{ "id": 4283443, "name": "THE DEPARTMENT OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES/THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE AND FAMILY SERVICES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, STATE PANEL, et al., Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Department of Central Management Services v. Illinois Labor Relations Board", "decision_date": "2009-02-05", "docket_number": "No. 4-08-0210", "first_page": "319", "last_page": "338", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 319" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "745 N.E.2d 647", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1527718 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/319/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 Harv. L. Rev. 59", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Harv. L. Rev.", "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 A.L.R.3d 19", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1977 S. Ill. U. L.J. 1", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "S. Ill. U. L.J.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "448 N.E.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "877" }, { "page": "877" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3112269 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" }, { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 N.E.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3642384 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "799 N.E.2d 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 1036", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3718930 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1041" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/343/1036-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 1094", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3571586 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1097" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/1094-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 N.E.2d 466", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" }, { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill. App. 3d 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2845923 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" }, { "page": "575-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/9/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 N.E.2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" }, { "page": "304" }, { "page": "305" }, { "page": "305", "parenthetical": "\"This is not to say that all publicly employed lawyers must necessarily be deemed managerial employees under the Labor Act\"" }, { "page": "304-05" }, { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198923 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" }, { "page": "303" }, { "page": "305" }, { "page": "305" }, { "page": "304" }, { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 N.E.2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" }, { "page": "137" }, { "page": "137" }, { "page": "136" }, { "page": "137", "parenthetical": "distinguishing Cook County State's Attorney on that basis" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156914 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" }, { "page": "87" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "87" }, { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 N.E.2d 415", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 955", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5796521 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "975" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0955-01" ] }, { "cite": "613 N.E.2d 311", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5383704 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 N.E.2d 795", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "799" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 385557 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/178/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 N.E.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" }, { "page": "302" }, { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821407 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" }, { "page": "204" }, { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ill. Reg. 4172", "category": "laws:admin_register", "reporter": "Ill. Reg.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1491, "char_count": 46031, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1397994326093674e-07, "percentile": 0.5781875700089079 }, "sha256": "dd485b0df789bd4dbd4370bd7ea0320aba17cdcea8f16ff94ac016fde3c2e45f", "simhash": "1:3e3c604e55137158", "word_count": 7108 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:04:57.079883+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE DEPARTMENT OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES/THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE AND FAMILY SERVICES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, STATE PANEL, et al., Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner, the Department of Central Management Services (employer), brings this action for direct review of a decision by the Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel (Board), declaring the Illinois Nurses Association (union) to be the exclusive bargaining representative of all public service administrators, option 8, in the Bureau of Administrative Litigation, office of the Inspector General, Department of Healthcare and Family Services, except, as the \u201cCertificate of Representative\u201d says, supervisory, managerial, and confidential employees. See Illinois Nurses Ass\u2019n, 23 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 173, No. S \u2014 RC\u201407\u2014036 (Illinois Labor Board, State Panel, October 30, 2007) (hereinafter 23 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 173). These employees are attorneys who represent the agency in internal hearings before administrative law judges.\nFor two reasons, the employer urges us to reverse the Board\u2019s decision outright or at least reverse it and remand the case for reconsideration: (1) all of the attorneys in question are managerial employees, and (2) the proposed bargaining unit is inappropriate because it carves a subset of employees out of a larger, centralized classification.\nThe Board found the attorneys were not managerial employees. Because that finding is not clearly erroneous, we decline to overturn it. The Board\u2019s decisions have created a \u201cpresumption of inappropriateness\u201d in situations in which the union seeks to represent only a portion of the employees who perform duties in identical job classifications. The Board could have found sufficient evidence, however, to rebut that presumption. The State employs many more attorneys than the six staff attorneys in the Bureau of Administrative Litigation; option 8L of the classification of public service administrator consists of approximately 134 attorneys. But the record reveals little or nothing about these numerous attorney positions outside the Bureau (e.g., their skills, functions, hours, or working conditions). Given this dearth of information, one could not validly conclude that all of the attorneys in option 8L belong in the same bargaining unit. Therefore, we affirm the Board\u2019s decision.\nI. BACKGROUND\nA. The Union\u2019s Petition and the Employer\u2019s Position Statement\nOn September 5, 2006, the union filed with the Board a petition to become the exclusive bargaining representative of all public service administrators, option 8, in the Bureau of Administrative Litigation, office of the Inspector General, Department of Healthcare and Family Services. See 5 ILCS 315/9(a)(l) (West Supp. 2007). (In their briefs, the parties agree that the employees in question are, more precisely, public service administrators, option 8L, but the union\u2019s petition and the Board\u2019s \u201cCertificate of Representative\u201d merely say \u201coption 8.\u201d It appears, however, that the Bureau of Administrative Litigation has no option 8 employees other than option 8Ls; therefore, failing to specify the subset of option 8 apparently makes no practical difference.) In its petition, the union stated that 30% of the employees requested a secret ballot to determine whether the Board should certify the union as their exclusive bargaining agent. See 5 ILCS 315/9(a)(l) (West Supp. 2007).\nThe Board scheduled an investigative hearing for October 5 and 6, 2006, and requested the employer to submit a comprehensive and detailed position statement addressing the appropriateness of the proposed bargaining unit. See 80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71210.100(a)(3), as amended by 28 Ill. Reg. 4172, 4174, eff. February 19, 2004. On October 2, 2006, the employer submitted a position statement arguing that the Board should dismiss the union\u2019s petition for three reasons. First, public service administrators, option 8L, were managerial employees, both as a matter of law and as a matter of fact. Second, because the union\u2019s petition was limited to the six option 8Ls in the Bureau of Administrative Litigation within the office of the Inspector General of the Department of Healthcare and Family Services, the petition impermissibly sought to carve out a handful of employees from a statewide classification. Third, the only appropriate unit of state-employed attorneys was the existing unit, S \u2014 VR\u201491\u201410 (VR \u2014 10), represented by the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (AFSCME) (see State of Illinois, Department of Central Management Services, 21 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 205, No. S \u2014 UC\u201405\u2014006, at 748, 755 (Illinois Labor Board, State Panel, November 4, 2005)) (hereinafter 21 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 205).\nB. The Administrative Hearing\nOn October 5 and 6, 2006, the Board held an administrative hearing, in which the following evidence emerged.\n1. The State\u2019s System of Classifying Jobs\nTo make sure that state employees who hold comparable positions receive comparable pay, the State has devised a system of classifying positions. According to the class specification for public service administrator, the distinguishing feature of that classification is the \u201cmanagement nature of the work\u201d: \u201cthe exercise of discretion in controlling or directing the organization\u2019s supportive program\u201d and the \u201cresponsibility to direct the effectuation of management policies.\u201d There are approximately 4,000 public service administrators statewide. In deciding which positions belong in the classification of public service administrator, the State considers the following factors, which overlap to some extent: the nature and variety of the work; the supervision the employee receives; the supervision the employee exercises; the guidelines available to the employee, such as job manuals or step-by-step regulations; the extent to which the position requires originality, independent thinking, and sophisticated analysis; the decisions and commitments the employee must make in the position (i.e., the weightiness or public consequence of the employee\u2019s decisions or the employee\u2019s ability to commit an agency to a course of action); and the educational and experiential requirements of the position.\nThe State has divided the classification of public service administrator into eight options. Option 8 consists of employees who must possess a license to perform the type of work their position requires\u2014 for example, attorneys, nurses, and engineers. There are approximately 460 employees in option 8. The State has further divided option 8 into options 8A through 8Z, to designate the various licensed professions. Option 8L consists of attorneys. There are approximately 136 employees in option 8L, statewide. The six staff attorneys in the Bureau of Administrative Litigation \u2014 the only employees whom the union has petitioned to represent in this case \u2014 are option 8Ls. They are Martin S. Feldman, Joan T. Cherry, Alan M. Polikoff, Avery A. Gerstein, Henry M. Soltysinski Jr., and Daniel E. Falb. According to employer\u2019s exhibit No. 7, the agency\u2019s office of General Counsel has seven additional option 8Ls \u2014 Jeanette B. Cuomo, Thomas K. Fischer, William C. Kurylak, Dora L. McNew-Clarke, Vickie V Fair, Stacy L. Cooper, and Leo J. Howard, the first four of whom are administrative law judges or hearing referees \u2014 and the office of the Director has one option 8L, Shannon M. Verner. The six staff attorneys employed in the Bureau of Administrative Litigation appear before the administrative law judges and hearing referees employed in the office of General Counsel. Also, in his testimony, the agency\u2019s Inspector General, John C. Allen TV, mentioned a \u201cstaff attorney\u201d in the General Counsel\u2019s office, Dan Leikvold (whose name does not appear in employer\u2019s exhibit No. 7). According to Allen, Leikvold reviewed exceptions and \u201cruled on\u201d the administrative law judges\u2019 recommended decisions.\nOf the approximately 960 classifications in the State\u2019s classification system, not a single classification existed in which some positions were included in a bargaining unit and other positions were excluded (unless the excluded positions were excluded for statutory reasons, i.e., the employees in those positions were managerial, supervisory, or confidential employees) \u2014 that is, until the Board\u2019s decision in the present case. Further, with one exception, no bargaining unit in the State has been limited to a single agency when the classification represented by the unit existed statewide in more than one agency\u2014 that is, until now. The lone exception was the educators in the Illinois School for the Deaf in Jacksonville; they were represented by a historically recognized unit, HR \u2014 10, which predated the Act.\n2. A Preexisting Bargaining Unit That Represents Attorneys\nIn 1991, the State and AFSCME stipulated, and the Board certified, that the RC \u2014 10 bargaining unit was the only appropriate unit of attorneys working statewide. (We assume that RC \u2014 10 is the same unit as VR \u2014 10, to which the employer refers in its position statement to the Board.) RC \u2014 10 included the classifications of technical advisor advanced program specialist, technical advisor III, technical advisor II, technical advisor I, and hearings referee. The positions in the classification of technical advisor advanced program specialist were previously classified as public service administrator, option 8L, but because the classification of public service administrator, by definition, could not include any positions subject to collective bargaining, the option 8Ls were reclassified upon their inclusion in RC \u2014 10. The State and AFSCME further stipulated that any state-employed attorneys not included in the RC \u2014 10 bargaining unit were excluded because of their status as managerial employees, supervisors, or confidential employees. The six staff attorneys in the Bureau of Administrative Litigation were not included in RC \u2014 10.\n3. The Office of Inspector General\nThe agency has four divisions or primary areas of responsibility: (1) the division that oversees Medicaid and other medical programs, (2) the Division of Child Support Enforcement, (3) the Office of Energy Assistance, and (4) Group Health Purchasing. Further, the agency has an office of the Inspector General, which investigates allegations of fraud, substandard care, and other wrongdoing within the medical programs. The Inspector General also audits the agency\u2019s programs and, generally, is responsible for ensuring the integrity of the programs.\nSections 12 \u2014 13.1(b) and (f) of the Illinois Public Aid Code set forth the powers and duties of the Inspector General:\n\u201c(b) In order to prevent, detect, and eliminate fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and misconduct, the Inspector General shall oversee the Department of Healthcare and Family Services\u2019 integrity functions, which include, but are not limited to, the following:\n(1) Investigation of misconduct by employees, vendors, contractors[,] and medical providers.\n(2) Audits of medical providers related to ensuring that appropriate payments are made for services rendered and to the recovery of overpayments.\n(3) Monitoring of quality assurance programs generally related to the medical assistance program and specifically related to any managed[-] care program.\n(4) Quality[-] control measurements of the programs administered by the Department of Healthcare and Family Services.\n(5) Investigations of fraud or intentional program violations committed by clients of the Department of Healthcare and Family Services.\n(6) Actions initiated against contractors or medical providers for any of the following reasons:\n(A) Violations of the medical assistance program.\n(B) Sanctions against providers brought in conjunction with the Department of Public Health or the Department of Human Services (as successor to the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities).\n(C) Recoveries of assessments against hospitals and long-term care facilities.\n(D) Sanctions mandated by the United States Department of Health and Human Services against medical providers.\n(E) Violations of contracts related to any managed[-] care programs.\n(7) Representation of the Department of Healthcare and Family Services at hearings with the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation in actions taken against professional licenses held by persons who are in violation of orders for child[-]support payments.\n* * *\n(f) To carry out his or her duties as described in this Section, the Inspector General and his or her designees shall have the power to compel[,] by subpoena[,] the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, electronic records[,] and papers as directly related to public assistance programs administered by the Department of Healthcare and Family Services or the Department of Human Services (as successor to the Department of Public Aid).\u201d 305 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 13.1(b), (f) (West Supp. 2007).\nThe office of the Inspector General is divided into five bureaus: (1) the Bureau of Medicaid Integrity, which is responsible for auditing state Medicaid programs; (2) the Bureau of Investigations, which investigates potential fraud by recipients of Medicaid; (3) the Bureau of Information Technology, which collects and analyzes data to identify trends suggestive of fraud by providers or recipients of services in the medical-assistance programs; (4) the Bureau of Internal Affairs, which investigates wrongdoing by agency employees; and (5) the Bureau of Administrative Litigation, which prosecutes vendors who have engaged in wrongdoing in connection with the medical-assistance programs.\n4. The Bureau of Administrative Litigation\nThe Bureau of Administrative Litigation consists of one bureau chief, six staff attorneys, and an executive I. At the time of the administrative hearing, Feldman was serving both as acting bureau chief and as a staff attorney. In its brief, the union informs us that Feldman now is merely a staff attorney and no longer is the acting bureau chief.\nThe six staff attorneys in the Bureau of Administrative Litigation represent the agency in administrative hearings, in which providers are the respondents. Providers can incur penalties, including suspension or termination from participation in the agency\u2019s medical-assistance programs, for violating the agency\u2019s rules or providing substandard care to patients. If the Inspector General determines, through an audit, that the agency has overpaid a provider, the staff attorneys bring a recoupment action against the providers. These actions are administrative; the staff attorneys may not represent the agency in court. The staff attorneys also represent the agency, the Department of Public Health, and the Department of Human Services in Medicaid decertification actions against long-term care facilities and in actions to terminate provider agreements on the basis of certification surveys the agency performs every year. They also represent the agency\u2019s Division of Child Support Enforcement in administrative hearings before other licensing agencies to have the state licenses or certifications of noncustodial parents revoked, suspended, or not renewed because of their failure to pay child support. The licensing agencies include the Department of Finance and Professional Regulation, Illinois Gaming Board, Department of Nuclear Safety, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Children and Family Services. The staff attorneys also represent the agency and the Department of Revenue in administrative hearings to suspend a provider\u2019s participation in the medical-assistance programs because of the provider\u2019s failure to pay taxes to the State.\n5. The Duties and Routine of Staff Attorneys\nThe six staff attorneys in the Bureau of Administrative Litigation are responsible for preparing cases and presenting them to administrative law judges in the agency. As we said, these cases are administrative actions to suspend or terminate a provider\u2019s participation in the medical-assistance programs, to recover overpayments, or to revoke a license or certification because of failure to pay taxes or child support. Allen described the duties of the staff attorneys as follows: \u201cpreparing witnesses, reviewing cases, identifying documentation, formulating witness lists and evidence lists, presenting arguments and evidence to the administrative law judge, preparing exceptions!,] *** drafting rules as assigned!,] and some legal research.\u201d He also testified that the staff attorneys drafted settlement agreements and \u201cdecision memoranda\u201d to accompany the settlement agreements. Occasionally, the staff attorneys worked with attorneys in other agencies, such as when someone\u2019s license was being revoked or someone was suing the agency. A few times, the Inspector General has requested the staff attorneys\u2019 help in drafting rules.\nThe union called three staff attorneys: Gerstein, Polikoff, and Sol-tysinski. They testified they had discretion to decide what questions to ask witnesses, the order in which to call the witnesses, the documents they would present in the hearing, and the closing argument they would make. Otherwise, they had to obtain the approval of Feldman as acting bureau chief, who sometimes, in turn, had to obtain the approval of his superiors. Feldman assigned cases to the staff attorneys under his supervision, and the referring bureaus specified the charges and the penalties. The staff attorneys had no authority to change the charges or seek different penalties, although they were expected to evaluate the case to see if the elements of the alleged violation could be proved. Even if they concluded the charges could not be proved, they had no authority to withdraw the case. Instead, they had to bring their concerns to Feldman, who, after conferring with the referring bureau, sometimes told the staff attorneys to proceed with the case even though he agreed the case could not be proved. The only document the staff attorneys were permitted to sign was exceptions to the recommended decisions of administrative law judges. They could not sign the notice or complaint that went out to the provider; the bureau chief had to sign it in the Inspector General\u2019s name. Settlement agreements and decision memoranda went up the chain of command all the way to the Director. According to the testimony of the staff attorneys, Feldman reviewed everything they wrote, often making substantive revisions. They did not know how much time Feldman spent reviewing any one document \u2014 probably less time than former bureau chiefs, because while holding down the job of acting bureau chief, Feldman also was working as a staff attorney and had a caseload of his own.\nC. The Board\u2019s Decision\nIn her recommended decision, the administrative law judge dismissed the union\u2019s petition on the grounds that (1) the petition carved a subset of employees out of a larger, centralized classification, and the union failed to rebut the presumption of inappropriateness; and (2) the staff attorneys were managerial employees as a matter of fact and as a matter of law.\nThe Board declined to accept the administrative law judge\u2019s recommendation. The Board said:\n\u201cThe preference for large, functionally-based [sic] units was, and continues to be, an important consideration, yet[,] [in some of our previous decisions,] excessive concern with avoiding fragmentation and promoting economy and efficiency in public bargaining and contract administration consumed not only the employees\u2019 right to organize, but also the criteria set forth in [s]ection 9(b) [(5 ILCS 315/9(b) (West Supp. 2007))]. The Act demands that we balance between these extremes so as to avoid regularly and completely depriving public employees of their right granted therein. After reviewing the petitioned-for unit in light of the considerations set forth in [s]ection 9(b), [we find that] only the fragmentation factor favors dismissal, and by itself, it is insufficient to deny the [union\u2019s] petition.\nAs an alternative, the State offers the RC \u2014 10 bargaining unit, in existence since 1991, represented by a union other than [petitioner, as the only appropriate unit for the petitioned-for employees. However, the representative of the RC \u2014 10 unit does not seek herein to represent the petitioned-for employees, nor has it [done so] in the [16] years since that unit was formed. It is fundamentally at odds with the Act itself to place the petitioned-for employees\u2019 right to organize completely under the control of a third party, and thus, the [e]mployer\u2019s suggestion in this regard is without merit.\n* * *\nAt most, in this matter, the petitioned-for employees exercise professional discretion and technical expertise, but *** this is insufficient to exclude them from collective bargaining under the managerial exclusion. Correspondingly, there is no evidence that these employees possess final responsibility and independent authority to establish and effectuate policy for the [e]mployer. *** There is no indication that the petitioned-for employees have substantial discretion, or even a role, in developing the means and methods of reaching the agency\u2019s policy objectives or responsibility for determining the extent to which such objectives will be achieved. Thus, the petitioned-for employees are not managerial within the meaning of [s]ection 3(j) of the Act [(5 ILCS 315/3(j) (West Supp. 2007))].\u201d\nThe Board ordered that a secret ballot election be conducted among the six staff attorneys, in which they would receive the opportunity to vote on whether they desired representation by the union or no representation.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Standards of Review\nWe review questions of law de novo. City of Belvidere v. Ilinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205, 692 N.E.2d 295, 302 (1998). We ask whether the Board\u2019s purely factual findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 204, 692 N.E.2d at 302. Insomuch as the Board decided questions that were a mixture of fact and law, we ask whether the Board\u2019s decision is clearly erroneous. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205, 692 N.E.2d at 302.\nB. Managerial Employees\n1. The Traditional Test\nThe employer argues the staff attorneys in the Bureau of Administrative Litigation are managerial employees and, therefore, have no right to organize and bargain collectively. See 5 ILCS 315/3(n) (West Supp. 2007); 5 ILCS 315/6(a) (West 2006). The Board and the appellate court have applied two tests to determine whether an employee is a managerial employee: (1) the traditional test, which considers whether the employee is a managerial employee as a matter of fact (21 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 205, at 753), and (2) the alternative test, which considers whether the employee is a managerial employee as a matter of law (Chief Judge v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 178 Ill. 2d 333, 343, 687 N.E.2d 795, 799 (1997); 21 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 205, at 753-54). According to the employer, both of these tests show that the staff attorneys are managerial employees.\nThe traditional test considers, factually, whether the employee conforms to the definition of a \u201cmanagerial employee\u201d in section 3(j) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Act) (5 ILCS 315/3(j) (West Supp. 2007)). That statute defines \u201cmanagerial employee\u201d as follows: \u201c[A]n individual who is engaged predominantly in executive and management functions and is charged with the responsibility of directing the effectuation of management policies and practices.\u201d 5 ILCS 315/3(j) (West Supp. 2007). Thus, the statute sets down two criteria, both of which the employee must meet to be considered a managerial employee. First, the employee must be engaged predominantly in executive and management functions. Second, the employee must be charged with the responsibility of directing the effectuation of management policies and procedures.\nThe Act does not define \u201cexecutive and management functions,\u201d but the Board and appellate court have said that these functions \u201crelate to running a department and include such activities as formulating department policy, preparing the budget, and assuring the efficient and effective operations of the department.\u201d Village of Elk Grove Village v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 245 Ill. App. 3d 109, 121-22, 613 N.E.2d 311, 320 (1993); see also 21 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 205, at 753. \u201cOther executive and management functions include using independent discretion to make policy decisions as opposed to following established policy, changing the focus of an employer\u2019s organization, being responsible for day[-]to[-]day operations, negotiating on behalf of an employer with its employees or the public[,] and exercising authority to pledge an employer\u2019s credit.\u201d 21 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 205, at 753. An employee is not a management employee if he or she serves merely a subordinate or advisory function in the development of policy, for \u201cit is the final responsibility and independent authority to establish and effectuate policy that determines managerial status under the Act.\u201d City of Evanston v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 227 Ill. App. 3d 955, 975, 592 N.E.2d 415, 428 (1992). As we have held, this criterion \u201crequires more than the exercise of professional discretion and technical expertise. The employee must possess and exercise authority and discretion which broadly [ajffects a department\u2019s goals and means of achieving its goals.\u201d Department of Central Management Services v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 278 Ill. App. 3d 79, 87, 662 N.E.2d 131, 136 (1996).\nAs for the second criterion, an employee directs the effectuation of management policies and procedures if the employee \u201coversees or coordinates policy implementation through development of means and methods of achieving policy objectives, determines the extent to which the objectives will be achieved, and is empowered with a substantial amount of discretion to determine how policies will be effected.\u201d Department of Central Management Services, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 87, 662 N.E.2d at 137. It is not enough that the employee \u201cmerely performs duties essential to the employer\u2019s ability to accomplish its mission.\u201d 21 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 205, at 753. Instead, the employee \u201cmust possess the authority or responsibility to determine the specific methods or means of how the employer\u2019s services will be provided.\u201d 21 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 205, at 753. \u201cManagerial employees are involved in the direction of the governmental enterprise or a major unit thereof.\u201d Department of Central Management Services, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 88, 662 N.E.2d at 137.\nThe employer argues that the staff attorneys in the Bureau of Administrative Litigation are managerial employees because they do the following:\n\u201c[They] mak[e] daily decisions with respect to case strategy[,] specif[y] charges against the alleged wrong-doer[,] identify] potential witnesses and documentary evidence needed[,] engag[e] in appropriate discovery to gather the information [they have] determined is necessary[,] schedule] and attend[ ] pre[ ]hearing conferences on behalf of the [agency,] prepare[ ] witnesses and their testimony[,] and present[ ] the [agency\u2019s] case in the hearing. *** In addition, the petitioned-for employees may draft rules and legislation^] work with the Attorney General\u2019s office preparing cases when [the agency] is the plaintiff in a civil action[,] work with state and federal prosecutors in preparing criminal cases against providers!,] prepare exceptions to [a]dministrative [l]aw Q]udges\u2019 recommended decisions, and prepare [djecision [m]emos to authorize settlements.\u201d\nMostly, these are tasks that any attorney would perform in the course of litigation. Again, the status of managerial employee \u201crequires more than the exercise of professional discretion and technical expertise.\u201d Department of Central Management Services, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 87, 662 N.E.2d at 136. By using their professional discretion and skills of legal analyses, the staff attorneys \u201cperform! ] duties essential to the employer\u2019s ability to accomplish its mission,\u201d but it does not follow that they are managerial employees. 21 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 205, at 753. They have no independent authority to settle a case or withdraw a charge. They do not determine the means by which the Inspector General accomplishes his statutory duties. They do not decide the extent to which the policy objectives of the Inspector General will be achieved. The referring bureau determines the charges and sanctions in each case. Very rarely do the staff attorneys draft a rule or legislation; therefore, this infrequent activity would not cause them to be \u201cpredominantly\u201d engaged in executive or management functions. 5 ILCS 315/3(j) (West Supp. 2007). Besides, their superiors review any rule or legislation they draft, and the record appears to contain no evidence that their superiors approve the proposed rule or legislation \u201cas a matter of course,\u201d without substantive revision. 21 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 205, at 754. The Board could reasonably conclude that, under the traditional test, the staff attorneys in this case do not meet the criteria for being managerial employees.\n2. The Alternative Test\nIn Office of the Cook County State\u2019s Attorney v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Board, 166 Ill. 2d 296, 305, 652 N.E.2d 301, 305 (1995), the supreme court held that because a \u201cdetailed statutory apparatus\u201d described the powers and duties of assistant State\u2019s Attorneys and because assistant State\u2019s Attorneys were \u201c \u2018generally clothed with all the powers and privileges of the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019 \u201d (Cook County State\u2019s Attorney, 166 Ill. 2d at 303, 652 N.E.2d at 304, quoting People v. Nahas, 9 Ill. App. 3d 570, 575, 292 N.E.2d 466, 470 (1973)), they were managerial employees as a matter of law and fact-finding was unnecessary to determine whether they were managerial employees (Cook County State\u2019s Attorney, 166 Ill. 2d at 305, 652 N.E.2d at 305). The employer argues that the staff attorneys in this case likewise are managerial employees as a matter of law, because \u201cas designees of the Inspector General in the performance of his statutory duties, [they] have the power to commence and prosecute enforcement actions, give legal opinions, and take numerous discretionary actions that effectively control or implement the statutes, regulations, and policies [a]ffecting the [agency].\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nThe staff attorneys in this case are not comparable to assistant State\u2019s Attorneys. See Cook County State\u2019s Attorney, 166 Ill. 2d at 305, 652 N.E.2d at 305 (\u201cThis is not to say that all publicly employed lawyers must necessarily be deemed managerial employees under the Labor Act\u201d). The supreme court deemed assistant State\u2019s Attorneys to be managerial employees as a matter of law because they could act with the full power of the State\u2019s Attorney in his or her absence. Cook County State\u2019s Attorney, 166 Ill. 2d at 304, 652 N.E.2d at 304-05; Department of Central Management Services, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 88, 662 N.E.2d at 137 (distinguishing Cook County State\u2019s Attorney on that basis). The staff attorneys in the Bureau of Administrative Litigation are not surrogates of the Inspector General; they are not assistant Inspectors General. In the Inspector General\u2019s absence, they would have no independent authority, for example, to investigate misconduct by employees, vendors, contractors, and medical providers; audit medical providers; or monitor quality-assurance programs. See 305 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 13.1(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3) (West Supp. 2007). That is to say, they would not be able to do those things solely by virtue of being staff attorneys. The Inspector General can designate employees as having \u201cthe power to compel by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, electronic records[] and papers as directly related to public[-]assistance programs administered by the [agency].\u201d 305 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 13.1(f) (West Supp. 2007). An employee so designated would be able to do those things not because of any statutory powers of his or her position but because the Inspector General designated that employee. Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, once they are appointed, do not require any designation by the State\u2019s Attorney. Solely by virtue of being assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, they are \u201c \u2018clothed with all the powers and privileges of the State\u2019s Attorney; and all acts done by [assistant State\u2019s Attorneys] in that capacity must be regarded as if done by the State\u2019s Attorney himself.\u2019 \u201d Cook County State\u2019s Attorney, 166 Ill. 2d at 303, 652 N.E.2d at 304, quoting Nahas, 9 Ill. App. 3d at 575-76, 292 N.E.2d at 470. Section 12 \u2014 13.1(b) of the Illinois Public Aid Code (305 ILCS 5/12\u2014 13.1 (West Supp. 2007)) describes the powers and duties of the Inspector General, but it does not describe the powers and duties of the staff attorneys. The statute does not so much as mention them, let alone clothe them with any authority.\nC. Feldman as a Managerial Employee or Supervisor\nIn a footnote to its brief, the employer argues that Feldman, in his capacity as acting bureau chief, meets the statutory definitions of a managerial employee (5 ILCS 315/3(j) (West Supp. 2007)) and supervisor (5 ILCS 315/3(r) (West Supp. 2007)). We need not consider that argument, because the union represents to us, in its brief, that Feldman no longer is the acting bureau chief. The employer does not dispute that representation. We will not decide whether Feldman used to be a managerial employee or supervisor. The question now is academic. A case on appeal is moot to the extent that the reviewing court\u2019s decision could have no practical effect on the parties. Bunge Corp. v. Lewis, 146 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 1097, 497 N.E.2d 867, 868 (1986).\nD. The Appropriateness of the Proposed Bargaining Unit\n1. Carving Six Employees Out of Larger Classifications\nThe employer argues the Board should have dismissed the union\u2019s petition because the petition seeks to carve a subset of employees out of a larger, centralized classification. Section 9(b) of the Act states as follows:\n\u201cThe Board shall decide in each case, in order to assure public employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining, based upon but not limited to such factors as: historical pattern of recognition; community of interest including employee skills and functions; degree of functional integration; interchangeability and contact among employees; fragmentation of employee groups; common supervision, wages, hours[,] and other working conditions of the employees involved; and the desires of the employees. For purposes of this subsection, fragmentation shall not be the sole or predominant factor used by the Board in determining an appropriate bargaining unit.\u201d 5 ILCS 315/9(b) (West Supp. 2007).\nThe Board has held that fragmentation of a classification raises a presumption that the proposed bargaining unit is inappropriate. The Board has said:\n\u201c[W]here the employing public entity has an established and centralized job classification system, a presumption of inappropriateness is warranted solely by virtue of the fact that the [petitioner has sought only a portion of employees who perform duties in identical job classifications. In the public sector, a commonality of functions and community of interest generally exists among people in the same job classificationf,] which, as here, would often override such specific factors as common supervision and functional integration.\u201d Du Page County Board, 1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2003, Nos. S \u2014 RC\u20149, S \u2014 RC\u201417, at 7 (ISLRB April 26, 1985) (hereinafter 1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par 2003).\nThe Board has provided the following rationale for this \u201cpresumption of inappropriateness\u201d:\n\u201c \u2018[I]n the public sector, the concepts of community of interest and commonality in wages, hours [,] and working conditions are given expansive interpretations, to yield broad-based bargaining units whenever feasible. Larger, broad-based units are preferred in order to facilitate stability in labor relations and avoid excessive expense and difficulty in public bargaining and administration.\u2019 \u201d General Service Employees Union, Local 73, 3 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 3033, No. L \u2014 RC\u201487\u201414, at 245 (ILLRB October 30, 1987) (hereinafter 3 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 3033), quoting American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, 2 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) Par. 3027, No. L \u2014 RC\u201486\u201405, at IX \u2014 130 (ILLRB November 13, 1986).\nThe employer makes the following observations. The six staff attorneys in the Bureau of Administrative Litigation are in the classification of public service administrator, which, statewide, consists of approximately 4,000 employees. Further, the six staff attorneys are in the subclassification of public service administrator, option 8, consisting of employees who need a license to perform the duties of their positions, and approximately 460 employees statewide are in option 8. Further, the six staff attorneys are in the subclassification of option 8 known as option 8L, consisting entirely of attorneys, and approximately 134 employees statewide are in that subclassification. The employer argues that under the Board\u2019s previous decisions, a \u201cpresumption of inappropriateness\u201d arises because the union seeks to represent \u201conly a portion of employees who perform duties in identical job classifications.\u201d 1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2003, at 7.\nAs the Board seems to recognize in its decision in the present case, the \u201cpresumption of inappropriateness\u201d is difficult to square with section 9(b), which says: \u201c[Fragmentation shall not be the sole or predominant factor used by the Board in determining an appropriate bargaining unit.\u201d 5 ILCS 315/9(b) (West Supp. 2007). Treating fragmentation as presumptively decisive seems to elevate it to predominance.\nIn any event, like all presumptions, this \u201cpresumption of inappropriateness\u201d is rebuttable. Once evidence contrary to the presumption is introduced, the bubble bursts \u2014 the presumption vanishes. Then the issue will be determined as if no presumption ever existed. Lipscomb v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Services, Inc., 343 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1041, 799 N.E.2d 293, 298 (2003), quoting Lehman v. Stephens, 148 Ill. App. 3d 538, 551, 499 N.E.2d 103, 112 (1986). To rebut the presumption, the evidence must be \u201c \u2018sufficient to support a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact.\u2019 \u201d Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean, 95 Ill. 2d 452, 463, 448 N.E.2d 872, 877 (1983), quoting M. Graham, Presumptions in Civil Cases in Rlinois: Do They Exist? 1977 S. Ill. U. L.J. 1, 24. The weight of the rebutting evidence will depend on the strength of the presumption. Franciscan Sisters, 95 Ill. 2d at 463, 448 N.E.2d at 877. The trier of fact will weigh the persuasiveness of the rebutting evidence against the persuasiveness of the presumption. \u201c \u2018[M]ost presumptions should, where applicable at all, continue to operate unless and until the evidence persuades the trier at least that the non[ ]existence of the presumed fact is as probable as its existence.\u2019 \u201d W. Shipley, Annot., Effect of Presumption as Evidence or Upon Burden of Proof, Where Controverting Evidence Is Introduced, 5 A.L.R.3d 19, 57 n.14 (1966), quoting E. Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 59, 83 (1933).\nIt follows that the strength of the rebutting evidence, relative to the strength of the presumption, is a question of fact. Our deference to the Board is greatest with respect to questions of fact. See 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 2006). The theory behind the presumption is that \u201c [i]n the public sector, a commonality of functions and community of interest generally exist[ ] among people in the same job classification!;,] which, as here, would often override such specific factors as common supervision and functional integration.\u201d 1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2003, at 7. In the circumstances of this case, a reasonable trier of fact would not necessarily consider this presumption to be strong. The classification system is not perfect; it is approximate and, to some degree, subjective; it inevitably will blur distinctions between positions. For example, the classification of public service administrators (and, therefore, the subclassification of option 8L) is supposed to contain only managerial employees, but, clearly, the six staff attorneys in this case are far from being managers. There is a gap between the class specification and the reality of what certain employees in that class do on the job. The presumption of inappropriateness can be rebutted by evidence that the classification encompasses employees who do not, in fact, have the same functions and community of interest.\nThe record reveals that the option 8Ls in the agency consist not only of the six staff attorneys in the Bureau of Administrative Litigation, who serve as advocates for the agency in administrative hearings, but also administrative law judges, hearing referees, and a staff attorney in the office of General Counsel. It is not difficult to surmise why these two groups of attorneys are in different divisions of the agency. The administrative law judges and hearing referees preside over administrative hearings and write recommended decisions. The staff attorney in the office of General Counsel \u201crules on\u201d the recommended decisions of administrative law judges and the exceptions thereto. While the attorneys in the Bureau of Administrative Litigation are expected to be advocates, the attorneys in the office of General Counsel are expected to be impartial decision-makers. The integrity of the adversary system demands a rigorous segregation of those two functions. Thus, the record contains evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that not all the attorneys in option 8L have the same functions and community of interest. The presumption of inappropriateness was rebutted and, therefore, is irrelevant.\nThe record does not reveal what the other approximately 120 attorneys in option 8L do or what their wages, hours, and other working conditions are. Thus, the Board could have reasonably decided that the record afforded an insufficient evidentiary basis for concluding that all 134 employees in option 8L belonged in the same bargaining unit. The record does not provide enough information to apply the factors in section 9(b) (5 ILCS 315/9(b) (West Supp. 2007)) to option 8L as a whole. We decline to hold that all of the employees in option 8L belong in the same bargaining unit solely and simply because they are attorneys. Such a holding would be simplistic and artificial and not based on the factors in section 9(b). Unlike the clerical employees in General Service Employees Union, Local 73, 3 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 3033, at 248, publicly employed attorneys do not have the same job description, and they are not interchangeable.\nIt appears from the record, however, that the six staff attorneys in the Bureau of Administrative Litigation have the same skills and serve the same functions; that they are functionally integrated; that they are interchangeable and have regular contact with each other; and that they have the same supervisor, hours, and working conditions. See 5 ILCS 315/9(b) (West Supp. 2007). Thus, the record contains evidence to support the Board\u2019s finding that a bargaining unit consisting of those employees is an appropriate unit. That finding is not clearly erroneous, considering that section 9(b) forbids us to make fragmentation a predominant factor. We have no reason to conclude, on the record before us, that the unit is \u201cartificial or arbitrary.\u201d See Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Board, 319 Ill. App. 3d 729, 743, 745 N.E.2d 647, 659 (2001).\n2. Unit RC \u2014 10, the Preexisting Unit of Attorneys\nThe employer argues that if the staff attorneys are not managerial employees, they should be placed in the preexisting bargaining unit of attorneys, RC \u2014 10, represented by AFSCME. In support of that argument, the employer cites Department of Central Management Services, 21 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 205, at 755, in which the Board held that a group of attorneys employed by the Department of Revenue were not managerial employees and the Board placed them in the existing unit, VR \u2014 10. In that case, however, AFSCME filed a unit-clarification petition seeking to add those employees to VR \u2014 10. In the present case, as the Board said, AFSCME \u201cdoes not seek herein to represent the petitioned-for employees, nor has it [done so] in the [16] years since that unit was formed.\u201d 23 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 173, at 743. We agree with the Board that it is \u201cfundamentally at odds with the Act itself to place the petitioned-for employees\u2019 right to organize completely under the control of a third party.\u201d 23 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 173, at 743.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board\u2019s decision.\nAffirmed.\nMYERSCOUGH and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Mark W. Bennett (argued) and Joseph M. Gagliardo, Special Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for appellant.", "Stanley Eisenstein and Judiann Chartier, both of Katz, Friedman, Eagle, Eisenstein, Johnson & Barek, P.C., of Chicago, for appellee Illinois Nurses Association.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Janon E. Fabiano (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for other appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE DEPARTMENT OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES/THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE AND FAMILY SERVICES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, STATE PANEL, et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 08\u20140210\nOpinion filed February 5, 2009.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Mark W. Bennett (argued) and Joseph M. Gagliardo, Special Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for appellant.\nStanley Eisenstein and Judiann Chartier, both of Katz, Friedman, Eagle, Eisenstein, Johnson & Barek, P.C., of Chicago, for appellee Illinois Nurses Association.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Janon E. Fabiano (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for other appellees." }, "file_name": "0319-01", "first_page_order": 335, "last_page_order": 354 }