{ "id": 4283602, "name": "PAMELA BOSCO, Indiv. and as Ex'r of the Estate of Peter Bosco, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT JANOWITZ et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Bosco v. Janowitz", "decision_date": "2009-02-10", "docket_number": "No. 1-07-0617", "first_page": "450", "last_page": "466", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 450" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619618 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "854 N.E.2d 758", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265347 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "841 N.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 Ill. App. 3d 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5766277 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/363/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 N.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307264 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "861 N.E.2d 280", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "371 Ill. App. 3d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4268250 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/371/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "824 N.E.2d 1117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1125" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3749644 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.E.2d 958", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "959" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3164374 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "836 N.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4258836 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/361/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 N.E.2d 1073", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1077" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5072114 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/166/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "823 N.E.2d 1046", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1054", "parenthetical": "\"a reviewing court can sustain the decision of the trial court to admit or exclude evidence for any appropriate reason, regardless of whether the trial court relied on that reason or whether the trial court's reasoning was correct\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 981", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599675 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "990-91", "parenthetical": "\"a reviewing court can sustain the decision of the trial court to admit or exclude evidence for any appropriate reason, regardless of whether the trial court relied on that reason or whether the trial court's reasoning was correct\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0981-01" ] }, { "cite": "572 N.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432" }, { "page": "432", "parenthetical": "\" '[A]n erroneous ruling on evidence is harmless where the result reached was not affected by the ruling, and the result reached was the only one warranted by other evidence in the case' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 950", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2604463 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "952-53" }, { "page": "952" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/213/0950-01" ] }, { "cite": "626 N.E.2d 1367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1376" }, { "page": "1376" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 Ill. App. 3d 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2991912 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" }, { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/255/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "885 N.E.2d 1120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1130" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "381 Ill. App. 3d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3627473 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/381/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 N.E.2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "832", "parenthetical": "\"it is the function of the jury to weigh contradictory evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and draw ultimate conclusions as to the facts of a case\"" }, { "page": "832" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 874", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260345 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880", "parenthetical": "\"it is the function of the jury to weigh contradictory evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and draw ultimate conclusions as to the facts of a case\"" }, { "page": "880" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 N.E.2d 32", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5429143 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 N.E.2d 508", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" }, { "page": "513" }, { "page": "513" }, { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3292317 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452-53" }, { "page": "455-56" }, { "page": "456" }, { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1271" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3513992 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 N.E.2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5416375 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "857 N.E.2d 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 Ill. App. 3d 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4267325 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/368/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3427450 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "654 N.E.2d 1365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1374" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198922 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "854 N.E.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" }, { "page": "652" }, { "page": "652" }, { "page": "652", "parenthetical": "\"[a] court of review 'should not usurp the function of the jury and substitute its judgment on questions of fact fairly submitted, tried, and determined from the evidence which did not greatly preponderate either way' \"" }, { "page": "653" }, { "page": "653-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3602061 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "179" }, { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2866138 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0494-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1398, "char_count": 43589, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.096236137916677e-08, "percentile": 0.4674550523988078 }, "sha256": "8f050c586554fedba1658324d5df4a69b789a0547624ed5ea5476eff3bdb38fd", "simhash": "1:bdfc239bb72dbde6", "word_count": 7124 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:04:57.079883+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PAMELA BOSCO, Indiv. and as Ex\u2019r of the Estate of Peter Bosco, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT JANOWITZ et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury verdict in favor of the defendants in a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff filed a posttrial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a request for a new trial on all issues. On February 27, 2008, the circuit court of Cook County denied the plaintiffs motion, holding that the jury\u2019s decision was fully supported by the evidence. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that: (1) a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on all issues was warranted; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence against the plaintiff; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of other physicians\u2019 negligence, and in instructing the jury with the long forms of the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, Nos. 12.04 and 12.05 (2000). For the following reasons, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nPeter Bosco (Bosco) battled a series of long, complicated gastrointestinal illnesses before succumbing to colon cancer on May 17, 2002, at the age of 37. In March 1993, Bosco began experiencing symptoms of cramps, diarrhea and abdominal pain. He visited his family physician, Dr. Robert Janowitz (Dr. Janowitz), at Westmont Family Practice, S.C. Dr. Janowitz conducted a stool sample test, which tested negative for infection, and prescribed medicine to Bosco to relieve the symptoms. Within two days of this visit, Bosco reported that his symptoms had resolved. However, on May 13, 1993, he returned to Dr. Janowitz, complaining of the same symptoms, along with a fever and a feeling of weakness. Dr. Janowitz sent Bosco to the emergency department of a hospital (ER) for intravenous (IV) fluids to prevent further dehydration. Blood tests revealed a low hemoglobin level of 9.4. Bosco was informed of these test results.\nOn June 14, 1993, Bosco returned to Dr. Janowitz for more blood tests. Bosco reported no pain or symptoms. However, the results of his blood tests showed an increased hemoglobin level of 11.1, but Dr. Janowitz still considered Bosco to be anemic. Three days later, Bosco reported \u201cvague epigastric fullness\u201d to Dr. Janowitz, who then ordered an upper gastrointestinal (G.I.) series test and an ultrasound. Dr. Janowitz advised both Bosco and his wife, Pam Bosco, of the normal test results on June 23, 1993, and instructed Bosco to return to Dr. Janowitz\u2019s office for a follow-up on July 12, 1993.\nOn June 28, 1993, Bosco reported to Dr. Janowitz that his G.I. symptoms had returned and had been recurring for the past three days. In response, Dr. Janowitz referred him to see Dr. Philip Sweeney (Dr. Sweeney), a gastroenterologist.\nOn June 29, 1993, Bosco made his first visit to Dr. Sweeney, where he presented with symptoms of diarrhea, abdominal cramps, weight loss and anemia. Dr. Sweeney performed a full physical examination, which revealed blood in the stool. A diagnostic colonoscopy was scheduled for the following day.\nDr. Sweeney performed the colonoscopy on Bosco the next day, during which a single polyp was identified and removed from Bosco\u2019s ascending colon. The removed polyp was diagnosed as a tubular adenoma, a specific type of benign polyp. The results of the colonos-copy enabled Dr. Sweeney to diagnose Bosco with ulcerative colitis, a chronic condition that required lifelong management. Subsequently, Dr. Sweeney prescribed steroid medications to reduce inflammation and iron pills for anemia. Bosco was instructed to return to Dr. Sweeney within two to three weeks.\nAfter Dr. Sweeney\u2019s diagnosis, Bosco sought a second opinion at the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota. The Mayo Clinic confirmed that Bosco had ulcerative colitis, but did not advise Bosco that a cancer surveillance plan was necessary at that time.\nIn August 1993, Bosco was hospitalized for two days as a result of an ulcerative colitis flare-up, experiencing symptoms of recurrent vomiting and upper abdominal pain. Both Dr. Janowitz and Dr. Sweeney examined Bosco at the hospital. Dr. Janowitz conducted a basic physical examination on Bosco, while Dr. Sweeney ordered an \u201cupper GI exam with a small bowel follow through.\u201d Because Bosco believed that some of his pain stemmed from an infection secondary to his work environment, he did not consent to the procedure that Dr. Sweeney recommended.\nA month after his discharge from the hospital, Bosco called Dr. Janowitz to report that he was feeling better and that he would follow up with Dr. Sweeney. Bosco also contacted Dr. Sweeney by telephone in October 1993 to say that he was feeling well, at which time Dr. Sweeney instructed him to follow up in the office in six to eight weeks. However, on November 5, 1993, Bosco experienced another flare-up, and as a result, Dr. Sweeney increased his medication and instructed Bosco to return in three weeks for reevaluation. Bosco never returned to Dr. Sweeney.\nIn 1995, due to changes in his health insurance, Bosco switched his primary care physician from Dr. Janowitz to Dr. Edward Mc-Menamin (Dr. McMenamin). On October 3, 1995, Bosco was again hospitalized with complaints of diarrhea and skin rash. Dr. Mc-Menamin performed a history and physical examination and blood tests, which revealed that Bosco\u2019s hemoglobin level was at a severely low level of 5.5. Dr. McMenamin requested a consultation with Dr. Gregorio Orbeta (Dr. Orbeta), a gastroenterologist.\nDuring the October 3, 1995, hospitalization, Dr. Orbeta examined Bosco, performed a flexible sigmoidoscopy examination, and prescribed oral medications to alleviate his symptoms. Dr. Orbeta\u2019s plan was to also perform a diagnostic colonoscopy examination, but to do so at a later date when Bosco was no longer bleeding, since the colon was more susceptible to perforation during periods of flare-ups. Dr. Orbeta advised Bosco of the symptoms, medications, possible complications and the necessity for Bosco to be examined once a year.\nOn October 13, 1995, Bosco made a follow-up visit to Dr. Orbeta\u2019s office. Subsequently, on October 20, 1995, Dr. Orbeta performed the scheduled diagnostic colonoscopy examination. During the procedure, Dr. Orbeta took photographs and three biopsies of the transverse colon, but did not find any polyps. Dr. Orbeta noted that the \u201centire colonic mucosa showed edema, hyperemia, multiple ulcerations, and multiple pseudopolyp formations.\u201d His findings were consistent with ulcerative colitis, with no evidence of malignancy. Dr. Orbeta reported these findings to Bosco by telephone on October 24, 1995, at which time Bosco reported that he was feeling better.\nSometime in 1996, Bosco changed his primary care physician from Dr. McMenamin back to Dr. Janowitz, but kept Dr. Orbeta as his gastrointestinal specialist. On November 14, 1996, Bosco treated with Dr. Orbeta and reported that he was doing well and not experiencing any pain. The ulcerative colitis was under control with medication.\nOn June 7, 1997, Bosco visited Dr. Janowitz\u2019s office for urinary problems, which were resolved shortly after the visit. However, on June 30, 1997, Bosco called Dr. Orbeta and complained of blood in his semen, although his ulcerative colitis was otherwise asymptomatic. Dr. Orbeta referred Bosco to a urologist.\nBosco did not treat with Dr. Orbeta again until May 8, 1998, at which time he reported that the ulcerative colitis was still asymptomatic and under control with medication. Dr. Orbeta noted that Bosco had a \u201cnormal exam\u201d and \u201cno bleeding.\u201d\nOn September 10, 1998, Bosco made a final visit to Dr. Janowitz\u2019s office for the purpose of having a \u201cpre-adoption\u201d physical because he and his wife wanted to adopt a child. At this visit, Bosco informed Dr. Janowitz that his condition was under control and that he was asymptomatic.\nOn May 17, 1999, Bosco visited Dr. Orbeta\u2019s office for the last time. He reported that he had no bleeding, occasional cramps, and was otherwise asymptomatic. Dr. Orbeta did a complete blood analysis as one had not been done since 1995. A few days later, Dr. Orbeta telephoned Bosco about the results of the blood test and informed him of a low hemoglobin level. Dr. Orbeta instructed Bosco to take iron pills and to return to the office for a follow-up blood evaluation in one month. Bosco went to Dr. Orbeta\u2019s office on July 8, 1999, to pick up an order for a repeat blood test, but he never returned to Dr. Orbeta for the follow-up visit, despite instructions to do so.\nBosco sought no treatment from any physician from May 17, 1999, until October 1999, when he visited another gastroenterologist, Dr. Joseph Brasco (Dr. Brasco), for a second opinion regarding his condition. On October 19, 1999, Bosco was admitted to the ER at Northwest Community Hospital with complaints of abdominal pain. Dr. Brasco saw Bosco at the hospital, where several X-rays were taken. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Brasco discharged Bosco from the hospital.\nOn October 25, 1999, Bosco was readmitted to the ER for severe abdominal pain. Dr. Brasco then performed a colonoscopy and diagnosed an obstruction in the colon. Unknown to Dr. Brasco at the time, he had perforated Bosco\u2019s colon during the procedure. Bosco was subsequently rushed into emergency surgery.\nDr. Robert Aki (Dr. Aki) performed emergency surgery on Bosco after the colon perforation and removed three-quarters of the colon after discovering the presence of stage 2 cancer. Dr. Aki informed Bosco\u2019s wife that he had removed all of the cancer during the surgery.\nFollowing the surgery, Bosco was referred to Dr. A1 Benson (Dr. Benson), an oncologist at Northwestern Memorial Hospital. On January 17, 2000, Bosco had his first visit with Dr. Benson, who advised him that stage 2 cancer was a \u201cgood\u201d stage and that the cancer could be treated and cured. Subsequently, Bosco began chemotherapy treatments.\nOn September 7, 2000, Dr. Aki again performed surgery on Bosco to remove the remaining one-quarter of his colon. It was during this surgery that Dr. Aki discovered that Bosco\u2019s colon cancer had spread to his abdomen. The metastatic cancer would eventually spread to the spleen, liver, pelvis and neck. Bosco died on May 17, 2002.\nOn September 6, 2002, Bosco\u2019s wife, Pam Bosco, individually and as the executor of Bosco\u2019s estate, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Brasco, Northwest Community Hospital, Dr. Janowitz, Westmont Family Practice, S.C., Dr. Gregorio Orbeta, Jr., and Gregorio R. Orbeta, Jr., M.D., S.C. On October 3, 2006, a jury trial commenced at which the plaintiff and defendants presented the testimony of several expert witnesses.\nAt trial, Dr. Richard Gorlin (Dr. Gorlin), a gastroenterologist, testified on behalf of the plaintiff. He testified that patients with ulcerative colitis and polyps, as in Bosco\u2019s situation, have an exceedingly high risk of developing colon cancer. He testified that because Bosco\u2019s colon had the presence of both polyps and ulcerative colitis, two indicia for cancer development, Dr. Orbeta should have taken biopsies from the entire colon, rather than only the transverse colon. To a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Gorlin testified that both Dr. Janowitz and Dr. Orbeta breached the standard of care by failing to create a colon cancer detection plan, failing to communicate the plan to Bosco, and failing to execute a colon cancer detection plan. These omissions, he opined, caused and contributed to the development of metastatic colon cancer and Bosco\u2019s death.\nThe plaintiff also presented the expert testimony of Dr. Patrick Sullivan (Dr. Sullivan), who specialized in internal medicine. Dr. Sullivan testified that even when a primary care physician refers a patient to a specialist, the primary care physician is still responsible for coordinating the patient\u2019s care. Dr. Sullivan opined that the primary care physician \u201chas to find out what is going on with the patient, what\u2019s the diagnosis, what\u2019s the problem.\u201d He testified that in his own practice, his responsibility did not end once he referred a patient to a specialist because the primary care doctor is \u201cthe doctor that the patient will turn to for questions.\u201d In Dr. Sullivan\u2019s opinion, Dr. Janowitz breached the standard of care by not creating a colon cancer detection plan, by failing to communicate such a plan to Bosco, and by failing to execute such a detection plan. It was Dr. Sullivan\u2019s opinion that by failing to have a cancer detection plan, which would have included annual exams such as testing stools for occult blood, blood tests, and liver function tests, Dr. Janowitz caused and contributed to the development and spread of Bosco\u2019s colon cancer, which ultimately led to his death. Dr. Sullivan further testified that had stool testing or a colonoscopy been done in 1998, Bosco\u2019s colon cancer would have been detected at that time.\nDoctors Janowitz, Orbeta, Eisenstein and Barrett testified on behalf of the defense. Dr. Janowitz testified that the standard of care for a primary care physician between 1993 and 1999 did not require the physician to advise a patient of all risks and complications relating to his disease, when the patient\u2019s condition was being treated by a specialist. Rather, the primary care physician\u2019s role was to try to get the patient treated by a physician who could best deal with the patient\u2019s problem. Dr. Janowitz testified that once Bosco was diagnosed with ulcerative colitis, it was his plan to have Bosco continue to be followed by his gastroenterologist, Dr. Sweeney. He stated that the reason he did not discuss the risks and long-term issues of ulcerative colitis with Bosco was because \u201cI refer [patients] to the doctor who can do the best for them to treat that problem the best. And that\u2019s why I sent him to Dr. Sweeney, so that Dr. Sweeney would use more knowledge of that problem and could give Mr. Bosco [all] of the information that [he] needed about [his] particular problem that I couldn\u2019t.\u201d Dr. Janowitz stated that he further communicated such a plan to Bosco by continually referring him to Dr. Sweeney, who was a gastroenterologist, for evaluation and treatment of his ulcerative colitis.\nDr. Steve Eisenstein (Dr. Eisenstein), a board-certified family practice physician, testified on behalf of Dr. Janowitz. He testified that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Janowitz complied with the standard of care, and Dr. Janowitz\u2019s treatment did not cause injury to Bosco. Specifically, Dr. Eisenstein opined that after Dr. Janow-itz\u2019s referral to Dr. Sweeney and Dr. Sweeney\u2019s subsequent diagnosis, Dr. Sweeney became the primary treater for Bosco\u2019s ulcerative colitis. He opined that a gastroenterologist was the appropriate physician to make management decisions about Bosco\u2019s condition \u2014 such as explain treatment options, treat the patient, formulate plans and recommend follow-ups. Further, Dr. Eisenstein stated that the physician with the most knowledge and experience regarding the disease should be the one making treatment decisions. He also testified that a family physician, who is less familiar with a complicated illness, may give mixed messages or confuse possible issues relating to the illness and, thus, Dr. Sweeney was Bosco\u2019s main source of information regarding his ulcerative colitis. Dr. Eisenstein further testified that the standard of care did not require Dr. Janowitz to do a complete physical examination on Bosco in 1998 when Bosco requested a \u201cpre-adoption physical\u201d for the purpose of adopting a child. The standard of care also did not require Dr. Janowitz to do annual rectal examinations on patients with ulcerative colitis whose condition was being treated and managed by a gastroenterologist. Dr. Eisenstein also testified that Dr. Janowitz was not required to recommend or advise Bosco to have annual colonoscopies following his diagnosis of the ulcerative colitis, because those procedures were performed at the discretion of a gastroenterologist. Also, the standard of care did not require Dr. Janowitz to advise Bosco about the risks of colon cancer after Bosco was diagnosed with ulcerative colitis, because a gastroenterologist was the one who could provide the most accurate statistics, treatment and information about the risks of colon cancer as related to ulcerative colitis.\nDr. Orbeta also testified that the standard of care regarding colon cancer surveillance for patients with ulcerative colitis was that surveillance should begin eight years after the initial diagnosis. The basis of his opinion stemmed from guidelines set by three major gastroenterol-ogy societies in the United States. Bosco\u2019s initial diagnosis of ulcerative colitis occurred in 1993, and according to the standard of care enunciated by Dr. Orbeta, colon cancer surveillance for Bosco was not required until 2001. Dr. Orbeta further testified that the standard of care for a diagnostic colonoscopy only required biopsies to be done in a representative area of the colon, rather than throughout the entire colon. He also testified that during their first meeting, he had discussed with Bosco information about the disease, its course, etiology, symptoms, risks of cancer, the need for follow-up, annual office visits, and the need for surveillance colonoscopies eight years after the initial diagnosis.\nIn support of Dr. Orbeta\u2019s testimony, Dr. Terrence Barrett (Dr. Barrett) testified that the single polyp that Dr. Sweeney removed during Bosco\u2019s colonoscopy in 1993 was a \u201cdiminutive polyp\u201d that was typically insignificant for a patient with ulcerative colitis. He opined that the standard of care did not require Dr. Orbeta to begin a colon cancer detection plan for Bosco until 8 to 10 years \u201cafter the first bout of a severe episode of pancolitis,\u201d which would have been in the year 2001 in this case. Further, Dr. Barrett testified that Dr. Orbeta complied with the standard of care by taking three biopsies from the transverse colon because it was a diagnostic colonoscopy, not a cancer surveillance colonoscopy. Because no polyps were found during Dr. Or-beta\u2019s diagnostic colonoscopy on Bosco in 1995, there was no reason for Dr. Orbeta to suspect that Bosco had cancer. Dr. Barrett also opined that Dr. Orbeta complied with the standard of care with respect to his treatment plan for Bosco\u2019s anemia and low hemoglobin levels, and properly communicated such plan to Bosco.\nOn October 16, 2006, the jury rendered a unanimous verdict in favor of the defendants. Subsequently, on January 16, 2007, the plaintiff filed a posttrial motion requesting that the trial court grant her a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on all issues. On February 28, 2007, the trial court denied the motion, holding that the jury\u2019s decision was fully supported by the evidence.\nOn March 6, 2007, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal before this court.\nANALYSIS\nWe determine the following three issues: (1) whether a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on all the issues is warranted; (2) whether the trial court was within its discretion in admitting evidence that Bosco failed to follow up with his physician; and (3) whether the trial court properly gave the long-form instruction to the jury concerning the sole proximate cause issue.\nWe first address the issue of whether the plaintiff is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on all issues. The plaintiff argues that she is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the liability issue, based on the fact that the evidence overwhelmingly showed that the defendants breached the standard of care when they failed to create a cancer detection plan, communicate such a plan to Bosco, and execute the plan. Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that the judgment should be set aside and a new trial on all the issues should be granted because the judgment for the defendants was contrary to the weight of the evidence and substantial justice was not accomplished in this case. We disagree.\nA judgment notwithstanding the verdict is reviewed de novo and should be granted only when \u201call of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.\u201d Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504, 513-14 (1967); York v. Rush-Presbyterian-St.Luke\u2019s Medical Cen ter, 222 Ill. 2d 147, 178, 854 N.E.2d 635, 652 (2006). The threshold for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is high, and a motion for such will only be successful when all of the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences considered in favor of the nonmovant, point to a \u201ctotal failure or lack of evidence\u201d to prove the nonmovant\u2019s case. York, 222 Ill. 2d at 178, 854 N.E.2d at 652. For that reason, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is improper if \u201c \u2018reasonable minds might differ as to inferences or conclusions to be drawn from the facts presented.\u2019 \u201d York, 222 Ill. 2d at 178, 854 N.E.2d at 652, quoting Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering, 166 Ill. 2d 337, 351, 654 N.E.2d 1365, 1374 (1995). Specifically, in medical malpractice actions, the Pedrick standard requires the reviewing court to scrutinize all of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. Mielke v. Condell Memorial Hospital, 124 Ill. App. 3d 42, 48, 463 N.E.2d 216, 222 (1984). Using expert testimony, the plaintiff must establish the standard of care by which to measure the physicians\u2019 conduct, and prove, through affirmative evidence, that the defendants were negligent and that the negligence proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. Schmitz v. Binette, 368 Ill. App. 3d 447, 452-53, 857 N.E.2d 846, 851 (2006), citing Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 60 Ill. 2d 418, 423, 328 N.E.2d 301, 304-05 (1975). However, \u201c[wjhere the parties offer conflicting medical testimony regarding the applicable standard of care and [the] defendant\u2019s breach of that standard, the jury is uniquely qualified to resolve the conflict,\u201d and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is inappropriate. Swaw v. Klompien, 168 Ill. App. 3d 705, 711, 522 N.E.2d 1267, 1271 (1988).\nIn the case at bar, the plaintiff specifically argues that the defendants failed to provide evidence to support the verdict in their favor. She contends that the record did not establish that Dr. Janowitz could reasonably rely on Dr. Orbeta to carry out Dr. Janowitz\u2019s duty to create, communicate and execute a colon cancer detection plan. The plaintiff argues that Dr. Orbeta had no memory of ever creating, communicating or executing a colon cancer detection plan and, thus, breached the standard of care in treating Bosco.\nWe disagree with the plaintiffs argument that the defense failed to present evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict. A review of the record indicates that when all of the evidence, including expert testimony, is considered with all reasonable inferences in favor of the defendants, the plaintiff is not able to meet the high standard that warrants awarding her a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. At trial, Dr. Janowitz and Dr. Eisenstein both testified that the standard of care for primary care physicians did not require a primary care physician to advise a patient, whose ulcerative colitis was already being treated and managed by a gastroenterologist, of all the risks and complications of the disease. The jury also heard expert testimony that the standard of care from 1993 to 1998, the time during which Bosco treated with Dr. Janowitz, did not require Dr. Janowitz to create, communicate or execute a cancer detection plan. While the plaintiffs experts, Dr. Gorlin and Dr. Sullivan, testified to the contrary, resolution of such conflicting opinions was squarely within the province of the jury. York, 222 Ill. 2d at 178, 854 N.E.2d at 652 (\u201c[a] court of review \u2018should not usurp the function of the jury and substitute its judgment on questions of fact fairly submitted, tried, and determined from the evidence which did not greatly preponderate either way\u2019 \u201d), quoting Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 452-53, 603 N.E.2d 508, 512 (1992). We find that the defense presented sufficient evidence to enable the jury to find that Dr. Janowitz did not breach the standard of care for a primary care physician.\nLikewise, the jury heard sufficient evidence to find that Dr. Orbeta complied with the standard of care for a reasonably well-qualified gastroenterologist. Doctors Orbeta and Barrett presented testimony that Dr. Orbeta did not breach the standard of care from 1995 to 1999 during his treatment of Bosco\u2019s ulcerative colitis. Specifically, Dr. Or-beta testified that colon cancer surveillance for Bosco was not required under the then-existing standard of care until eight years after the initial diagnosis. Because Dr. Sweeney diagnosed Bosco with ulcerative colitis in 1993, Dr. Orbeta testified that cancer surveillance would not have been required until 2001, and Bosco was no longer a patient of Dr. Orbeta in 2001. Similarly, Dr. Barrett supported Dr. Orbeta in testifying that based on the recommendation of the major gastroenter-ology societies in the United States, the standard of care did not require Dr. Orbeta to begin any colon cancer surveillance with Bosco until 8 to 10 years after \u201cthe first bout of a severe episode of pancoli-tis.\u201d He also testified that because the procedure was only a diagnostic colonoscopy, Dr. Orbeta complied with the standard of care by taking three biopsies from the transverse colon. Again, while the plaintiff offered competing expert testimony regarding the standard of care as applied to Dr. Orbeta, the jury, as fact finder, was uniquely qualified to resolve any conflicting medical testimony and to subsequently find that neither Dr. Janowitz nor Dr. Orbeta breached the standard of care. We hold that the record before us shows sufficient evidence to support the jury\u2019s finding that Dr. Orbeta did not breach the standard of care for a reasonably well-qualified gastroenterologist.\nTherefore, the plaintiff has not established the necessary threshold to warrant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. All of the evidence, together with all the reasonable inferences considered in favor of the defendants, does not show a \u201ctotal failure or lack of evidence\u201d to prove the defendants\u2019 case. In fact, the record shows that the defendants presented sufficient evidence, including the testimony of several experts in response to the plaintiff\u2019s theories. That evidence provided a sufficient basis for the jury to reject the plaintiffs theories and find for the defendants.\nIn the alternative, the plaintiff requests that this court set aside the judgment for the defendants and order a new trial. She argues that the evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient to show that substantial justice was not done in this case. We find the plaintiffs contention without merit.\nThe standard which we must apply regarding the trial court\u2019s decision to deny the plaintiffs motion for a new trial is abuse of discretion. York, 222 Ill. 2d at 179, 854 N.E.2d at 653. A new trial is granted only \u201cif the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d Mizowek v. De Franco, 64 Ill. 2d 303, 310, 356 N.E.2d 32, 36 (1976). A verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence \u201cwhen the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or when the jury\u2019s findings prove to be unreasonable, arbitrary and not based upon any of the evidence.\u201d York, 222 Ill. 2d at 179, 854 N.E.2d at 653-54. To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, we must consider \u201cwhether the jury\u2019s verdict was supported by the evidence and whether the losing party was denied a fair trial.\u201d Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 455-56, 603 N.E.2d at 513. Further, in denying a motion for a new trial, the trial judge \u201c ' \u201chas the benefit of his previous observation of the appearance of the witnesses, their manner in testifying, and of the circumstances aiding in the determination of credibility.\u201d \u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 456, 603 N.E.2d at 513.\nHere, we cannot say that the jury\u2019s verdict in favor of the defendants was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unsupported by evidence so that an opposite conclusion is clearly evident. As outlined above, the defendants presented evidence including the testimony of several experts regarding the proper standard of care by which the physicians who treated Bosco from 1993 to 1999 should be judged. The jury heard evidence that the defendants did not breach the standard of care in treating Bosco and, as a result, did not proximately contribute to or cause his death. While the jury also heard the plaintiffs theories and heard those experts testify that the defendants breached the standard of care, the jury was free to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses presented. Moore v. Anchor Organization for Health Maintenance, 284 Ill. App. 3d 874, 880, 672 N.E.2d 826, 832 (1996) (\u201cit is the function of the jury to weigh contradictory evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and draw ultimate conclusions as to the facts of a case\u201d). Thus, we are not \u201cat liberty to substitute [our] judgment for that of the [jury] merely because different conclusions might be drawn from the evidence presented at trial.\u201d Moore, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 880, 672 N.E.2d at 832. It was within the province of the jury, as finder of fact, to listen to the competing expert testimony, weigh the evidence presented, determine the credibility of all the witnesses, and determine whose testimony to accept or reject. See Lisowski v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital Ass\u2019n, 381 Ill. App. 3d 275, 282-83, 885 N.E.2d 1120, 1130 (2008).\nIn denying the plaintiffs motion for a new trial, in this case, the trial court held that the jury\u2019s verdict was supported by the evidence presented:\n\u201cYou [heard] them tell you that \u2014 tell all of us that they gave higher marks to witnesses who had appeared on behalf of the defendants than they did for witnesses who appeared on behalf of the plaintiff. And you [heard] them tell us that they weighed all of that evidence and they believed that the plaintiff\u2019s claims that these defendants had violated standards of practice were wanting, that the plaintiff did not meet the standards, the burden of proof that was applicable to the plaintiff on that issue.\nThey did exactly what we asked them to do when we call jurors in, weigh the evidence and based upon the evidence, decide whether there is a case for liability or not, and they found the case for liability wanting.\u201d\nWe find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs motion for a new trial because the jury\u2019s verdict in favor of the defendants was supported by the evidence. The plaintiff was not denied a fair trial since she was also afforded the opportunity to present evidence including expert testimony in support of her position. Thus, we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial on this basis.\nWe next determine the issue of whether the trial court was within its discretion when it admitted evidence that Bosco failed to follow up with Dr. Orbeta after May 17, 1999. The plaintiff argues that a new trial is warranted because the admission of such evidence was prejudicial to the plaintiff. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that this evidence was erroneously admitted because the defendants had abandoned this \u201caffirmative defense\u201d when they failed to tender instructions to the jury that would have permitted the jury to apply the evidence to the issues presented.\nAs stated above, a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion for a new trial unless it is affirmatively shown that the trial court clearly abused its discretion. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 455, 603 N.E.2d at 513. \u201cGenerally, a party is not entitled to reversal based upon evidentiary rulings unless the error was substantially prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case.\u201d Taluzek v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., 255 Ill. App. 3d 72, 83, 626 N.E.2d 1367, 1376 (1993). The discretion as to whether evidence is admitted is given to the trial court, and such determination will not be overturned on appeal unless there is clearly an abuse of discretion. Taluzek, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 83, 626 N.E.2d at 1376. The party seeking reversal bears the burden of establishing prejudice. Smith v. Baker\u2019s Feed & Grain, Inc., 213 Ill. App. 3d 950, 952-53, 572 N.E.2d 430, 432 (1991).\nIn this case, the defendants contend that the evidence regarding Bosco\u2019s failure to follow up with Dr. Orbeta was properly admitted as evidence to rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case. They argue that it shows that the defendants were unable to do what the plaintiff and her experts claimed the defendants should have done to treat Bosco\u2019s condition. We find this argument persuasive.\nHere, the evidence that Bosco failed to return to Dr. Orbeta\u2019s office for a follow-up evaluation, despite being instructed to do so, did not constitute prejudicial evidence that should have been excluded. Instead, it was evidence used to rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case, as the defendants had a right to do. One of the plaintiff\u2019s chief complaints against Dr. Orbeta was that he failed to comply with the standard of care because he should have performed a colonoscopy after May 17, 1999, if colon cancer was the suspected culprit of Bosco\u2019s health problems at that time. Dr. Orbeta testified that he had informed Bosco by telephone after the May 17, 1999, blood results that Bosco needed to come back in one month for reevaluation. It was undisputed that Bosco never returned to see Dr. Orbeta. Such evidence was highly relevant and goes to the issue of whether Dr. Orbeta could even have complied with the standard of care which the plaintiff claims he breached. Essentially, Bosco\u2019s failure to return to see Dr. Orbeta and to consent to treatment prevented Dr. Orbeta from further examining Bosco and performing any other necessary medical procedures. Even had Dr. Orbeta created a colon cancer surveillance plan and communicated that plan to Bosco, as the plaintiff urges he should have done, Bosco\u2019s failure to follow up with Dr. Orbeta was rebuttal evidence to establish that Dr. Orbeta could not possibly have executed that plan. See Agnew v. Shaw, 355 Ill. App. 3d 981, 990-91, 823 N.E.2d 1046, 1054 (2005) (\u201ca reviewing court can sustain the decision of the trial court to admit or exclude evidence for any appropriate reason, regardless of whether the trial court relied on that reason or whether the trial court\u2019s reasoning was correct\u201d).\nAlso, the admission of the evidence complained of by the plaintiff did not affect the outcome of the case. The jury heard several experts testify that the defendants did not breach the standard of care in treating Bosco. The result reached by the jury was clearly warranted by all of the other evidence presented, regardless of whether evidence of Bosco\u2019s failure to return to Dr. Orbeta for follow-up was erroneously admitted into evidence. Smith, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 952, 572 N.E.2d at 432 (\u201c \u2018[A]n erroneous ruling on evidence is harmless where the result reached was not affected by the ruling, and the result reached was the only one warranted by other evidence in the case\u2019 \u201d), quoting Atkins v. Thapedi, 166 Ill. App. 3d 471, 477, 519 N.E.2d 1073, 1077 (1988).\nThe plaintiff has failed to carry her burden of proof regarding the prejudicial effect of the admitted evidence. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting that evidence. Because of this holding, we need not address the plaintiff\u2019s argument that the defendants abandoned the evidence as an affirmative defense when they failed to tender jury instructions that would have permitted the jury to apply that evidence to the issues.\nLastly, we consider the issue of whether the trial court erred in giving the long-form instructions to the jury concerning the sole proximate cause issue related to Bosco\u2019s death. The plaintiff argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the jury was irrevocably tainted when the trial court denied her motion in limine and her request to give a specific version of the jury instructions that did not include sole proximate cause language.\nA review of the record discloses that the plaintiffs motion in limine regarding this issue is absent from the record submitted to this court. The record contains a transcript of the trial court denying the motion. That transcript states in pertinent part:\n\u201cRegarding number 20 [motion in limine] and any evidence with respect to the negligence of third parties, certainly under the Reidy [sic] case, which came down in August of this year, it\u2019s clear that any settling defendants may be part of consideration by a jury in attributing fault to various defendants, and therefore, negligence concerning third parties would certainly be something that the jury would be allowed to consider. So as a blanket consideration, this would be denied.\nIt\u2019s further denied concerning developing of the defendant\u2019s theory as to whether or not certain things needed to be done by the defendants or whether they were following similar practices of others that the plaintiff was seeing at the time. So number 20 is denied.\u201d\nWe defer to the trial court\u2019s reasoning for denying the plaintiffs motion in limine. Because the motion in limine itself is absent from the record, we are limited to resolving any doubts arising from an incomplete record against the plaintiff and, consequently, assume that the trial court\u2019s ruling was correct. 155 Ill. 2d R. 328; Muellman Cohen v. Brak, 361 Ill. App. 3d 52, 54, 836 N.E.2d 678, 679 (2005), citing Foutch v. O\u2019Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392, 459 N.E.2d 958, 959 (1984).\nSubsequently, the trial court instructed the jury with the long forms of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, Nos. 12.04 and 12.05 (2000) (IPI), which included sole proximate cause language. The trial court reasoned:\n\u201cI believe that if the jury concludes that the \u2014 it is more probably true than not true that the negligence of Dr. Brasco was the sole proximate cause of the spread of the cancer and the death of Mr. Bosco then it would be appropriate to use the sole proximate cause instruction. That is something that they could conclude from the evidence. And, therefore, it\u2019s appropriate to give the sole proximate cause instruction over the objection of the plaintiff.\nIf the jury believes that the cancer was contained as of October 1999 and if the colon had been removed in toto at that point that Mr. Bosco would not have developed cancer further then the proximate cause of the spread of the cancer would be as a result of the perforation of the colon and the subsequent spread of the cancer as a result of the actions of Dr. Brasco.\nThey certainly could conclude that from the evidence but it\u2019s up to them to reach that conclusion, it\u2019s not for me to say one way or the other. But since they could reach that conclusion it would be appropriate to give the instruction to allow the defendants to make that argument to the jury.\u201d\nThe long form of IPI Civil (2000) No. 12.04 is appropriately given to the jury when there is admitted evidence that the sole proximate cause of the resulting injury could have been the negligent conduct of a dismissed defendant. Petre v. Kucich, 356 Ill. App. 3d 57, 66, 824 N.E.2d 1117, 1125 (2005). Likewise, the long form of the IPI Civil (2000) No. 12.05 is proper since \u201c \u2018[a] defendant has the right not only to rebut the evidence tending to show that [the] defendant\u2019s acts are negligent and the proximate cause of claimed injuries, but also has the right to endeavor to establish by competent evidence that the conduct of a third person, or some other causative factor, is the sole proximate cause of [the] plaintiffs injuries.\u2019 \u201d Mack v. Anderson, 371 Ill. App. 3d 36, 57, 861 N.E.2d 280, 300 (2006), quoting Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 101, 658 N.E.2d 450, 459 (1995); see also Brax v. Kennedy, 363 Ill. App. 3d 343, 351, 841 N.E.2d 137, 144 (2005).\nIn this case, the defendants argue that the evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to allow the trial court to give the long-form instructions which included the proximate cause language complained of by the plaintiff. The jury heard evidence that allowed it to conclude that the conduct of Dr. Brasco was the sole proximate cause of Bosco\u2019s metastatic cancer and death. Doctor Gorlin, the plaintiffs own expert, testified that Dr. Brasco\u2019s perforation of the colon caused the metastatic spread of the cancer and that the failure of Dr. Aki to remove the entire colon soon after Bosco\u2019s partial colectomy increased the risk that the cancer would recur. He also testified that Bosco\u2019s stage 2 cancer in October 1999 was treatable and curable. Bosco\u2019s oncologist, Dr. Benson, also testified that leaving the partial colon behind increased the risk of recurring colon cancer. The jury also heard testimony from Dr. Sullivan, who testified that had the surgery been done in a timely fashion and the cancer taken out prior to its spread, Bosco likely would have enjoyed an average life expectancy. Finally, the jury also heard evidence that at the time Dr. Brasco perforated Bosco\u2019s colon and Dr. Aki removed Bosco\u2019s colon, neither Dr. Janowitz nor Dr. Orbeta was involved in Bosco\u2019s treatment. It was undisputed that Bosco\u2019s final visits to Dr. Janowitz and Dr. Orbeta were on September 10, 1998, and May 17, 1999, respectively.\nWe hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury with the long forms of IPI Civil (2000) Nos. 12.04 and 12.05, in light of the fact that the jury could have concluded from the evidence that Dr. Brasco\u2019s conduct was the sole proximate cause of Bosco\u2019s metastatic cancer and eventual death. Accordingly, the plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial based on this theory.\nWe need not address the plaintiffs argument that the trial court misapplied Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, 367 Ill. App. 3d 272, 854 N.E.2d 758 (2006), aff\u2019d in part & rev\u2019d in part, 232 Ill. 2d 369 (2008), because apportionment rules are inapplicable where, as here, the defendants were found not liable.\nAs a final matter, we note that there is some merit to the defendants\u2019 contention that the plaintiff forfeited certain arguments on appeal by failing to provide legal authority or cite to the record in violation of Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7)); nonetheless, these failures to comply with Rule 341 have had no effect on this appeal.\nAffirmed.\nKARNEZIS, P.J., and HOFFMAN, J., concur.\nPrior to trial, Dr. Brasco and Northwest Community Hospital settled with the plaintiff, and were dismissed with prejudice from the lawsuit. Thus, they are not parties before this court on appeal.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM" } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Offices of Kenneth C. Chessick, of Schaumburg (Kenneth C. Ches-sick, of counsel), and Novoselsky Law Offices, of Chicago (David A. Novosel-sky and Leslie J. Rosen, of counsel), for appellant.", "Pretzel & Stouffer Chtrd., of Chicago (Robert Marc Chemers, Edward H. Nielsen, Belle L. Katubig, and Scott L. Howie, of counsel), for appellees Robert Janowitz and Westmont Family Practice, S.C.", "Bollinger, Ruberry & Garvey, of Chicago (Scott C. Bentivenga, James E. Abbott, Michael S. Haggerty, and Krista R. Frick, of counsel), for other appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PAMELA BOSCO, Indiv. and as Ex\u2019r of the Estate of Peter Bosco, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT JANOWITZ et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 07\u20140617\nOpinion filed February 10, 2009.\nLaw Offices of Kenneth C. Chessick, of Schaumburg (Kenneth C. Ches-sick, of counsel), and Novoselsky Law Offices, of Chicago (David A. Novosel-sky and Leslie J. Rosen, of counsel), for appellant.\nPretzel & Stouffer Chtrd., of Chicago (Robert Marc Chemers, Edward H. Nielsen, Belle L. Katubig, and Scott L. Howie, of counsel), for appellees Robert Janowitz and Westmont Family Practice, S.C.\nBollinger, Ruberry & Garvey, of Chicago (Scott C. Bentivenga, James E. Abbott, Michael S. Haggerty, and Krista R. Frick, of counsel), for other appellees." }, "file_name": "0450-01", "first_page_order": 466, "last_page_order": 482 }