{ "id": 4284895, "name": "MADELINE BADEA, Plaintiff, v. MARK A. PHILLIPS, Defendant (David Koppelman, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "Badea v. Phillips", "decision_date": "2009-03-23", "docket_number": "No. 1-08-0338", "first_page": "292", "last_page": "300", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 292" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "210 Ill. 2d 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "809 N.E.2d 123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "we \"give effect to a clearly worded statute, no matter the result\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 895", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3832586 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "908", "parenthetical": "we \"give effect to a clearly worded statute, no matter the result\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/0895-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 N.E.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "where the court's power to act existed at common law, no statutory authority is required" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777553 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68", "parenthetical": "where the court's power to act existed at common law, no statutory authority is required" }, { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 N.E.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statute of limitations that applies to converting a respondent in discovery into a defendant must be scrupulously followed where it concerns \"an opportunity unknown at common law: the right to unilateral discovery\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 Ill. App. 3d 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5137612 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103", "parenthetical": "statute of limitations that applies to converting a respondent in discovery into a defendant must be scrupulously followed where it concerns \"an opportunity unknown at common law: the right to unilateral discovery\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/240/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 N.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3203685 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" }, { "page": "384" }, { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "621 N.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\" 'It is an elementary principle of law that judicial power essentially involves the right to enforce the results of its own exertion' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 Ill. App. 3d 1038", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5409368 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1042", "parenthetical": "\" 'It is an elementary principle of law that judicial power essentially involves the right to enforce the results of its own exertion' \"" }, { "page": "1044" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/249/1038-01" ] }, { "cite": "848 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 Ill. 2d 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3598302 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/219/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "682 N.E.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 790", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351096 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/0790-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 N.E.2d 323", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 349614 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" }, { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/309/0386-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 757, "char_count": 19388, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1438937173557223 }, "sha256": "4cdda88b497d6e35d5aa0e4a4adb58d93aa2f0d0887b9661f173878724e0ff35", "simhash": "1:7f741ebfef9948f4", "word_count": 3241 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:37:38.013620+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MADELINE BADEA, Plaintiff, v. MARK A. PHILLIPS, Defendant (David Koppelman, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARCIA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is a review of an order of the circuit court barring the defendant\u2019s counsel, David Koppelman and his law firm, from using the discovery deposition of Dr. Roberto Diaz, a nonparty witness, in any other proceeding as a sanction pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 219(c). 210 Ill. 2d R. 219(c). The sanction was entered following a motion by Dr. Diaz based on Mr. Koppelman\u2019s alleged violation of a protective order. The motion was filed after the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a stipulation and settlement agreement, resulting in the dismissal with prejudice of the underlying suit. Mr. Koppelman first contends the circuit court had no jurisdiction to address a motion for sanctions filed by a nonparty after a dismissal order had been entered. We agree and vacate the circuit court\u2019s order imposing the sanction.\nBACKGROUND\nThis case arises from a lawsuit for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff received treatment for the injuries from Dr. Diaz. Dr. Diaz referred the plaintiff for an MRI at Regional MRI of Chicago (now known as Spectrum Diagnostics). Regional MRI billed the plaintiff $1,050 for this MRI. In addition, Spine Centers Institute, a separate entity, allegedly owned in part by Dr. Diaz, issued a bill for $2,106, purportedly for the same MRI of the plaintiff. To investigate why two bills were generated by two different entities for what appeared to be the same MRI, Mr. Koppelman served Dr. Diaz with a subpoena to give his discovery deposition.\nOn April 16, 2007, Dr. Diaz filed a motion for a protective order seeking to exclude any questioning of his involvement with the two MRI centers, his billing practices, or contracts. He argued his deposition should be limited to his treatment of the plaintiff. During the initial hearing on Dr. Diaz\u2019s motion, Mr. Koppelman explained the defendant\u2019s need to question Dr. Diaz about two bills for the same examination. On April 24, 2007, the circuit court granted Dr. Diaz\u2019s motion for a protective order, holding that his deposition should consist solely of questions pertaining to the care and treatment he administered to the plaintiff, barring all questions pertaining to contractual relationships between Dr. Diaz and the MRI centers or other physicians.\nOn May 17, 2007, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration/ clarification of the circuit court\u2019s April 24, 2007, order. Mr. Koppelman argued that based upon the evidence in the case, the defendant should be allowed to inquire as to why both companies issued bills for what seemed to be the same MRI of the plaintiff. Mr. Koppelman further argued that because Dr. Diaz allegedly partially owned Spine Centers Institute, he would have insight to why his company issued a bill for the MRI the plaintiff had taken at Regional MRI.\nOn June 1, 2007, the circuit court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the defendant\u2019s motion for reconsideration/ clarification. The circuit court judge orally clarified the parameters of Dr. Diaz\u2019s discovery deposition. The judge stated that defense counsel was entitled to know which bill was the legitimate bill for the services rendered to the plaintiff. Mr. Koppelman then added, \u201cand why [it is] a legitimate bill.\u201d The judge found Mr. Koppelman\u2019s addition was going too far because that line of questioning had nothing to do with the plaintiff\u2019s injuries in this case. The judge explained that defense counsel could inquire as to which of the two bills was the legitimate bill, but could not inquire about Dr. Diaz\u2019s billing practices or contracts. In response to Mr. Koppelman\u2019s suggestion that more clarity was needed, the judge replied, \u201c[T]he question is[:] Dr. Diaz, there were two bills issued to my client. Do you have knowledge which is the correct bill for the services rendered by you?\u201d Mr. Koppelman further inquired whether he was entitled to ask Dr. Diaz \u201cwhy his fee is a reasonable and customary fee for the services he claims to have rendered in this case.\u201d The judge informed Mr. Koppelman that if Dr. Diaz admitted the correct bill was the one from Spine Centers, he could inquire as to whether the charges were reasonable and customary, but that is where the inquiry must end. The judge cautioned Mr. Koppelman that he was not permitted to ask Dr. Diaz to break down the costs of the bill. The judge also found that Mr. Koppelman was \u201cpushing\u201d her ruling. The judge instructed Dr. Diaz\u2019s counsel that if he had objections to the questioning during the deposition, he should state, \u201cI\u2019m not allowing my client to answer based on the Judge\u2019s ruling\u201d and certify the question to the circuit court. The written order entered on June 1, 2007, following the hearing, did not set out the parameters for Dr. Diaz\u2019s deposition but merely stated the defendant\u2019s motion for reconsideration/clarification was granted in part and denied in part.\nOn July 17, 2007, the circuit court dismissed the underlying suit with prejudice pursuant to a stipulation and settlement agreement between the parties.\nOn August 15, 2007, Dr. Diaz filed a motion for sanctions against Mr. Koppelman and his law firm for alleged violations of the circuit court\u2019s June 1, 2007, discovery order. On January 11, 2008, the circuit court granted Dr. Diaz\u2019s motion for sanctions.\nAt the initial hearing on Dr. Diaz\u2019s sanctions motion, Mr. Koppel-man argued the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear Dr. Diaz\u2019s motion for sanctions. The circuit court judge directed the parties to submit briefs on the issue of the jurisdiction of the court. At the subsequent hearing, the trial judge concluded that she did have jurisdiction because the motion was filed within 30 days of dismissal of the underlying suit. At this hearing, Dr. Diaz\u2019s counsel argued Mr. Koppelman went beyond the scope of the court\u2019s protective order by asking Dr. Diaz certain questions that he read into the record. Beyond those questions, Dr. Diaz\u2019s counsel argued Mr. Koppelman improperly asked \u201cabout the names and appointments status of other physicians\u201d working for Dr. Diaz\u2019s company.\nThe judge asked Mr. Koppelman to explain his \u201cblatant violation\u201d of the circuit court\u2019s order \u201cwhich we spent a lot of time arguing in my chambers and coming up [with parameters] for Dr. Diaz\u2019s deposition.\u201d Mr. Koppelman argued his questions were permitted based on the judge\u2019s ruling clarifying the parameters of Dr. Diaz\u2019s deposition. The judge concluded Mr. Koppelman\u2019s questions went beyond the scope of the circuit court\u2019s ruling and, as such, were a violation of the protective order. The judge granted Dr. Diaz\u2019s motion for sanctions and held that Dr. Diaz\u2019s deposition could not be used in any collateral proceeding. Mr. Koppelman interjected, asking the judge whether the violation was of Rule 137. The judge explained counsel\u2019s violation was of Rule 219(c), not Rule 137. Mr. Koppelman asked the judge \u201cwhich question or questions, if any, is your Honor saying were beyond the scope of this court order?\u201d The judge responded that the questions were adequately set out in the transcript of the hearing. The judge concluded: \u201c[M]y sanction is that this deposition cannot be used in collateral proceedings and I\u2019m not going to enter any monetary sanctions.\u201d The judge determined that no monetary damages were warranted because the improper questioning of Dr. Diaz caused him no harm as counsel objected and the questions were never answered. Mr. Koppelman, as counsel for the defendant, appeals.\nANALYSIS\nMr. Koppelman initially contends the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to rule upon Dr. Diaz\u2019s Rule 219(c) motion for discovery sanctions because the underlying suit had been dismissed with prejudice prior to the filing of the motion. In the alternative, Mr. Koppelman argues the circuit court abused its discretion in imposing what he characterizes as a punitive sanction. Mr. Koppelman contends he did not \u201cunreasonably violate the trial court\u2019s order\u201d because no answers were given to the offending questions, thus resulting in no harm to Dr. Diaz.\nJurisdiction of Circuit Court\nAt the first postjudgment hearing, the trial judge, consistent with Mr. Koppelman\u2019s position, ruled she no longer had jurisdiction over the case because the underlying suit had been settled and dismissed by the time Dr. Diaz filed his motion for sanctions. The issue of the court\u2019s jurisdiction was then briefed by the parties. At the subsequent hearing, Dr. Diaz asserted the circuit court retained jurisdiction to address the matter of sanctions under Supreme Court Rule 137. 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. Ultimately, the trial judge ruled she retained jurisdiction \u201cto hear this motion for sanctions [because it] was filed within 30 days after dismissal.\u201d When Mr. Koppelman asked whether the sanction was being imposed under Rule 137 or Rule 219(c), the trial judge stated that the sanction was imposed for a violation of Rule 219(c), not Rule 137.\nDr. Diaz persists in his claim that his motion for sanctions was filed under Rule 137. He does so apparently because Rule 137 expressly provides that \u201c[m]otions brought pursuant to this rule must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the final judgment.\u201d 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. Dr. Diaz restates this claim in his brief: the circuit court has \u201cresidual jurisdiction over a case for a 30-day period after entry of a final order.\u201d\nUnder Rule 137, a sanction may be imposed based on \u201ca pleading, motion, or other paper *** signed in violation of this rule.\u201d 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. The rule also provides that a sanction may require the offending person \u201cto pay *** the amount of reasonable expenses incurred\u201d for any filing that violates the rule. 155 Ill. 2d R. 137.\nDr. Diaz makes no attempt to reconcile the nature of his discovery sanction motion with the nature of a sanction motion for improper filings under the express terms of Rule 137. Moreover, the trial judge made clear the basis for her ruling: Rule 219(c). We agree with the trial judge; the substance of Dr. Diaz\u2019s discovery sanction motion fell under Rule 219(c). We address the propriety of her ruling under Rule 219(c) only.\nThe precise issue before us is very narrow: did the circuit court have jurisdiction to entertain a motion for sanctions under 219(c) by a nonparty after the underlying suit had been dismissed? This issue is a question of law. In re Marriage of Zuberbier, 309 Ill. App. 3d 386, 388, 722 N.E.2d 323 (1999). The resolution of the issue turns on whether the circuit court had residual jurisdiction at the time the motion was filed.\nIn support of his claim that residual jurisdiction was present, Dr. Diaz cites to Harchut v. Oce/Bruning, Inc., 289 Ill. App. 3d 790, 682 N.E.2d 432 (1997), and section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1203 (West 2006)). We agree that each authority supports the existence of residual jurisdiction. \u201cOnce a final order has been entered, the circuit court retains residual jurisdiction for 30 days. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1203(a) (West 1994).\u201d Harchut, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 793. However, under section 2 \u2014 1203(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, residual jurisdiction is limited to challenges to the judgment entered in a nonjury case by a party to the suit. Section 2 \u2014 1203(a) has no application to the discovery sanction motion filed by Dr. Diaz. The circuit court here did not retain residual jurisdiction under section 2 \u2014 1203(a); Harchut is thus inapposite.\nWe look then to the provisions of Rule 219(c) to determine whether the rule itself grants residual jurisdiction to the circuit court to rule upon Dr. Diaz\u2019s motion. In construing a supreme court rule, we apply the same principles we employ to construe a statute, with the goal of determining the intent of the drafters of the rule. Zuberbier, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 388. Once construed, the provisions of the rule are applied to the facts of a particular case to determine the outcome. See Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 219 Ill. 2d 182, 235, 848 N.E.2d 1 (2005).\nLike Rule 137, Rule 219(c) contains a provision extending the circuit court\u2019s jurisdiction to address sanctions after a final judgment is entered. However, by the express language of Rule 219(c) the motion for sanctions must have been \u201cpending *** prior to the filing of a notice or motion seeking a judgment or order of dismissal.\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 219(c). Here, Dr. Diaz\u2019s motion for sanctions was not filed until after the dismissal without prejudice order had been entered. Moreover, Rule 219(c) limits the residual jurisdiction of the circuit court to the enforcement of \u201cany order imposing monetary sanctions.\u201d We are not dealing with such an order here.\nThat Rule 219(c) does not extend the jurisdiction of the circuit court beyond the termination of the case, except for circumstances expressly set out by the rule, is consistent with the clear aim of the rule of compelling compliance with discovery matters during the pendency of the case. The listed remedies for a violation of Rule 219(c) make this clear: (1) litigation may be stayed until the rule is complied with; (2) an offending party may be debarred from filing other pleadings relating to a discovery issue; (3) a witness\u2019s testimony may be barred at trial; (4) a default judgment may be entered against an offending party; (5) the pleadings of an offending party may be stricken; and (6) the offending party may be ordered to pay interest on a judgment entered against it. The listed remedies do not provide any relief to be afforded based on a sanction motion filed after final judgment has been entered. Accordingly, we find no basis to conclude that the circuit court retained residual jurisdiction under Rule 219(c) to address Dr. Diaz\u2019s motion.\nDr. Diaz next argues that because the circuit court issued a protective order to apply at his deposition, the circuit court was merely exercising its inherent authority to enforce its own order and, therefore, retained residual jurisdiction to impose a sanction on Mr. Koppelman. See American Society of Lubrication Engineers v. Roetheli, 249 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1042, 621 N.E.2d 30 (1993) (\u201c \u2018It is an elementary principle of law that judicial power essentially involves the right to enforce the results of its own exertion\u2019 \u201d), quoting Cities Service Oil Co. v. Village of Oak Brook, 84 Ill. App. 3d 381, 384, 405 N.E.2d 379 (1980).\nWhile we do not disagree with the general principle cited by Dr. Diaz, the principle has no application here. Under the facts present in this case, Dr. Diaz is constrained to argue that in imposing the sanction after the dismissal of the underlying suit, the circuit court was enforcing its protective order that restricted the questions that could be asked of Dr. Diaz at his deposition. We are presented with no authority for this broad definition of \u201cenforcing.\u201d In Roetheli, the court expressly grounded its holding on the circuit court\u2019s express decision to \u201cretain[ ] jurisdiction for the precise purpose of enforcing the settlement.\u201d Roetheli, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 1044. In Cities Service Oil Co., cited as authority by Roetheli, a distinction was drawn between a circuit court having \u201cjurisdiction to modify the original decree [and having] jurisdiction to enforce it.\u201d Cities Service Oil Co., 84 Ill. App. 3d at 384. Residual jurisdiction was lacking in the former, but present for the latter. Cities Service Oil Co., 84 Ill. App. 3d at 384.\nHere, the circuit court was not seeking to enforce its protective order but to sanction Mr. Koppelman for allegedly having violated it. We are unconvinced that any residual jurisdiction the circuit court may have to enforce its own order extends so far as to impose a sanction for a violation of Supreme Court Rule 219(c), which we treat as analogous to statutory authority. See Froehlich v. Sheehan, 240 Ill. App. 3d 93, 103, 608 N.E.2d 889 (1992) (statute of limitations that applies to converting a respondent in discovery into a defendant must be scrupulously followed where it concerns \u201can opportunity unknown at common law: the right to unilateral discovery\u201d); Cf. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 68, 619 N.E.2d 702 (1993) (where the court\u2019s power to act existed at common law, no statutory authority is required). We reject Dr. Diaz\u2019s unstated but necessary claim that imposing a sanction for an alleged violation of Rule 219(c) is the same as enforcing the protective order itself.\nAbsent authority based on an express provision in Rule 219(c) to impose the sanction under the circumstances present in this case, the order imposing the sanction exceeded the circuit court\u2019s power to act and the order is void. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 66. To the extent Dr. Diaz felt entitled to any relief based on Mr. Koppelman\u2019s purported violation of the protective order, it was incumbent upon Dr. Diaz to act within the provisions of Rule 219(c). See Robinson v. Johnson, 346 Ill. App. 3d 895, 908, 809 N.E.2d 123 (2003) (we \u201cgive effect to a clearly worded statute, no matter the result\u201d).\nWe hold the circuit court had no jurisdiction to address the motion for discovery sanctions filed by Dr. Diaz after the case ended on July 17, 2007, when the court dismissed the underlying suit with prejudice pursuant to a stipulation and settlement agreement between the parties. The circuit court\u2019s residual jurisdiction did not extend to the imposition of sanctions under Rule 219(c) for alleged violations of its protective order because the rule makes no provision for the postjudgment filing of such a motion.\nAccordingly, although the trial judge found merit in the claims raised by Dr. Diaz\u2019s motion, the circuit court lost the authority to grant relief by the time the motion was filed. The circuit court\u2019s order sanctioning Mr. Koppelman and his firm is void for lack of jurisdiction.\nAbuse of Discretion Claim\nBased on our finding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a motion for sanctions under Rule 219(c) under the circumstances present in this case, we do not address Mr. Koppel-man\u2019s challenge to the circuit court\u2019s exercise of its discretion.\nCONCLUSION\nBecause Dr. Diaz\u2019s discovery sanction motion was not filed until after the underlying lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to thereafter enter a sanction under Rule 219(c). We vacate the January 11, 2008, order of the circuit court of Cook County imposing a sanction upon Mr. Koppelman and his law firm.\nVacated.\nWOLFSON and HALL, JJ., concur.\nAt oral argument we raised the question whether Rule 219(c) applies to a nonparty. We provide no answer because the issue was not addressed in the briefs.\nDr. Diaz also argues in his brief that the circuit court retained residual jurisdiction because \u201cthe dismissal order itself states that \u2018the Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter to adjudicate any/all liens.\u2019 \u201d However, Dr. Diaz provides no authority for his implied argument that his discovery sanction motion should be treated as a lien adjudication and, therefore, we do not address it. See 210 Ill. 2d 341(h)(7).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARCIA" } ], "attorneys": [ "David Koppelman, of LaRose & Bosco, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "William Gundlach, of Steven M. Pontikes & Associates, of Chicago, for ap-pellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MADELINE BADEA, Plaintiff, v. MARK A. PHILLIPS, Defendant (David Koppelman, Respondent-Appellant).\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201408\u20140338\nOpinion filed March 23, 2009.\nDavid Koppelman, of LaRose & Bosco, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nWilliam Gundlach, of Steven M. Pontikes & Associates, of Chicago, for ap-pellee." }, "file_name": "0292-01", "first_page_order": 308, "last_page_order": 316 }