{ "id": 4283708, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ADRIAN P. BALDWIN, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Baldwin", "decision_date": "2009-03-23", "docket_number": "No. 3-08-0118", "first_page": "1028", "last_page": "1036", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 1028" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "734 N.E.2d 507", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" }, { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 744", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980629 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748" }, { "page": "748" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0744-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 N.E.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 251474 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 U.S. 675", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11300009 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/470/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 696", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6193241 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0696-01" ] }, { "cite": "871 N.E.2d 815", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "374 Ill. App. 3d 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 7327955 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/374/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 U.S. 93", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5902037 ], "weight": 15, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/544/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "796 N.E.2d 1024", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1029" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 975007 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 491", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6195479 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500", "parenthetical": "plurality op." }, { "page": "238", "parenthetical": "plurality op." }, { "page": "1325-26", "parenthetical": "plurality op." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "830 N.E.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060013 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "898 N.E.2d 603", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3617207 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/231/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "806 N.E.2d 722", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 1101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3833399 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/1101-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 U.S. 405", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5902584 ], "weight": 21, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" }, { "page": "846" }, { "page": "408" }, { "page": "847" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/543/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "886 N.E.2d 947", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "959, 961" }, { "page": "961" }, { "page": "957", "parenthetical": "\"Defendant has not argued that the computerized warrant check, conducted at the same time as the officer's check of the status of the driver's license, unreasonably prolonged his seizure\"" }, { "page": "961" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706523 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240, 244" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "236" }, { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 U.S. 249", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3573063 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/551/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "857 N.E.2d 187", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3602037 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "789 N.E.2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609689 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" }, { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0220-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 890, "char_count": 20532, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.970502611891114e-08, "percentile": 0.46319592377779556 }, "sha256": "7b9214659d2d608909f1aeb5cf474c77a02634542afd3cc868fc63cc1c2c1acc", "simhash": "1:eb06ba5e89c18d47", "word_count": 3408 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:04:57.079883+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ADRIAN P. BALDWIN, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Adrian P Baldwin, was charged with unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia (720 ILCS 600/3.5(a) (West 2006)). The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, which the circuit court granted. On appeal, the State argues that the circuit court erred when it granted the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. We affirm.\nFACTS\nOn July 28, 2007, McDonough County deputy sheriff Mike Pilat initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Curtis Baldwin, but owned by his wife. Pilat had observed the vehicle make two lane violations. The defendant, who was 17 years old at the time, was seated in the front passenger seat, and a minor female was seated in the backseat.\nPilat approached the driver\u2019s side of the vehicle, and a reserve officer approached the passenger side of the vehicle. Pilat began talking to the defendant while the reserve officer shined his flashlight into the vehicle. Pilat obtained the driver\u2019s information, then asked the passengers for identification. The passengers did not have any identification, so Pilat asked for and received the passengers\u2019 names. Pilat testified that the defendant mumbled his name to Pilat, resulting in Pilat having to ask more than once for the defendant\u2019s information. Pilat also had to ask more than once for the minor female\u2019s name. Pilat testified that, although he smelled a faint odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle, he did not smell alcohol on the breath of the driver or the passengers. He did not smell any odor of cannabis.\nPilat also testified that the defendant began breathing heavily when Pilat asked for the defendant\u2019s name. According to Pilat, the defendant appeared nervous and would not look at Pilat, although Pi-lat admitted that the defendant might have been distracted by the reserve officer. The defendant also kept his right hand at his side, along the seat. Pilat testified that he thought the defendant might be hiding something in his hand. On cross-examination, Pilat stated that he also thought that the defendant might have a weapon in his hand, although he did not inquire about the defendant\u2019s hands, nor did he frisk the defendant.\nA videotape of the stop was admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing. The tape began with the vehicle already at a stop. Within two minutes of the beginning of the tape, Pilat had obtained the driver\u2019s and passengers\u2019 information and returned to his squad car, at which point Pilat turned off his microphone. Approximately 21/2 minutes later, Pilat returned to the vehicle and began talking to the defendant. Nothing on the videotape indicated that any issue arose with the information run by Pilat. Likewise, at the suppression hearing, no evidence was introduced to indicate any issue arose with the information run by Pilat.\nApproximately 40 seconds after returning to the stopped vehicle, Pilat asked the driver to step out of the vehicle, and Pilat and the driver began having a conversation at the rear of the vehicle. Because Pilat\u2019s microphone was still off, there was no audio of the conversation on the tape of the stop.\nPilat testified that he asked the driver about the odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle. The driver explained that he had been sober for approximately 10 or 11 years. The driver also explained that he had been playing in a band at a benefit being held at a bar that night, and he noticed an odd odor coming from the vehicle when he and the passengers were leaving the bar. The vehicle was a convertible; at the time it was parked in the bar\u2019s lot, the top was down. When the stop was made, the top was up.\nDuring the conversation, Pilat asked the driver for consent to search the vehicle numerous times, with multiple requests being made because the driver would not give a yes or no answer. Pilat testified that the driver refused to give consent. The driver testified that Pilat was \u201cadamant\u201d when asking for consent and persisted even though the driver told Pilat that there was no reason to search the vehicle.\nAt some point while he and the driver were talking at the rear of the vehicle, Pilat claimed that he saw the defendant turn around, look in the direction of Pilat and the driver, reach into his pocket, and reach down along his side.\nEventually, the conversation moved to the passenger side of the vehicle, where the tape shows the driver briefly talking to the defendant, then Pilat briefly talking to the defendant while shining his flashlight into the vehicle. The conversation moved back to the rear of the vehicle, and Pilat asked the driver to return to the vehicle and wait, as Pilat was going to request a canine to perform a sniff of the vehicle. After the approximately 3-minute, 15-second conversation outside the vehicle, the driver sat back down in the vehicle. At this point, approximately nine minutes had passed since the time at which Pilat\u2019s camera began recording.\nApproximately 30 seconds later, Pilat called to request a canine unit. The tape indicated that the canine unit arrived approximately two minutes later. When the sniff was completed, approximately 14 minutes had passed since the time at which Pilat\u2019s camera began recording.\nThe dog allegedly alerted to the vehicle, and Pilat conducted pat downs of the driver and the defendant. In the subsequent search of the vehicle, Pilat found a homemade push rod, made for cleaning cannabis out of a pipe. Pilat found the push rod on the floor by the front passenger seat. Pilat later recovered a cannabis pipe from the defendant\u2019s person.\nAfter arresting the defendant and conducting a full search of the vehicle, Pilat gave the driver a warning for the lane violations.\nDuring the suppression hearing, which was held on January 18, 2008, the parties contested the applicable law. The circuit court eventually agreed with the defendant that People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 789 N.E.2d 260 (2003), was still good law and controlled the situation at hand. The court found that Pilat\u2019s questioning was unrelated to the purpose of the stop. In addition, the court found that Pilat\u2019s actions of calling for a dog sniff and \u201cfurther delaying this matter\u201d were inconsistent with the purpose of the stop. Accordingly, the court granted the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, and the State appealed.\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, the State argues that the circuit court erred when it granted the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Specifically, the State argues that the officer did not unreasonably delay the traffic stop. Alternatively, the State argues, without citation to any authority, that any delay was justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.\nWe employ a two-part standard of review when faced with a challenge to a circuit court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress. People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 857 N.E.2d 187 (2006). First, we review the circuit court\u2019s findings of historical fact for clear error, and we afford deference to any inferences the circuit court drew from those facts. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 857 N.E.2d 187. We will not disturb the circuit court\u2019s factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 857 N.E.2d 187. Second, because a reviewing court is free to assess the facts relative to the issue presented in the case, we review the circuit court\u2019s ultimate legal ruling on the motion to suppress de novo. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 857 N.E.2d 187.\nThe fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution guarantee citizens the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a76. The driver of a vehicle, and any passengers within the vehicle, are subjected to a lawful seizure when a police officer initiates a traffic stop of the vehicle based on probable cause. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132, 127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007); People v. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d 222, 886 N.E.2d 947 (2008). Nevertheless, an initially lawful seizure can become unlawful if subsequent police conduct violates the fourth amendment\u2019s reasonableness standard. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005); People v. Jones, 346 Ill. App. 3d 1101, 806 N.E.2d 722 (2004).\nTraditionally, many courts, including Illinois courts, have analyzed routine traffic stops under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). People v. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d 262, 898 N.E.2d 603 (2008). Under Terry, the reasonableness of police action taken during an investigative detention involves a dual inquiry: (1) whether the officer\u2019s action was justified at its inception; and (2) whether the officer\u2019s action was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868. In the traffic stop context, an officer\u2019s observation of a traffic violation constitutes probable cause and satisfies Terry\u2019s first prong. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d 261, 830 N.E.2d 541 (2005). The second prong of the Terry analysis, which has come to be called the scope inquiry, has been the subject of much debate.\nIn Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 789 N.E.2d 260, our supreme court held that the Terry scope inquiry contains both temporal and substantive aspects, in accord with United States Supreme Court precedent. As stated by our supreme court in a different case:\n\u201cUnder the second prong we consider the length of the detention and the manner in which it was carried out. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 233. That is, \u2018 \u201c \u2018an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,\u2019 \u201d \u2019 and \u2018 \u201c \u2018the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer\u2019s suspicion in a short period of time.\u2019 \u201d \u2019 Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 233, quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325-26 (1983) (plurality op.).\u201d (Emphasis in original.) People v. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d 7,14, 796 N.E.2d 1024, 1029 (2003).\nIn Gonzalez, our supreme court developed a three-part test to determine whether an officer\u2019s questioning during a traffic stop violated Terry\u2019s scope requirement. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 789 N.E.2d 260. The first question to ask was whether the question was reasonably related to the justification for the stop; if it was, no fourth amendment violation occurred. If the question was not so related, the second question to ask was whether the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the question; if he did, no fourth amendment violation occurred. If the question was not independently justified, the third question to ask was whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the question impermissibly prolonged the duration of the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop; if the question did neither, no fourth amendment violation occurred. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 789 N.E.2d 260.\nHowever, in Harris, our supreme court stated that the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decisions in Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 125 S. Ct. 834, and Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005), \u201cunequivocally overruled\u201d Gonzalez \u201cto the extent that it holds that the reasonableness of a traffic stop must be judged not only by its duration, but by the additional criterion of whether the actions of the officer alter the fundamental nature of the stop.\u201d Harris, 228 Ill. 2d at 240, 244, 886 N.E.2d at 959, 961. Furthermore, our supreme court stated that \u201c[t]he duration prong of the inquiry predates our decision in Gonzalez and has been reaffirmed in both Caballes and Muehler. It, therefore, survives as the sole focus of the scope inquiry. [Citations.]\u201d Harris, 228 Ill. 2d at 244, 886 N.E.2d at 961.\nOur supreme court also stated that Caballes established two principles to guide the analysis of police conduct during a traffic stop. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d 222, 886 N.E.2d 947. First:\n\u201c[A] seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution. [Citation.] A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.\u201d Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 846, 125 S. Ct. at 837.\nSecond, police conduct does \u201cnot change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner,\u201d unless that conduct itself violated an individual\u2019s \u201cconstitutionally protected interest in privacy.\u201d Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 847, 125 S. Ct. at 837; Harris, 228 Ill. 2d 222, 886 N.E.2d 947.\nThus, police conduct occurring during an otherwise lawful seizure does not render the seizure unlawful unless it either unreasonably prolongs the duration of the detention or independently triggers the fourth amendment. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d 222, 886 N.E.2d 947. If the conduct violates either principle, the conduct must possess a separate fourth amendment justification to avoid rendering the seizure unlawful. See Muehler, 544 U.S. 93, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465; People v. Starnes, 374 Ill. App. 3d 329, 871 N.E.2d 815 (2007).\nIn this case, there is no question that Pilat\u2019s questions with regard to the odor of alcohol, requests for consent to search, and calling for a drug dog did not independently trigger the fourth amendment. See Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 125 S. Ct. 834; Muehler, 544 U.S. 93, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465. The question presented to us focuses on the duration principle: whether Pilat\u2019s actions unreasonably prolonged the duration of the detention, thereby rendering the seizure unlawful.\nBecause the dispositive questions in Caballes, Muehler, and Harris involved the question of whether certain police conduct independently triggered the fourth amendment, those cases involved Caballes\u2019 second principle and provide either little or no guidance on standards for the bench and bar to apply a duration-only scope inquiry. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 846, 125 S. Ct. at 837 (\u201cThe question on which we granted certiorari [citation] is narrow: \u2018Whether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop\u2019 accepting state court\u2019s conclusion that the duration of the stop was proper); Muehler, 544 U.S. 93, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (declining to address whether the duration of the detention was prolonged because the court below did not address it); Harris, 228 Ill. 2d at 236, 886 N.E.2d at 957 (\u201cDefendant has not argued that the computerized warrant check, conducted at the same time as the officer\u2019s check of the status of the driver\u2019s license, unreasonably prolonged his seizure\u201d). However, because Harris did use Terry-type language in its discussion of Gonzalez and the \u201cduration prong\u201d of the \u201cscope inquiry\u201d (Harris, 228 Ill. 2d at 244, 886 N.E.2d at 961), and because no court of primary authority has explicitly stated that Terry no longer applies to traffic stops in Illinois, we will continue to look to Terry and its progeny, when applicable, to assess the reasonableness of a detention\u2019s duration during a traffic-stop-related seizure.\nAlbeit not in the traffic stop context, the United States Supreme Court has twice declined to adopt a bright-line rule to indicate a fixed point at which investigative detentions become unreasonable. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985). Likewise, we decline to adopt any type of bright-line rule to guide our duration analysis. Rather, we will employ a contextual, totality of the circumstances analysis that includes consideration of the brevity of the stop and whether the police acted diligently during the stop. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 105 S. Ct. 1568; People v. Koutsakis, 272 Ill. App. 3d 159, 649 N.E.2d 605 (1995).\nIn this case, Pilat stopped the vehicle after observing two lane violations. Pilat approached the vehicle, obtained the driver\u2019s and passengers\u2019 information, and became suspicious of the defendant based on nervousness, heavy breathing, and the location of the defendant\u2019s right hand. Without inquiring as to what the defendant may have had in his hand or conducting a frisk for weapons, Pilat returned to his squad car and ran the information. At this point, approximately two minutes had passed since the beginning of the recording. No evidence was presented to show that any issues arose with the running of the information. Pilat returned to the stopped vehicle 2V2 minutes later. Thus, at approximately 41/2 minutes into the stop, Pilat was apparently ready to conclude the initial purpose of the traffic stop.\nRather than issue a citation or warning ticket, however, Pilat spoke to the driver for 40 seconds at the vehicle, then approximately 3 minutes and 15 seconds outside the vehicle. After numerous unsuccessful attempts at obtaining consent to search the vehicle, Pilat had the driver return to the vehicle, informing the driver that he was going to call for a drug dog. Thirty seconds later, Pilat called for the drug dog. The canine unit arrived approximately two minutes later. After an explanation of what was about to occur, the officer walked the dog around the vehicle. When the sniff was completed, approximately 14 minutes had passed since the time at which Pilat\u2019s camera began recording. As previously noted, however, Pilat was apparently ready to conclude the initial purpose of the stop at 41/2 minutes. Under these circumstances, we hold that the duration of the detention was prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the traffic stop. See Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 125 S. Ct. 834. Our analysis does not end there, however.\nGiven that Pilat\u2019s actions unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop, we must address whether those actions had a separate fourth amendment justification. See Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 125 S. Ct. 834; Muehler, 544 U.S. 93, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465. A traffic stop \u201cmay be broadened into an investigative detention *** if the officer discovers specific, articulable facts which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.\u201d People v. Ruffin, 315 Ill. App. 3d 744, 748, 734 N.E.2d 507, 511 (2000). Here, Pilat stated he was suspicious of the defendant\u2019s nervousness, heavy breathing, and right-hand placement. There was no odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle. While Pi-lat was also suspicious of the faint odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle, he dispelled those suspicions quickly, yet persisted in his attempts to obtain consent to search the vehicle. During those attempts, Pilat alleged that he saw the defendant turn around, look in the direction of Pilat and the driver, reach into his pocket, and reach down along his side. However, we find that all of these observations essentially amount to nothing more than a hunch based on the 17-year-old passenger\u2019s nervousness. \u201cMere hunches and unparticularized suspicions are not enough to justify a broadening of the stop into an investigatory detention.\u201d Ruffin, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 748, 734 N.E.2d at 511. Under these circumstances, we hold that Pilat lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to prolong the detention. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err when it granted the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of McDonough County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLYTTON, J., concurs.\nJUSTICE SCHMIDT, specially concurring:\nI concur in the judgment.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James Hoyle, State\u2019s Attorney, of Macomb (Terry A. Mertel and Judith Z. Kelly, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Verlin R. Meinz, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ADRIAN P. BALDWIN, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3 \u2014 08\u20140118\nOpinion filed March 23, 2009.\nJames Hoyle, State\u2019s Attorney, of Macomb (Terry A. Mertel and Judith Z. Kelly, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nVerlin R. Meinz, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1028-01", "first_page_order": 1044, "last_page_order": 1052 }