{ "id": 4283782, "name": "FOUNDERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALBERT L. MU\u00d1OZ et al., Defendants-Appellants; FOUNDERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL VALLARTA et al., Defendants-Appellants; FOUNDERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. YAROSLAV HONCHAR et al., Defendants-Appellants; SAFEWAY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FLAVIO FERNANDEZ et al., Defendants-Appellants; FOUNDERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAURA LEVAN, Special Adm'r of the Estate of Christine L. Seekamp, Deceased, et al., Defendants-Appellants; FOUNDERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAFAEL TECPANECATL et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Founders Insurance v. Mu\u00f1oz", "decision_date": "2009-03-27", "docket_number": "Nos. 1-07-0792, 1-08-0208, 1-08-0415, 1-08-2042, 1-08-2059, 1-08-2283 cons.", "first_page": "744", "last_page": "757", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 744" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "787 N.E.2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 1054", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894478 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1060" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/1054-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Ill. Reg. 15605", "category": "laws:admin_register", "reporter": "Ill. Reg.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ga. App. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 686573 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" }, { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/202/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 Pa. Super. 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 699908 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476-77", "parenthetical": "\"entitlement\" consists of permission of the owner or lawful possessor" }, { "page": "1020", "parenthetical": "\"entitlement\" consists of permission of the owner or lawful possessor" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/375/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380", "parenthetical": "a person knowingly driving a vehicle without a driver's license may nevertheless have a reasonable belief that he was entitled to use the vehicle" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 771", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5308955 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "776", "parenthetical": "a person knowingly driving a vehicle without a driver's license may nevertheless have a reasonable belief that he was entitled to use the vehicle" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0771-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 S.W.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9987532 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "802", "parenthetical": "policy ambiguous in failing to specify whether \"entitled\" means obtaining permission from the owner or whether a valid driver's license is also required" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/700/0801-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ariz. 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 1502899 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259", "parenthetical": "exclusion clearly ambiguous as shown by the divergent interpretations given to it by the parties and the trial court" }, { "page": "37", "parenthetical": "exclusion clearly ambiguous as shown by the divergent interpretations given to it by the parties and the trial court" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/151/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 N.W.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10697427 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/539/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ga. 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 1245764 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "716" }, { "page": "663" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/266/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "721 P.2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Wash. App. 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. App.", "case_ids": [ 1801064 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/44/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 1071", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1080" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 Ill. App. 3d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2613735 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/180/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "612 N.E.2d 1268", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1271", "parenthetical": "a driver can have a reasonable belief without a valid license" }, { "page": "1271", "parenthetical": "test is not whether he reasonably believed he was licensed to drive, but whether he reasonably believed he was authorized to drive" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ohio App. 3d 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1679843 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617", "parenthetical": "a driver can have a reasonable belief without a valid license" }, { "page": "616-17", "parenthetical": "test is not whether he reasonably believed he was licensed to drive, but whether he reasonably believed he was authorized to drive" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-app-3d/82/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "578 N.W.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329", "parenthetical": "\"Without a driver[']s license [defendant] could not reasonably believe that she had met all of the requirements necessary to entitle her to drive [the automobile]\"" }, { "page": "329", "parenthetical": "rational minds would agree that an underage, unlicensed, inexperienced driver was not \"entitled\" to drive the automobile" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 Mich. App. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 307035 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89", "parenthetical": "\"Without a driver[']s license [defendant] could not reasonably believe that she had met all of the requirements necessary to entitle her to drive [the automobile]\"" }, { "page": "89", "parenthetical": "rational minds would agree that an underage, unlicensed, inexperienced driver was not \"entitled\" to drive the automobile" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/228/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "866 S.W.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10006880 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540", "parenthetical": "no license, no permission" }, { "page": "540-41", "parenthetical": "unreasonable for 16-year-old unlicensed driver who took the truck out after his parents were asleep to believe that he was entitled to drive the truck" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/866/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 A.2d 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 11830521 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260", "parenthetical": "no license, no permission" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/710/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Md. App. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md. App.", "case_ids": [ 4446049 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525-26", "parenthetical": "no license, no permission, previous arrests for driving without a license" }, { "page": "1351", "parenthetical": "no license, no permission, previous arrests for driving without a license" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/75/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "789 N.E.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836" }, { "page": "835-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 Ill. App. 3d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2469123 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" }, { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/339/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 N.E.2d 1334", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1337" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3609175 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" }, { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 906", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3452572 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "911" }, { "page": "911" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0906-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 N.E.2d 906", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "912" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Ill. App. 3d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2559395 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/206/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "726 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411629 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 601", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 1062", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3126478 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1064" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/1062-01" ] }, { "cite": "708 N.E.2d 1122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1130" }, { "page": "1130" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243917 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" }, { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "784 N.E.2d 312", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 776", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599282 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "783" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0776-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 N.E.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198897 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 1203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1205" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3083008 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 N.E.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" }, { "page": "75", "parenthetical": "whether pollution exclusion bars coverage for claims of carbon monoxide poisoning caused by an allegedly defective furnace" }, { "page": "75" }, { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317117 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" }, { "page": "479" }, { "page": "479" }, { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "821 N.E.2d 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448460 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "875 N.E.2d 1082", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1090" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610622 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "823 N.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" }, { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450488 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" }, { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 N.E.2d 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810152 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "766 N.E.2d 1118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1123" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58922 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "728 N.E.2d 726", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 1051", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411636 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1057" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/1051-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 1204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1209" }, { "page": "1212" }, { "page": "1212" }, { "page": "1212-13" }, { "page": "1212-13", "parenthetical": "whether coverage for suits seeking damages includes equitable or injunctive relief as well as actions at law" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108-09" }, { "page": "108-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "07 L 4498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Lans. Ch.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "06 SC 6246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1366, "char_count": 33869, "ocr_confidence": 0.789, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.155886591299522e-08, "percentile": 0.38258639789424015 }, "sha256": "fef7ee3fff9708b123521d383f6325871861173ff8865e4a0d8593124fb3bb92", "simhash": "1:8ac7e0ccb797d60a", "word_count": 5374 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:37:38.013620+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "FOUNDERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALBERT L. MU\u00d1OZ et al., Defendants-Appellants.\u2014FOUNDERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL VALLARTA et al., Defendants-Appellants.\u2014FOUNDERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. YAROSLAV HONCHAR et al., Defendants-Appellants.\u2014SAFEWAY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FLAVIO FERNANDEZ et al., Defendants-Appellants.\u2014FOUNDERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAURA LEVAN, Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Christine L. Seekamp, Deceased, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\u2014FOUNDERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAFAEL TECPANECATL et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE TOOMIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis consolidated appeal arises from declaratory judgment actions to enforce the provisions of automobile insurance policies which excluded coverage for the named insured and permissive drivers who did not have a reasonable belief they were entitled to use a motor vehicle. The complaints sought a declaration that plaintiffs had no duty to defend or indemnify defendants in six subrogation cases pending in the circuit court. Summary judgment was granted in favor of plaintiffs and defendants appeal asserting that the exclusion: (1) is ambiguous; (2) violates public policy created by the Illinois mandatory insurance law; and (3) usurps the legislative prerogative by contractually excluding liability coverage to drivers for violations of traffic laws. Additionally, in case No. 1 \u2014 07\u20140792, defendants contend that the Founders\u2019 named driver exclusion cannot be enforced where the insurance card issued by Founders failed to contain the statutory warning that Alberto Mu\u00f1oz was an excluded driver. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment in No. 1 \u2014 07\u20140792 and reverse and remand the remaining judgments for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nBACKGROUND\nThe following facts appear from plaintiffs\u2019 complaints and attachments, as well as from materials submitted by the parties in their cross-motions for summary judgment.\nAs noted, the common thread linking these consolidated appeals is found in the entitlement exclusion of Founders\u2019 and Safeway\u2019s automobile policies. The relevant language provides:\n\u201cPart I \u2014 LIABILITY\nExclusions. This policy does not apply under Part I:\n[T]o bodily injury or property damage arising out of the use by any person of a vehicle without a reasonable belief that the person is entitled to do so[.]\u201d\nIn the proceedings below, the drivers involved in the various accidents giving rise to various third-party claims did not have valid driver\u2019s licenses. As to each matter, the record provided the following basic information.\nA. Founders v. Alberto L. Mu\u00f1oz (No. 1 \u2014 07\u20140792)\nFounders Insurance Company (Founders) insured a 1992 Buick Park Avenue under an automobile policy issued to Paulina Flores from September 19, 2004, to March 19, 2005. In the application signed by Flores on September 18, 2004, she listed \u201cAlberto Mu\u00f1uz\u201d as a household member, but stated that he had never been licensed to drive. Accordingly, the policy excluded from coverage any \u201cclaim or suit which occurs as a result of any auto being operated by \u2018Alberto Mu\u00f1uz.\u2019 \u201d However, the insurance card issued to Ms. Flores did not contain a warning that Mu\u00f1uz was excluded from coverage. A policy amendment on March 24, 2005, added \u201cAlberto Mu\u00f1oz\u201d as a second driver, reflecting a current driver\u2019s license.\nOn or about March 11, 2005, Alberto L. Mu\u00f1oz was involved in an accident with Ewa R. Johnson in Des Plaines, Illinois. In turn, Allstate Insurance Company filed a subrogation lawsuit in the circuit court of Cook County entitled Allstate Insurance v. Mu\u00f1oz, No. 05 M2 002135, for property damage to the Johnson vehicle and medical payments for her injuries in the amount of $9,373.87.\nB. Founders v. Daniel Vallarta (No. 1 \u2014 08\u20140208)\nFounders also insured a 1988 Pontiac Bonneville under a policy issued to Florencio Vallarta from November 27, 2004, to November 27, 2005. The policy contained the identical entitlement exclusion common to Founders automobile policies.\nOn or about December 13, 2004, Daniel Vallarta, the resident son of Florencio Vallarta, was operating the insured vehicle when he was involved in an accident with parked vehicles owned by Demetra Soter and Patricia Saifuddin in Chicago, Illinois. Daniel was unlicensed at the time of the accident. Ms. Soter\u2019s insurance carrier, Allstate Insurance Company, filed a subrogation lawsuit in the circuit court of Cook County entitled Allstate Insurance v. Vallarta, No. 06 Ml 21949, for property damage to the Soter vehicle in the amount of $3,612.55.\nC. Founders v. Yaroslav Honchar (No. 1 \u2014 08\u20140415)\nFounders likewise insured a 2000 Ford Windstar under an automobile policy issued to Mariya Poruchnyk and Yaroslav Honchar, from October 6, 2005, to April 6, 2006. The policy also contained the previously noted entitlement exclusion.\nOn or about November 25, 2005, Mr. Honchar was operating the insured vehicle in Chicago, Illinois, when he became involved in an accident with Bernard Riley. At the time of the accident, Honchar\u2019s license was suspended. Mr. Riley was operating a vehicle owned by Shirley Brown and insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by Allstate Insurance Company. In turn, Allstate sought subrogation in an action brought in the circuit court of Will County entitled Allstate Insurance Co. v. Honchar, No. 06 SC 6246, for the property damages sustained by the Brown vehicle in the amount of $9,902.07.\nD. Safeway v. Flavio Fernandez (No. 1 \u2014 08\u20142042)\nSafeway Insurance Company (Safeway) insured a 1996 CMC Sierra 1500 under a policy issued to Sergio Ramirez from November 9, 2006, to May 9, 2007. Safeway\u2019s policy included an entitlement exclusion identical to those contained in the Founders policies.\nOn or about November 13, 2006, while Flavio Fernandez was operating the insured vehicle, he was involved in an accident with Rolando Almaraz and Sandra Flores in Chicago, Illinois. Fernandez did not have a valid Illinois driver\u2019s license at the time. Rolando Almaraz was operating a vehicle owned by Pedro Almaraz and insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by Allstate Insurance Company. Flores was a passenger in the Almaraz vehicle when the accident occurred. Thereafter, Allstate filed a subrogation lawsuit in the circuit court of Cook County entitled Allstate Insurance Co. v. Fernandez, No. 07 Ml 16142, for property damage and personal injuries sustained in the accident in the amount of $15,752.10.\nE. Founders v. Laura Levan (No. 1 \u2014 08\u20142059)\nFounders also insured a 1991 Chevrolet Geo Metro under an insurance policy issued to Christine L. Seekamp from March 1, 2004, to March 1, 2005. The policy contained the same entitlement exclusion common to Founders\u2019 automobile policies. On or about January 29, 2005, Ms. Seekamp was involved in an automobile accident with David Schlesinger in Chicago, Illinois. She was cited for driving on a suspended driver\u2019s license at the time of the accident. Schlesinger was operating his own vehicle, which was insured by Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company. Allstate subsequently filed a subrogation lawsuit in the circuit court of Cook County entitled Allstate Insur-anee Co. v. Seekamp, No. 06 M1 13868, for property damages and personal injuries sustained in the January 29, 2005, accident.\nF. Founders v. Rafael Tecpanecatl (No. 1\u201408\u20142283)\nFounders likewise insured a 1999 Ford Explorer under an automobile policy issued to Rafael Tecpanecatl from May 18, 2006, to November 18, 2006. The policy contained the identical entitlement exclusion common to the other Founders\u2019 automobile policies.\nOn or about October 27, 2006, Mr. Tecpanecatl was operating the insured vehicle when he was involved in an automobile accident with Mike M. Marusic, Heather M. Burns and Kara Campos in Elmhurst, Illinois. Tecpanecatl had never been licensed to drive. Mr. Marusic was operating a vehicle insured under an automobile liability policy issued by Allstate Insurance Company. Ms. Burns was a passenger in the Ma-rusic vehicle. Ms. Campos was operating another vehicle owned by Vickie Ritter and also insured under an automobile liability policy issued by Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate filed a subrogation lawsuit in the circuit court of Cook County entitled Allstate Insurance Co. v. Tecpanecatl, No. 07 L 4498, for the property damage and personal injuries arising from the October 27, 2006, accident.\nG. Proceedings in the Circuit Court\nInstead of providing a defense in the various cases, Founders and Safeway commenced the underlying actions seeking declarations that they had no duty to defend or indemnify their named insureds or permissive drivers. As noted, the insurers\u2019 actions were premised upon the averment that none of the drivers had a reasonable belief that they were entitled to drive the insured vehicles under the policies because they did not have valid driver\u2019s licenses at the time of the accident.\nOn cross-motions for summary judgment in each action, the trial court denied defendants\u2019 motions and entered judgment for the insurers, finding that because none of the drivers possessed a reasonable belief that they were entitled to drive at the time of the accidents, neither Founders nor Safeway owed any duty to defend or indemnify the named insureds or such drivers.\nANALYSIS\nWe now consider defendants\u2019 argument that the circuit court erred in entering summary judgment on plaintiffs\u2019 complaints for declaratory judgment. Because the propriety of an order granting summary judgment is a question of law, the cornerstone of our review is de novo. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102, 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (1992).\nIt is well settled that a grant of summary judgment is appropriate only where the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits confirm that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 1005 (West 2006). Although summary judgment is encouraged as an aid to expeditious disposal of a lawsuit, it is a drastic means of disposing of litigation and should only be allowed when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. Bokodi v. Foster Wheeler Robbins, Inc., 312 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1057, 728 N.E.2d 726, 731 (2000). In considering whether summary judgment is appropriate, our precedent instructs that courts should construe the facts most strictly against the moving party and in the light most favorable to the opponent. Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 179, 186, 766 N.E.2d 1118, 1123 (2002). A triable issue of fact exists where there is a dispute as to material facts or where the material facts are undisputed but reasonable persons might draw different inferences from those facts. In re Estate of Hoover, 155 Ill. 2d 402, 411, 615 N.E.2d 736, 740 (1993).\nA. Ambiguity of the Entitlement Exclusion\nWhen construing the language of an insurance policy, a court\u2019s primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed by the words of the policy. Hobbs v. Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest, 214 Ill. 2d 11, 17, 823 N.E.2d 561, 564 (2005). Because the court must assume that every provision was intended to serve a purpose, an insurance policy is to be construed as a whole, giving effect to every provision (Rich v. Principal Life Insurance Co., 226 Ill. 2d 359, 371, 875 N.E.2d 1082, 1090 (2007); Central Illinois Light Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d 141, 153, 821 N.E.2d 206, 213 (2004)), and taking into account the type of insurance provided, the nature of the risks involved, and the overall purpose of the contract (American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473, 479, 687 N.E.2d 72, 75 (1997); Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 108, 607 N.E.2d at 1212).\nIf the provisions of the policy are clear and unambiguous, a court must afford them their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning (Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 108, 607 N.E.2d at 1212), and the policy will be applied as written, unless it contravenes public policy (Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 17, 823 N.E.2d at 564). All of the provisions of the insurance contract, rather than an isolated part, should be read together to interpret it and to determine whether an ambiguity exists. United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Schnackenberg, 88 Ill. 2d 1, 5, 429 N.E.2d 1203, 1205 (1981).\nA policy provision is ambiguous only if it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation (Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Protection Mutual Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 520, 530, 655 N.E.2d 842, 846 (1995)), or obscure in meaning through indefiniteness of expression (Installco, Inc. v. Whiting Corp., 336 Ill. App. 3d 776, 783, 784 N.E.2d 312, 319 (2002)). Where competing reasonable interpretations of a policy exist, a court is not permitted to choose which interpretation it will follow. Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d 127, 141, 708 N.E.2d 1122, 1130 (1999); Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 108-09, 607 N.E.2d at 1212-13. Rather, in such circumstances, the court must construe the policy in favor of the insured and against the insurer that drafted the policy. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479, 687 N.E.2d at 75 (whether pollution exclusion bars coverage for claims of carbon monoxide poisoning caused by an allegedly defective furnace); Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 108-09, 607 N.E.2d at 1212-13 (whether coverage for suits seeking damages includes equitable or injunctive relief as well as actions at law).\nThus, exclusionary provisions are upheld only where the terms are clear, definite and explicit. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Schmitt, 94 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1064, 419 N.E.2d 601, 602 (1981). In Smith v. Allstate Insurance Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d 246, 254, 726 N.E.2d 1, 7 (2000), the court articulated the underlying rationale for this rule of construction. First, the insured\u2019s intent in purchasing an insurance policy is to obtain coverage and therefore any ambiguity jeopardizing such coverage should be construed consistent with the insured\u2019s intent. Second, the insurer is the drafter of the policy and could have drafted the ambiguous provision clearly and specifically.\nWith these rules of construction in mind, we address the key provision pertinent to this aspect of the instant appeal. The relevant language of what defendants denominate the \u201centitlement exclusion\u201d common to each of the Founders and Safeway policies excludes coverage for \u201cbodily injury and property damage arising out of the use of a vehicle without a reasonable belief that the person is entitled to do so.\u201d Defendants posit that because the exclusion is ambiguous, it is axiomatic that the exclusion must be interpreted in a light most favorable to the insureds and against the insurers which drafted the policies. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479, 687 N.E.2d at 75.\nIn Hartford Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Jackson, 206 Ill. App. 3d 465, 564 N.E.2d 906 (1990), identical language was included among a litany of other exclusions. Some exclusions referred to \u201cfamily members,\u201d while others simply excluded \u201cany person\u201d from liability coverage. In Jackson, as here, the entitlement exclusion referred to \u201cany person.\u201d In interpreting the policy the court reasoned that when read as a whole, the policy implied that coverage for a \u201cfamily member\u201d was barred only by those exclusions which referenced that language. Finding the interchange of those terms ambiguous, the Jackson court interpreted the policy and, specifically, the entitlement exclusion in favor of coverage, thereby obligating Hartford to defend and indemnify its insured:\n\u201c[WJhere a policy creates two distinct classes, namely, \u2018family member\u2019 and \u2018any person,\u2019 and where several exclusions specifically include \u2018family member\u2019 but the exclusion under scrutiny does not, then, at the very least, it is ambiguous as to whether a \u2018family member\u2019 is barred from coverage under said exclusion.\u201d Jackson, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 476, 564 N.E.2d at 912.\nJackson adopted the rationale of Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kubik, 142 Ill. App. 3d 906, 492 N.E.2d 504 (1986), which interpreted similar policy language. The Kubik court likewise reasoned that because Economy had placed \u201cfamily member\u201d in some exclusions while omitting it from others, the court was compelled to read the entitlement exclusion literally and found that it did not apply to a \u201cfamily member.\u201d Kubik, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 911, 492 N.E.2d at 508. As in Jackson, the ambiguity was construed in a light most favorable to the insured, thereby requiring Economy to defend and indemnify the insured\u2019s 14-year-old unlicensed daughter who was driving the insured vehicle at the time of a fatal accident. Kubik, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 911, 492 N.E.2d at 505.\nFounders asserts that because its policies do not interchange defined terms such as \u201cfamily members\u201d and \u201cany persons,\u201d defendants\u2019 reliance upon Jackson and Kubik is misplaced. Founders maintains that its policies do not draw the distinction perceived in the Hartford and Economy policies; rather, a simple reading of the Founders policies demonstrates that \u201cany person\u201d means \u201cany person\u201d and includes the insured and permissive drivers alike. However, we are not persuaded that the underlying rationale of Jackson and Kubik should be summarily rejected. Although the policies at issue do not designate \u201cfamily members\u201d as a different class of individuals, as in Jackson and Kubik, coverage nonetheless is excluded in certain instances for two distinct classes, the \u201cinsured\u201d or \u201cnamed insured\u201d and \u201cany person.\u201d Accordingly, we find some merit in defendants\u2019 argument that the entitlement exclusion at issue here may well be plagued with the same ambiguity found in Jackson and Kubik.\nDefendants submit that the instant appeals present cases of first impression before this court. We likewise find a dearth of reported decisions wherein Illinois courts have had occasion to interpret the entitlement exclusion in the precise manner suggested by defendants. We discern defendants\u2019 argument to be narrowly drawn, focusing upon the ambiguity perceived in the use of \u201centitled\u201d within the exclusion. Although the Jackson and Kubik courts indeed construed the exclusion, those decisions did not address the meaning of \u201centitled\u201d but, rather, the construction placed upon \u201cany person\u201d in relation to other categories of insured individuals.\nPlaintiffs, however, rely upon two cases that have upheld the exclusion, Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 153 Ill. App. 3d 378, 505 N.E.2d 1334 (1987), and Century National Insurance Co. v. Tracy, 339 Ill. App. 3d 173, 789 N.E.2d 833 (2003). Both were decided by the Second District and are clearly distinguished from the factual scenarios at bar. In Economy, there were multiple grounds for excluding coverage, including the driver\u2019s transfer of title to his girlfriend to obtain valid plates following the suspension of his license, his intoxication on the night of the accident, and the forcible taking of the car keys from his girlfriend before driving away. Additionally, in affirming denial of coverage the Economy court focused on the \u201creasonable belief\u2019 of the driver, rather than the \u201centitled\u201d aspect of the exclusion:\n\u201cEconomy has not raised the issue, and we need not decide, whether \u2018entitled\u2019 to use the car means the legal authority to drive a car so that Barton is thereby precluded from coverage on the sole fact that his driver\u2019s license was suspended.\u201d Economy, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 383, 505 N.E.2d at 1337.\nThe factual scenario in Tracy is likewise distinguished from the cases before this court. As in Economy, when applying for insurance coverage Tracy acknowledged his license was suspended and was informed that he would not be covered by the policy. The suspension covered a 14-year period and was in force when defendant was involved in the accident. Significantly, in upholding the policy exclusion, the Tracy court recognized that no Illinois court had decided whether the absence of a driver\u2019s license in and of itself would suffice to uphold application of the exclusion. Although the court validated the exclusion, as in Economy, the focus of the court\u2019s interpretation was not upon whether the defendant was \u201centitled\u201d to drive, but rather whether he \u201creasonably believed\u201d that he could use the vehicle. Tracy, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 176, 789 N.E.2d at 836.\nThe two federal district court cases offered by plaintiffs, Grinnell Select Insurance Co. v. Glodo, No. 05\u20144178\u2014JLF (S.D. Ill. September 12, 2006), and Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Uhring, No. 05\u2014CV\u2014 0603 \u2014 DRH (S.D. Ill. December 20, 2006), likewise rely upon Tracy. Although both cases validated the entitlement exclusion at issue, the holdings did not construe the import of being \u201centitled\u201d in interpreting the provision. As such, the cases offer little guidance in meeting the collective arguments of defendants.\nAlthough the Tracy court was cognizant of decisions from courts in other jurisdictions interpreting this same policy exclusion, the court gleaned little guidance from those decisions:\n\u201cSeveral courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted this same policy exclusion. In most of these cases, however, there were other factors at issue besides the lack of a driver\u2019s license. See, e.g., General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Perry, 75 Md. App. 503, 525-26, 541 A.2d 1340, 1351 (1988) (no license, no permission, previous arrests for driving without a license); Craig v. Barnes, 710 A.2d 258, 260 (Me. 1998) (no license, no permission); Omaha Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 866 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Tenn. App. 1993) (no license, no permission). In the few cases where the only relevant factor was the absence of a driver\u2019s license, courts have gone both ways. Compare Huggins v. Bohman, 228 Mich. App. 84, 89, 578 N.W.2d 326, 329 (1998) (\u201cWithout a driver[\u2019]s license [defendant] could not reasonably believe that she had met all of the requirements necessary to entitle her to drive [the automobile]\u201d), with Blount v. Kennard, 82 Ohio App. 3d 613, 617, 612 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (1992) (a driver can have a reasonable belief without a valid license).\u201d Tracy, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 176, 789 N.E.2d at 835-36.\nPlaintiffs boldly claim that the entitlement exclusion at issue here \u201cunambiguously encompasses unlicensed drivers.\u201d In essence, plaintiffs posit that the only correct interpretation of the language they have employed connotes a legal meaning; as a matter of law one who does not have a valid driver\u2019s license \u201ccannot be legally entitled\u201d to drive an automobile. That interpretation, to be sure, does have a clear and definite meaning. Had Founders and Safeway intended to exclude coverage for unlicensed drivers, they could easily have done so in clear and explicit terms. See 7A Couch on Insurance 3d \u00a7110:49, at 110 \u2014 64\u201465 (1998). Yet, the exclusion at issue here does not speak to being \u201clegally entitled\u201d or \u201chaving a valid driver\u2019s license,\u201d but rather simply being \u201centitled.\u201d Additionally, neither policy provides any indication or insight as to the meaning of \u201centitled.\u201d\nMoreover, the touchstone for judging whether a term is ambiguous depends not on how the legally trained mind interprets the word, but on how the ordinary person understands it. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 378, 391, 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1080 (1989). Such terms, defendants argue, are to be given their ordinary and popular meaning. Problematic here, and due perhaps to the ambiguity inherent in the very word \u201centitled,\u201d resort to extrinsic dictionary definitions may be unavailing. As defined by Webster\u2019s, \u201centitle\u201d means \u201cto give a right or legal title to : qualify (one) for something : furnish with proper grounds for seeking or claiming something.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 758 (1993). Likewise, commonly recognized synonyms include, to designate, empower, or enable. Webster\u2019s Revised Unabridged Dictionary 497 (1913). \u201cEntitle\u201d could also connote other situations such as being \u201cauthorized,\u201d \u201cpermitted\u201d or \u201cdirected.\u201d\nPutting dictionary definitions aside, in the absence of Illinois decisions addressing this issue, resort to the holdings of courts in sister states are instructive. For example, we find helpful the analysis of the Court of Appeals of Washington in Safeco Insurance of America v. Davis:\n\u201cSeveral reasonable interpretations of \u2018entitled\u2019 are possible within the scope of the exclusionary language. One is \u2018permission\u2019 or \u2018consent,\u2019 which focuses on the relationship between the driver and the owner of the vehicle. Another equally plausible interpretation of \u2018entitled,\u2019 apparently that urged by Safeco, is \u2018legal authority,\u2019 which focuses on a variety of relationships that arise between the driver and the [sjtate.\u201d Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Davis, 44 Wash. App. 161, 165, 721 P.2d 550, 552 (1986).\nIn Hurst v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co., 266 Ga. 712, 470 S.E.2d 659 (1996), the construction of the same entitlement exclusion sub judice was before the court. In Hurst, as here, the insurance contract did not contain a definition of the word \u201centitled.\u201d The Georgia Supreme Court reasoned that the exclusion was susceptible of three logical and reasonable interpretations:\n\u201c[T]hat the user must be authorized by law to drive in order to reasonably believe he is entitled to use a vehicle; that the user must have the consent of the owner or apparent owner in order to reasonably believe he is entitled to use the vehicle; or, that the user must have both consent and legal authorization in order to be entitled to use the vehicle. The number of reasonable and logical interpretations makes the clause ambiguous.\u201d Hurst, 266 Ga. at 716, 470 S.E.2d at 663.\nAn identical result obtained in Farm & City Insurance Co. v. Gilmore, 539 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Iowa 1995), where in employing the same analysis the Iowa Supreme Court found the term \u201centitled\u201d in the policy exclusion to be ambiguous. Adopting the interpretation most favorable to the insured, the court limited the exclusion to situations where permissive use of the vehicle was lacking. See also Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Heflin, 151 Ariz. 257, 259, 727 P.2d 35, 37 (App. 1986) (exclusion clearly ambiguous as shown by the divergent interpretations given to it by the parties and the trial court); State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ellis, 700 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Ky. App. 1985) (policy ambiguous in failing to specify whether \u201centitled\u201d means obtaining permission from the owner or whether a valid driver\u2019s license is also required); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 326 N.C. 771, 776, 392 S.E.2d 377, 380 (1990) (a person knowingly driving a vehicle without a driver\u2019s license may nevertheless have a reasonable belief that he was entitled to use the vehicle); Blount v. Kennard, 82 Ohio App. 3d 613, 616-17, 612 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (1992) (test is not whether he reasonably believed he was licensed to drive, but whether he reasonably believed he was authorized to drive); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Moore, 375 Pa. Super. 470, 476-77, 544 A.2d 1017, 1020 (1988) (\u201centitlement\u201d consists of permission of the owner or lawful possessor).\nWe are likewise mindful that in construing the same exclusion other courts have found no ambiguity. Thus, in Safeway Insurance Co. v. Jones, 202 Ga. App. 482, 483, 415 S.E.2d 19, 20 (1992), the court determined that an unlicensed driver could not have reasonably believed that he was entitled to drive any vehicle, regardless of whether he had permission to do so. See also Huggins v. Bohman, 228 Mich. App. 84, 89, 578 N.W.2d 326, 329 (1998) (rational minds would agree that an underage, unlicensed, inexperienced driver was not \u201centitled\u201d to drive the automobile); Omaha Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 866 S.W.2d 539, 540-41 (Tenn. App. 1993) (unreasonable for 16-year-old unlicensed driver who took the truck out after his parents were asleep to believe that he was entitled to drive the truck).\nReturning to the Founders and Safeway policies, we discern that notwithstanding their inherent inconsistency, each of the interpretations offered by the parties is a reasonable one. Precisely because the exclusion is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations we find it to be ambiguous. Under the prevailing guideposts of construction we are not at liberty to choose which interpretation to follow. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 186 Ill. 2d at 141, 708 N.E.2d at 1130. Plaintiffs undeniably created the ambiguity and we are therefore constrained to interpret the policy and specifically the entitlement exclusion in a light most favorable to defendants. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479, 687 N.E.2d at 75. Accordingly, we find that although coverage is excluded for persons using the insured vehicle without a reasonable belief that he or she was a permissive driver, the exclusion does not necessarily encompass unlicensed drivers. Therefore, summary judgment was not appropriate on this issue.\nB. Named Driver Exclusion\nLast, we address defendants\u2019 argument, limited solely to case No. 1 \u2014 07\u20140792, that the named driver exclusion of Alberto L. Mu\u00f1oz cannot be enforced because the insurance card issued by Founders failed to disclose that Mr. Mu\u00f1oz was an excluded driver. Defendant\u2019s argument is premised on section 7 \u2014 602 of the Illinois mandatory insurance law, which describes the requirements for insurance cards and provides in relevant part:\n\u201cIf the insurance policy represented by the insurance card does not cover any driver operating the motor vehicle with the owner\u2019s permission, or the owner when operating a motor vehicle other than the vehicle for which the policy is issued, the insurance card shall contain a warning of such limitations in the coverage provided by the policy.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 602 (West 2004).\nAdditionally, the administrative regulations promulgated by the Secretary of State mandate that insurance cards contain the excluded driver warning. Title 50, section 8010.20(d)(7), of the Illinois Administrative Code provides:\n\u201c(d) The insurance card shall contain the following insurance information:\n* * *\n(7) a warning of excluded drivers or vehicles, when applicable.\u201d 50 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a78010.20(d)(7), amended at 15 Ill. Reg. 15605, eff. October 15, 1991.\nIn St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Smith, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 1060, 787 N.E.2d 852, 857 (2003), we concluded that the plain language of the statute, coupled with the administrative regulations, expressly evinced the legislature\u2019s intent to carve out a narrow public policy exception for named driver exclusions. Although St. Paul Fire & Marine indeed validated this exclusion, the opinion does not address the consequences mandated for an insurer\u2019s failure to include correct information in the insurance card.\nNonetheless, defendants boldly state that the provision excluding Mr. Mu\u00f1oz from coverage cannot be enforced in the absence of the warning required by law. Defendants have not enlightened us with any authority, statutory or otherwise, in support of this novel interpretation, nor have we located any. Accordingly, we find no statutory impediment to enforcement of Founders\u2019 named driver exclusion in 1 \u2014 07\u20140792 excluding Alberto Mu\u00f1oz from coverage in the accident of March 11, 2005. Inasmuch as the policy provision provides an additional and separate contractual basis absolving Founders of any duty to defend or indemnify Mr. Mu\u00f1oz, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in this case.\nCONCLUSION\nOur determination that the entitlement exclusion common to plaintiffs\u2019 policies is ambiguous obviates the need to address defendants\u2019 remaining concerns. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court in case No. 1 \u2014 07\u20140792 and reverse the grant of summary judgment in each of the remaining consolidated cases and remand the matters for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nJudgment affirmed in No. 1 \u2014 07\u20140792 and the remaining judgments reversed and remanded.\nFITZGERALD SMITH, EJ., with O\u2019MARA FROSSARD, J., concur.\nThe parties proceeded under the belief that Alberto Mu\u00f1oz rather than Alberto Mu\u00f1uz was the unlicensed driver excluded in the policy. Although this assumption may have been warranted, it is contrary to the recitals contained in the policy application and declarations. In any event, it was not germane to the court\u2019s ruling.\nAlthough Florencio later stated that Daniel had never been licensed to drive, the form completed by her when applying for coverage reflected that he had permission to drive the insured vehicle.\nMs. Seekamp passed away during the pendency of the trial court proceedings, and Laura Levan was appointed as special administrator in her stead.\nIndeed, the record reflects that Safeway\u2019s policy included such an exclusion at the time it commenced this proceeding. The policy attached to Safeway\u2019s complaint for declaratory judgment contains both the entitlement exclusion at issue here as well as an unlicensed driver exclusion which was later abrogated.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE TOOMIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Peter C. Morse and Cynthia Ramirez, both of Morse & Bolduc, and Steven A. Drizin and Alison R. Flaum, both of Center on Wrongful Convictions, Bluhm Legal Clinic, of Northwestern University School of Law, both of Chicago, for appellants.", "Shari Shelmadine, of Law Office of Shari Shelmadine, and Michael O\u2019Halloran and Keely Hillison, both of Parrillo, Weiss & O\u2019Halloran, both of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FOUNDERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALBERT L. MU\u00d1OZ et al., Defendants-Appellants.\u2014FOUNDERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL VALLARTA et al., Defendants-Appellants.\u2014FOUNDERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. YAROSLAV HONCHAR et al., Defendants-Appellants.\u2014SAFEWAY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FLAVIO FERNANDEZ et al., Defendants-Appellants.\u2014FOUNDERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAURA LEVAN, Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Christine L. Seekamp, Deceased, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\u2014FOUNDERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAFAEL TECPANECATL et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNos. 1\u201407\u20140792, 1\u201408\u20140208, 1\u201408\u20140415, 1\u201408\u20142042, 1\u201408\u20142059, 1\u201408\u20142283 cons.\nOpinion filed March 27, 2009.\nRehearing denied April 30, 2009.\nPeter C. Morse and Cynthia Ramirez, both of Morse & Bolduc, and Steven A. Drizin and Alison R. Flaum, both of Center on Wrongful Convictions, Bluhm Legal Clinic, of Northwestern University School of Law, both of Chicago, for appellants.\nShari Shelmadine, of Law Office of Shari Shelmadine, and Michael O\u2019Halloran and Keely Hillison, both of Parrillo, Weiss & O\u2019Halloran, both of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0744-01", "first_page_order": 760, "last_page_order": 773 }