4022424 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/348/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3362706 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3362596 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264-65" }, { "page": "266" }, { "page": "266" }, { "page": "266" }, { "page": "266-67" }, { "page": "267" }, { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5442891 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58942 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5705778 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" }, { "page": "514" }, { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/227/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609688 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" }, { "page": "494" }, { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442052 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5735912 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" }, { "page": "185-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3828044 ], "weight": 13, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" }, { "page": "595" }, { "page": "595" }, { "page": "592-94" }, { "page": "596" }, { "page": "597" }, { "page": "598" }, { "page": "598" }, { "page": "599" }, { "page": "600" }, { "page": "597-98", "parenthetical": "\"However, it is undisputed that Taddeo's felony convictions were not related in any way to his employment as township supervisor for Proviso Township. Without such a nexus, there is no basis for disqualifying Taddeo from receiving his township supervisor's pension\"" }, { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 820", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256336 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "824" }, { "page": "824" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0820-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 813, "char_count": 22092, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.594203391136844e-08, "percentile": 0.48965441614549726 }, "sha256": "6b567820d019784c13c014149b61f83e5b66aa066dfd8c2f3d68fec8b2e9041e", "simhash": "1:5b3ca0dd284746cd", "word_count": 3608 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:04:57.079883+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GEORGE H. RYAN, SR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RETIREMENT SYSTEM et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, George H. Ryan, Sr., brought this administrative review action following defendant\u2019s, the Board of Trustees of the General Assembly Retirement System (the Board), termination of Ryan\u2019s pension benefits in accordance with section 2 \u2014 156 of the Illinois Pension Code (Pension Code) (40 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 156 (West 2006)). The Board held that Ryan forfeited his pension earned through his service as a member of the General Assembly, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State and Governor, following felony convictions based on his conduct during his service to the State. The trial court affirmed the Board\u2019s decision on administrative review.\nRyan appeals, arguing that section 2 \u2014 156 of the Pension Code limits forfeiture to the period of service in such office as is connected to a felony conviction and partial forfeiture satisfies the rationale underlying the statute.\nThe parties do not dispute the facts in this case.\nIn 1966, Ryan was appointed to the Kankakee County Board of Supervisors. Ryan was subsequently elected to and served on the Kankakee Country Board of Supervisors from 1966 to 1972, including a two-year period as chairman. While serving on the Kankakee County Board of Supervisors, Ryan contributed to the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (IMRF).\nIn November 1972, Ryan was elected as a representative to the General Assembly. He was reelected and served until 1982. While in the General Assembly, Ryan was selected as the Minority Leader and Speaker of the House. When Ryan was elected to the General Assembly, he became a member of the General Assembly Retirement System (the System). Ryan requested to transfer his credits earned in the IMRF into the System.\nIn November 1982, Ryan was elected Lieutenant Governor alongside Governor James R. Thompson. Ryan won reelection in 1986. Subsequently, in 1990, Ryan was elected the Secretary of State and he served two terms in this position. In November 1998, Ryan was elected Governor and served from January 1999 until January 2003.\nRyan continued to participate in the System while serving as Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State and Governor. In December 2002, Ryan applied for his retirement annuity to begin in January 2003.\nIn December 2003, a federal grand jury indicted Ryan on felony charges for racketeering, conspiracy, mail fraud, making false statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and income tax violations. These charges were premised on conduct that arose out of and in connection with Ryan\u2019s service as Secretary of State and Governor. In April 2006, a jury found Ryan guilty on all counts. The district court dismissed two of the counts after finding insufficient evidence to support the claims and entered judgment on the remaining counts. Ryan was sentenced to 78 months in prison.\nFollowing Ryan\u2019s felony convictions, the acting executive secretary of the Illinois State Retirement Systems notified Ryan that all of his pension benefits were being suspended pursuant to section 2 \u2014 156 of the Pension Code. Section 2 \u2014 156 provides: \u201cNone of the benefits herein provided for shall be paid to any person who is convicted of any felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with his or her service as a member.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 156 (West 2006). Ryan was also informed that this suspension included all of his insurance coverage for him and his wife. The suspension was retroactive to the date of Ryan\u2019s sentencing.\nRyan sought review of the suspension of his pension benefits before the Board. Ryan argued that the benefits earned as county board supervisor, member of the General Assembly, and Lieutenant Governor were not subject to forfeiture. The Board disagreed and ratified the acting executive secretary\u2019s decision to completely terminate Ryan\u2019s retirement annuity. Subsequently, Ryan sought administrative review in the trial court. The trial court affirmed the termination of Ryan\u2019s retirement benefits.\nThis appeal followed.\nOn appeal, Ryan argues that the plain language of section 2 \u2014 156 limits forfeiture to those benefits earned through service in the specific office connected to the felony convictions. Ryan does not dispute the termination of his benefits earned while serving as Secretary of State and Governor, but contends that there is no nexus between his service as a member of the General Assembly and Lieutenant Governor and his felony convictions. The Board maintains that all of Ryan\u2019s benefits were subject to forfeiture pursuant to section 2 \u2014 156 in light of his felony convictions arising out of his service to the State of Illinois as a member of the System. Therefore, the question on appeal is whether the pension forfeiture provision disqualifies a member of the General Assembly Retirement System from receiving all of his or her pension benefits if convicted of a felony \u201crelating to or arising out of or in connection with his or her service as a member.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 156 (West 2006).\nWhen a party appeals the circuit court\u2019s decision on a complaint for administrative review, the appellate court\u2019s role is to review the administrative decision rather than the circuit court\u2019s decision. Siwek v. Retirement Board of the Policemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 324 Ill. App. 3d 820, 824 (2001). Although a reviewing court may not reverse findings of fact made by an administrative agency unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, an issue of statutory construction raises a question of law subject to de novo review. Siwek, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 824. While the interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration is generally given deference, such deference is not binding and, if erroneous, will be rejected. Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 216 Ill. 2d 590, 595 (2005).\nThe primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 595. \u201cLegislative intent is best derived from the language of the statute itself, which, if unambiguous, should be enforced as written.\u201d Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 595. \u201cUnder the doctrine of in pari materia, two statutes dealing with the same subject will be considered with reference to each other, \u2018so that they may be given harmonious effect.\u2019 \u201d Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 218 Ill. 2d 175, 185 (2006), quoting Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2002). \u201cThis doctrine is also applicable to different sections of the same statute and is consonant with one of our fundamental rules of statutory construction \u2014 \u2018to view all of the provisions of a statute as a whole.\u2019 \u201d Collinsville Community, 218 Ill. 2d at 185-86, quoting Land, 202 Ill. 2d at 422. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the entire act, its nature, its object, and the consequences resulting from different constructions. Shields v. Judges\u2019 Retirement System, 204 Ill. 2d 488, 494 (2003). \u201c[A]ll words and phrases must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute and must not be construed in isolation.\u201d Brucker v. Mercola, 227 Ill. 2d 502, 514 (2007). \u201cEach word, clause and sentence of the statute, if possible, must be given reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous.\u201d Brucker, 227 Ill. 2d at 514. \u201cIn determining the General Assembly\u2019s intent, we may properly consider not only the language of the statute, but also the purpose and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the goals to be achieved.\u201d Brucker, 227 Ill. 2d at 514. The language of pension statutes must also be liberally construed in favor of the rights of the pensioner. Shields, 204 Ill. 2d at 494.\nThe facts of this case raise an issue of first impression. While other felony forfeiture statutes have been interpreted by the courts, none has considered the statutory language present in section 2 \u2014 156.\nSection 2 \u2014 156 of the Pension Code provides:\n\u201cNone of the benefits herein provided for shall be paid to any person who is convicted of any felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with his or her service as a member.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 156 (West 2006).\nThe term \u201cmember\u201d is defined under section 2 \u2014 105 as follows:\n\u201c \u2018Member\u2019: Members of the General Assembly of this State *** and any person serving as Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Comptroller, or Attorney General for the period of service in such office.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 105 (West 2006).\nThe crux of Ryan\u2019s argument hinges on the phrase \u201cperiod of service in such office\u201d from the Pension Code\u2019s definition of \u201cmember.\u201d In his view, this phrase \u201cexpresses a legislative intent to narrow the scope of the term \u2018Member\u2019 and to limit the forfeiture provision to the period of service in such office as is directly related to the felony conviction.\u201d Ryan points out that the legislature did not draft section 2 \u2014 156 in broader terms, such as, \u201cservice as an employee\u201d or \u201cservice to the State of Illinois.\u201d For example, the forfeiture provisions in both the IMRF and State Employees\u2019 Retirement System (SERS) use the phrase, \u201cservice as an employee.\u201d See 40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 219, 14 \u2014 149 (West 2006).\nOur supreme court considered the IMRF felony forfeiture provision in Taddeo. In that case, Taddeo served as the township supervisor of Proviso Township while simultaneously serving as mayor of Melrose Park. Later, Taddeo entered into a guilty plea for extortion relating to his position as mayor of Melrose Park. Subsequently, the IMRF notified Taddeo that all of his pension benefits were being terminated as a result of his felony conviction, as dictated by the relevant felony forfeiture statute (40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 219 (West 2002)). The Board of Trustees of the IMRF (IMRF Board) upheld the termination, but the circuit court reversed the IMRF Board and reinstated Taddeo\u2019s benefits for his employment as township supervisor. This court affirmed the circuit court\u2019s decision. Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 592-94.\nOn appeal to the supreme court, the IMRF Board argued that \u201cthe plain language of section 7 \u2014 219 must be read literally and, when so read, requires us to find that \u2018none of the benefits provided for\u2019 in article 7 may be paid if the IMRF participant commits \u2018any felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with his service as an employee.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 596. The supreme court disagreed, and relying on Devoney v. Retirement Board of the Policemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 199 Ill. 2d 414 (2002), found that \u201cpension benefits are forfeited only if there is a clear and specific connection between the felony committed and the participant\u2019s employment.\u201d Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 597. Taddeo conceded that there was such a nexus between the felony convictions and his position as mayor of Melrose Park, but it was undisputed that the felony convictions were not related to Taddeo\u2019s position as township supervisor. Thus, the court held there was \u201cno basis for disqualifying Taddeo from receiving his township supervisor\u2019s pension.\u201d Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 598.\nIn rejecting the IMRF Board\u2019s interpretation of the felony forfeiture statute, the supreme court stated that \u201c[njothing in the plain language of the statute, which the [IMRF] Board purports to rely on, suggests that the forfeiture requirement was intended to encompass the situation where, as here, the participant\u2019s entitlement to an IMRF pension is based on his employment with two separate participating municipalities.\u201d Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 598.\nThe IMRF Board contended that an interpretation allowing Taddeo to retain part of his pension would encourage malfeasance and defeat the statute\u2019s purpose. The supreme court disagreed and pointed out that in Devoney, it held that \u201cthe common purpose of all pension forfeiture provisions is to \u2018 \u201cdiscourage official malfeasance by denying the public servant convicted of unfaithfulness to his trust the retirement benefits to which he otherwise would have been entitled.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 599, quoting Devoney, 199 Ill. 2d at 418, quoting Kerner v. State Employees\u2019 Retirement System, 72 Ill. 2d 507, 513 (1978). The Taddeo court concluded that \u201cthis purpose is not negated by allowing the participant to keep that part of his pension untainted by his felony conviction.\u201d Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 600.\nThe Second District in Grever v. Board of Trustees of the Ilinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 353 Ill. App. 3d 263 (2004), considered the IMRF felony forfeiture provision under similar facts. Grever served as supervisor of Ela Township while also a member of the Lake County Board and a commissioner for the Lake County Forest Preserve District. Grever was convicted of a felony in connection with his performance of his duties as Ela Township supervisor. The IMRF notified Grever that all of his pension benefits were being terminated. The IMRF Board and circuit court upheld the termination. Grever, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 264-65.\nWhile the Second District\u2019s decision predated the supreme court\u2019s ruling in Taddeo, the Grever court relied on this court\u2019s decision in Taddeo. See Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 353 Ill. App. 3d 48 (2004), aff\u2019d, 216 Ill. 2d 590 (2005). The reviewing court agreed that \u201cthere must be a nexus between an employee\u2019s wrongdoing and his performance of his official duties in order for the employee\u2019s pension to be forfeited. Because that nexus is lacking in regard to plaintiffs employment with the County and with the District, we hold that plaintiff is not disqualified from receiving benefits accruing from his employment with those entities.\u201d Grever, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 266. The court went on to conclude that its holding was supported by the statute and that the IMRF Board\u2019s reading was \u201coverly literal.\u201d Grever, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 266.\n\u201c \u2018[CJourts must avoid reading statutory language either too literally or too broadly, and must try to garner what the legislature intended.\u2019 \u201d Grever, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 266, quoting Village of Lake Villa v. Bransley, 348 Ill. App. 3d 280, 284 (2004). \u201cA literal interpretation is not controlling where the spirit and intent of the General Assembly in enacting a statute are clearly expressed, its objects and purposes are clearly set forth, and a literal interpretation of a particular clause would defeat the obvious intent [citation]; where literal enforcement of a statute will result in great injustice that was not contemplated by the General Assembly [citation]; or where a literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result.\u201d Grever, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 266-67. The Grever court concluded that forfeiture of pension benefits from Grever\u2019s employment with the Lake County Board and the Lake County Forest Preserve District, which had no connection to his felony conviction, \u201cwould not serve the purpose of the forfeiture provision and would defeat the salutary objectives of Article 7 of the [Pension] Code.\u201d Grever, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 267. The court reasoned that \u201ca literal application of the statute to strip an employee of benefits fairly earned and untainted by malfeasance would amount to a substantial injustice.\u201d Grever, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 267.\nWhile the question raised in this case differs from prior decisions, we are guided by their construction of pension disqualification statutes. These cases considered the pension disqualification statutes liberally in favor of the pensioner and only found disqualification of the pension when a connection was found between the felony conviction and the pensioner\u2019s employment. The supreme court in Taddeo concluded that the IMRF felony forfeiture statute should not be read broadly to terminate all pension benefits earned by a member. Rather, there must be a nexus between the felony conviction and the employment. Pension benefits, earned by the member, that were untainted by wrongdoing were not subject to the forfeiture. While the Taddeo court considered the fact that Taddeo had earned a pension from two separate municipalities, the focus of the decision was on the connection between Taddeo\u2019s felony conviction and his employment in the municipalities. See Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 597-98 (\u201cHowever, it is undisputed that Taddeo\u2019s felony convictions were not related in any way to his employment as township supervisor for Proviso Township. Without such a nexus, there is no basis for disqualifying Taddeo from receiving his township supervisor\u2019s pension\u201d).\nThe Board relies on the Second District\u2019s decision in Wells v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 361 Ill. App. 3d 716 (2005), to support its argument that it is the \u201cidentity of the employer\u201d that determines the amount of forfeiture. We are not persuaded. In that case, Wells was employed by the Village of Antioch from 1974 until 2001. Wells was hired as a laborer and later was promoted to be the foreman of the water and sewer department, then the director of the public works department, and finally the village administrator. Following his retirement, Wells entered into a plea agreement for forgery and perjury. As a result of Wells\u2019 felony convictions, the Board terminated his pension benefits, which the circuit court affirmed. Wells, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 718-19.\nOn appeal, Wells argued that the appellate decisions in Taddeo and Grever applied to his case and his pension benefits should only be terminated for his position that gave rise to his wrongdoing. The reviewing court disagreed and pointed out that the felony forfeiture statute applied to a person\u2019s \u201cservice as an employee,\u201d rather than \u201crelated to one\u2019s job\u201d or \u201crelated to one\u2019s position.\u201d Wells, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 722. The court also noted that the plaintiffs in Taddeo and Grever were employed by separate municipal employers. Wells, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 722.\nEven though Ryan, like Wells, was serving only the State of Illinois, section 2 \u2014 156 does not use the same language as the IMRF felony forfeiture provision and we must consider the language present in this case. The Board focuses on Wells\u2019 discussion of a singular employer, but that discussion was in regard to the forfeiture statute at issue in that case. The article of the Pension Code relating to the System is not framed around an employer/employee relationship and the Board\u2019s reliance on that aspect of the case is misplaced.\nRather than looking at a member\u2019s \u201cservice as an employee,\u201d section 2 \u2014 156 applies to \u201cservice as a member.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 156 (West 2006). As we previously pointed out, \u201cmember\u201d is defined in the statute. \u201cMember\u201d is defined as \u201cMembers of the General Assembly of this State *** and any person serving as Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Comptroller, or Attorney General for the period of service in such office.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 105 (West 2006). The phrase, \u201cperiod of service in such office,\u201d was drafted in the singular and, thus, limits the scope to a specific office held. \u201cIt is the dominion of the legislature to enact laws and it is the province of the courts to construe those laws. We can neither restrict nor enlarge the meaning of an unambiguous statute.\u201d Shields, 204 Ill. 2d at 497.\nWhen this definition is read alongside section 2 \u2014 156, we find that the felony conviction \u201crelating to or arising out of or in connection with his or her service as a member\u201d must be linked to the \u201cthe period of service in such office.\u201d Here, Ryan held several different elected offices in the State of Illinois. Ryan ran for and was elected to each term of office. Ryan held positions in both the legislative and executive branches in the State of Illinois. He served as a member of the General Assembly for five two-year terms and as the Lieutenant Governor for two four-year terms, the Secretary of State for two four-year terms and the Governor for one four-year term. Each of these offices qualifies as a separate period of service and they are easily divisible. Further, Ryan\u2019s terms in office were not tied to or related to his other positions. It is undisputed that his felony convictions relate to his service in the offices of Secretary of State and Governor. The Board does not argue that the felony convictions relate to Ryan\u2019s service as a member of the General Assembly or Lieutenant Governor. Absent such a connection, we will not disqualify Ryan\u2019s pension benefits earned while serving in those offices. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court\u2019s affirmance of the Board\u2019s denial of Ryan\u2019s pension earned by his service as a member of the General Assembly and Lieutenant Governor.\nOur conclusion follows the public policy behind the felony forfeiture provisions to discourage malfeasance. As the supreme court noted in Taddeo, \u201cthis purpose is not negated by allowing the participant to keep that part of his pension untainted by his felony conviction.\u201d Taddeo, 216 Ill. 2d at 600. Ryan will still suffer a financial loss in the termination of the pension benefits he earned while serving as the Secretary of State and Governor. Ryan served the State of Illinois for 30 years and will be losing his pension for 12 of those years, presumably the years he received the highest salary.\nBased on the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the circuit court of Cook County and reinstate Ryan\u2019s pension benefits earned while a member of the General Assembly and the Lieutenant Governor.\nReversed.\nJ. GORDON and CAHILL, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "James R. Thompson, Raymond W. Mitchell, Kyle P. DeJong, and Justin L. Leinenweber, all of Winston & Strawn, LLP of Chicago, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for ap-pellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GEORGE H. RYAN, SR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RETIREMENT SYSTEM et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 07\u20141601\nOpinion filed February 6, 2009.\nJames R. Thompson, Raymond W. Mitchell, Kyle P. DeJong, and Justin L. Leinenweber, all of Winston & Strawn, LLP of Chicago, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for ap-pellees." }, "file_name": "0161-01", "first_page_order": 177, "last_page_order": 185 }