{ "id": 4283801, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARC A. CLOSE, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Close", "decision_date": "2009-04-01", "docket_number": "No. 3-08-0357", "first_page": "228", "last_page": "237", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 228" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 2d 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1598134 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/106/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5428859 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 1087", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3450216 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1089" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/1087-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 1004", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3575113 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1006" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/1004-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5792540 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352-53" }, { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3362680 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79338 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 786", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980667 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "792" }, { "page": "792" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0786-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 Ill. App. 3d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4275448 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" }, { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/378/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351271 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451664 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451345 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 Ill. App. 3d 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4276389 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711" }, { "page": "712-13" }, { "page": "713" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/379/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 438", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787623 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 605100 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/490/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 U.S. 90", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3276079 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/547/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 U.S. 366", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8897100 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/540/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442058 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "885 N.E.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" }, { "page": "360" }, { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 Ill. App. 3d 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4276389 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712" }, { "page": "712" }, { "page": "712" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/379/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473660 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "769 N.E.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58945 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "885 N.E.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "379 Ill. App. 3d 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4276389 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/379/0710-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 994, "char_count": 25396, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.46765605076141e-08, "percentile": 0.279968639098264 }, "sha256": "9cb3f263b00d9eaefc7ceb5132fc201290e7426055928d1635f68fab76fc1960", "simhash": "1:22ceb3220f6b52e9", "word_count": 4246 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:37:38.013620+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARC A. CLOSE, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WRIGHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nA grand jury of La Salle County issued a bill of indictment charging defendant, Marc A. Close, with one count of felony driving while license revoked. Following a hearing on April 18, 2008, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The State filed a certificate of substantial impairment pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)) and appeals the trial court\u2019s ruling.\nFACTS\nOn August 7, 2007, a grand jury of La Salle County issued a bill of indictment charging defendant with one count of felony driving while license revoked. The indictment alleged that on or about June 24, 2007, defendant knowingly drove a 1987 Chevrolet upon a public highway, Argyle Street, at a time when defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license was revoked for a conviction for the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol and the defendant had been previously convicted of the offense of driving while license revoked.\nOn December 5, 2007, defendant filed a \u201cmotion to quash and suppress\u201d alleging in part that defendant\u2019s conduct did not give rise to probable cause. Defendant sought the suppression of any statements or physical evidence obtained as a result of defendant\u2019s arrest and the dismissal of the charges.\nAfter multiple continuances, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to quash and suppress on April 18, 2008. Defense counsel called Thomas Belski to testify. Belski, a sergeant with the La Salle police department, testified that he had been employed with the department for four years. Prior to that, he worked as a deputy with the Bureau County sheriffs department for eight years.\nOn June 24, 2007, he conducted routine patrol in the city of La Salle. At approximately 7:13 p.m., he performed a registration check on a motor vehicle with license plate 12293B while he followed the vehicle on a roadway. The registration check revealed that the driving privileges of the registered owner of the vehicle were revoked. From the registration check, he also learned that the registered owner had been issued a restricted driving permit, but he did not know the terms of the permit. Belski explained that he used the computer equipment in his squad car to retrieve a photograph of the registered owner, Marc A. Close. He believed Marc A. Close to be the driver of the vehicle after comparing the photograph to the face of the driver he observed operating the vehicle.\nBelski stopped the motor vehicle without witnessing the driver commit any violations of the vehicle code. When asked by defense counsel if he stopped the vehicle because he \u201chad a hunch\u201d that the driver was not complying with the terms of his restricted driving permit, Belski stated, \u201cThat\u2019s correct.\u201d\nUpon further questioning, Belski stated that he stopped the vehicle based upon his observations of the driver, his clothing, the day of the week, and the time. He further stated that the stop occurred on Sunday, and he knew from prior experience that restricted driving permits were issued for work purposes or hardship issues only. After stopping the vehicle, Belski approached the driver and inquired about the driver\u2019s driving privileges. Upon learning that the driver\u2019s privileges were revoked, Belski arrested the driver.\nAt that time, the trial court interjected about a recent case on the issue. Defense counsel provided the court with a copy of a case entitled People v. Johnson, but failed to offer a citation on the record. Defense counsel then continued his questioning of Belski. Belski indicated that the traffic stop occurred in a residential area of La Salle. Belski explained that he observed the driver wearing a baseball cap, sunglasses, and a tank top.\nDefense did not call any other witnesses. The State did not offer any evidence. At the conclusion of the evidence, defense counsel again argued the relevance of the case of People v. Donnell Johnson, without reference to the citation. Defense counsel further argued that the officer lacked an adequate basis to stop the vehicle.\nThe State argued that the special needs doctrine allowed the officer to stop the driver to determine compliance with the restricted driving permit. The State also argued that the doctrine of inevitable discovery also applied. The State explained that if the officer had not stopped the vehicle, the officer could have later determined the terms of the restricted driving permit. Based upon the officer\u2019s observations, he could still issue a ticket and warrant for defendant, if deemed appropriate.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the motion to quash and certified the question for review by the appellate court. The trial court indicated that it \u201cwould like some instruction [from the appellate court] because I can understand why they [law enforcement] believe they could do that.\u201d\nOn April 30, 2008, the State filed a certificate of substantial impairment pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1). On May 16, 2008, the trial court entered an order granting the certificate of impairment and directing the clerk of the court to prepare a notice of appeal. Pursuant to the order, the clerk of the court filed a notice of appeal on May 16, 2008. Following leave of the court, the State filed an amended notice of appeal on June 13, 2008.\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, the State asserts People v. Johnson, 379 Ill. App. 3d 710 (2008), was incorrectly decided, and consequently, this court should not follow the Second District\u2019s decision. Alternatively, the State argues that the additional circumstances considered by the of-fleer in this case are readily distinguishable from those facts relied upon by the court in Johnson. In addition, the State suggests the special needs doctrine applies and requires reversal of the trial court\u2019s ruling on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nAt issue in this case is the officer\u2019s basis for a traffic stop to investigate whether a driver, reasonably suspected to be the registered owner of the vehicle, was driving while his license was revoked. The ultimate question of whether the evidence should be suppressed requires de novo review. People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476, 483-84 (2005); People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 512 (2004); People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 430-31 (2001).\nThe standards for a lawful investigative traffic stop evolved from case law developed after the United States Supreme Court\u2019s landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). Based on Terry, a police officer may temporarily stop and approach a person for the purposes of investigating suspected criminal behavior, even though the officer acts on less information than is necessary to support probable cause to make an arrest. People v. Moore, 378 Ill. App. 3d 41, 46 (2007). Hunches are not enough to support a Terry stop. People v. Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d 786, 792 (2000). An officer must have specific knowledge such that the officer is able to articulate sufficient facts present at the time of the encounter to justify the officer\u2019s reasonable suspicion that the person in question has committed or is about to commit a crime. People v. Moore, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 46; People v. Chavez, 327 Ill. App. 3d 18, 32 (2001); People v. Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 792.\nIt is well established that an officer can lawfully conduct a Terry stop of a vehicle after learning or receiving information that the license of the registered owner of the vehicle is revoked or suspended. See People v. Blankenship, 353 Ill. App. 3d 322, 325 (2004); Village of Lake in the Hills v. Lloyd, 227 Ill. App. 3d 351, 352-53 (1992). The purpose of the stop is to allow the officer to check the status of the operator\u2019s privilege to drive. Village of Lake in the Hills v. Lloyd, 227 Ill. App. 3d at 353, citing People v. Barnes, 152 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 1006 (1987).\nIn this case, the officer learned from reliable law enforcement records that the registered owner of the vehicle had a revoked driver\u2019s license. Additionally, the officer also learned from the same reliable records that the registered owner had been issued a valid restricted driving permit (RDP).\nConsequently, we are called upon to determine whether the existence of an RDP demands an added layer of information before an officer develops a sound articulable basis to stop a suspected revoked driver. The issue is whether an officer, knowing the suspected driver has been issued an RDR may initiate a traffic stop based solely on the knowledge that the suspected driver\u2019s license has been revoked; or whether the officer must delay stopping a suspected revoked driver, known to have received an RDR until the officer considers additional information that excludes a reasonable possibility that the driver may be operating the automobile within the scope of the restricted permit. The answer can be found in the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/1\u2014 100 et seq. (West 2006)) and existing case law.\nThe case law provides that once a \u201cperson\u2019s privilege to drive has been revoked the restoration of that privilege is not an automatic matter.\u201d Agans v. Edgar, 142 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1089 (1986), citing People v. Turner, 64 Ill. 2d 183, 186 (1976). A restricted driving permit does not restore a person\u2019s driving privileges but merely allows the person with a revoked driver\u2019s license to drive upon a highway \u201csubject to the restrictions provided therein and not otherwise.\u201d People v. Manikas, 106 Ill. App. 2d 315, 320 (1969).\nDue to the exigent circumstances created by a moving vehicle, the investigation of this type of driving offense requires swift decision making on the part of the officer. Presumably to assist in the enforcement of driving restrictions, our legislators have imposed a requirement on all drivers to carry their valid license or permit at all times when driving. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 112 (West 2006). This is not a meaningless requirement. It is a legislatively created tool available to law enforcement to remove drivers who are unlawfully operating their vehicles from the roadway without delay.\nWe next examine the language selected by our lawmakers to define the elements of the offense of driving while license revoked. The relevant provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code provide as follows:\n\u201c\u00a76 \u2014 303. Driving while driver\u2019s license, permit or privilege to operate a motor vehicle is suspended or revoked.\n(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (a \u2014 5), any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on any highway of this State at a time when such person\u2019s driver\u2019s license, permit or privilege to do so *** is revoked or suspended as provided by this Code or the law of another state, except as may be specifically allowed by a *** restricted driving permit issued pursuant to this Code or under the law of another state, shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.\n* * \u2756\n(d) Any person convicted of a second violation of this Section shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony ***, if the revocation or suspension was for a violation of Section 11 \u2014 401 or 11 \u2014 501 of this Code, or a similar out-of-state offense, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, or a statutory summary suspension under Section 11\u2014 501.1 of this Code.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303(a), (d) (West Supp. 2007).\nThe language of the statute set forth above demonstrates the issuance of RDPs creates a statutory defense for revoked drivers who are not fully restored as licensed drivers, but have received an RDE In other words, the exception contained in the provisions of sections 6 \u2014 303(a) and (d) (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303(a), (d) (West Supp. 2007)) does not create an additional element of the offense for the State to prove. Instead, the exception for specially permitted drivers allows a revoked driver to avoid a conviction by demonstrating the driver was \u201cspecifically allowed\u201d by the permit to operate the vehicle at that point in time, even though his or her driving status remained revoked.\nThus, we agree that an officer is not required to determine or verify the scope of the restricted driving permit before performing a traffic stop when a reasonable articulable basis exists to believe the license of the person behind the wheel is revoked. We conclude the mere existence of an RDE does not extinguish an officer\u2019s reasonable and articulable basis to believe the officer has witnessed a revoked driver traveling on a highway of this state, in violation of the provisions of the Vehicle Code. However, if the visual inspection of the permit by the officer following a traffic stop does not support the officer\u2019s suspicion that the driver is unlawfully operating a motor vehicle, the inspection itself defeats probable cause to continue the investigation of the driver\u2019s license status or to make an arrest.\nHere, the officer visually confirmed that the facial characteristics of the person whom he observed driving the vehicle matched a photograph of the registered owner. The officer also learned the license of the registered owner was revoked. At this point, based on existing case law, we conclude that this officer, presented with the facts of this case, had a reasonable, articulable basis to believe that defendant was operating a motor vehicle upon a highway of this state at a time when his privilege to do so was revoked in violation of section 6 \u2014 303(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303(a) (West Supp. 2007). We hold that this officer lawfully initiated this investigatory stop after learning of the registered owner\u2019s revoked driving privileges standing alone, regardless of the issuance of an RDE\nFor purposes of this appeal, defendant does not suggest he was lawfully operating his vehicle within the terms of his restricted permit at the time of the stop. Instead, he simply challenges the basis for the initial stop and the evidence gathered from that stop.\nNext, we address whether the case of People v. Johnson, 379 Ill. App. 3d 710 (2008), controls the outcome in this case. In Johnson, the officer testified that on Sunday, February 12, 2006, at 4:30 p.m., he conducted a registration check of a motor vehicle and learned that the male, registered owner of the vehicle possessed a restricted driving permit. After observing \u201cthe driver was a male with an appearance consistent with that of the male owner,\u201d the officer initiated a traffic stop on the vehicle. People v. Johnson, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 711.\nThe appellate court upheld the trial court\u2019s decision quashing the arrest and suppressing the evidence in Johnson. The appellate court ruled that the traffic stop was based on \u201ca hunch, not reasonable suspicion,\u201d in part, because the officer relied on the time of day alone to deduce the driver might not be operating his vehicle within the conditions of the permit. People v. Johnson, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 712-13. The court went on to acknowledge that under other circumstances, not present in that case, \u201csome combination of factors, including the time the holder of an RDP was driving, might lead to a reasonable suspicion that the driver was outside the terms of his or her permit.\u201d People v. Johnson, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 713.\nUnlike the court in Johnson, we deliberately reject the view that a combination of factors in this case provided the officer with an articulable suspicion to believe the driver was not complying with his permit based on the time, location, and driver\u2019s attire. Such an approach invites abuse. Instead, we decline to follow the ruling in People v. Johnson, 379 Ill. App. 3d 710 (2008), based on existing case law discussed above and the provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code.\nWhile the trial judge was required to follow Johnson in the absence of a contrary view from this court, we now expressly decline to follow Johnson. Therefore, we hold that this officer had a reasonable articu-lable basis at the time of this encounter to support a brief investigatory traffic stop to identify the driver, and after confirming the driver was in fact the registered owner, conduct an inspection or investigate the scope of the driver\u2019s RDP Accordingly, the order granting the motion to quash and suppress is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nIn light of our conclusion that the officer possessed reasonable ar-ticulable suspicion to justify this traffic stop, it becomes unnecessary to address the State\u2019s other argument regarding the special needs doctrine.\nCONCLUSION\nThe judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WRIGHT" }, { "text": "JUSTICE SCHMIDT,\nspecially concurring:\nI concur with the holding above that the officer\u2019s knowledge of the registered owner\u2019s revoked driving privileges (RDP) supported a Terry stop. I write separately to point out that in my opinion, the Johnson case, upon which defendant and the trial court relied, was wrongly decided.\nThe Johnson court acknowledged that \u201c \u2018[w]hile the facts supporting the officer\u2019s suspicions need not rise to the level of probable cause, they must be based on more than a mere hunch.\u2019 \u201d People v. Johnson, 379 Ill. App. 3d 710, 712, 885 N.E.2d 358, 360 (2008), quoting People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462, 467 (2002).\nIt seems obvious that the case turned upon whether the officer\u2019s conclusion that the RDP was not valid on Sunday afternoon was simply a hunch or a reasonable, articulable suspicion.\nNew Webster\u2019s Dictionary defines \u201chunch\u201d as \u201can intuition or presentiment.\u201d New Webster\u2019s Dictionary & Thesaurus 188 (1991). The American Heritage College Dictionary defines \u201chunch\u201d as \u201can intuitive feeling or premonition.\u201d American Heritage College Dictionary 663 (3d ed. 1993).\nThe Johnson court stated \u201cMcGreall was likely correct in believing that Sunday afternoons are times when many RDPs prohibit driving, but that insight was not enough to give rise to reasonable suspicion.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Johnson, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 712, 885 N.E.2d at 360.\nOne needs to think about what the Johnson court said. Three appellate judges acknowledged that the officer \u201cwas likely correct\u201d and yet, nonetheless, they labeled his suspicion as a mere hunch. In Johnson, the officer knew that the driver was revoked, had an RDR and was driving on a Sunday afternoon. Apparently, the Johnson court wanted him to know that his RDP was not valid on Sunday afternoon. If the officer had proof positive that defendant\u2019s RDP was not valid on this Sunday afternoon, he would have had enough to convict beyond a reasonable doubt. That is not the type of evidence that is required for a Terry stop. The appellate court in Johnson must have agreed that the officer\u2019s articulated suspicion was reasonable, otherwise, how could it have noted that the officer \u201cwas likely correct\u201d? Johnson, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 712, 885 N.E.2d at 360. If, in fact, the officer had nothing more than a hunch, how could three appellate judges unanimously agree that he was likely correct? The Johnson court described a reasonable, articulable suspicion and then labeled it as a mere hunch.\nIn my opinion, the Johnson court, like many Illinois courts, has eroded the concept of reasonable, articulable suspicion. Since the officer might have been wrong and the defendant\u2019s RDP might have been valid, courts simply say that there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion of wrongdoing. Since the issue before us is a fourth amendment issue, the United States Supreme Court is the guiding light for our analysis.\nThe long-prevailing standard of probable cause protects citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime, while giving fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community\u2019s protection. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769, 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003). Probable cause exists when there is fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular case. United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 164 L. Ed. 2d 195, 126 S. Ct. 1494 (2006).\nWe have lost sight of the fact that reasonable, articulable suspicion is even a lower threshold than is probable cause. Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification for making a stop: something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or \u201chunch,\u201d but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). Reasonable, articulable suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989). We know that a preponderance of the evidence is that something is more likely true than not. Therefore, to form reasonable, articulable suspicion, the officer does not have to establish that it is more likely true than not that the subject of the stop is guilty of criminal wrongdoing. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that there will be circumstances in which wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 65 L. Ed. 2d 890, 100 S. Ct. 2752 (1980); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989).\nBased on the facts set forth above, the officer clearly had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver was operating in violation of his RDP It would be fair to say that most, but not all, people driving about on Sunday afternoons are not going to or from work. This commonsense observation is undoubtedly what led the Johnson court to conclude that the arresting officer was likely correct. Even had he been wrong and had the defendant actually been going to or coming from work, or going to or coming from the hospital, the brief investigatory stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion and, therefore, constitutionally permissible. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989). Again, the concept of reasonable, articulable suspicion presupposes that the detained person\u2019s conduct might very well be innocent. I believe the trial court, as did the Johnson court, held the State to a higher burden than that imposed by the law and, therefore, concur in the judgment to reverse and remand for further proceedings.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE SCHMIDT," }, { "text": "JUSTICE McDADE,\ndissenting:\nI dissent from the decision of the majority to reverse the trial court\u2019s order granting defendant\u2019s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.\nThe majority holds that \u201can officer is not required to determine or verify the scope of the restricted driving permit before performing a traffic stop when a reasonable articulable basis exists to believe the license of the person behind the wheel is revoked.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) 389 Ill. App. 3d at 233. Stated another way, once the officer reasonably determines that the person behind the wheel has a revoked driver\u2019s license, that officer can execute a traffic stop to investigate whether the driver was operating the vehicle outside the terms of his/ her RDE Thus, the terms or scope of the RDF have no bearing on the question of whether the officer had a sufficient basis to execute the traffic stop. Instead, the majority finds that an RDF merely creates a statutory defense which allows a revoked driver to avoid a conviction by demonstrating to the officer that he/she is \u201cspecifically allowed\u201d by the permit to operate the vehicle at the time of the seizure. 389 111. App. 3d at 233.\nI believe the majority\u2019s reasoning is flawed in that it ignores the fact that an officer is only allowed to stop and detain an individual if the officer has \u201cknowledge of sufficient articulable facts at the time of the encounter to create a reasonable suspicion that the person in question has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.\u201d (Emphasis added). People v. Love, 199 Ill. 2d 269, 275, 769 N.E.2d 10, 15 (2002), quoting People v. Smithers, 83 Ill. 2d 430, 434 (1980). Driving on a revoked license is not a crime if the individual is driving within the scope of his/her RDE Thus, in order to effectuate a valid traffic stop, I believe an officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is operating the vehicle outside the terms of his/her RDE As in the case of People v. Johnson, 379 Ill. App. 3d 710, 885 N.E.2d 358 (2008), the officer\u2019s stop in the present case was based solely on a hunch, not reasonable suspicion. In the case where a driver of a vehicle has an RDl^ mere knowledge that the driver has a revoked driver\u2019s license is insufficient to support a Terry stop. Johnson, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 712, 885 N.E.2d at 360. While the majority declines to adopt the reasoning set forth in Johnson, I believe Johnson was properly decided.\nAccordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court granting defendant\u2019s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE McDADE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Brian Towne, State\u2019s Attorney, of Ottawa (Terry A. Mertel and Judith Z. Kelly (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Douglas B. Olivero (argued), of Louis E. Olivero & Associates, of Peru, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARC A. CLOSE, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201408\u20140357\nOpinion filed April 1, 2009.\nSCHMIDT, J., specially concurring.\nMcDADE, J., dissenting.\nBrian Towne, State\u2019s Attorney, of Ottawa (Terry A. Mertel and Judith Z. Kelly (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nDouglas B. Olivero (argued), of Louis E. Olivero & Associates, of Peru, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0228-01", "first_page_order": 244, "last_page_order": 253 }