{ "id": 4283090, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCOTT W. HACKER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hacker", "decision_date": "2009-02-18", "docket_number": "No. 4-08-0422", "first_page": "346", "last_page": "352", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 346" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "614 N.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "877", "parenthetical": "noting that the defendant can establish a prima facie case by presenting evidence that, if believed, would establish the issue in question" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5383763 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165", "parenthetical": "noting that the defendant can establish a prima facie case by presenting evidence that, if believed, would establish the issue in question" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 N.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3218359 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/124/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "815 N.E.2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" }, { "page": "414-15", "parenthetical": "affirming the trial court's dismissal of the defendant's petition to rescind for failure to establish a prima facie case, noting that although the defendant presented some evidence, the law requires credible evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 921", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1083960 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "927" }, { "page": "927-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/351/0921-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 32", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9505377 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41, 48" }, { "page": "343, 347-48" }, { "page": "454, 458" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 N.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "883", "parenthetical": "not all roadblocks constitute a per se violation of the fourth amendment" }, { "page": "883" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3125798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280", "parenthetical": "not all roadblocks constitute a per se violation of the fourth amendment" }, { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 N.E.2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" }, { "page": "581", "parenthetical": "holding that safety-check roadblock did not violate the fourth amendment" }, { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 Ill. App. 3d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2435916 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143" }, { "page": "144" }, { "page": "143-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/241/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "896 N.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "882" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "385 Ill. App. 3d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4280607 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/385/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 N.E.2d 1215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1217-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55988 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "773 N.E.2d 1272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1274" }, { "page": "1274" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 860", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034046 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862" }, { "page": "862" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0860-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 721, "char_count": 14057, "ocr_confidence": 0.793, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0631455452425056e-07, "percentile": 0.5576213130572477 }, "sha256": "daabe90b8f66776d191caf77daf5b75f4905d052334fff494c1a1ba7ae6b0752", "simhash": "1:820abd9276ef1485", "word_count": 2279 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:04:57.079883+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCOTT W. HACKER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Scott W Hacker, appeals the trial court\u2019s denial of his petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn March 16, 2008, police officers arrested defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and gave him a copy of the notice of statutory summary suspension. In April 2008, defendant filed a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. The petition alleged that the police stopped defendant\u2019s vehicle at an illegal \u201cdrug[-] interdiction checkpoint,\u201d forced him from the vehicle, and forced him to perform an illegal field-sobriety test. Defendant asserted that stopping his vehicle at an illegal drug-interdiction checkpoint violated his fourth-amendment rights, thereby rendering the statutory summary suspension unlawful and improper. Defendant also filed a motion to suppress evidence on the same grounds.\nOn April 30, 2008, the trial court held a hearing on defendant\u2019s petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension.\nDefendant testified that on March 16, 2008, at approximately 1 a.m., he left downtown Bloomington to return to his parents\u2019 house. Defendant began driving to his parents\u2019 house by way of \u201cNorth 51.\u201d Defendant testified he was obeying the traffic laws and was not speeding, driving erratically, or crossing the centerline. At the intersection of Orlando and North 51, defendant noticed that the traffic signals were flashing red. Defendant was in the right lane and drove up to the traffic line \u201cas a normal stop\u201d when he was approached by a police officer. Defendant testified the officer instructed him to stop. Officers in the left lane walked up to him and said \u201c[WJe\u2019re doing a drug check point and we want you to pull on up.\u201d Defendant testified he pulled up and talked to the next officer, who told defendant to move his vehicle to the side of the road. When asked if that officer also told defendant he was looking for \u201cmiscellaneous criminal activity,\u201d defendant testified \u201cYes, he did.\u201d Defendant then testified:\n\u201cAfter he had stopped me, he, I asked him what he was doing? And he said, drug checkpoint, miscellaneous activity and that I was under suspicion of drunk driving.\u201d\nDefendant testified he had no prior knowledge \u2014 by way of newspaper article or radio announcement \u2014 of the drug-interdiction checkpoint. Defendant did not recall seeing any warning signs on the road alerting to a \u201c[d]rug checkpoint\u201d or \u201c[cjriminal checkpoint\u201d but admitted on cross-examination that such signs could have been there and he might not have seen them. He also admitted he had never heard anything on the radio about \u201cstop points\u201d previously, he did not currently live in the Bloomington area, and did \u201c[n]ot that often\u201d read the local paper.\nDefendant testified the officer had him perform various field-sobriety tests. Defendant admitted on cross-examination that he had been drinking that night. He also admitted he blew into a Breathalyzer machine, and the results were a 0.126.\nDefendant testified that the officer arrested him for DUI and took defendant to jail, where he was able to post bond. After defendant bonded out, he received notice of summary suspension from the Secretary of State. Defendant\u2019s exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence, is the notice of statutory summary suspension signed by the arresting officer and dated March 16, 2008.\nDonna R. Hacker, defendant\u2019s mother, testified that she lived in Lexington, Illinois, and subscribed to the Pantagraph. Hacker never saw any articles or local notices about a \u201cdrug checkpoint\u201d or \u201ccriminal[-]interdiction checkpoint.\u201d Hacker also testified she did not hear any notice on the radio about a \u201cdrug checkpoint.\u201d Defendant rested.\nThe State tendered the arresting officer\u2019s report, which the trial court admitted over defendant\u2019s objection. See 625 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 118.1(b) (West 2006) (\u201cThe hearing may be conducted upon a review of the law[-]enforcement officer\u2019s own official reports; provided however, that the person may subpoena the officer\u201d).\nThe report, prepared by Sergeant Jeff Gaither, provided in part as follows:\n\u201c[W]hile working a roadside safety check[, I] observed a gray GMC pick[ ]up (II. 254712D) fail to stop when I requested him to. I shined the light and got him to stop. I approached the driver[\u2019]s side window and spoke to the driver. He stated he did not understand what we wanted him to do. I observed he had very red, glassy eyes and a moderate odor of alcohol beverage on his breath as he spoke. He presented an Illinois driver\u2019s license showing him to be Scott W. Hacker. I asked Mr. Hacker to park his truck and walk with me to my [s]quad car.\u201d\nThe report further provided that defendant had poor balance and swayed as he walked. Defendant admitted having had a few beers. Sergeant Gaither had defendant perform field-sobriety tests and a portable breath test, after which Sergeant Gaither arrested defendant for DUI. Sergeant Gaither read the warning to motorist to defendant and defendant consented to \u201ca RBT\u201d test, the results of which were a 0.126. Sergeant Gaither issued an \u201cimmediate notice of summary suspension with a receipt to drive.\u201d The vehicle was inventoried and towed. Sergeant Gaither read defendant his Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)), interviewed him, and then transported him to the county jail.\nOn May 12, 2008, the trial court entered an order denying the petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. The court noted that defendant had the burden of establishing a prima facie case for rescission. The court concluded that defendant had not proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that \u201cthe stop was an illegal drug[-] interdiction checkpoint.\u201d Specifically, the court found that defendant only presented as evidence his own \u201cvague testimony\u201d that the officers were checking for drugs, miscellaneous criminal activity, and suspicion of drunk driving. Defendant failed to present any evidence that he was questioned about drugs, that drug-sniffing dogs were present, or any other evidence to specifically show that this was an illegal drug-interdiction checkpoint. The court noted that the officer\u2019s report showed the checkpoint was a roadside safety check. Finally, the court noted that defendant failed to stop when requested, which gave the officers an additional basis to stop defendant\u2019s vehicle.\nOn June 3, 2008, defendant filed a motion to reconsider. Defendant asserted that the State had only recently provided him with a recording of the traffic stop. Over the State\u2019s objection, the trial court agreed to watch the recording of the stop. That recording, contained in the record on appeal, shows the stop from the point when defendant began the field-sobriety tests until the officer and defendant arrived at the jail. The recording does not show the initial encounter between defendant and the officers at the checkpoint.\nOn June 6, 2008, the trial court entered an order stating that after reviewing the recording, the court found nothing to prove to the court that it was an illegal drug-interdiction checkpoint or lack of probable cause for the stop. The court denied the motion to reconsider.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Standard of Review\nIn a statutory summary suspension hearing, the defendant motorist bears the burden of proof to establish a prima facie case for rescission. People v. Granados, 332 Ill. App. 3d 860, 862, 773 N.E.2d 1272, 1274 (2002). The defendant must satisfy his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Granados, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 862, 773 N.E.2d at 1274. After the defendant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with evidence justifying the suspension. People v. Smith, 172 Ill. 2d 289, 295, 665 N.E.2d 1215, 1217-18 (1996). Generally, this court will reverse a trial court\u2019s judgment on a petition to rescind a statutory summary suspension only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Fonner, 385 Ill. App. 3d 531, 539, 898 N.E.2d 646, 653 (2008). Recently, however, the Illinois Supreme Court applied a two-part standard of review in an appeal of a petition to rescind. In People v. Wear, 229 Ill. 2d 545, 561-62, 893 N.E.2d 631, 641 (2008), the supreme court held that the reviewing court will defer to factual findings but will review de novo the ultimate determination of whether the petition to rescind should be granted.\nB. Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying Petition To Rescind\nBy statute, the grounds upon which the petition to rescind a statutory summary suspension may be based are generally limited to the following: (1) whether the motorist was under arrest for DUI; (2) whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the motorist was in physical control of a vehicle upon a highway while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both; (3) whether the motorist refused to submit to chemical testing after being advised that such refusal would result in a statutory summary suspension of driving privileges; and (4) whether the motorist submitted to chemical testing and had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. See 625 ILCS 5/2\u2014 118.1(b) (West 2006). \u201cIn addition to the statutory grounds for rescinding a summary suspension (625 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 118.1 (West 2006)), a suspension may be rescinded where the stop of the defendant\u2019s vehicle was improper.\u201d People v. Paige, 385 Ill. App. 3d 486, 489, 896 N.E.2d 879, 882 (2008).\nA seizure under the fourth amendment occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a roadblock or checkpoint. People v. Wells, 241 Ill. App. 3d 141, 143, 608 N.E.2d 578, 581 (1993); People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 280, 486 N.E.2d 880, 883 (1985) (not all roadblocks constitute a per se violation of the fourth amendment). Relevant factors for determining whether a roadblock or checkpoint is constitutional include the following: \u201c(1) the presence of procedural guidelines; (2) the absence of discretion in individual field officers; (3) some indication to the public of the official nature of the operation; and (4) selection of the site by supervisory personnel.\u201d Wells, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 144, 608 N.E.2d at 581 (holding that safety-check roadblock did not violate the fourth amendment).\nThe overriding concern is whether the roadblock or checkpoint is reasonable. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 280, 486 N.E.2d at 883. Temporary roadblocks for the purpose of checking driver\u2019s licenses and for drivers under the influence do \u201cnot violate the fourth amendment because the State ha[s] a compelling interest in reducing alcohol-related accidents which outweigh[s] the minimal intrusion on motorists.\u201d Wells, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 143-44, 608 N.E.2d at 581. However, roadblocks \u201cwhose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing,\u201d such as roadblocks with the primary purpose of indicting illegal narcotics, violate the fourth amendment. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41, 48, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 343, 347-48, 121 S. Ct. 447, 454, 458 (2000).\nOn appeal, defendant argues the roadblock in question was an illegal drug-interdiction checkpoint. In support thereof, defendant points to his testimony that the arresting officer told defendant, \u201c[W]e\u2019re doing a drug check[]point and we want you to pull on up.\u201d However, the trial court concluded that defendant had not met his burden of presenting a prima facie case for rescission. The court found \u201cvague\u201d defendant\u2019s testimony that the officers were checking for drugs, miscellaneous criminal activity, and suspicion of drunk driving. The court specifically noted the lack of any other evidence to show that the roadblock was an illegal drug-interdiction checkpoint. Even after admission and consideration of the recording of the traffic stop, the court concluded no evidence demonstrated the roadblock was an illegal drug-interdiction checkpoint or that probable cause for the stop was not shown.\nWhether a defendant has met his burden of proof is a question of fact for the trial court. People v. Tibbetts, 351 Ill. App. 3d 921, 927, 815 N.E.2d 409, 414 (2004). \u201cThe burden shifts to the State only if the trial court finds the motorist\u2019s testimony to be credible.\u201d Tibbetts, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 927-29, 815 N.E.2d at 414-15 (affirming the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the defendant\u2019s petition to rescind for failure to establish a prima facie case, noting that although the defendant presented some evidence, the law requires credible evidence). Clearly here, the trial court did not find defendant\u2019s testimony credible or entitled to any weight. See, e.g., People v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d 326, 340-41, 530 N.E.2d 210, 217 (1988) (noting that when the motorist seeks rescission on the basis that the test results were unreliable, the motorist must present credible testimony to call into doubt the test results before the burden will shift to the State to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the test results). This court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court when the trial court\u2019s findings are based on credibility of the witnesses or involve the evidence\u2019s weight. See People v. Tucker, 245 Ill. App. 3d 161, 165, 614 N.E.2d 875, 877 (1993) (noting that the defendant can establish a prima facie case by presenting evidence that, if believed, would establish the issue in question). Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nTURNER and POPE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jack C. Vieley, of Bloomington, for appellant.", "William A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and Anastacia R. Brooks, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCOTT W. HACKER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 08\u20140422\nOpinion filed February 18, 2009.\nJack C. Vieley, of Bloomington, for appellant.\nWilliam A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and Anastacia R. Brooks, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0346-01", "first_page_order": 362, "last_page_order": 368 }