{
  "id": 5379610,
  "name": "MAYOR'S JEWELERS OF FT. LAUDERDALE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORRAINE I. LEVINSON et al., Defendants-Appellants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Mayor's Jewelers of Ft. Lauderdale, Inc. v. Levinson",
  "decision_date": "1976-06-08",
  "docket_number": "No. 75-132",
  "first_page": "16",
  "last_page": "19",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 16"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "30 A.L.R. 3d 9",
      "category": "reporters:specialty",
      "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d",
      "year": 1970,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "42, \u00a711"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 450,
    "char_count": 7816,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.845,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.836695823112693e-07,
      "percentile": 0.7214966972977961
    },
    "sha256": "4399e5797cdb200fcde5b108202fab8e97b3a91bd9e641e8286aa122a3198ee5",
    "simhash": "1:456844f3f78fde9c",
    "word_count": 1288
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:44:11.874495+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "MAYOR\u2019S JEWELERS OF FT. LAUDERDALE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORRAINE I. LEVINSON et al., Defendants-Appellants."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE DIXON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis action was brought by plaintiff, Mayor\u2019s Jewelers of Ft. Lauderdale, Inc., to recover two rings in the possession of defendants. The Circuit Court of Winnebago County gave judgment for plaintiff.\nDonald Levinson was about to have a 25th wedding anniversary. He asked plaintiff to find a diamond of exactly 2.5 carat so that he could present it to his wife Lorraine on the occasion. Plaintiff found what it believed would meet Levinson\u2019s requirement and on July 12,1972, mailed the diamond from Florida to Donald Levinson in Rockford, Illinois, for his approval. Accompanying the ring was a conditional sales contract signed by the seller but not by Donald Levinson, also a note stating, \u201cI know your lovely wife will be thrilled with her token of your sentiment on the great occasion of your 25th anniversary.\u201d\nThe conditional sales contract sets forth in bold print:\n\u201cNOTICE TO BUYER\nTHIS IS A CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT UNDER WHICH MAYOR\u2019S RETAINS TITLE TO THE ABOVE DESCRIBED GOODS UNTIL THEY ARE PAID FOR IN FULL.\u201d\nAfter receipt of the ring with the accompanying contract Donald Levinson on July 15,1972, telephoned the plaintiff stating he approved the ring and would be in to pay for it in a few weeks. The ring was presented to Lorraine Levinson on July 15, 1972.\nOn October 28, 1972, Levinson appeared at Mayor\u2019s Store in Florida and signed his name to the store\u2019s copy of the contract. On the same date Levinson also purchased a gold wedding band for *800, signed a conditional sales contract for it and paid *1,000 on his account at Mayor\u2019s leaving a balance of *7800 to be paid plus finance charges.\nNo further payments were ever made by Levinson who was nearing bankruptcy. Levinson then gave a promissory note to defendant Phillip B. Johnson in amount of *10,000 for fees for representing Levinson in bankruptcy proceedings. On March 14,1973, Lorraine Levinson pledged both rings to attorney Johnson to secure payment of the *10,000 note.\nPlaintiff was scheduled by Levinson in the bankruptcy proceedings as a general unsecured creditor and after hearing this plaintiff commenced this action seeking return of the rings. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Mayor\u2019s giving it possession of both rings. Defendants do not on appeal challenge the correctness of the judgment as it pertains to the wedding band but do contend that because Levinson did not sign the contract until Octber 28, 1972, ownership passed to him on receipt of the ring on July 15, 1972, free of any security interest.\nThe prefatory portion of the \u201ctide\u201d section of the Uniform Commercial Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 26, par. 2 \u2014 401) rejects the \u201ctitle\u201d concept or approach where other Code provisions can be utilized. Each provision of article 2 on sales with regards to the rights, obligations and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies irrespective of title to the goods except where the provision refers to such tide. Section 2 \u2014 401(1) provides in pertinent part.\n\u201c \u00ae \u00b0 \u00b0 Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest.\u201d\nThe Code defines \u201csecurity interest\u201d (section 1 \u2014 201 (37)) in pertinent part as follows:\n\u2018Security interest\u2019 means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation.\nA transaction in the form of a conditional sale or a sale with retention of title will create a purchase-money security interest. Section 2 \u2014 401(1).\nArticle 9 of the Code applies to security interests created by conditional sale or by other lien or title retention contract (section 9 \u2014 102(2)) and to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal property. Section 9 \u2014 102(1)(a).\nCode Section 9 \u2014 203(1) prior to July 1, 1973, provided that a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties unless the collateral is in the secured parties\u2019 possession or the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description of the collateral.\nCode section 9 \u2014 204(1) prior to July 1, 1973, provided that a security interest cannot attach until there is agreement that it attach.\nUnder the Code, a written security agreement that meets certain formal requisites is necessary to the creation and enforceability of a security interest (Annot., 30 A.L.R. 3d 9, 42, \u00a711 (1970)), unless the collateral is in the possession of the secured party (Code section 9 \u2014 203(1)). There are exceptions which are not pertinent to this case.\nIn the present case there was written evidence of the security agreement although not signed by the debtor.\nA technical anomaly existed between the code provision (prior to July 1, 1973) that no nonpossessory security interest is enforceable against anyone, in absence of a written agreement signed by the debtor (section 9 \u2014 203(1)) and the provision that a security interest does not attach in the absence of an agreement to that effect, without specification in the second provision (section 9 \u2014 204(1)) that the agreement must be in writing. See Final Report of the Review Committee for article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, section 9 \u2014 203(1) as proposed. 69 Am. Jur. 2d Secured Transactions \u00a7333 (1973).\nIn using the term \u201csecurity interest\u201d it is necessary to bear in mind the concepts of \u201cattachment\u201d and \u201cperfection\u201d and \u201cenforceability\u201d in connection with any security interest. The concept of attachment and enforceability of security interests was formerly contained in section 9\u2014 204(1) but effective July 1,1973 was transferred to subsections (1) and (2) of section 9 \u2014 203 of the Illinois Code. The revision remedies an anomaly under the earlier text that a security interest could \u201cattach\u201d and be \u201cperfected\u201d and still be \u201cunenforceable\u201d against anyone for want of a written security agreement. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 26, \u00a79 \u2014 203, Illinois Code Comment (Smith-Hurd 1974).\nWhen Levinson accepted the ring on July 15,1972, he did so upon the written condition that the seller retain title until paid in full for the ring. A security interest attached July 15, 1972. In some instances a security interest is perfected by attachment alone, with nothing more. Perfection may be by attachment alone with respect to a purchase-money security interest in consumer goods. (Section 9 \u2014 302(l)(d).) Consumer goods are defined by section 9 \u2014 109(1) as follows: \u201cGoods are\n(1) \u2018Consumer goods\u2019 if they are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes.\u201d\nAccordingly Mayor\u2019s security interest attached and was perfected on July 15, 1972. The security interest was not then \u201cenforceable\u201d because the debtor had not signed as required by section 9 \u2014 203(1). But by Levinson\u2019s signing on October 28, 1972, the security interest became enforceable thereafter.\nThe donee of the gift, Lorraine Levinson, took subject to the security interest since she gave no value for the ring as defined in section 1 \u2014 201 (44) (d) nor was she a buyer. Section 9 \u2014 307(2).\nDefendant Johnson was neither a \u201cbuyer in ordinary course of business\u201d (section 1 \u2014 201 (9)) nor did he \u201cbuy for his own personal, family, or household purposes\u201d (section 9 \u2014 307 (2)).\nThe entry of summary judgment for plaintiff by the trial court was proper and is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nT. J. MORAN, P. J., and RECHENMACHER, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE DIXON"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Keegan & Gosdick, of Rockford, for appellants.",
      "Harold Turner, of Kalivoda, Turner & Shoemaker, of Rockford, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "MAYOR\u2019S JEWELERS OF FT. LAUDERDALE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORRAINE I. LEVINSON et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nSecond District (2nd Division)\nNo. 75-132\nOpinion filed June 8, 1976.\nKeegan & Gosdick, of Rockford, for appellants.\nHarold Turner, of Kalivoda, Turner & Shoemaker, of Rockford, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0016-01",
  "first_page_order": 44,
  "last_page_order": 47
}