{
  "id": 5381204,
  "name": "EDWARD D. BENNINGHOVEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCES F. BENNINGHOVEN, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Benninghoven v. Benninghoven",
  "decision_date": "1976-06-14",
  "docket_number": "No. 75-450",
  "first_page": "286",
  "last_page": "288",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 286"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        5426498
      ],
      "year": 1976,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "133"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/63/0128-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "4 Ill. App. 3d 179",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        2916948
      ],
      "year": 1972,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "183"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/4/0179-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 335,
    "char_count": 4628,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.868,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.1745006308644307e-07,
      "percentile": 0.5872214943805604
    },
    "sha256": "0843da807b1d697bc38d0d62e7672e1fd23be4dba63809a0a0d4c06cecc9ef68",
    "simhash": "1:0c1130cdf48454b4",
    "word_count": 739
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:44:11.874495+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "EDWARD D. BENNINGHOVEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCES F. BENNINGHOVEN, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant appeals the construction of a provision originally contained in a separation agreement between the parties and subsequently incorporated into the parties\u2019 divorce decree. The contested provision reads as follows:\n\u201cPlaintiff shall pay to defendant as additional allowance hereunder an amount equal to one-third of all proceeds heretofore paid to him under the Continental Employees Profit Sharing Plan, dated January 11, 1960, as amended. Proceeds distributed in securities still held by plaintiff as of the date of this decree shall be valued as of this date. Securities received but heretofore sold shall be valued as of the date of sale. Plaintiff shall pay such sum to defendant within 60 days hereof, subject to retention of one-third the estimated federal income taxes attributable to such profit sharing payment, with adjustment to be made at the time the tax liability is determined, but not later than April 15, 1975. Plaintiff shall pay defendant one-third of all interest earned by him on the investment of the tax monies.\u201d\nPlaintiffs portion of this plan amounted to 661 shares of Conill Corporation stock with an aggregate value of *34,286.07, and *104,940.78 in cash, for a total distribution of *139,226.85, all of which was transferred to him in December of 1973.\nFollowing the entry of the divorce decree on May 9, 1974, plaintiff, after subtracting *25,433 to cover estimated taxes, computed defendant\u2019s share of the Plan\u2019s proceeds to be *29,454. On July 8, 1974, plaintiff transferred to defendant 605 of the 661 shares of Conill Corporation stock and a check for *35.88 in satisfaction of his obligation. On the date of the decree (the same date as the valuation), the stock was worth 48% dollars per share for a total of *29,418.12, but by the date of transfer (July 8), the value of each share had declined considerably. On February 28, 1975, defendant filed with the trial court a petition for rule to show cause alleging that because of plaintiffs method of distribution, she had suffered an economic loss of *14,500 due to the depreciation in the value of the Conill Corporation stock. Defendant petitioned for an order directing plaintiff to transfer to her one-third of each asset, stock and cash, less one-third of the total taxes.\nThis petition, a petition for rehearing, and a supplemental petition, all asserting the invalidity of plaintiffs distribution, were denied. Defendant appeals contending that she is entitled to receive one-third of each asset contained in plaintiffs share of the profit sharing plan.\nIn interpreting the provisions of a property settlement, the rules used in the construction of contracts apply. Our prime function in this regard is to ascertain the intent of the parties and to interpret the provision in a fair and reasonable manner. See Breuer v. Breuer, 4 Ill. App. 3d 179, 183 (1972).\nWe find that plaintiff met his responsibility when he transferred to defendant 605 shares of Conill Corporation stock and *35.88 in cash within the allotted 60 days. Defendant\u2019s position, that she is entitled to one-third of each asset comprising plaintiffs share, is simply untenable under a reasonable interpretation of the language in this provision of the decree. The provision, which was drafted by defendant\u2019s representative, calls for plaintiff to pay to defendant \u201can amount equal to 1/3 of all proceeds.\u201d It does not direct plaintiff to remit to defendant 1/3 of each asset. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s petitions.\nJudgment affirmed.\nRECHENMACHER and DIXON, JJ., concur.\nDefendant has filed a motion to strike plaintiffs answering brief. Although we grant defendant\u2019s motion on the basis of plaintiffs failure to comply with the substantive sections of Supreme Court Rule 341 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110A, \u00a7341), we nonetheless, rule on the merits of this appeal in accordance with the Supreme Court\u2019s recent decision in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976), wherein the court stated that \u201cif the record is simple and the claimed errors are such that the court can easily decide them without the aid of an appellee\u2019s brief, the court of review should decide the merits of the appeal.\u201d",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Barbara Lundergren, of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Edward D. Benninghoven, of Chicago, for appellee, pro se."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "EDWARD D. BENNINGHOVEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCES F. BENNINGHOVEN, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District (2nd Division)\nNo. 75-450\nOpinion filed June 14, 1976.\nBarbara Lundergren, of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, of Chicago, for appellant.\nEdward D. Benninghoven, of Chicago, for appellee, pro se."
  },
  "file_name": "0286-01",
  "first_page_order": 314,
  "last_page_order": 316
}