{ "id": 4284960, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOYCE M. MOTT, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Mott", "decision_date": "2009-04-20", "docket_number": "No. 4-07-0756", "first_page": "539", "last_page": "547", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 539" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "S.D. Codified Laws \u00a732-15-6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "S.D. Codified Laws", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Minn. Stat. \u00a7169.71", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Minn. Stat.", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Wis. Stat. \u00a7346.88", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Wis. Stat.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law \u00a7375", "category": "laws:leg_act", "reporter": "N.Y.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "McKinney 2008" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a760-6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Neb. Rev. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Mich. Comp. Laws \u00a7257.709", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Mich. Comp. Laws", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Conn. Gen. Stat. \u00a714", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Conn. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Cal. Veh. Code \u00a726708", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Cal. Code", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ariz. Rev. Stat. \u00a728-959.01", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ariz. Rev. Stat.", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "617 N.W.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Corrigan, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "463 Mich. 881", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Corrigan, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "959 A.2d 1054", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Conn. App. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn. 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App. 3d 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265784 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195-96", "parenthetical": "\"the defendant must convince the trial court that the *** seizure was unlawful\"" }, { "page": "196" }, { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "874 N.E.2d 81", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89-90", "parenthetical": "holding officer lacked reasonable suspicion one-fourth-inch-wide beads were a material obstruction" }, { "page": "90" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "369 Ill. App. 3d 960", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4267915 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding officer lacked reasonable suspicion one-fourth-inch-wide beads were a material obstruction" }, { "page": "971" }, { "page": "968" }, { "page": "970" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/369/0960-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 952, "char_count": 20421, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4020864483823253e-07, "percentile": 0.6449117303750141 }, "sha256": "abb4e06ad91d1db1d01e4a567e1f2227ae0568b64a92126dd7898b29a9c905d8", "simhash": "1:33f4b41f564598f4", "word_count": 3319 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:37:38.013620+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOYCE M. MOTT, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe trial court granted a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop of defendant, Joyce M. Mott. The State appeals, arguing the court erred when it found police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop defendant\u2019s vehicle and granted the motion to suppress. We disagree and affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn November 2006, the State charged defendant with unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2004)), arising out of defendant\u2019s alleged possession of alprazolam (commonly known as Xanax) found during a traffic stop of defendant\u2019s car. In June 2007, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence alleging, inter alia, Clark County sheriff\u2019s deputy Steven McKillop lacked reasonable suspicion to stop defendant\u2019s car to investigate a material obstruction of the driver\u2019s view out of her front windshield in violation of section 12 \u2014 503(c) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 503(c) (West 2004)).\nDeputy McKillop was the only witness, and he testified to the following facts. On the date of the traffic stop, November 24, 2006, McKillop was on patrol driving eastbound in a marked squad car on Archer Avenue, a four-lane road with two lanes in each direction, around 4:30 p.m. McKillop was driving in the curbside lane and defendant was in the center lane behind and to the left of McKillop\u2019s squad car. McKillop noticed defendant\u2019s car did not have front license plates, and he slowed down to 10 miles per hour to permit defendant to go by him in the inside lane. Defendant slowed down as well, refusing to go past him. At that point, McKillop saw defendant\u2019s car had an air freshener hanging from its rearview mirror. McKillop pulled into a parking lot and defendant\u2019s car passed by. McKillop noted defendant\u2019s car had an Indiana license plate on the rear, which eliminated probable cause to pull the car over for a license-plate violation. However, given defendant\u2019s evasive behavior, McKillop decided to pull defendant over. He stated \u201c[the air freshener] became what [he] was going to use for probable cause for the traffic stop.\u201d\nDefense counsel entered a leaf-shaped air freshener into evidence, which Deputy McKillop identified as the same air freshener he noticed in defendant\u2019s car. McKillop described the air freshener as \u201clarge\u201d but also stated it was a typical size for an air freshener. He estimated its size as 3V2 to 4 inches wide and 4 to 5 inches tall. With respect to the air freshener\u2019s position, McKillop stated that it hung about one inch below the rearview mirror on a string and was swinging from side to side.\nIn Deputy McKillop\u2019s view, the air freshener materially obstructed the driver\u2019s view. McKillop had no formal training regarding the precise, legal meaning of \u201cmaterial obstruction.\u201d However, McKillop stated that a colleague, Deputy Sanders had once explained \u201cmaterial obstruction\u201d in the following way:\n\u201c[Deputy Sanders] asked me to take my thumb and hold it out in front of me and take my finger and put it over a person or an object, closing one eye or just looking[.] [A]nd that if your thumbnail covers up a person or object which is in front of you and is about the same distance from your face is as what the windshield is in your vehicle, [Sanders] said[.] [N]ow looking at your thumbnail, we\u2019re putting in perspective a large air freshener, [M]ardi [G]ras beads hanging from the mirror, anything of that nature that would really obstruct the vision, and we\u2019re going from a thumbnail to a large air freshener now, and it could cover up a lot more.\u201d\nMcKillop stated that he used Deputy Sanders\u2019 explanation of material obstruction when he decided to curb defendant\u2019s car.\nDuring closing arguments, defense counsel compared the instant situation to People v. Cole, 369 Ill. App. 3d 960, 969-70 874 N.E.2d 81, 89-90 (2007) (holding officer lacked reasonable suspicion one-fourth-inch-wide beads were a material obstruction). Counsel argued Deputy McKillop did not have reasonable suspicion to believe the air freshener was a material obstruction and curbed defendant\u2019s car based upon a mistake of law. The State argued McKillop had articulated reasonable suspicion: the air freshener, given its size and location, could have materially obstructed defendant\u2019s view of the road in violation of the statute. In rebuttal, defense counsel argued (1) such a small air freshener could not, as a matter of law, constitute a \u201cmaterial obstruction\u201d; and (2) McKillop had failed to show the air freshener\u2019s position in relation to defendant\u2019s line of sight.\nThe trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress in a written order which included the following findings of fact:\n\u201cThe air freshener *** is in the irregular shape of a leaf with a stem at the bottom. The stem is approximately [one-quarter] inch wide and [one-half] inch long. The leaf is three inches long from base to point. Its maximum width is [23/i] inches. It is [one-sixteenth] inch thick with a consistency similar to that of the cardboard backing on a legal pad. The string by which the air freshener was suspended is not in evidence. [Deputy McKillop] did not say whether it was the top or bottom of the air freshener that was suspended one inch below the mirror.\n*** There was no testimony about the relationship of the air freshener to the driver\u2019s eye level. *** It is improper to assume that this air freshener would have obstructed the driver\u2019s view of pedestrians, absent testimony that it hung in that part of the windshield through which a driver would observe persons walking on the pavement.\n*** The \u2018fingernail/penny\u2019 example is not helpful. There is no evidence [defendant] was driving with one eye closed. The illustration, in the abstract, ignores *** binocular vision as well as matters of distance, line of vision, and perspective. *** A visor and decals obstruct a windshield but typically are not considered prohibited material obstructions.\n*** Deputy McKillop expressed the conclusion that an air freshener suspended from the rearview mirror is a material obstruction. However, at no time did he testify as a matter of factual observation that the suspended object was at or below [defendant's eye level or otherwise obstructed a material portion of the windshield or [defendant\u2019s] line of vision.\u201d\nThe trial court also found Deputy McKillop\u2019s understanding of material obstruction was a mistake of law based upon this court\u2019s holding in Cole, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 971, 874 N.E.2d at 90.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nThe State argues the trial court erred when it found Deputy McKillop lacked reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for a material obstruction of her front windshield.\nA. Burden Of Proof\nThe defendant has the burden of persuasion on a motion to suppress. People v. Roberson, 367 Ill. App. 3d 193, 195-96, 854 N.E.2d 317, 320 (2006) (\u201cthe defendant must convince the trial court that the *** seizure was unlawful\u201d). The burden of producing evidence, or the burden of production, rests with the defendant. Roberson, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 196, 854 N.E.2d at 320. If the defendant makes out a prima facie case of an unlawful search or seizure, the burden shifts to the State to introduce evidence justifying the search or seizure. Roberson, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 196, 854 N.E.2d at 320.\nReview of a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of fact and law. People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 512, 813 N.E.2d 93, 100 (2004). The correctness of the trial court\u2019s ultimate ruling on the motion to suppress presents a legal question, which this court reviews de novo. People v. Moss, 217 Ill. 2d 511, 518, 842 N.E.2d 699, 704 (2005). However, this court will not overturn the trial court\u2019s finding of historical facts unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d at 512, 813 N.E.2d at 100. This standard is grounded in the realization the trial court observed the witnesses and their demeanor and had the opportunity to resolve conflicts in testimony firsthand. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d at 512, 813 N.E.2d at 100-01. \u201cA finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.\u201d People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332, 882 N.E.2d 999, 1005 (2008).\nB. Findings Of Fact\nThe trial court found Deputy McKillop misinterpreted section 12 \u2014 503(c) of the Vehicle Code. McKillop mistakenly believed any object the size of a fingernail or larger hanging between the driver and the windshield constituted a \u201cmaterial obstruction\u201d providing reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. McKillop\u2019s understanding of material obstruction also failed to take into account perspective, line of sight, distance, and binocular vision.\nWith respect to the circumstances of the stop itself, the trial court found Deputy McKillop did not testify to the relationship between the air freshener and defendant\u2019s eye level. McKillop expressed a testimonial conclusion the air freshener constituted a material obstruction but did not express any specific facts showing how he arrived at his conclusion. The court noted McKillop did not testify whether the air freshener\u2019s top or bottom was one inch below the bottom of the rearview mirror. Finally, the air freshener was significantly smaller than McKillop estimated on the witness stand. Rather than four to five inches tall and three to four inches wide, the air freshener was less than three inches wide at its widest point and only three inches tall, including a one-quarter-inch-wide and half-inch-tall stem. The court concluded McKillop articulated facts showing defendant had an air freshener suspended from her rearview mirror, nothing more. We conclude the court\u2019s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nC. Review After Mistake Of Law\nThe fourth amendment protects all citizens\u2019 rights \u201cto be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d U.S. Const., amend. IV Traffic stops constitute seizures of persons for purposes of the fourth amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 95, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996). The fourth amendment commands all traffic stops be reasonable. People v. Johnson, 384 Ill. App. 3d 409, 412, 893 N.E.2d 275, 278 (2008).\nWhere a traffic stop is based upon a mistake of law, it is unconstitutional. However, this may not resolve the issue. An otherwise improper stop based on a mistake of law may be found reasonable and constitutional if \u201cthe facts known to [the officer] raised a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was in fact violating the law as written.\u201d Cole, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 968, 874 N.E.2d at 88. A police officer may stop a vehicle where he has reasonable suspicion to believe a driver is violating the Vehicle Code. See Cole, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 970, 874 N.E.2d at 90. Reasonable suspicion exists where an officer possesses specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences derived from those facts, give rise to a belief the driver is committing a traffic violation. See People v. Rollins, 382 Ill. App. 3d 833, 837, 892 N.E.2d 21, 24 (2008).\nThe material-obstruction statute reads as follows:\n\u201cNo person shall drive a motor vehicle with any objects placed or suspended between the driver and the front windshield *** which materially obstructs the driver\u2019s view.\u201d (Emphases added.) 625 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 503(c) (West 2004).\nDeputy McKillop\u2019s decision to pull defendant over was based upon a mistake of law. Thus, defendant made a prima facie showing the search was unlawful. The burden then shifted to the State to show the facts known to McKillop at the time provided reasonable suspicion the air freshener constituted a material obstruction of defendant\u2019s windshield.\nWe find People v. Johnson, 384 Ill. App. 3d 409, 414, 893 N.E.2d 275, 280 (2008), instructive. In Johnson, this court affirmed the grant of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence seized after a traffic stop for a violation of the statute at issue here. In Johnson, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 410, 893 N.E.2d at 478, the arresting officer looked at defendant\u2019s car from the rear and the side at night and saw an air freshener shaped like two life-sized cherries hanging from the defendant\u2019s rearview mirror. The officer estimated the air freshener was two inches wide but had no training regarding the meaning of \u201cmaterial obstruction.\u201d Johnson, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 410-11, 893 N.E.2d at 277. Similar to the officer\u2019s behavior in Johnson, Deputy McKillop had only a brief view of the air freshener when defendant\u2019s car was behind his patrol car. The air freshener in this case was around the same size as the air freshener in Johnson, less than three inches wide at its widest point and only three inches long, including a tiny stem.\nDeputy McKillop failed to articulate any specific facts giving rise to an inference defendant\u2019s view was obstructed. Defendant\u2019s trial counsel and McKillop had the following exchange:\n\u201c[Q.] *** Why was it that you believed that that particular item, being the air freshener[,] *** materially obstructed the driver\u2019s view in this case?\n[A.] While operating the motor vehicle, there are lots of different hazards that come about, such as people walking, crossing on the sidewalks, even traffic[-]control devices, stop signs, whatnot. While the air freshener is hanging from the mirror of the vehicle, it can block out said hazards *** to where the driver may not at a certain point in time see those items and could cause an accident.\u201d\nWhen asked to give specifics regarding his observations, McKillop, in the trial court\u2019s estimation, failed to do so. We will not overturn the court\u2019s credibility findings unless they are manifestly erroneous. People v. Driggers, 222 Ill. 2d 65, 70, 853 N.E.2d 414, 417 (2006). Given the lack of specificity in McKillop\u2019s response and his overestimation of the air freshener\u2019s size, we cannot say the court improperly found McKillop\u2019s testimony lacked credibility.\nThe record does not support the State\u2019s argument the facts in the instant case are similar to People v. Mendoza, 234 Ill. App. 3d 826, 599 N.E.2d 1375 (1992) (Fifth District), United States v. Smith, 80 F.3d 215 (7th Cir. 1996), and People v. Jackson, 335 Ill. App. 3d 313, 780 N.E.2d 826 (2002) (Second District). In Mendoza, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 838, 599 N.E.2d at 1383, the Fifth District affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress where police stopped a car because it had \u201cfuzzy dice and other items hanging from the rearview mirror.\u201d The trial court made no specific factual findings regarding the position of the items in relation to the driver, other than finding the arresting officer\u2019s testimony credible when she opined the driver had a materially obstructed view. Mendoza, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 839, 599 N.E.2d at 1384. In Smith, 80 F.3d at 219, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress without any discussion of the evidence presented regarding the materiality of the obstruction. In Jackson, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 314, 780 N.E.2d at 827, the Second District reversed a trial court\u2019s decision to suppress evidence because the arresting officer testified he saw a \u201c \u2018large obstruction\u2019 \u201d between the defendant and his windshield. In that case, the trial court specifically found the arresting officer\u2019s testimony credible and his acts taken in good faith. Jackson, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 314, 780 N.E.2d at 827.\nThe trial court in this case made specific factual findings, to which this court must defer, regarding Deputy McKillop\u2019s opportunity to view the air freshener and his motivation for the stop. The air freshener was smaller than McKillop\u2019s testimony indicated. McKillop saw the air freshener when defendant\u2019s car was behind his car and to the left. Although made in good faith, the court found the stop was pretextual. See People v. Lomas, 349 Ill. App. 3d 462, 468, 812 N.E.2d 39, 44 (2004) (noting trial court may consider officer\u2019s subjective motivation for traffic stop). Most important, McKillop never testified how he believed the air freshener might have materially obstructed defendant\u2019s view of the road when he decided to stop defendant\u2019s car.\nWe also disagree with defendant\u2019s trial counsel\u2019s interpretation of section 12 \u2014 503(c), seemingly accepted by the trial court, that an air freshener could not, as a matter of law, constitute a material obstruction. The court\u2019s order states, \u201cIllinois law does not criminalize [per se] the suspension of an object from a rearview mirror. It is not unusual to see objects such as necklaces, pendants, parking passes, souvenirs, good[-]luck charms, beads, crucifixes, St. Christopher [medals], and sunglasses suspended from a rearview mirror. [Section] 12\u2014 503(c) prohibits the suspension or placement of an object in a window \u2018[which] materially obstructs the driver\u2019s view.\u2019 \u201d See 625 ILCS 5/12\u2014 503(c) (West 2006). Size alone does not determine whether an object materially obstructs the driver\u2019s view. In our view, all of the objects listed could be material obstructions in the proper situation.\nMany states have statutes that criminalize the placement of objects hanging from rearview mirrors. Three distinct approaches exist. The first approach criminalizes the placement of objects that \u201cmaterially obstruct\u201d the driver\u2019s vision. Illinois follows this approach. 625 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 503(c) (West 2006). Oklahoma and Pennsylvania have similar statutes, although the Third Circuit has read the materiality requirement quite loosely when interpreting Pennsylvania\u2019s statute. Okla. Stat. tit. 47, \u00a712 \u2014 404 (2007); 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. \u00a74524(c) (2006); see also United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 400 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding pendant hanging almost to dashboard was material obstruction).\nThe second approach criminalizes the placement of objects that \u201cobstruct\u201d or \u201cobstruct or impair\u201d the driver\u2019s vision. The obstruction requirement is a low threshold that requires the officer to testify credibly he believed the object was in the driver\u2019s line of vision. See, e.g., State v. Cyrus, 111 Conn. App. 482, 959 A.2d 1054 (2008); People v. Fisher, 463 Mich. 881, 617 N.W.2d 37 (2000) (Corrigan, J., concurring). The majority of states follow this approach, including Arizona, California, Connecticut, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Ariz. Rev. Stat. \u00a728\u2014959.01 (2008); Cal. Veh. Code \u00a726708 (2000) ; Conn. Gen. Stat. \u00a714\u201499f (2000); Mich. Comp. Laws \u00a7257.709 (2001) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a760\u20146,256 (1993); N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law \u00a7375 (McKinney 2008); Va. Code. Ann. \u00a746.2\u20141054 (Michie 2003); Wis. Stat. \u00a7346.88 (2007).\nThe third approach criminalizes the placement of any object between the driver and the windshield. Minnesota and South Dakota follow this approach. Minn. Stat. \u00a7169.71 (2006); S.D. Codified Laws \u00a732\u201415\u20146 (Michie 2004).\nWe sympathize with trial judges and with police officers who are called upon to determine whether an object \u201cmaterially obstructs\u201d the driver\u2019s vision. The bright-line approach taken by Minnesota and South Dakota would make law enforcement\u2019s job easier. The \u201cobstruct\u201d approach taken by the majority of states seems the most reasonable. We commend the statute to the attention of our legislature to consider whether the approach we now use in Illinois accomplishes the result intended.\nIn this case, the mere fact defendant had an air freshener hanging from her rearview mirror did not give rise to reasonable suspicion of a violation of section 12 \u2014 503(c). Therefore, the trial court did not err when it suppressed the evidence found during the traffic stop.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling on the motion to suppress evidence.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH, EJ., and TURNER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Dennis E. Simonton, State\u2019s Attorney, of Marshall (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Michael J. Pelletier, Gary R. Peterson, and Judith L. Libby (argued), all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOYCE M. MOTT, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201407\u20140756\nOpinion filed April 20, 2009.\nDennis E. Simonton, State\u2019s Attorney, of Marshall (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Gary R. Peterson, and Judith L. Libby (argued), all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0539-01", "first_page_order": 555, "last_page_order": 563 }