{ "id": 4284016, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ENRIQUE SANTANA, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Santana", "decision_date": "2009-02-20", "docket_number": "Nos. 2-07-0640, 2-07-0642 cons.", "first_page": "961", "last_page": "969", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 961" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 846", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273791 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" }, { "page": "852" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/376/0846-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 Ill. App. 3d 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4282147 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" }, { "page": "313" }, { "page": "315-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/387/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 Ill. App. 3d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4268720 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" }, { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/372/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 Ill. App. 3d 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4269757 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/372/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 Ill. App. 3d 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3627840 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735", "parenthetical": "\" 'You could be fined or you could get a penitentiary sentence and have to serve a period of three years mandatory supervised release' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/381/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 Ill. App. 3d 972", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3628096 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/381/0972-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 Ill. App. 3d 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4280934 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475-76" }, { "page": "474" }, { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/386/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "378 Ill. App. 3d 1010", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4274655 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1018" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/378/1010-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259086 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3600666 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777558 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" }, { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442050 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2966716 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3874667 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "190" }, { "page": "203-05" }, { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610490 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" }, { "page": "7-8" }, { "page": "8" }, { "page": "8" }, { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 832, "char_count": 20933, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.61617649526609e-08, "percentile": 0.5268339968855327 }, "sha256": "5721df44f88a9dea4bc7176076c6dc7d1c7857aaa88c950b6589dd272b25f15f", "simhash": "1:3ea9e6234648f4f4", "word_count": 3490 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:04:57.079883+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ENRIQUE SANTANA, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE JORGENSEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn these consolidated appeals, defendant, Enrique Santana, seeks review of orders dismissing petitions under section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401 (West 2006)), which sought the reduction of his sentences for aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.2(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2000)). We affirm.\nIn separate prosecutions, defendant was charged with aggravated discharge of a firearm in incidents that occurred on or about March 23, 2001 (case No. 2 \u2014 07\u20140640), and March 28, 2001 (case No. 2 \u2014 07\u20140642). On May 29, 2001, defendant entered negotiated guilty pleas in both cases. The prosecutor provided the following statement of the terms of the plea agreement:\n\u201cWe have a proposed disposition. The defendant will be pleading guilty to both cases. *** On each case he will be sentenced to ten years in the Illinois Department of Corrections.\nThe Court will also as part of our plea make a finding *** that consecutive sentence is necessary in this case having regard for the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history of the defendant that a consecutive term is required to protect the public. As a result, those sentences will run consecutively.\u201d\nThe prosecutor did not explain that, by operation of law, defendant\u2019s sentences included a two-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR), to be served upon release from incarceration. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(d)(2) (West 2000). However, before accepting defendant\u2019s guilty pleas, the trial court admonished him as follows:\n\u201cIf you are found guilty of [the charge arising from the March 23, 2001, incident], you could be sentenced from four to five [szc] years in the penitentiary followed by a two-year [MSR] term that used to be called parole and a fine of up to $25,000.\n\u2756 \u2756\nIf you are found guilty of [the charge arising from the March 28, 2001, incident], you could be sentenced from four to 15 years in the penitentiary followed by a one-year [MSR] term that used to be called \u2014 let me start that again. If you are found guilty of that aggravated discharge of a firearm, you could be sentenced from four to 15 years in the penitentiary followed by a two-year [MSR] term that used to be called parole and a fine of up to $25,000.\u201d\nDefendant filed his section 2 \u2014 1401 petitions in April 2007. He alleged that he \u201cwas never admonished or even told that 2 years of MSR would have to be done once his determinate sentence was complete.\u201d Defendant contended that the addition of a term of MSR to his sentences contravened his plea agreement. The State moved to dismiss the petitions, and the trial court granted the motions, concluding that the petitions were untimely and that, because defendant was properly admonished, each petition failed to state a basis for relief. Defendant filed timely notices of appeal, and this court ordered the appeals consolidated.\nSection 2 \u2014 1401 provides \u201ca comprehensive, statutory procedure that allows for the vacatur of a final judgment older than 30 days.\u201d People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (2007). \u201cRelief under section 2 \u2014 1401 is predicated upon proof, by a preponderance of evidence, of a defense or claim that would have precluded entry of the judgment in the original action and diligence in both discovering the defense or claim and presenting the petition.\u201d Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 7-8. Ordinarily the petition must be brought within two years after the entry of the judgment or order from which relief is sought. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401(c) (West 2006). Relief under section 2 \u2014 1401 is available in criminal as well as civil cases. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 8. The petition may be dismissed if legally or factually insufficient. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 8. Absent an evidentiary hearing on the petition, our review of the dismissal of the petition is de novo. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 13.\nDefendant argues on appeal that his petitions set forth claims for relief pursuant to the principles announced in People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177 (2005). In that case, our supreme court noted that a violation of due process occurs when a defendant pleads guilty in exchange for a specific sentence, but receives \u201ca different, more onerous sentence.\u201d Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 189. The Whitfield court further observed that under Supreme Court Rule 402(a)(2) (177 Ill. 2d R. 402(a)(2)) \u2014 which requires the trial court to inform the defendant of the minimum and maximum sentences prescribed by law before accepting a guilty plea \u2014 the defendant must be informed that a term of MSR will be added to his or her sentence. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 188, citing People v. Wills, 61 Ill. 2d 105, 109 (1975). Without a proper admonition, adding MSR to the defendant\u2019s sentence \u201camounts to a unilateral modification and breach of the plea agreement by the State, inconsistent with constitutional concerns of fundamental fairness.\u201d Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 190. However, because a defendant sentenced to imprisonment must also serve a term of MSR, the Whitfield court concluded that the remedy most closely approximating the defendant\u2019s bargain with the State is to reduce the defendant\u2019s prison term by a period equal to the MSR term. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 203-05. Accordingly, in Whitfield, where the defendant pleaded guilty in exchange for a 25-year prison term and was not told he would also have to serve a 3-year term of MSR, the court reduced the prison term by 3 years.\nDefendant argues that, in accordance with Whitfield, his prison terms should be reduced by two years. Defendant contends that his failure to file his petitions within two years after his conviction does not bar relief. According to defendant, the portion of his sentences exceeding what is permissible under Whitfield is void and may be challenged at any time under section 2 \u2014 1401. Defendant alternatively argues that, if section 2 \u2014 1401\u2019s time limit does in fact apply, the trial court should have recharacterized his petition as one seeking relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2006)), in which case the trial court would have to appoint counsel to represent defendant before considering the timeliness of the petition. See generally People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89 (2002).\nWe disagree with defendant\u2019s theory that a sentence that runs afoul of Whitfield is partly void. \u201cWhether a judgment is void or voidable presents a question of jurisdiction.\u201d People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 155 (1993). A judgment is void if the court entered it without personal or subject matter jurisdiction or if the court \u201clacked the power to render the particular judgment or sentence.\u201d People v. Rodriguez, 355 Ill. App. 3d 290, 296 (2005). There is no question that the trial court possessed jurisdiction over defendant\u2019s person and over the subject matter. The only issue is whether the court lacked the power to impose sentences that violated defendant\u2019s agreement with the State. Our supreme court has observed that the requirement that a court have the \u201cinherent power\u201d to render a particular judgment is largely a relic of the period prior to 1964, when courts exercised only limited jurisdiction conferred by statute. Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 529-30 (2001). In criminal cases, the \u201cinherent power\u201d requirement endures mainly as a limitation on the court\u2019s ability to impose a sentence contravening a statutory requirement. Thus, \u201ca sentence not conforming to a statutory requirement is void and may be corrected at any time.\u201d People v. Davison, 378 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1018 (2008), appeal allowed, 228 Ill. 2d 540 (2008).\nHere, defendant\u2019s sentences \u2014 including MSR \u2014 are authorized by statute. Whether or not defendant\u2019s sentences comport with Whitfield, the trial court clearly had the power to impose the sentences. Even if the trial court failed to sufficiently admonish defendant concerning MSR, the error would not vitiate the trial court\u2019s power to impose a sentence authorized by statute. As our supreme court has noted, \u201cjurisdiction or power to render a particular judgment does not mean that the judgment rendered must be the one that should have been rendered, for the power to decide carries with it the power to decide wrong as well as to decide right.\u201d Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 156.\nNor do we believe that the trial court erred by declining to recharacterize defendant\u2019s section 2 \u2014 1401 petition as one brought under the Act. In support of his argument, defendant relies on People v. Smith, 386 Ill. App. 3d 473 (2008). Smith held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to recharacterize, sua sponte, an untimely pro se section 2 \u2014 1401 petition that would have been timely under the Act. Smith, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 475-76. The result in Smith is questionable. The trial court is under no obligation to recharacterize a pleading on its own. Section 122 \u2014 1(d) of the Act provides that \u201c[a] trial court that has received a petition complaining of a conviction or sentence that fails to specify in the petition or its heading that it is filed under [the Act] need not evaluate the petition to determine whether it could otherwise have stated some grounds for relief under [the Act].\u201d (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1(d) (West 2006). In any event, Smith is distinguishable. First, unlike in Smith, defendant\u2019s petitions were time-barred not only under section 2 \u2014 1401, but under the Act as well. Even if we agreed with Smith, we would not extend its holding to a case like this one, where the defendant\u2019s ultimate success would depend not only on the recharacterization of the petition but also on the defendant establishing an excuse for the late filing or the State deciding to forgo a valid challenge under the Act to the timeliness of the petition. Such circumstances would not justify overriding the trial court\u2019s discretion in determining whether to recharacterize a defendant\u2019s petition.\nSecond, even under the Act, defendant\u2019s petitions fail to establish grounds for relief under Whitfield. According to defendant, the trial court should have specifically informed him that the plea agreement provided for MSR. Defendant recognizes that this case differs from Whitfield, in which during the plea proceedings there was no reference whatsoever to MSR. However, defendant insists that \u201cmerely mentioning that MSR could be part of a potential sentence did not inform [defendant] that MSR was certain to be part of the sentence for which he was agreeing to plead guilty.\u201d The argument is meritless.\nReviewing courts have not insisted that the admonition concerning MSR take any particular form or that MSR be addressed at any particular point in the proceedings. In several cases, courts have held that Whitfield did not apply when the trial court mentioned MSR while advising the defendant of the maximum and minimum penalties for the charged offense, even though the defendant was not specifically admonished that a term of MSR would attach to his or her sentence. See People v. Thomas, 381 Ill. App. 3d 972 (2008); People v. Marshall, 381 Ill. App. 3d 724 (2008); People v. Holt, 372 Ill. App. 3d 650 (2007). Defendant contends that Thomas, Marshall, and Holt are distinguishable, however, because in those cases the trial courts made it clear that a term of MSR would follow any prison term. However, the admonition in Marshall was not significantly different from the one given here. See Marshall, 381 Ill. App. 3d at 735 (\u201c \u2018You could be fined or you could get a penitentiary sentence and have to serve a period of three years mandatory supervised release\u2019 \u201d). Moreover, the distinction defendant attempts to draw does not apply to People v. Borst, 372 Ill. App. 3d 331 (2007). In Borst, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault and home invasion in exchange for concurrent 15-year sentences and the dismissal of a charge of residential burglary. The trial court admonished the defendant, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u2018[TRIAL COURT]: Count [I], attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, is a Class [1] [fjelony punishable by one to three years, I\u2019m sorry, four to 15 years in the penitentiary. If there are aggravating factors present[,] could be 15 to 30 years. Two yearsf\u2019] [MSR], Up to four years on probation. Up to $25,000 fine.\nCount [II], home invasion, is a Class X [fjelony as charged. It\u2019s six to 30 years in the penitentiary. Could be 30 to 60 years if there are aggravating factors present. Three years[\u2019] [MSR], Is not proba-tionable. And up to $25,000 fine.\nCount [III], residential burglary, is a Class 1 offense with penalty that I just read to you except it is not probationable.\u2019 \u201d (Emphases in original.) Borst, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 332.\nHowever, as in this case, the trial court made no mention of MSR when describing the sentence that would be imposed pursuant to the plea agreement. Notwithstanding the omission, the Borst court rejected the defendant\u2019s Whitfield claim for the following reasons:\n\u201cThe situation in the case at bar is similar to that in Whitfield with one important exception. In Whitfield, the trial court did not make any mention of MSR to the defendant before he entered his negotiated guilty plea for a specific term of years. [Citation.] In the instant case, the trial court informed defendant of MSR. While the court could have made its admonitions clearer, the court did make defendant aware of MSR.\nIf the trial court had failed to give defendant any admonitions concerning MSR, we would follow Whitfield even though we have concerns about the supreme court\u2019s opinion. However, in our case, the court did admonish defendant about MSR. We will not expand the holding in Whitfield to apply to situations like those in the instant case. While the court\u2019s admonitions in this case were inartful, defendant\u2019s constitutional right to due process and fundamental fairness was not violated.\u201d Borst, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 334.\nIn People v. Mendez, 387 Ill. App. 3d 311 (2008), we approved of this result:\n\u201cThe trial court [in Borst] complied with the Whitfield requirement to link the MSR term to the plea, by linking MSR \u2018to the defendant\u2019s crime.\u2019 [Citation.] The trial court in Borst individually listed each count of the indictment, named the offense and the class of felony, and stated that the offense was \u2018punishable by\u2019 a prison term, possibly an extended term, MSR, probation (or not), and a fine. [Citation.] Thus, the Borst trial court\u2019s general admonition was sufficient because it was a broad statement that the defendant\u2019s prison term would be followed by MSR. What remained open for negotiation in the plea process was merely the length of the prison term.\u201d Mendez, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 319.\nDefendant argues, however, that this case resembles People v. Company, 376 Ill. App. 3d 846 (2007). In Company, the defendant pleaded guilty to home invasion. Pursuant to an agreement with the State, he was sentenced to a 15-year prison term and a first-degree murder charge was dismissed. During the plea proceedings, the only reference to MSR was the trial court\u2019s statement that, if the defendant had been \u201cconvicted at trial\u201d of first-degree murder or home invasion, his prison term would be followed by a term of MSR. The Company court held that Whitfield, not Borst, was controlling. The Company court reasoned:\n\u201cBased on the trial court\u2019s statements, the defendant could reasonably understand that an MSR term applied only if he were to be found guilty at a trial. Nothing in the record shows that the defendant knew he would be subject to an MSR term as a result of his guilty plea. The fact that the trial court mentioned MSR in connection with the defendant\u2019s possible sentence if he were to be found guilty at a trial does not establish that the defendant was aware that an MSR term applied to his plea.\u201d Company, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 851.\nThe Company court concluded that Borst was distinguishable because \u201c[t]he trial court\u2019s admonishment in Borst related MSR to the defendant\u2019s crime,\u201d whereas the admonishment in Company \u201clinked MSR to the defendant\u2019s possible sentence if he were to be found guilty at a trial and not to a sentence for his crime in general or to the sentence that was being imposed as a result of his guilty plea.\u201d Company, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 852.\nDefendant contends that the same reasoning applies here because the trial court admonished defendant that he could be sentenced to imprisonment and MSR if he were \u201cfound guilty.\u201d According to defendant, \u201c[b]eing \u2018found guilty\u2019 implies that a trier of fact would determine [defendant\u2019s] guilt rather than [defendant] himself acknowledging his guilt and pleading guilty.\u201d\nWe disagree. This case is more closely analogous to Borst than to Company. Here, the trial court\u2019s admonition did not explicitly link MSR to a conviction following a trial. The trial court\u2019s broad statement that defendant could serve a prison term, followed by a term of MSR, if \u201cfound guilty\u201d was not confined to a conviction resulting from a trial. A conviction based on a guilty plea depends on a judicial finding of guilt (albeit one based on uncontested facts); the trial court may not simply enter judgment on the plea, but must also determine that there is a sufficient factual basis for the plea (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 2(a) (West 2000)).\nAs was the case in Borst, the discussion of MSR was sufficient to apprise defendant of the penal consequences of his plea. The remote, theoretical possibility that defendant might have misinterpreted the admonition is insufficient to establish either that \u201creal justice has been denied\u201d or that the admonishment prejudiced defendant in any appreciable way. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 195.\nOur decision in Mendez does not require a different result. In Mendez, after confirming that the defendant had agreed to serve a 12-year prison term for aggravated battery with a firearm, the trial court stated, \u201c \u2018[T]he way this was charged, it is a Class X felony, which means that its possible penalties could have been between six and thirty years in the Department of Corrections with three years of mandatory supervised release or what was known as parole.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) Mendez, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 313. We reasoned that the emphasized language was misleading because it \u201csuggested that these were the possible penalties had the circumstances been other than what they were, i.e., in the absence of a plea and in the event of a conviction at trial.\u201d Mendez, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 315-16. Here, in contrast, defendant was not advised that his sentence \u201ccould have been\u201d a prison term followed by MSR. Rather he was told that he \u201ccould be\u201d sentenced to prison and MSR if found guilty.\nSmith is also distinguishable. In Smith, the plea agreement provided that the defendant would serve a 22-year prison sentence for first-degree murder. Outlining the authorized penalties for that offense, the trial court advised the defendant, \u201c \u2018you could be sentenced to twenty to sixty years in the Department of Corrections. You could be fined up to $25,000. You could be subject to mandatory supervised release of three years.\u2019 \u201d Smith, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 474. In holding the admonition insufficient, the Smith court reasoned:\n\u201cWhen the trial court accepted the plea and imposed the sentence, it specifically mentioned the 22 years\u2019 incarceration, court costs, DNA testing, and disbursement of bond monies, but it did not mention a term of mandatory supervised release. Because the defendant negotiated a sentence at the low end of the sentencing range, the failure to affirmatively inform the defendant that mandatory supervised release remained as a part of his sentence could have led him to believe that the mandatory-supervised-release term had also been negotiated away.\u201d Smith, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 482.\nUnlike in this case, in Smith the trial court phrased its admonition in a manner that suggested that imprisonment, a fine, and MSR were alternative penalties. This could have fostered the idea that MSR could be bargained away. Here, in contrast, the admonition made clear that, if defendant were found guilty and sentenced to a prison term, a term of MSR would follow the prison term. The admonition could not have led defendant to believe that imprisonment and MSR were alternative penalties.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcLaren and HUTCHINSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE JORGENSEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas A. Lilien and Yasemin Eken, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Lawrence M. Bauer and Mary Beth Burns, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ENRIQUE SANTANA, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNos. 2 \u2014 07\u20140640, 2 \u2014 07\u20140642 cons.\nOpinion filed February 20, 2009.\nThomas A. Lilien and Yasemin Eken, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Lawrence M. Bauer and Mary Beth Burns, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0961-01", "first_page_order": 977, "last_page_order": 985 }