{ "id": 4284170, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Anderson", "decision_date": "2009-03-16", "docket_number": "No. 1-07-1768", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "11", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "660 N.E.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909174 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249342 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "882 N.E.2d 1140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "alleged Zehr violation addressed under plain error exception as the claimed error \"is of such a magnitude as to deny him a fair and impartial trial\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "379 Ill. App. 3d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4275831 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109", "parenthetical": "alleged Zehr violation addressed under plain error exception as the claimed error \"is of such a magnitude as to deny him a fair and impartial trial\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/379/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "830 N.E.2d 467", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060336 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178-79" }, { "page": "178-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "790 N.E.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 806", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 25383 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "810" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/338/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 N.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256255 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "in order to preserve an error for appellate review, the defendant must object at trial and include the alleged error in a posttrial motion" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186", "parenthetical": "in order to preserve an error for appellate review, the defendant must object at trial and include the alleged error in a posttrial motion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "812 N.E.2d 714", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 721", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5433325 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "858 N.E.2d 606", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 Ill. App. 3d 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4266640 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/368/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "889 N.E.2d 1225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "383 Ill. App. 3d 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4278636 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/383/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 N.E.2d 983", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Zehr teaches that admonitions and instructions are no substitute for interrogation\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. App. 3d 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3551243 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596", "parenthetical": "\"Zehr teaches that admonitions and instructions are no substitute for interrogation\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/169/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "896 N.E.2d 904", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "385 Ill. App. 3d 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4279721 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" }, { "page": "522" }, { "page": "520-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/385/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "826 N.E.2d 951", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3750268 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670" }, { "page": "670" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "754 N.E.2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "use of the word \"shall\" is \"construed as a clear expression of legislative intent to impose a mandatory obligation\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259033 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93", "parenthetical": "use of the word \"shall\" is \"construed as a clear expression of legislative intent to impose a mandatory obligation\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 1062", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152531 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" }, { "page": "477" }, { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 N.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198894 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "775 N.E.2d 987", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477035 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "648 N.E.2d 1002", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 F.3d 1226", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7653485 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1230", "parenthetical": "\"trial court's actions *** cut off the vital flow of information from venire to court\" during voir dire process warranting reversal" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/106/1226-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619537 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228", "parenthetical": "individuals may waive \"substantive rules of law, statutory rights and even constitutional rights\" through counsel's stipulation or agreement" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 N.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "policy considerations expressed in similar case not present in instant case, thus prior case not controlling" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3567403 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87", "parenthetical": "policy considerations expressed in similar case not present in instant case, thus prior case not controlling" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "874 N.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610464 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060336 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178-79" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 Ill. App. 3d 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4279721 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520", "parenthetical": "\"we find guidance in our supreme court's decision in *** Houston, *** where the court failed to give full effect to the principle of strict compliance with the mandatory nature of the Illinois Supreme Court rules\" regarding the recording of jury selection (emphasis in original)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/385/0515-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 981, "char_count": 24416, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0898136801622968e-07, "percentile": 0.76020551777343 }, "sha256": "d5c1e8dfbe50bb6b15762ddcbcfa17b2036416f5d1707b1064e8bdde9d216ddb", "simhash": "1:20a2d3aabe2c9d3d", "word_count": 4172 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:37:38.013620+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe amended Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) went into effect on May 1, 2007. Jury selection in the murder case against James Anderson began three weeks later, on May 21, 2007. The jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. The defendant raises several issues on appeal, but we focus on the question of whether the trial court complied with Rule 431(b) (111. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007)) and, if not, whether the defendant\u2019s convictions should be reversed for another trial. We reverse and remand.\nFACTS\nOn May 3, 2003, defendant agreed to drive the codefendants, Christopher Washington and Sheldon Smith, to a neighborhood where the codefendants shot three individuals. Two of the victims were injured and one died. According to defendant, the codefendants merely asked him to drive them to obtain marijuana. Defendant testified he did not know the codefendants intended to shoot the victims. Defendant said he continued to follow the codefendants\u2019 instructions as they chose their targets because he feared for his safety. Defendant never attempted to withdraw himself from the scene or report the offenses.\nCodefendant Washington, who pled guilty to his involvement in the offenses and was sentenced to 26 years\u2019 imprisonment, testified he was in a car around midnight on the date in question looking to avenge a fellow gang member\u2019s death. Washington did not know the driver of the car. Washington was armed. He shot three people, in different locations. He said he shot all the victims, but he did not instruct the driver to slow the car in order to do so. The police chased the car, and Washington and the driver left it to run away. Washington was caught and arrested.\nAlthough he originally named two rival gang members, Washington eventually implicated defendant and codefendant Smith. Washington said at trial the police forced him to name defendant and codefendant Smith because of their criminal backgrounds.\nWashington had agreed to videotape his statement. It was introduced into evidence. At trial, he said most of the videotaped statement was untrue. In the videotape, Washington said he, defendant, and Smith were selected by their gang to shoot rival gang members in exchange for drugs and money. Defendant drove the car. Defendant and Smith were armed with handguns and all three shot at different individuals throughout the neighborhood. Washington said he was treated well by the police. At trial, he testified he was \u201cjacked\u201d by the police.\nDetective John Otto testified he and Assistant State\u2019s Attorney (ASA) William Merritt interviewed defendant on January 30, 2004. Otto advised defendant of his Miranda rights, which defendant waived. Defendant admitted he drove the vehicle involved in the shootings while Smith and Washington rode as passengers. When Otto confronted defendant with inconsistencies between his confession and Washington\u2019s statement, defendant drew a diagram of the shootings as he remembered them. Defendant said he drove the vehicle during each shooting. Defendant never told Otto he was threatened at gunpoint. ASA Merritt\u2019s testimony was consistent with that of Detective Otto, adding defendant said he was the driver, but not a shooter.\nDefendant consented to have his confession videotaped. The videotape was admitted as evidence. The videotaped statement was consistent with defendant\u2019s oral statement, adding he was in shock after the first shooting, but he continued driving as told. He did not say he was threatened at gunpoint.\nDefendant testified he did not know Washington and Smith were armed when he agreed to drive them to obtain marijuana. While driving, Washington first instructed defendant to slow down near two men standing on a corner. Washington rolled down the window, asked the men for marijuana, then shot at them. Defendant was shocked, but he was instructed to drive away. He complied. On the way to the next location, Washington and Smith told defendant to slow the car when they saw another individual. Smith asked that individual whether he had marijuana and whether he was a rival gang member. The individual responded no to both questions. Smith shot him. Defendant then drove to the next location as instructed. He was told to stop when they reached a man in an alley. Washington asked the man about marijuana. Then he shot him.\nOn cross-examination, defendant said he did not want to continue driving the car, but he was ordered to at gunpoint. Defendant admitted he did not include that fact in his videotaped statement; however, he said it to the detectives before he gave the videotaped statement. Anderson testified he drove to the second location as instructed because he thought he would be shot if he disagreed. Defendant said he stopped the car during the second shooting, but did not attempt to exit because he was afraid. Defendant denied knowing Washington and Smith intended to shoot the man in the alley, but admitted he drove the car around the block to find the man again. When unsuccessful, Smith and Washington exited the car and approached another individual. Defendant was instructed to wait in the car and he complied. Smith and Washington shot that individual, then told defendant to drive away. Defendant tried to slow the car when the police approached, but was instructed to turn on a dead-end road and speed up. He complied and did not exit the car to run away until instructed. Defendant later moved to Du Page County. Defendant denied evading the police, but admitted he never reported the offenses because he feared for his and his family\u2019s safety.\nThe jury found defendant not guilty of aggravated battery with a firearm of the first victim, but guilty of aggravated battery with a firearm of the second victim and first degree murder of the third victim. Both convictions were based on the theory of accountability. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of 35 years\u2019 imprisonment for the first degree murder count and 10 years\u2019 imprisonment for the aggravated battery with a firearm count. This timely appeal followed.\nDECISION\nI. Rule 431(b)\nWe first turn to the issue of whether the court complied with the requirements of Rule 431(b) and, if not, whether lack of compliance may be considered harmless error.\nDefendant did not make a Rule 431(b) objection. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988) (in order to preserve an error for appellate review, the defendant must object at trial and include the alleged error in a posttrial motion). The State contends the defendant forfeited the Rule 431(b) issue by failing to make a timely objection and by omitting the issue from his posttrial motion. We recognize, as suggested by the defendant, a \u201cless rigid application of the waiver rule\u201d is applied when the trial court\u2019s conduct is at the center of the claimed error. People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d 423, 455, 553 N.E.2d 368 (1990); People v. Stevens, 338 Ill. App. 3d 806, 810, 790 N.E.2d 52 (2003). We have chosen to address the defendant\u2019s claim that plain error occurred. We focus our attention on the questioning of the first panel, from which eight jurors were selected.\nThe plain error doctrine allows us to review an issue affecting substantial rights despite forfeiture in either of two circumstances:\n\u201cFirst, where the evidence in a case is so closely balanced that the jury\u2019s guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and not the evidence, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error in order to preclude an argument that an innocent man was wrongly convicted. [Citation.] Second, where the error is so serious that [a] defendant was denied a substantial right, and thus a fair trial, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error in order to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.\u201d People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178-79, 830 N.E.2d 467 (2005).\nSee People v. Gilbert, 379 Ill. App. 3d 106, 109, 882 N.E.2d 1140 (2008) (alleged Zehr violation addressed under plain error exception as the claimed error \u201cis of such a magnitude as to deny him a fair and impartial trial\u201d).\nIt is the second Herron circumstance that we consider in this case. Defendant claims the trial court\u2019s failure to comply with Rule 431(b) denied him basic guarantees for obtaining a fair and impartial jury. The right to an impartial jury \u201cis so fundamental to due process that any infringement of that right requires reversal by a reviewing court.\u201d People v. Boston, 271 Ill. App. 3d 358, 360, 648 N.E.2d 1002 (1995).\nThe court conducted voir dire and empaneled the jury. The court first told the entire group of prospective jurors:\n\u201cThe charges in this case, ladies and gentlemen, come by way of a Cook County Grand Jury indictment. They are not any evidence of guilt against [defendant]. He is presumed innocent of the charges and the State has the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d\nThe first panel of prospective jurors was then brought forward. The judge said:\n\u201cAs I indicated earlier, the defendant is presumed innocent of the charges. The State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant is not required to prove his innocence, nor is he required to testify or call witnesses on his own behalf.\nShould the State meet their burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is there anybody seated in the jury box who could not or would not go into the jury room with your fellow jurors and the law that governs this case as I give it to you and sign a verdict form of guilty? Anybody who could not or would not do that for any reason?\n(No audible response.)\nNo response. Should the State fail to meet their burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is there anybody seated in the jury box who could not or would not go into the jury room with your fellow jurors and the law that governs this case as I give it to you and sign a verdict form of not guilty?\n(No audible response.)\nNo response.\u201d\nEight jury members were selected from this panel. After the eight jury members were selected, they were sent to the jury room and were not present for the voir dire of the remaining panels.\nWhen the second panel of potential jurors was brought forward, the judge said:\n\u201cLadies and gentlemen, I wish to thank you for your time and patience. As I indicated earlier, the charges against the defendant come by way of a Grand Jury indictment. They are not any evidence against the defendant.\nThe defendant is presumed innocent of the charges against him and the State has the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. He is not required to call witnesses on his own behalf or testify on his own behalf.\nIs there anybody who has any qualms or problems with those propositions of law?\n(No audible response.)\nNo response. Should the State meet their burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is there anybody seated in the jury box who could not or would not go into the jury room with your fellow jurors and follow the law that governs this case as I give it to you and sign a verdict form of guilty? Anybody who could not or would not do that for any reason?\n(No audible response.)\nNo response. Should the State fail to meet their burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is there anybody seated in the jury box who could not or would not go into the jury room with your fellow jurors and the law that governs this case as I give it to you and sign the verdict form of not guilty?\n(No audible response.)\nNo response.\u201d\nFour jurors were selected to serve from this panel and one juror was selected as an alternate.\nWhen the court called the third panel, the judge said:\n\u201cAgain, ladies and gentlemen, I wish to thank you for your time and patience. As indicated in my opening remarks, the defendant is presumed innocent of the charges against him and the State has the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nIs there anyone who has any problems or qualms with that proposition of law?\n(No audible response.)\nNo response. The defendant is not required to prove his innocence. He is not required to call witnesses or testify on his own behalf.\nIf the State meets their burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is there anybody seated in the jury box who could not or would not go into the jury room with your fellow jurors and the law that governs this case as I give it to you and sign a verdict form of guilty? Anybody who would not or could not do that?\n(No audible response.)\nNo response. If the State should fail to meet their burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is there anybody who could not or would not follow the law and sign a verdict form of not guilty.\n(No audible response.)\nNo response.\u201d\nOne alternate juror was selected from this panel.\nThe defense does not challenge the trial court\u2019s questioning of the second and third juror panels. Nor do we.\nThe canons of statutory construction apply to supreme court rules. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 332, 775 N.E.2d 987 (2002). Our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the drafters by relying on the plain and ordinary language of the rule. Robidoux, 201 Ill. 2d at 332. The supreme court has said:\n\u201cThe rules of court we have promulgated are not aspirational. They are not suggestions. They have the force of law, and the presumption must be that they will be obeyed and enforced as written.\u201d Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210, 652 N.E.2d 275 (1995).\nConstruction of supreme court rules is a question of law, which we review de novo. Robidoux, 201 Ill. 2d at 332.\nRule 431(b), as amended effective May 1, 2007, provides:\n\u201cThe court shall ask each potential juror, individually or in a group, whether that juror understands and accepts the following principles: (1) that the defendant is presumed innocent of the charge(s) against him or her; (2) that before a defendant can be convicted the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that the defendant\u2019s failure to testify cannot be held against him or her; however, no inquiry of a prospective juror shall be made into the defendant\u2019s failure to testify when the defendant objects.\nThe court\u2019s method of inquiry shall provide each juror an opportunity to respond to specific questions concerning the principles set out in this section.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007).\nBefore the 2007 amendment, the court was required to admonish the jurors and ascertain whether they understood and accepted the enumerated principles announced in People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472, 469 N.E.2d 1062 (1984), \u201c[i]f requested by the defendant.\u201d 177 Ill. 2d R. 431(b). Before that, in 1997, Rule 431 was amended to ensure compliance with the Zehr principles by changing the court\u2019s voir dire requirements from discretionary to compulsory by amending the word \u201cmay\u201d to \u201cshall.\u201d See People v. O\u2019Brien, 197 Ill. 2d 88, 93, 754 N.E.2d 327 (2001) (use of the word \u201cshall\u201d is \u201cconstrued as a clear expression of legislative intent to impose a mandatory obligation\u201d).\nIt is axiomatic that amendments to rules are designed to serve some purpose. In re Application of the County Collector, 356 Ill. App. 3d 668, 670, 826 N.E.2d 951 (2005). We must construe the rule consistent with the purpose of the amendments, relying on the presumption that the supreme court intended to change the law in 1997 and 2007. See In re Application of the County Collector, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 670.\nThe clear language of Rule 431(b) requires the court to ensure jurors are qualified to know, understand, and accept the enumerated principles and are provided with an opportunity to respond. See Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d at 477. The rule \u201cseeks to end the practice where the judge makes a broad statement of the applicable law followed by a general question concerning the juror\u2019s willingness to follow the law.\u201d 177 Ill. 2d R. 431, Committee Comments, at lxxix.\nWhen the 2007 amendment deleted the language \u201c[i]f requested by the defendant,\u201d the rule charged trial courts with an affirmative sua sponte duty to ask potential jurors whether they understand and accept the Zehr principles in each and every case. People v. Stump, 385 Ill. App. 3d 515, 520, 896 N.E.2d 904 (2008). Moreover, the court must provide each juror with \u201can opportunity to respond to\u201d the specific Zehr principles. We find Rule 431(b) was amended to send a clear message to trial and appellate courts: it is the courts\u2019 responsibility to enforce the rules as written. Compliance with Rule 431(b) is a judicial duty.\nThe incomplete voir dire conducted in this case is the practice the amended rule seeks to end. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 431, Committee Comments. With regard to the first panel of prospective jurors, from which eight were selected, the court provided three of the four Zehr principles in narrative form, not in questions. Asking the first panel members as a group whether they would sign the appropriate verdict form if the State had or had not met its burden of proof was a \u201cgeneral question concerning the juror\u2019s willingness to follow the law.\u201d 177 Ill. 2d R. 431, Committee Comments, at lxxix. The court did not determine whether the majority of empaneled jurors understood and accepted the Zehr principles. The court addressed those principles but did not satisfy the stringent requirements of Rule 431(b).\nThe questions set out in Rule 431(b) are \u201cessential to the qualifications of jurors in a criminal case.\u201d Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d at 477. Instructing the jury properly at the end of trial does not address the question of whether a fair and impartial jury has been selected. The supreme court said:\n\u201cIf a juror has a prejudice against any of these basic guarantees, an instruction given at the end of the trial will have little curative effect.\u201d Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d at 477.\nSee People v. Starks, 169 Ill. App. 3d 588, 596, 523 N.E.2d 983 (1988) (\u201cZehr teaches that admonitions and instructions are no substitute for interrogation\u201d (emphasis added)).\nThe decisions cited by the State do not apply to this case. All of them involved the preamendment versions of Rule 431(b). See People v. Yarbor, 383 Ill. App. 3d 676, 686, 889 N.E.2d 1225 (2008); People v. Williams, 368 Ill. App. 3d 616, 623, 858 N.E.2d 606 (2006); People v. Benford, 349 Ill. App. 3d 721, 733, 812 N.E.2d 714 (2004).\nWe have found one case decided under the amended version of Rule 431(b). In Stump, the Fourth District held the trial court\u2019s error in failing to fully comply with the rule was harmless where each juror was \u201caddressed\u201d with all of the Zehr principles \u201cat some point during voir dire\u201d either by the judge or by defense counsel, and the evidence against defendant was overwhelming. Stump, 385 Ill. App. 3d at 522. Stump is distinguishable from this case because, here, neither defense counsel nor the court \u201caddressed\u201d each juror with all four of the Zehr principles during voir dire. Moreover, despite acknowledging that \u201cthe mandatory nature of the rule\u201d signified presumptive prejudicial error, the Stump court used a harmless error analysis. Stump, 385 Ill. App. 3d at 520-21. We decline to do so.\nWe recognize the evidence against the defendant was substantial. But the weight of the evidence is not something we are obliged to consider. We have found the plain error described in the second circumstance of the Herron test. That is, the Rule 431(b) error \u201cis so serious that [a] defendant was denied a substantial right, and thus a fair trial.\u201d Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 178-79. Once having said that, there is no need to inquire into the harmfulness of the error or the measure of prejudice incurred by the defendant. Plain error is reversible error. See People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17, 660 N.E.2d 901 (1995). There is no need for further inquiry.\nII. Remaining Contentions\nBecause of our disposition of the Rule 431(b) issue, we see no need to consider defendant\u2019s other contentions.\nCONCLUSION\nWe reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nHALL, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" }, { "text": "JUSTICE GARCIA,\nspecially concurring:\nI add two reasons to find plain error and reverse.\nFirst, while the Stump court concluded that the Zehr principles were substantially \u201caddressed\u201d before the prospective jurors, I find the analysis, guided by the holding in People v. Houston, 226 Ill. 2d 135, 874 N.E.2d 23 (2007), regarding compliance fails to consider the broader policy implications embodied in amended Rule 431(b). Stump, 385 Ill. App. 3d at 520 (\u201cwe find guidance in our supreme court\u2019s decision in *** Houston, *** where the court failed to give full effect to the principle of strict compliance with the mandatory nature of the Illinois Supreme Court rules\u201d regarding the recording of jury selection (emphasis in original)). See In re Marriage of Fotsch, 139 Ill. App. 3d 83, 87, 487 N.E.2d 84 (1985) (policy considerations expressed in similar case not present in instant case, thus prior case not controlling). In Houston, when asked whether he wanted a court reporter present during voir dire, defense counsel stated, \u201cI don\u2019t need it recorded.\u201d The prosecutor immediately followed with, \u201cPeople waive.\u201d Houston, 226 Ill. 2d at 138. Houston is an ineffective assistance of counsel case, where a remand was ordered to assess the prejudice prong in the context of a Batson claim. If not for a Batson claim, Houston might well have been addressed as a stipulation case. See Smith v. Freeman, 232 Ill. 2d 218, 228 (2009) (individuals may waive \u201csubstantive rules of law, statutory rights and even constitutional rights\u201d through counsel\u2019s stipulation or agreement). Of course, the rule involved in Houston, mandating the recording of jury selection, did not place the decision to have a court reporter present expressly on the trial judge.\nI read amended Rule 431(b) before us to embody the public policy in Illinois to ensure the selection of fair and unbiased jurors in criminal cases. Prior to the amendment, the burden fell solely on the defendant to request the voir dire questioning now mandated by the amended rule. The amended rule now places the legal obligation that fair and unbiased jurors are selected directly on the shoulders of the trial judge. Cf. United States v. Rowe, 106 F.3d 1226, 1230 (5th Cir. 1997) (\u201ctrial court\u2019s actions *** cut off the vital flow of information from venire to court\u201d during voir dire process warranting reversal). Under the amended rule, she must \u201cask each potential juror, individually or in a group, whether that juror understands and accepts\u201d the principles of certain basic constitutional guarantees. Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007). When a judge fails to comply with her obligations set out in amended Rule 431(b) to ensure the right of a defendant to a trial before fair and impartial jurors, our judicial system falls short and, I submit, the integrity of the judicial process is impacted. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 178-79.\nSecond, to the extent the rule in its current form places any burden on the defense to timely point out a trial judge\u2019s failure to abide by the rule, the rule places that same burden on the prosecution. The prosecution should not be heard to claim forfeiture by the defendant when the prosecution itself failed to correct the trial judge\u2019s omission. The prosecutor, as a representative of the people of Illinois, is there to ensure that those subject to our criminal justice system receive justice, as reflected in our rules and laws. As a representative of the people, the prosecution must know the rules and laws and do its part to ensure that the rules and laws are followed. When a trial judge falls short on what amended Rule 431(b) requires, the prosecutor cannot sit mute. The prosecutor must have an incentive to speak up.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE GARCIA," } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Unsinn, and Brian E. Koch, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, and Clare Wesolik Connolly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201407\u20141768\nOpinion filed March 16, 2009.\nGARCIA, J., specially concurring.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Patricia Unsinn, and Brian E. Koch, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, and Clare Wesolik Connolly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 17, "last_page_order": 27 }