{ "id": 4283423, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SPYRIDON C. BOTSIS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Botsis", "decision_date": "2009-02-02", "docket_number": "No. 1-07-3118", "first_page": "422", "last_page": "443", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 422" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "33 Ill. Reg. 2391", "category": "laws:admin_register", "reporter": "Ill. Reg.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "876 N.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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Super.", "case_ids": [ 716698 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/14/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 N.Y.S.2d 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 N.Y.2d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.2d", "case_ids": [ 2244398 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny-2d/2/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 N.E.2d 109", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Recklessness was established where it was shown the defendant had fallen asleep while driving on numerous occasions and, therefore, was aware he suffered from a physical condition that made it hazardous for him to drive" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. App. 3d 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5634697 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212", "parenthetical": "Recklessness was established where it was shown the defendant had fallen asleep while driving on numerous occasions and, therefore, was aware he suffered from a physical condition that made it hazardous for him to drive" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/49/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 N.E.2d 954", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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SPYRIDON C. BOTSIS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAt around 3:45 p.m. on January 30, 2005, defendant Spyridon Bot-sis was driving to work on Lake Cook Road when he lost consciousness. Defendant\u2019s car crossed from the westbound lane of traffic into the eastbound lane and hit several other cars, killing Vanessa Grimes and injuring Sharon Tracy.\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant was convicted of aggravated reckless driving and reckless homicide. He was sentenced to a three-year prison term for reckless homicide and a concurrent one-year prison term for aggravated reckless driving. On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred in denying two critical pretrial motions; (3) the State committed several discovery violations; (4) the trial court erred by refusing to give paragraph 2 of the jury instruction Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.01B (4th ed. 2000); and (5) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present improper evidence to the jury. We affirm the convictions and sentences.\nFACTS\nAt trial, Georgia Botsis, defendant\u2019s mother, testified she kept a file regarding defendant\u2019s medical condition. Botsis testified defendant had at least three prior fainting incidents: On June 6, 1999, and November 15, 2003, defendant fainted while he was using the bathroom; on May 22, 2004, defendant fainted while driving his car, which resulted in a minor crash when defendant rear-ended the car in front of him. After each of the three fainting episodes, defendant and his family sought medical advice to determine a diagnosis and treatment.\nBotsis testified that following the June 1999 incident, defendant went to the emergency room. Defendant was 17 at the time. Several tests were run; each came back normal. When defendant was released, he went to see his pediatrician, Dr. Stein.\nFollowing the November 2003 incident, defendant was taken to the hospital by ambulance. Defendant was prescribed medication and instructed not to operate any equipment that could be dangerous should another \u201cseizure\u201d occur. Botsis contacted Dr. Voula Asimaco-poulos.\nDr. Asimacopoulos testified she went to the hospital on November 15, 2003, and referred defendant to a specialist, Dr. Levy. Dr. Asimaco-poulos told defendant not to drive until he had a diagnosis and was treated.\nBotsis testified defendant went to see Dr. Levy on November 24, 2003. Defendant told Botsis that Dr. Levy instructed him not to drive for one month. After a follow-up visit one month later, defendant told Botsis that Dr. Levy said he could drive.\nDr. Barry Levy, a neurologist, testified he saw defendant in his office on November 24, 2003. His tentative diagnosis was a seizure or fainting spell. Dr. Levy recommended defendant not drive for a \u201cminimum of six months without recurrence of episodes.\u201d Dr. Levy said he never told defendant he could drive again after one month. While Dr. Levy routinely encouraged follow-up visits before a patient drove again, he \u201cdidn\u2019t feel it was mandatory in this situation.\u201d\nOn May 22, 2004, defendant was involved in a minor traffic crash after he lost consciousness and drove into the back of a car. After the crash, defendant was treated by Dr. John Vozenilek, an emergency room physician at Glenbrook Hospital. After a physical exam revealed tongue lacerations, Dr. Vozenilek concluded defendant had a seizure. In his discharge papers defendant was instructed not to drive. Defendant signed the instruction.\nGeorgia Botsis testified defendant went back to Dr. Levy after the May 22 crash. According to Botsis, Dr. Levy prescribed Dilantin for defendant. Botsis said defendant took it for a week and then stopped because it made him feel terrible and his tests came back negative. Botsis believed defendant had spoken to Dr. Levy about not taking the medication. Botsis said she and Dr. Asimacopoulos agreed to wean defendant off the Dilantin.\nDr. Levy testified defendant returned to his office on May 25, 2004. When asked to describe his symptoms, defendant said he \u201csuddenly lost consciousness\u201d and his next recollection was with the paramedics. Dr. Levy diagnosed a seizure disorder and prescribed Dilantin. Dr. Levy testified he told defendant \u201cnot to drive\u201d for a \u201c[b]are minimum of six months with no episodes\u201d but to \u201cbe determined as things went along.\u201d Dr. Levy told defendant \u201cwe would need to discuss clearance to drive at a future point.\u201d Defendant was not told he could just wait six months and then drive. Dr. Levy said defendant never contacted him regarding a request to change or stop taking his medication. Defendant was scheduled for an appointment on July 7, 2004; it was canceled. Dr. Levy did not see defendant again after the May 25 appointment. Dr. Levy never gave defendant permission to resume driving.\nDr. Asimacopoulos testified that sometime after May 22, 2004, defendant called her to talk about a conversation he had with Dr. Levy. Defendant told Dr. Asimacopoulos that Dr. Levy said he should stay on Dilantin and even increase the dose, even though his tests were normal. Defendant complained about the dosage and how it made him feel. Dr. Asimacopoulos said she never told defendant he should not take Dilantin and never assisted him in weaning off the medication. After defendant said he wanted a second opinion, Dr. Asimaco-poulos recommended Dr. Rosenbaum, a cardiologist. Dr. Asimacopou-los testified she never told defendant directly or indirectly that he could drive.\nDr. Richard Rosenbaum testified he met with defendant on July 9, 2004. Defendant told Dr. Rosenbaum about his prior fainting episodes. When asked what happened on May 22, defendant told Dr. Rosen-baum he was fatigued and running late to work when he had a seizure or lost consciousness, which resulted in hitting a car. Defendant explained it was a hot day and he did not have air conditioning in his car. Defendant told Dr. Rosenbaum he had been prescribed Dilantin but was no longer taking it. It was Dr. Rosenbaum\u2019s understanding that defendant had been the one to decide to discontinue his medication. Dr. Rosenbaum testified defendant\u2019s recollection of his office visit with Dr. Levy \u201csounded as though Doctor Levy had given him instructions not to drive.\u201d Dr. Rosenbaum said defendant told him he had begun driving again approximately two weeks before his July 9 visit.\nDr. Rosenbaum made a differential diagnosis of neurocardiogenic syncope, the common faint. Dr. Rosenbaum said defendant could not anticipate when he would lose consciousness. Dr. Rosenbaum believed:\n\u201c[Defendant] represented to me among the most high risk patients with neurocardiogenic syncope because I\u2019m worried they won\u2019t have any warning. And he\u2019s already proven himself to have syncope while seated behind the wheel of a car.\u201d\nWhen asked \u201cwhat did you tell [defendant] specifically about driving,\u201d Dr. Rosenbaum said \u201cI told him specifically he should not drive.\u201d Dr. Rosenbaum performed a \u201ctilt table test\u201d to study defendant\u2019s heart rate and blood pressure. The results were normal, which did not rule out syncope.\nDuring the July 16 office visit, Dr. Rosenbaum prescribed defendant florniff, a steroid-like compound used to treat neurocardio-genic syncope. Dr. Rosenbaum instructed defendant \u201cto refrain from driving a motor vehicle.\u201d Dr. Rosenbaum \u201cdidn\u2019t give him any specific time where he would be able to reinitiate driving privileges.\u201d Although defendant was scheduled for a follow-up appointment, Dr. Rosenbaum did not see defendant again after July 16, 2004. Dr. Rosenbaum admitted he wrote a letter to Dr. Asimacopoulos indicating that defendant should not drive for three to six months, and that he was concerned about defendant driving because he did not have any warning signs before losing consciousness.\nGeorgia Botsis testified defendant stopped driving after the July 9 appointment and did not drive again until six months later.\nDr. Marc Dahman testified he was working in the emergency room at Lutheran General Hospital on January 30, 2005, when defendant was brought in for treatment after the collision that resulted in the charges in this case. When Dr. Dahman spoke to defendant about what happened, defendant said he had lost consciousness. Defendant told Dr. Dahman he had three past episodes where he lost consciousness. Dr. Dahman diagnosed defendant as having a syncopal episode.\nDavid Saifuku, since retired, testified he was a Highland Park police officer on January 30, 2005, when he interviewed defendant in the emergency room. Defendant told Saifuku he was driving westbound on Lake Cook Road on his way to work when he crossed the center line. Defendant said a green Honda may have cut him off, but he could not recall all of the facts. Defendant said he started to black out at the start of the crash. When Saifuku spoke to Dr. Asimacopolouos at the hospital, she gave him the names of defendant\u2019s doctors \u2014 Dr. Levy and Dr. Rosenbaum.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of reckless homicide (death of Vanessa Grimes) and aggravated reckless driving (injuries to Sharon Tracy). He was sentenced to a three-year prison term for reckless homicide and a concurrent one-year prison term for aggravated reckless driving. Defendant appeals.\nDECISION\nI. Sufficiency of the Evidence\nDefendant contends the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of reckless homicide and aggravated reckless driving. Specifically, defendant contends the State did not prove he had a culpable mental state.\nDefendant\u2019s reasonable doubt argument concentrates on the reckless homicide conviction, with only a passing mention of the aggravated reckless driving charge. However, the bottom line issue in both counts of the indictment is the same: was defendant acting recklessly when his car struck the cars in which Vanessa Grimes and Sharon Tracy were riding?\nThe relevant question is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278, 818 N.E.2d 304 (2004); People v. Ornelas, 295 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1049, 693 N.E.2d 1247 (1998). It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 338, 739 N.E.2d 455 (2000). A criminal conviction will not be reversed unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt is justified. People v. Moore, 171 Ill. 2d 74, 94, 662 N.E.2d 1215 (1996).\nA defendant is guilty of reckless homicide when the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant was operating a motor vehicle; (2) the defendant unintentionally caused a death while operating the vehicle; and (3) the acts which caused the death were performed recklessly so as to create a likelihood of death or great bodily harm to some person. See 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3(a) (West 2006); People v. Wilson, 143 Ill. 2d 236, 245, 572 N.E.2d 937 (1991).\nIllinois\u2019s reckless homicide statute does not require that a defendant must deliberately intend to kill a human being. Wilson, 143 Ill. 2d at 246. \u201cIf a person \u2018unintentionally kills,\u2019 even in the performance of a \u2018lawful\u2019 act while conducting himself \u2018recklessly,\u2019 he commits the crime of reckless homicide.\u201d Wilson, 143 Ill. 2d at 246. Section 4 \u2014 6 of the Criminal Code of 1961 defines \u201crecklessness\u201d as follows:\n\u201cA person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense; and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 6 (West 2006).\nRecklessness, as it applies to a reckless homicide prosecution, may be inferred from all of the facts and circumstances in the record viewed as a whole and may be established by the defendant\u2019s physical condition. People v. Solis, 275 Ill. App. 3d 346, 355, 655 N.E.2d 954 (1995).\nIn Wilson, the defendant was convicted of reckless homicide after the car he was driving crossed the center line on a six-lane highway and collided with an oncoming vehicle, killing a passenger in the defendant\u2019s car. Our supreme court concluded the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant acted recklessly. Dr. Yeh, the doctor who diagnosed Wilson\u2019s sleep disorder, testified the defendant told him he had been suffering from excessive drowsiness problems for a number of years, and the problem had recently been exacerbated by the defendant\u2019s weight gain. Dr. Yeh also testified the defendant had informed him he had been falling asleep inappropriately for a number of years. The court found the evidence established the defendant was aware of his sleep disorder for years prior to the collision. Wilson, 143 Ill. 2d at 247.\nOur supreme court pointed to authority in this state and in other jurisdictions to support a finding of criminal recklessness where a defendant chooses to drive an automobile knowing he suffers from a condition that could cause him to fall asleep or lose consciousness at the wheel. See People v. Shaffer, 49 Ill. App. 3d 207, 212, 364 N.E.2d 109 (1977) (Recklessness was established where it was shown the defendant had fallen asleep while driving on numerous occasions and, therefore, was aware he suffered from a physical condition that made it hazardous for him to drive); People v. Pecina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 139-40, 138 N.E.2d 799, 804, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 565 (1956) (\u201c[T]his defendant knew he was subject to epileptic attacks and seizures that might strike at any time. With this knowledge, and without anyone accompanying him, he deliberately took a chance by making a conscious choice of a course of action, in disregard of the consequences which he knew might follow from his conscious act, and which in this case did ensue\u201d (emphasis in original)); State v. Gooze, 14 N.J. Super. 277, 289, 81 A.2d 811, 816 (1951) (Under a reckless homicide statute similar to the Illinois statute, the court held defendant acted recklessly when he caused a death after losing consciousness while driving, based on evidence the defendant knew he suffered from a condition that could subject him to blackouts at unpredictable times).\nOur supreme court noted the rationale of these cases is that \u201ca driver may be guilty of a crime in undertaking to drive when he knows he may black out or lose consciousness.\u201d Wilson, 143 Ill. 2d at 247. The court held Wilson chose to operate an automobile \u201cwith the knowledge that he suffered from a condition that made it dangerous for him to drive,\u201d supporting a finding of recklessness on that basis \u201cwithout any evidence of drinking alcoholic beverages.\u201d Wilson, 143 Ill. 2d at 248-49. The court did say the evidence of recklessness was stronger because the evidence established alcohol consumption would aggravate the defendant\u2019s condition and he voluntarily consumed alcohol prior to driving. Wilson, 143 Ill. 2d at 249.\nHere, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that defendant acted recklessly. The evidence established defendant knew he had had at least three prior fainting incidents, including an incident on May 22, 2004, that resulted in a minor crash. Dr. Levy, defendant\u2019s neurologist, recommended defendant not drive for a \u201cminimum of six months without recurrence of episodes\u201d after defendant\u2019s November 2003 incident. Then, following defendant\u2019s May 2004 crash, Dr. Levy instructed defendant \u201cnot to drive\u201d for a \u201c[b]are minimum of six months with no episodes\u201d but to \u201cbe determined as things went along.\u201d Defendant was told he and Dr. Levy \u201cwould need to discuss clearance to drive at a future point.\u201d Dr. Levy never gave defendant permission to resume driving. The defendant had notice of the potential danger. An exact diagnosis was not required.\nDr. Rosenbaum diagnosed defendant with neurocardiogenic syncope, the common faint, on July 9, 2004. Dr. Rosenbaum told defendant he represented the \u201cmost high risk\u201d patient with syncope because he had \u201calready proven himself to have syncope while seated behind the wheel of a car.\u201d Dr. Rosenbaum specifically told defendant \u201che should not drive.\u201d Dr. Rosenbaum instructed defendant \u201cto refrain from driving a motor vehicle.\u201d\nDr. Asimacopoulos, defendant\u2019s family physician, never told defendant directly or indirectly that he could resume driving.\nLike the defendant in Wilson, Botsis chose to operate an automobile knowing he suffered from a physical condition that made it extremely dangerous for him to drive. Defendant\u2019s doctors testified defendant knew he could experience a blackout without warning while driving. Defendant was specifically instructed by several doctors after the May 22 crash to stop driving; he never received permission to resume driving. Defendant, however, chose to ignore his doctors\u2019 instructions and resume driving in conscious disregard of the substantial risks associated with his actions. Defendant\u2019s reckless conduct resulted in his loss of consciousness while behind the wheel of his car, causing a head-on collision that injured Sharon Tracy and killed Vanessa Grimes.\nThe evidence, taken as a whole, established defendant acted with a conscious disregard of a substantial risk that he would cause great bodily harm or death by driving. The evidence was sufficient to support convictions for reckless homicide and aggravated reckless driving. See Wilson, 143 Ill. 2d at 249.\nII. Pretrial Motions\nA. Motion to Suppress Statements\nDefendant contends the trial court erred by not granting his pretrial motion to suppress statements made to Highland Park police officer David Saifuku while being treated in the emergency room following the crash. Specifically, defendant contends that as a result of being interrogated in the emergency room without being advised of his Miranda rights, his statements to Officer Saifuku should have been suppressed as involuntary. His written motion to suppress alleges only the failure to give defendant Miranda warnings.\nThe testimony at the motion to suppress hearing showed that following the January 30 crash, defendant was taken by ambulance to the emergency room at Lutheran General Hospital. During questioning at the hospital, defendant told Officer Saifuku he had had three prior fainting incidents. Defendant told him the names of his treating doctors.\nDavid Saifuku testified he was employed as a Highland Park police officer on January 30, 2005, when he received an assignment to interview defendant regarding a crash. Defendant was in the emergency room, immobilized on a backboard with a cervical collar on. Defendant was in a room separated from other rooms by a sliding door or curtain. During the interview, several people came in and out of the room, including defendant\u2019s family and Dr. Asimacopoulos.\nSaifuku introduced himself as a police officer and requested a blood and urine sample from defendant. Defendant voluntarily signed a release while a registered nurse was present. Saifuku proceeded to question defendant regarding the crash, without advising him of his Miranda rights. Defendant never told Saifuku he could not talk to him because he was in pain. Saifuku did not handcuff defendant or tell him he was under arrest.\nSaifuku admitted defendant was restrained on a backboard with a strap across his chest and arms during the interview. A nurse pointed out that blood was coming out of the corners of defendant\u2019s mouth. Saifuku admitted he told the hospital staff, out of defendant\u2019s presence, he was there to get defendant\u2019s blood and urine samples with or without his consent. Although Saifuku knew a fatal crash had occurred prior to questioning defendant, he did not know whether defendant would be charged with reckless homicide.\nDefendant testified he was restrained on a backboard during the questioning. His neck was collared and he had bands around his head, shoulders, and legs. When defendant asked Saifuku to release the strap across his head, Saifuku ignored the request. The nurses also ignored his request to remove the strap. When asked whether he felt he could leave or terminate the questioning, defendant said no. Defendant was not told Saifuku was conducting a death investigation until after Saifuku had finished questioning him. Defendant admitted Saifuku asked for his consent to collect blood and urine samples.\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, finding defendant was not in custody because Saifuku simply questioned defendant as he found him.\nWhen reviewing a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress, findings of fact and credibility determinations are accorded great deference and will not be reversed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 505, 810 N.E.2d 472 (2003). The ultimate question posed by the legal challenge to the trial court\u2019s ruling is reviewed de novo, however. People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104, 116, 842 N.E.2d 674 (2005).\nIn Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706-07, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that prior to the start of an interrogation, a person being questioned by law enforcement officers must first \u201cbe warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed,\u201d as long as that person \u201chas been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.\u201d \u201cThe finding of custody is essential, as the preinterrogation warnings required by Miranda are intended to assure that any inculpatory statement made by a defendant is not simply the product of \u2018the compulsion inherent in custodial settings.\u2019 \u201d People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 149-50, 886 N.E.2d 986 (2008), quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 661, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938, 949, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2147 (2004).\nThe determination of whether a defendant is in custody involves two discrete inquiries: \u201c \u2018 \u201cfirst, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 150, quoting Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 505-06, quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 133 L. Ed. 2d 383, 394, 116 S. Ct. 457, 465 (1995). We therefore examine \u201cthe objective circumstances of the interrogation.\u201d Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 319-23, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293, 296-98, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1527-29 (1994).\nWe find the circumstances surrounding the interrogation supported the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant was not \u201cin custody\u201d for Miranda purposes. While we recognize defendant was immobilized on a backboard in the emergency room during questioning, he was placed in that position by medical personnel to facilitate his treatment, not by, or for, Officer Saifuku. Removing the strap would be a medical decision, not a law enforcement judgment. Defendant never was handcuffed, fingerprinted, or told he was under arrest. See Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 156. Nor was defendant told he was not free to terminate the interview. In addition to the medical personnel who came in and out of defendant\u2019s room during questioning, Saifuku testified defendant\u2019s family was present at times.\nThis fact situation is not close to that in People v. Dennis, 373 Ill. App. 3d 30, 866 N.E.2d 1264 (2007), relied on by the defendant. There, the State agreed defendant was under arrest and in custody when he spoke to the police officer at the hospital. Dennis, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 46. Based on the record before us, we see no reason to reverse the trial court\u2019s decision to deny the motion to suppress. See People v. Griffin, 385 Ill. App. 3d 202, 212, 898 N.E.2d 704 (2008) (\u201cwe note that the parties in this case did not argue \u2014 and correctly so \u2014 that Wheeler\u2019s interview of defendant conducted at the hospital *** was a custodial interrogation. This may be because the coercive environment and restriction on defendant\u2019s freedom so important to a finding that she was in custody were totally absent in analyzing the circumstances surrounding [the] interview\u201d).\nB. Medical Records\nDefendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of his privileged medical records in violation of section 8 \u2014 802 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 802) (West 2004)) and the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) (42 U.S.C. \u00a71320d et seq. (2000)). The applicability of a statutory evidentiary privilege and its exceptions is reviewed de novo. Kraima v. Ausman, 365 Ill. App. 3d 530, 533, 850 N.E.2d 530 (2006).\nMedical information disclosed between a physician and patient is protected by Illinois statute. The statute says:\n\u201cNo physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any information he or she may have acquired in attending any patient in a professional character, necessary to enable him or her professionally to serve the patient ***.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 802 (West 2004).\nTwo relevant exceptions exist: \u201c(1) in trials for homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or immediate circumstances of the homicide, *** [and] (4) in all actions brought by or against the patient *** wherein the patient\u2019s physical or mental condition is an issue.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 802(1X4) (West 2004).\nWe find both of the listed privilege exceptions apply here. Under the homicide exception, the State is required to show the disclosure directly related to the immediate circumstances of the homicide. People v. Sutton, 316 Ill. App. 3d 874, 882, 739 N.E.2d 543 (2000). The homicide exception applies in reckless homicide cases. Sutton, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 883, citing People v. Hart, 194 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1003, 552 N.E.2d 1 (1990). Although the exception is commonly applied in cases involving intoxication, \u201cany evidence which is probative of the issue of recklessness certainly relates directly to the immediate circumstances of the homicide.\u201d People v. Bates, 169 Ill. App. 3d 218, 225, 523 N.E.2d 675 (1988).\nDefendant\u2019s history of lost consciousness was probative of his recklessness and the immediate circumstances of the homicide because he was unconscious when found at the scene. Defendant\u2019s medical history was admissible under the homicide exception.\nThe second listed exception applies because defendant\u2019s physical and mental condition is at issue. See People v. Krause, 273 Ill. App. 3d 59, 62, 651 N.E.2d 744 (1995) (exception applies in criminal cases). Defendant lost consciousness at some point before the crash. Because his physical and mental condition during the crash is relevant in determining the issue of recklessness, the privilege exception applied to defendant\u2019s disclosures to the paramedics on the scene, Dr. Dahman, and Saifuku, as well as to his related medical records. See People v. Wilber, 279 Ill. App. 3d 462, 468, 664 N.E.2d 711 (1996) (the defendant\u2019s disclosure regarding his alcohol intake was not protected because his mental and physical condition was at issue in the DUI case). See People v. Popeck, 385 Ill. App. 3d 806, 809-10 (2008).\nDefendant also contends his medical records were illegally obtained in violation of HIPAA because he was not notified first.\nHIPAA regulates the occasions when protected health information may be disclosed. Giangiulio v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 365 Ill. App. 3d 823, 839, 850 N.E.2d 823 (2006). Defendant relies on the wrong HIPAA exception, i.e., judicial disclosure. The applicable exception is disclosure for law enforcement purposes, which does not require a patient\u2019s notice or consent. See Gibson v. State, 225 S.W3d 824, 827 (Tex. App. 2007). The regulation says:\n\u201cA covered entity may disclose protected health information for a law enforcement purpose to a law enforcement official if the conditions in paragraphs (f)(1) through\u00ae(6) of this section are met, as applicable.\u201d 45 C.ER. \u00a7164.512\u00ae (2007).\nOne of those conditions allows disclosure in compliance with a grand jury subpoena. 45 C.F.R. \u00a7 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(B) (2007).\nThe parties dispute whether the subpoenas for defendant\u2019s medical records sent to Doctors Asimacopoulos, Levy, and Rosenbaum were issued by the grand jury. The subpoenas do not appear in the record. However, in his motion to bar the State\u2019s use of his medical records, defendant admits the State obtained them through a grand jury subpoena. At the hearing on the motion, the trial court referred to the subpoenas as \u201cgrand jury subpoenas.\u201d Defendant first contended the subpoenas were issued by the State\u2019s Attorney in his motion to reconsider the trial court\u2019s denial of the original motion. Defendant had the burden of presenting an adequate record for our review. People v. Urdiales, 225 Ill. 2d 354, 419, 871 N.E.2d 669 (2007). We resolve any doubts arising from the inadequate record against him. Urd\u00edales, 225 Ill. 2d at 419. Based on the record here and defendant\u2019s admission, we find the disclosure of defendant\u2019s medical records was permitted under HIPAA.\nIII. Discovery Violations\nA. Discharge Summary\nDefendant contends the State failed to timely tender the discharge document Dr. Vozelinek said he gave to defendant following the May 22, 2004, crash. It was given to defense counsel just before Dr. Vozelinek\u2019s testimony. Defendant contends that violates Illinois Supreme Court Rule 412 (188 Ill. 2d R. 412) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963).\nSupreme Court Rule 412 requires the State, upon motion of the defendant, to disclose certain material and information within the State\u2019s possession or control, including \u201cany books, papers, documents, photographs or tangible objects which the prosecuting attorney intends to use in the hearing or trial.\u201d 188 Ill. 2d R. 412(a)(v).\nA trial court\u2019s ruling on a discovery violation will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Matthews, 299 Ill. App. 3d 914, 918, 702 N.E.2d 291 (1998). An abuse of discretion exists where the defendant is prejudiced by the discovery violation and the trial court fails to correct the prejudice. Matthews, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 918.\n\u201c[T]he purpose of the discovery rules is to protect the accused against surprise, unfairness, and inadequate preparation.\u201d People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 63, 821 N.E.2d 58 (1999). Although compliance with the rules is mandatory, failure to comply with the discovery rules does not require reversal absent a showing of prejudice. Heard, 187 111. 2d at 63, citing People v. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68, 78, 623 N.E.2d 352 (1993). \u201cThe burden of showing surprise or prejudice rests on the defendant.\u201d Heard, 187 Ill. 2d at 63.\nImmediately before Dr. Vozenilik\u2019s testimony in this case, the State informed the court that while preparing Dr. Vozenilik to testify the previous day, he told the prosecution a discharge summary signed by defendant should have been included in defendant\u2019s medical records from Glenhrook Hospital. The State called the hospital and had it fax a copy of the discharge summary defendant signed. The State then tendered a copy of the document to defense counsel and explained the State had just received it. The document contained protocol instructions signed by defendant, instructing defendant in part that: \u201cYou must not drive. You definitely had a seizure.\u201d The assistant State\u2019s Attorney admitted to the court the document had not been tendered during discovery, saying: \u201cI certainly didn\u2019t have it in my possession or control. And as soon as I got it, certainly within five minutes of getting it, I got it it [sic] to [defense counsel].\u201d\nDefense counsel objected, contending the document should be excluded because it was not disclosed until 15 minutes before Dr. Vozenilik\u2019s testimony. Defendant admitted he had received a separate document entitled \u201cafter visit summary, Spiro Bostsis\u201d during discovery, which contained an identical instruction not to drive, unsigned by defendant.\nThe trial court overruled the objection, finding: \u201cIt\u2019s not trial by ambush. The State wasn\u2019t aware of it themselves.\u201d The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a discovery violation had not occurred.\nNor was the State\u2019s failure to produce the document until the day of Dr. Vozenilik\u2019s testimony a Brady violation. In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held the prosecution violates an accused\u2019s constitutional right to due process by failing to disclose evidence favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment. People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 73, 890 N.E.2d 500 (2008), citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 218, 83 S. Ct. at 1196-97. The record here reflects the State did not fail to disclose the discharge summary document to defendant. As soon as the document came under the State\u2019s control, it tendered a copy of the document to defense counsel. When objecting to the document at trial, defense counsel specifically noted that he was not alleging the State \u201chid\u201d the document during discovery. Brady does not apply.\nB. Saifuku\u2019s Disciplinary Records\nDefendant contends the State violated defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial when it failed to disclose Officer Saifuku\u2019s criminal history and disciplinary records during discovery, in violation of Brady and Supreme Court Rule 412. Defendant contends the State\u2019s failure to disclose evidence of Saifuku\u2019s prior bad acts limited defendant\u2019s ability to question Saifuku during the motion to suppress and at trial regarding his interest, bias, and motive to provide false testimony. Defendant also contends the trial court erred in limiting defense counsel\u2019s impeachment of Saifuku during cross-examination at trial.\nA Brady claim requires a showing that evidence within the State\u2019s control was undisclosed and \u201cthe accused was prejudiced because the evidence is material to guilt or punishment.\u201d Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d at 73-74. Evidence is considered \u201cmaterial\u201d if there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d at 74, citing People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 293, 311, 794 N.E.2d 181 (2002). \u201cTo establish materiality, an accused must show \u2018the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.\u2019 \u201d Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d at 74, quoting People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 393, 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998).\nHere, the undisclosed evidence consisted of Saifuku\u2019s City of Highland Park Police Department disciplinary record and misdemeanor criminal history in Wisconsin. Defendant was aware before jury selection that Saifuku had been charged with two felonies and had pled guilty to misdemeanor battery and disorderly conduct in Wisconsin. Defense counsel discovered after Saifuku\u2019s testimony at the suppression hearing that the Wisconsin charge was the basis of one of two counts of disciplinary action against Saifuku by the Highland Park police department. Defendant alleged the other count of disciplinary action pending against Saifuku before his resignation stemmed from his failure to issue a ticket to an unlicensed driver who was involved in a property damage accident.\nBefore Saifuku\u2019s trial testimony, defendant filed a motion for mistrial or, alternatively, to bar Saifuku\u2019s testimony. Defendant claimed disclosure of the evidence of Saifuku\u2019s prior bad acts would have allowed him to impeach Saifuku\u2019s testimony during the motion to suppress hearing by showing Saifuku had an interest, bias, and motive to provide false testimony.\nDuring a hearing on defendant\u2019s mistrial motion, the trial court questioned Highland Park police department Commander George Pfutzenruefer regarding Saifuku\u2019s disciplinary record. Commander Pfutzenruefer testified that although Saifuku was under investigation for failing to ticket an unlicensed motorist, no disciplinary action was initiated against Saifuku. He testified the personnel file would only contain matters of either disciplinary action or commendatory actions. He was not aware of any paperwork regarding the investigation. He said the investigation was terminated after Saifuku resigned from the department.\nThe trial court also questioned Saifuku regarding his plea agreement in the Wisconsin case, out of the presence of the jury. Saifuku said there was no discussion or agreement reached with either the Cook County or Lake County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office regarding his testimony in defendant\u2019s case prior to his plea in Wisconsin. Saifuku admitted a disciplinary action was pending against him for his failure to write a ticket for an unlicensed motorist when he resigned from the department. Saifuku said his decision to resign had nothing to do with defendant\u2019s case. Saifuku said no promises of future employment or recommendations of future employment were made in exchange for his testimony.\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion for mistrial and allowed Saifuku to testify.\nEvidence of Saifuku\u2019s prior bad acts was of little relevance. There is no reasonable probability the result of the suppression proceedings would have been different had the evidence been disclosed. The lack of prejudice to defendant\u2019s case also renders harmless any alleged discovery violation under Supreme Court Rule 412.\nSaifuku\u2019s credibility was not a serious issue in this case. Defendant never contended his statements to Saifuku were coerced. Nor has defendant suggested Saifuku testified falsely regarding the content of defendant\u2019s statements. Instead, defendant has simply challenged the voluntariness of defendant\u2019s statements in light of Saifuku\u2019s failure to provide Miranda warnings prior to questioning him in a \u201ccustodial\u201d setting. Defendant\u2019s and Saifuku\u2019s recollections of the interview were essentially the same.\nMoreover, several other witnesses provided testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the January 30, 2005, crash, including Dr. Dahman, who testified defendant told him in the emergency room that he lost consciousness during the crash, and that he had lost consciousness three different times prior to this crash. Defendant told the paramedics on the scene that he lost consciousness during the crash. Saifuku\u2019s testimony played a minor role in the State\u2019s case.\nThe trial court did not err in limiting the scope of Saifuku\u2019s cross-examination. Although a defendant has the fundamental right to confront witnesses against him, a trial court may limit the scope of cross-examination. People v. Bell, 373 Ill. App. 3d 811, 818, 869 N.E.2d 807 (2007). \u201cThe latitude permitted on cross-examination is largely left to the discretion of the trial court and its determination \u2018will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion that resulted in manifest prejudice.\u2019 \u201d Bell, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 818, quoting People v. Quinn, 332 Ill. App. 3d 40, 43, 772 N.E.2d 872 (2002). When impeaching a witness by showing bias, interest, or motive to testify falsely, the evidence must give rise to the inference that the witness has something to gain or lose by his testimony. People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113, 147, 526 N.E.2d 335 (1988).\nAt trial, defendant suggested Saifuku might have been motivated to give false testimony in this case in order to \u201ccurry favor with his former employer and with any future employers.\u201d Defendant does not suggest what the false testimony might have been. The evidence that Saifuku was motivated to testify falsely in order to curry favor is too speculative and uncertain for us to hold the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination. See People v. Buckner, 376 Ill. App. 3d 251, 257, 876 N.E.2d 87 (2007).\nIV Jury Instructions\nDefendant next contends the trial court erred by refusing to give the jury the complete IPI Criminal 4th No. 5.01B, which describes the mental state of \u201cknowledge.\u201d See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No 5.01B (4th ed. 2000). Defendant asked the trial court to give IPI Criminal 4th No. 5.01B in its entirety for his aggravated reckless driving charge. The court provided the jury with paragraphs 1 and 3, but refused to give paragraph 2. We must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion with that ruling. See People v. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d 53, 66, 885 N.E.2d 1019 (2008).\nIPI Criminal 4th No. 5.01B:\n\u201c[1] A person [(knows) (acts knowingly with regard to) (acts with knowledge of)] the nature or attendant circumstances of his conduct when he is consciously aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that such fact exists.\nA person [(knows) (acts knowingly with regard to) (acts with knowledge of)] the result of his conduct when he is consciously aware that such result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct.\n[Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is preformed willfully.]\u201d (Emphasis added.) Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.01B (4th ed. 2000).\nCount 2 of defendant\u2019s indictment said:\n\u201c[Defendant *** committed the offense of AGGRAVATED RECKLESS DRIVING in that the defendant drove a motor vehicle with a willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property in that the defendant operated a motor vehicle westbound on Lake-Cook Road at a time when the defendant knew he was subject to a medical condition which caused him to lose consciousness, and the defendant lost consciousness while operating his motor vehicle westbound on Lake-Cook Road, thereby causing a motor vehicle accident, thereby causing great bodily harm to Sharon Tracy, in violation of 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 503(c).\u201d\nAggravated reckless driving requires the mental state of recklessness. See 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 503(c) (West 2004). The statute defines recklessness as \u201ca willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 503(c) (West 2004). The Committee Note for IPI Criminal 4th No. 5.01B says \u201c[t]he bracketed third paragraph is for use in conjunction with offenses including a mental state of \u2018willfullness.\u2019 \u201d Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.01B, Committee Note, at 143 (4th ed. 2000). Because defendant\u2019s indictment charged him with a \u201cwillful and wanton\u201d disregard for the safety of persons, paragraphs 1 and 3 of IPI Criminal 4th No. 5.01B were properly given.\nThe Committee Note also says:\n\u201cIn cases where the instruction is given, use paragraph [1] if the offense is defined in terms of prohibited conduct. Use paragraph [2] if the offense is defined in terms of a prohibited result. If both conduct and result are at issue, use both paragraphs [1] and [2].\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.01B, Committee Note, at 142 (4th ed. 2000).\nDefendant relies on People v. Lovelace, 251 Ill. App. 3d 607, 622 N.E.2d 859 (1993), to contend paragraph 2 of the instruction should have been given. Lovelace does not apply here. In Lovelace, the court held it was reversible error not to issue both paragraphs of the then-existing instruction where the indictment charged the defendant with knowingly causing great bodily harm and knowingly causing bodily harm to a peace officer as a result of his conduct. Lovelace, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 619. Here, defendant\u2019s indictment charged him with willfully and wantonly disregarding the safety of others when he drove while aware of his mental condition \u201cthereby causing great bodily harm.\u201d The State was not required to prove defendant knew his conduct would result in great bodily harm. That is, the offense does not require proof that the defendant knew a certain result would occur. The instruction was proper as given.\nV Evidentiary Issues\nA. Other Crimes Evidence\nDefendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of another crime, specifically, defendant\u2019s May 2004 crash in Glenview.\nGenerally, evidence of an uncharged bad act is not admissible to show a defendant\u2019s propensity to commit a crime. People v. Lopez, 371 Ill. App. 3d 920, 936, 864 N.E.2d 726 (2007). Such evidence is admissible, however, if it is relevant for any other purpose. People v. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 127, 135-36, 824 N.E.2d 191 (2005); Lopez, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 936. The admissibility of other crimes evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d at 136; Lopez, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 936.\nContrary to defendant\u2019s contention, evidence of the May 22, 2004, crash was relevant to establish defendant knew he had a condition that caused him to suddenly lose consciousness while driving. The circumstances surrounding the May 22 crash were inextricably intertwined with the issue of defendant\u2019s recklessness on January 30, 2005.\nGeorgia Botsis testified that following the May 22 crash, defendant sought medical advice to determine a diagnosis and treatment. Dr. Rosenbaum testified that based on the May 22 crash, he explained to defendant that defendant represented \u201cthe most high risk patients with neurocardiogenic syncope\u201d because \u201che\u2019s already proven himself to have syncope while seated behind the wheel of a car.\u201d Dr. Levy testified he told defendant \u201cnot to drive\u201d for a \u201c[b]are minimum of six months with no episodes\u201d in light of the May 22 crash.\nTestimony regarding the circumstances of the May 22 crash was relevant to establish defendant was aware of his condition and to provide a basis for his doctors\u2019 instructions not to drive. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the prior crash.\nB. Lay Witness Testimony\nDefendant contends the trial court erred in allowing two lay witnesses to the crash to offer medical and legal opinions \u201cwell beyond their ken.\u201d\nAt trial, Mary Olincy testified she was driving westbound on Lake Cook Road when defendant\u2019s car collided with her car on January 30, 2005. Following several impacts, defendant\u2019s car came to a stop. Olincy testified she went to check on defendant and found him seated in the car even though it was on fire. Defendant was lurched against the seat, convulsing repeatedly, and obviously having \u201ca seizure.\u201d Adrian Laboy testified he went to defendant\u2019s car to check on him after the crash. Laboy testified defendant was shaking, foaming at the mouth, unresponsive, and not acting normal. Laboy said defendant appeared to be \u201chaving some type of seizure or something.\u201d\n\u201cTo be admissible, a lay opinion must be based upon the witness\u2019 personal observation and recollection of concrete facts; and such facts cannot be described in sufficient detail to adequately convey to the jury the substance of the testimony.\u201d People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 497, 708 N.E.2d 309 (1998).\nIn this case, Laboy\u2019s and Olincy\u2019s testimony described what they personally observed regarding defendant\u2019s condition immediately following the crash. Neither witness was attempting to offer a medical diagnosis. The trial court did not err in allowing the lay witness testimony. See Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d at 497.\nC. Mandatory Reporting Requirement\nDefendant contends he was erroneously barred from introducing, for impeachment purposes, the Illinois Secretary of State\u2019s mandatory reporting requirement of unsafe drivers. Defendant contends Dr. Rosenbaum was obligated to report him as a \u201chigh risk\u201d driver. A trial court has discretion whether to admit or deny evidence based on a motion in limine and we will not disturb its decision absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Bennett, 376 Ill. App. 3d 554, 571, 876 N.E.2d 256 (2007).\nThe section of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) cited by defendant does not support his argument. See 92 Ill. Adm. Code. \u00a71030.16(d), as amended at 33 Ill. Reg. 2391, eff. January 21, 2009. There is no statute or other regulation which imposes a mandatory reporting duty on doctors. Any impeachment value provided by the Code is marginal.\nCONCLUSION\nWe affirm defendant\u2019s convictions and sentences.\nAffirmed.\nHALL and GARCIA, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jed Stone and John Curnyn, both of Stone & Associates, L.L.C., of Waukegan, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald and Janet C. Mahoney, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SPYRIDON C. BOTSIS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 07\u20143118\nOpinion filed February 2, 2009.\nRehearing denied March 4, 2009.\nJed Stone and John Curnyn, both of Stone & Associates, L.L.C., of Waukegan, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald and Janet C. Mahoney, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0422-01", "first_page_order": 438, "last_page_order": 459 }