{ "id": 4285608, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WALTER JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jackson", "decision_date": "2009-03-30", "docket_number": "No. 1-06-2787", "first_page": "11", "last_page": "45", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "391 Ill. App. 3d 11" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "365 Ill. App. 3d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4263480 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124", "parenthetical": "court held that calling defense counsel's argument \"ridiculous,\" \"sad,\" and \"pathetic\" was a comment on defendant's credibility and his theory of defense rather than an impermissible attack on defense counsel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/365/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 476988 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 847", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4262065 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859" }, { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0847-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260387 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707" }, { "page": "707" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3750139 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241", "parenthetical": "found no error in the prosecution's argument that a particular individual \" 'simply would not have the strength to have caused' \" the victims injuries and noted that the prosecution is permitted to discuss subjects of general knowledge, common experience, or common sense" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 Ill. App. 3d 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3585087 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/170/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444253 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0274-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2134, "char_count": 88991, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.527646540942415e-08, "percentile": 0.3471372269194073 }, "sha256": "31b95e41d829e743c2b3d49989555467251c7e39e697e8652868a5f9e357fc50", "simhash": "1:4ba474c50f25ef5b", "word_count": 14219 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:50:16.782503+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WALTER JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Walter Jackson was charged with two counts of financial identity theft (720 ILCS 5/16G \u2014 15(a) (West 2000)), two counts of theft by deception (720 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 1(a) (West 2000)), and three counts of forgery (720 ILCS 5/17 \u2014 3(a) (West 2000)), for his involvement in two residential real estate transactions, including the recording of a fraudulent quitclaim deed. Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant was convicted on all counts. The convictions were based on a theory of accountability. 720 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 2(c) (West 2000). A sentencing hearing was conducted where mitigation and aggravation were presented. After finding that defendant\u2019s convictions on both counts for theft by deception and two counts for forgery merged with defendant\u2019s convictions for financial identity theft, the trial court sentenced defendant to three concurrent five-year terms in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Defendant now appeals arguing that (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence including a signed written confession, and (4) the State made improper closing arguments. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe State claimed that in the fall of 2002, Antwon Tillman (codefendant Tillman) wrongfully used the name and social security number of a Florida resident named Antoine Tillman (Florida Tillman), an Air Force training instructor, to purchase two homes in Cook County. After Florida Tillman reported to police that he did not purchase either property, prosecutors charged defendant and codefendant Tillman with financial identity theft, theft by deception, and forgery. The financial identity theft counts alleged that defendant \u201cknowingly used the personal identifying information *** of another person\u201d to obtain property and financing in two separate transactions: (1) a September 30, 2002, residential property closing where codefendant Tillman purchased the property located at 9713 South Prospect, Chicago, Illinois (South Prospect home), from defendant; and (2) an October 7, 2002, residential property closing where codefendant Tillman purchased the property located at 22992 Farm Trace Road, Richton Park, Illinois (Farm Trace home), from Andre Norris. The forgery charge pertained to the recording of a quitclaim deed and the indictment alleged that defendant \u201cknowingly made or delivered a document *** apparently capable of defrauding another\u201d when he recorded this quitclaim deed regarding the Farm Trace property in January 2004.\nAt trial, the State argued that defendant was accountable for the aforementioned offenses. Defendant argued that he was not accountable for codefendant Tillman\u2019s actions because there was no evidence that defendant was aware that codefendant Tillman had used another person\u2019s identity. The jury disagreed and convicted defendant on all counts.\nA. Events Leading Up to Trial\nOn September 30, 2002, defendant sold his South Prospect home for $285,000; more than four times the $61,000 he paid for the home\u2019s purchase two years prior. At the time of the sale, it was encumbered by two outstanding mortgages totaling over $167,000 and was in foreclosure. The home was not listed on a multiple listing service prior to the relevant transaction.\nDefendant, codefendant Tillman and Denna Adams, a closer with Law Title Insurance Company, were present at the closing of the sale of the South Prospect home; neither defendant nor codefendant Tillman was represented by an attorney. Adams acted as agent for the St. Francis Mortgage Company as well as Law Title Insurance Company and witnessed codefendant Tillman sign both the mortgage note and the closing documents. Codefendant Tillman signed all the closing documents with the name \u201cAntoine Tillman\u201d (the spelling used by Florida Tillman) and used Florida Tillman\u2019s social security number. Codefendant Tillman also used Florida Tillman\u2019s name and social security number to obtain a loan from St. Francis Mortgage Company for $285,000, the full purchase price of the South Prospect home. The loan application listed Florida Tillman as the buyer and listed his employment as general manager for Panda Industries in Lynwood, Illinois. It was later discovered after the real estate closing that Panda Industries did not exist and that the employment verification forms included in the closing packet were fraudulent.\nAt the closing, codefendant Tillman produced a driver\u2019s license bearing the name \u201cAntwon L. Tillman\u201d and his own photograph. While reviewing the closing documents, Adams observed that codefendant Tillman\u2019s first name was spelled differently on his driver\u2019s license than on the closing documents. As a result, Adams asked codefendant Tillman for additional identification. Codefendant Tillman produced a firearm owner\u2019s identification card and casino club card, both bearing the name \u201cAntwon Tillman\u201d and told Adams that he was known both as \u201cAntoine [ ] Tillman\u201d and \u201cAntwon Tillman.\u201d Based on the discrepancy in the spelling of codefendant Tillman\u2019s name, Adams asked him to execute an affidavit certifying the different spellings in the affidavit and that \u201cAntoine Tillman\u201d and \u201cAntwon Tillman\u201d were the same person. Codefendant Tillman signed as \u201cAntoine Tillman\u201d and listed Florida Tillman\u2019s social security number.\nAmong the closing documents was an appraisal purportedly prepared by Eric Glenn, a licensed real estate appraiser who had worked with defendant in the past, which valued the South Prospect home at $285,000. Also included was a r\u00e9sum\u00e9 bearing Glenn\u2019s name, but listing defendant\u2019s credentials. In addition, a $300 invoice for Glenn\u2019s appraisal services was presented for payment during the closing. Glenn, however, did not perform the appraisal, did not submit his r\u00e9sum\u00e9, did not submit the $300 invoice, and did not receive the $300 payment.\nAs a result of the sale, both of the outstanding mortgages on the South Prospect property were paid in full and the foreclosure proceedings dismissed. Express Mortgage, the mortgage brokerage that brokered the mortgage loan for the South Prospect home, received a $10,400 brokerage fee from the South Prospect closing.\nOn October 7, 2002, seven days after the sale of the South Prospect home, codefendant Tillman purchased the Farm Trace home from its builder, Andre Norris. During the weeks leading up to the Farm Trace purchase, defendant dealt with Norris in making selections for the home including carpeting, tile, and appliances. Defendant was not present at the Farm Trace home closing.\nPresent at the Farm Trace home closing were codefendant Tillman, Eugene Bennett, an attorney, Darryl Rogers, a mortgage broker with Express Mortgage, Andre Norris, and Edith Love, an escrow closer. Rogers obtained two loans from First NLC Financial Services, a first mortgage for $308,000, and a second mortgage for $77,000, together totaling $385,000, for the full contract price of the Farm Trace home. Codefendant Tillman utilized Florida Tillman\u2019s social security number during the closing. Codefendant Tillman also used Florida Tillman\u2019s personal information to obtain the two loans. Once again, the appraisal for the Farm Trace home indicated that Glenn had performed the appraisal.\nLove, who witnessed codefendant Tillman sign the loan and closing documents, observed that certain closing documents spelled the buyer\u2019s first name as \u201cAntoine\u201d and others spelled it \u201cAntwon\u201d during her review of the closing packet. Although codefendant Tillman represented to Love that he was \u201cAntoine Tillman,\u201d his driver\u2019s license, which Love photocopied, spelled his name \u201cAntwon [ ] Tillman.\u201d\nAt the closing, Express Mortgage received $5,000 in brokerage fees and an additional $3,080 as a yield-spread premium, a fee often paid to a mortgage brokerage when a buyer pays a higher interest rate. A check was also disbursed to Glenn\u2019s address as the listed appraiser, but he never received the check.\nDefendant was not present in the room during the closing, but was in the lobby of the building. On that date, defendant delivered several checks drawn on his personal checking account to certain parties to the closing. Defendant delivered two checks drawn on his personal checking account payable to Norris\u2019s company, A&E Construction, each made out for $5,000. Another check defendant delivered that day was for $3,000 payable to codefendant Tillman, which was also drawn on defendant\u2019s personal checking account. Although defendant later claimed this check was to cover overage expenses, the closing documents did not indicate any overage expenses incurred by the buyer. After the closing, defendant moved into the Farm Trace home. Defendant later applied for a building permit to build a mailbox on the property. Defendant also made improvements to the home, and his fianc\u00e9e, Brianne Blue, was listed as the account holder on the municipal water bill.\nLater in October 2002, an advertisement was placed in a newspaper for the leasing of the South Prospect home. Carolyn Jones responded to the advertisement and met with defendant, who told Jones that he was the caretaker of the home for the owner, who was out of town. Defendant, Jones, and her husband entered into a lease for the South Prospect home entitled, \u201cLease with Option Purchase\u201d under which the Jones family paid $2,400 per month to rent the home. While the contract provided for an option to purchase the property, the copy of the contract introduced at trial had the purchase option provision crossed out.\nJones, her husband, and their children noticed problems with the South Prospect home soon after they moved in. The furnace made a \u201cbooming\u201d noise, the roof leaked when it rained, the electrical wiring and plumbing needed repair, the back steps were unsafe, and the basement leaked. At trial, Jones testified that her husband replaced the furnace and repaired the back steps, while defendant maintained that he replaced the furnace and repaired the back steps.\nPursuant to their lease agreement, the Jones family made the majority of their monthly rent checks payable to the order of \u201cExpress Mortgage and [defendant],\u201d although three checks were made payable only to defendant. When the Jones family did not have the funds to pay the rent, defendant instructed them to make any payment they were capable of making to him and asserted that he would cover the remaining balance due.\nIn the summer of 2004, the Cook County sheriff\u2019s department informed the Jones family that the South Prospect home was under foreclosure and served them with a foreclosure lawsuit. As a result they ultimately had to vacate the premises. Jones first telephoned defendant, who assured her that he had paid the mortgage and that she should not be concerned. However, in July 2004, the sheriff\u2019s department evicted the Jones family from the South Prospect home. Following their eviction, the Jones family rented a neighboring home for $1,200 a month.\nIn March 2003, five months after closing on the Farm Trace home, codefendant Tillman executed a quitclaim deed for the Farm Trace home, again utilizing Florida Tillman\u2019s personal information. The deed conveyed all interest in the property from Florida Tillman to a LaSalle Bank Trust.\nBy July 2003, the mortgage on the Farm Trace home was delinquent. In an attempt to renegotiate the mortgage loan, defendant called First NLC Financial Services, \u201cpretended to be Antoine Tillman,\u201d and provided the lender Florida Tillman\u2019s social security number. As a result of defendant\u2019s phone call, First NLC agreed to reinstate the delinquent loan. A letter memorializing the reinstatement of the loan was sent to the Farm Trace residence.\nIn December 2003, Florida Tillman received a notice of foreclosure from First NLC Financial Services for the Farm Trace home. Upon receiving the notice, Florida Tillman immediately contacted the Rich-ton Park police department and filed a police report. Florida Tillman informed Richton Park police that he did not take out a mortgage on the Farm Trace property, nor did he authorize anyone to procure the mortgage loan.\nOn January 13, 2004, defendant recorded the quitclaim deed pertaining to the Farm Trace home he obtained in March 2003, which transferred all interest in the property from Florida Tillman to a LaSalle Bank Trust. The deed in trust established defendant and his fianc\u00e9e the beneficiaries of the land trust for the Farm Trace home.\nFollowing Florida Tillman\u2019s phone call to Richton Park police, Detective Gerlach was assigned to investigate a claim of financial identity theft. Detective Gerlach first conducted a water record check with the Village of Richton Park for the Farm Trace home and learned that Blue, defendant\u2019s fianc\u00e9e, was listed as the account holder. Detective Gerlach also discovered that defendant applied for a building permit to build a mailbox on the Farm Trace property and signed the application as the owner. Based on this information, Detective Gerlach checked the arrest records of the Richton Park police department and discovered that defendant had been arrested by the Richton Park police for driving with a suspended license and informed them that he lived at the Farm Trace home. Detective Gerlach obtained the mortgage loan and closing documents for the Farm Trace home and learned that Florida Tillman was identified as the purchaser on those documents, as well as the account holder on the property real estate tax bill.\nDetective Gerlach then interviewed Andre Norris of A&E Construction, the builder of the Farm Trace home. During the interview, Detective Gerlach showed Norris a photo array of six photographs, including one of defendant, and Norris positively identified defendant as the person who purchased the Farm Trace home.\nOn April 28, 2004, at approximately 8:45 a.m., Detective Gerlach and his partner went to the Farm Trace home. When defendant answered the door, Detective Gerlach informed him that he was investigating a financial identity theft pertaining to the Farm Trace home and asked defendant if he would come to the police station for questioning. Defendant agreed and Detective Gerlach drove defendant to the station. Defendant was seated in the backseat of the police vehicle and Detective Gerlach\u2019s partner sat in the backseat with defendant. Defendant was not handcuffed.\nAt approximately 9 a.m., defendant and the detectives entered an unlocked interview room. Defendant was read his Miranda warnings prior to the commencement of the interview. According to Detective Gerlach, defendant was given Miranda warnings \u201cin case he made any incriminating statements.\u201d Defendant affirmed his understanding of his rights and signed a waiver form to that effect. During this 50-minute interview, defendant originally denied any involvement in the financial identity theft. However, after being informed of the results of their investigation, defendant admitted to the detectives that he paid David Offit, of Express Mortgage, $10,000 cash to use \u201cAntoine Tillman\u2019s\u201d name and social security number for the purchase of the Farm Trace home. Defendant then signed a written consent authorizing the detectives to search the Farm Trace home. During the search of the Farm Trace home, Detective Gerlach and his partner recovered over 700 documents including: a mortgage note on the Farm Trace property bearing the name and social security number of Florida Tillman; a letter from First NLC Financial Services which indicated an attempt to renegotiate the mortgage loan on the Farm Trace home; defendant\u2019s r\u00e9sum\u00e9; and a r\u00e9sum\u00e9 purportedly belonging to Eric Glenn, which attributed to Glenn all of defendant\u2019s credentials.\nThe detectives then returned to the police station and proceeded to interview defendant again. Defendant was again read his Miranda warnings and then shown some of the documents recovered from his home. Confronted with this evidence, defendant provided a confession that was later reduced to writing. In that confession statement, defendant stated that he worked as a residential appraiser for Express Mortgage from 2000 to 2003. He stated that in June 2002, Express Mortgage assisted him in selling his South Prospect home and he made a profit of $70,000 from that sale. Defendant stated that David Offit, a loan officer from Express Mortgage, informed him that the Farm Trace home was for sale. Defendant stated that he used the services of Express Mortgage, a company he knew to be dishonest, to help him purchase the $385,000 Farm Trace home. Defendant stated that he agreed to pay David Offit of Express Mortgage $10,000 cash in order to use \u201csomeone\u2019s credit and personal information to purchase the Farm Trace home\u201d and stated that the personal information used to purchase the home belonged to \u201cAntoine Tillman.\u201d Defendant\u2019s statement detailed his involvement in the Farm Trace transaction including meeting with Norris and delivering checks for codefendant Tillman and A&E Construction. Defendant stated that after the closing he received the closing documents and moved into the Farm Trace home where he presently resided.\nDefendant stated that he had failed to make any mortgage payments in seven months and had not paid the real estate tax bill on the Farm Trace home. Defendant further stated that in March 2004, he called NLC Financial and \u201cpretended to be Antoine Tillman\u201d and gave the lender Florida Tillman\u2019s social security number in order to reinstate the delinquent mortgage loan so that he could \u201cstay at the house a little longer.\u201d\nWhile defendant stated that he planned to have the Farm Trace home transferred into his name, he admitted that he recorded a quitclaim deed bearing the name of Antoine Tillman and, rather than transfer the home into his name, he transferred the home into a trust naming his fianc\u00e9e, Brianne Blue, and himself as beneficiaries. Defendant expressed remorse for his actions and stated, \u201cI know I was wrong for using someone else\u2019s credit and personal information. I am sorry [for] what I did.\u201d\nDefendant was subsequently charged with financial identity theft, theft by deception, and forgery pertaining to the South Prospect and Farm Trace properties. Defendant was also charged with one count of forgery pertaining to the filing of the aforementioned quitclaim deed.\nB. Motion to Quash Arrest and Suppress Inculpatory Statements\nOn August 4, 2005, a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his inculpatory statements and other evidence commenced before the trial court. In his motion, defendant argued that he was placed under arrest when Detective Gerlach arrived at the Farm Trace home on April 28, 2004, and that Detective Gerlach lacked probable cause to arrest him at that time. Defendant sought to have his statements, written confession, and any evidence recovered from the Farm Trace property suppressed.\nAt the hearing, Detective Gerlach testified regarding his investigation. Detective Gerlach testified that he spoke with Florida Tillman in January 2004, who stated that he was served with a mortgage foreclosure summons for the Farm Trace home in December 2003. Florida Tillman told the detective that he had never been to Richton Park and that he had not authorized anyone to purchase a home using his personal information. Detective Gerlach testified that he checked local municipal government records and found that Norris was the builder of the Farm Trace home and that defendant had applied for a permit to construct a brick mailbox on the property. According to Detective Gerlach, Norris identified defendant from a photo array as being present at the Farm Trace closing and said that defendant called himself \u201cAntoine Tillman\u201d on several occasions.\nDetective Gerlach testified that he and his partner went to the Farm Trace home in April 2004 and that defendant answered the door. Detective Gerlach testified that he asked defendant if he would come to the police station for questioning and defendant agreed. Defendant was seated in the backseat of Detective Gerlach\u2019s police vehicle with the detective\u2019s partner. Detective Gerlach drove the police vehicle to the police station.\nDetective Gerlach testified that once at the police station he read defendant his Miranda warnings and defendant signed a waiver form waiving his Miranda rights. Detective Gerlach testified that defendant was not free to leave the station at that point. He interviewed defendant for approximately 50 minutes. Defendant initially denied any wrongdoing. After defendant was informed that Norris described him as impersonating \u201cAntoine Tillman,\u201d defendant stated that he had paid Offit of Express Mortgage $10,000 to use \u201cAntoine Tillman\u2019s\u201d name and social security number to purchase the home. At the end of the interview, defendant signed a form consenting to a search of the Farm Trace property. After seizing documents from defendant\u2019s home, Detective Gerlach returned to the station and resumed questioning defendant, who provided the written statement.\nIn denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, the trial court found that defendant had not been involuntarily seized at his home. While the court noted that there was evidence to support arguments for or against seizure, it found controlling the facts that defendant was never handcuffed, that the police did not use weapons or in any way force defendant to accompany them, and defendant was never told that he was under arrest.\nAdditionally, the court found that even if defendant had been arrested at the home there was probable cause to support his arrest. The court noted that prior to interviewing Norris, Detective Gerlach learned that Florida Tillman was served with foreclosure documents for a home in Illinois which he never purchased; defendant was in possession of that home; defendant applied for a building permit for the home; defendant\u2019s fianc\u00e9e was a named user on the water bill; and defendant had previously told the police he lived at the home. Norris then identified defendant as the purchaser of the home and indicated that defendant had identified himself as \u201cAntoine Tillman.\u201d The trial court found that this information provided sufficient probable cause for defendant\u2019s arrest and therefore denied defendant\u2019s motion.\nC. Trial\nThe following evidence was presented at trial.\n1. State\u2019s evidence concerning the South Prospect home\nDenna Adams, a closer for Law Title Insurance Company, testified that she participated in a closing on September 30, 2002, in which St. Francis Mortgage Company lent \u201cAntoine Tillman\u201d $285,000 to buy the South Prospect home from defendant. Defendant and codefendant Tillman were both present, neither represented by an attorney. Codefendant Tillman presented Adams with a driver\u2019s license and state identification card listing the name \u201cAntwon [ ] Tillman,\u201d which she photocopied. An investigator for the Illinois Secretary of State later testified that he was assigned to investigate records for one identification card and one driver\u2019s license, which appear to be identical to the ones photocopied by Adams, and testified that the man in those photos was codefendant Tillman. Codefendant Tillman also presented Adams with other identification cards listing different variations of both his first and last names. Adams observed the discrepancy in the spellings between the identification cards and the loan documents and requested that codefendant Tillman sign an affidavit attesting to the other names he used and that he was the same person using two different spellings.\nCodefendant Tillman signed all the buyer\u2019s loan documents in Adams\u2019s presence, including the mortgage and a borrower\u2019s certification with the name and social security number of Florida Tillman.\nFlorida Tillman testified at trial and denied signing or initialing any of the loan documents. He also identified his name and social security number as being listed on forms and earning statements in the closing packet, but denied working for the Illinois employer listed on them.\nAdams identified stubs for the checks disbursed, including checks to pay off the existing mortgage on the South Prospect home. Defendant was issued two checks, for $93,212.74 and $8,600. Express Mortgage, the mortgage brokerage, received a check for $10,400, which included a $7,500 broker\u2019s fee and $2,850 for a yield spread premium.\nThe parties stipulated that a senior vice president for the successor company to St. Francis Mortgage Company if called as a witness would testify that St. Francis Mortgage would not have made the mortgage loan for the South Prospect home \u201chad it known that the true Antoine Tillman was not the borrower.\u201d The parties further stipulated to testimony that a r\u00e9sum\u00e9 for Eric Glenn was submitted along with the appraisal report in the loan application. The parties stipulated that two r\u00e9sum\u00e9s recovered from the Farm Trace home appear identical other than the name attached to the r\u00e9sum\u00e9s; one r\u00e9-sum\u00e9 bore the name of defendant while the other bore the name of Eric Glenn.\nEric Glenn, an appraiser who had worked with defendant in 2001, testified he did not appraise the South Prospect home and did not sign the appraisal attributed to him in the closing packet. Glenn also testified that the r\u00e9sum\u00e9 that was in the closing packet for the South Prospect home was not his, nor was it prepared by him.\nThe State introduced testimony from Carolyn Jones as to the events following the closing of the South Prospect home. Jones testified that she answered an advertisement in the Chicago Sun Times newspaper for a rental of the South Prospect home in October 2002. She and her husband met with defendant, who represented that he was the caretaker for the landlord Antoine Tillman, who was currently out of town. They signed a written lease for rental of the home for $2,400 a month. Jones testified that they agreed to a written lease with a purchase option and identified her copy of the lease, which was titled \u201cLease with Purchase Option.\u201d The provision for the purchase option was stricken and \u201cN/A\u201d was written in the margin next to the provision.\nAfter moving in, Jones delivered her rent checks to defendant. Defendant instructed the Jones family to make money orders payable to Express Mortgage and occasionally to himself. Jones identified 38 money order stubs used to pay rent, with the most recent stub being July 2004. Of these, she identified three money orders payable to defendant. Although her testimony is not clear, Jones testified that defendant told her that when she was unable to pay all the rent, he would cover the difference, and that the money orders to defendant were for \u201cback pay.\u201d\nJones described the South Prospect home as a large frame house in the Beverly neighborhood of Chicago which \u201clooked nice, but needed some repair work.\u201d She testified that the furnace made a \u201cbooming\u201d noise when it turned on, and her husband installed a new one. She also testified the roof leaked when it rained, the electrical wiring needed repair; the back steps were \u201craggedy and rickety\u201d; the back door needed repair; and \u201c[t]he plumbing wasn\u2019t the greatest.\u201d She testified on cross-examination that, before trial, the prosecutors had her list all of the problems with the house. Jones testified she did not know the average rent for that size house in that neighborhood, but that she was able to move into a neighboring home for $1,200 rent after vacating the South Prospect premises.\nIn the summer of 2004, a deputy sheriff served Jones with a foreclosure lawsuit. Jones testified that she telephoned defendant, who represented that he paid the mortgage and that she should not be concerned. Another deputy sheriff later came and evicted the Jones family from the premises.\n2. State\u2019s evidence regarding the Farm Trace home\nEdith Love, a closer for Chicago Title Insurance Company, testified that she participated in a real estate closing on October 7, 2002, in which First NLC Financial Services lent \u201cAntoine Tillman\u201d $385,000 to buy the Farm Trace home from Andre Norris. Express Mortgage, the mortgage brokerage firm, received a $5,000 brokerage fee for obtaining the loan from First NLC Financial Services and $3,080 for a yield spread premium. Norris and codefendant Tillman both attended the closing.\nLove asked codefendant Tillman for identification and he presented her with a driver\u2019s license bearing the name \u201cAntwon [ ] Tillman.\u201d The driver\u2019s license appears to be identical to the one given by the buyer at the Prospect closing, with the same photograph identified by the Illinois Secretary of State investigator as depicting codefendant Tillman. Codefendant Tillman signed or initialed all of the loan documents, including a loan application and taxpayer identification request with Florida Tillman\u2019s social security number.\nFlorida Tillman denied signing or initialing the loan documents in the closing packet. He also identified his name and social security number as being listed on W-2 forms and earning statements in the closing packet, but denied working for the Illinois employer listed in them. Florida Tillman also denied involvement in the transaction.\nAndre Norris, the builder of the Farm Trace home, testified that he met with defendant, a potential buyer who identified himself as \u201cWalter Jackson,\u201d several times during the summer of 2002. Norris testified that he, his attorney, defendant, and Darryl Rogers of Express Mortgage attended the closing on October 7, 2002. Rogers found the buyer (codefendant Tillman) for the property. Defendant was not at the closing, but Norris observed him in the lobby of the building where the closing took place. Norris could not recall what the buyer looked like.\nNorris testified that the Farm Trace home was priced at $395,000 and that loans covered $385,000, with defendant covering the remaining $10,000. Defendant also paid for appliances, which Norris testified was reflected as a seller\u2019s credit on the settlement sheet. Norris testified that the other similar houses in the development sold for between $380,000 and $390,000 and that an appraisal of $395,000 for the Farm Trace home was accurate.\nThe parties stipulated to the testimony of a branch manager for First NLC that it made two loans for $308,000 and $77,000 to \u201cAntoine Tillman\u201d for the Farm Trace home on October 7, 2002. The parties stipulated that the manager, if called as a witness, would testify First NLC would not have made the loan if it knew \u201cthe true [Antoine] Tillman\u201d was not the borrower.\nDetective Richard Gerlach identified a handwritten statement he wrote for defendant in April 2004, which defendant initialed and signed. The statement was then offered into evidence and published to the jury. In the statement, defendant states that he worked as an independent contractor residential appraiser for Express Mortgage, a mortgage broker, from 2002 to 2003. While working for Express Mortgage, he \u201cnoticed they were a dishonest organization.\u201d David Of-fit, a loan officer with Express Mortgage, told him about the Farm Trace home and he paid Offit and someone who he thought was \u201cAntoine Tillman\u201d $10,000 to use Antoine Tillman\u2019s \u201ccredit and personal information to get [that] house.\u201d Express Mortgage brokered two mortgage loans to purchase the home. Defendant did not attend the closing but delivered a $3,000 personal check made payable to \u201cAntoine Tillman.\u201d After the closing, Offit gave defendant the closing packet and keys, and he moved into the home.\nAfter defendant failed to make several mortgage payments, he called the lender representing himself as \u201cAntoine Tillman.\u201d He provided Florida Tillman\u2019s social security number in order to reinstate the delinquent loan. He stated that he wanted to stay in the house a little longer. Later he recorded a quitclaim deed transferring the title to the home in trust to himself and his fianc\u00e9e, Brianne Blue, as beneficiaries. The written statement includes his statement that he knew it was wrong to use someone else\u2019s credit and personal information.\nDarryl Phillips of the Cook County recorder of deeds identified a deed in trust which was recorded with the Cook County recorder of deeds on January 13, 2004. The deed conveyed any interest in the Farm Trace home from Antoine Tillman to LaSalle Bank as trustee under a written trust agreement. Detective Gerlach identified a March 12, 2003, agreement seized from the Farm Trace home establishing LaSalle Bank as trustee for the Farm Trace property and defendant and his fianc\u00e9e as beneficiaries. When shown the quitclaim deed, Florida Tillman denied signing or initialing it, and testified he never conveyed the property to defendant and never had an ownership interest in the property.\nThe parties stipulated to the testimony of a project manager and document control manager for the successor company to First NLC. The stipulated testimony is that \u201c[i]n July of 2003, a male identifying himself as [Antoine] Tillman called the lender and requested a repayment plan as he was delinquent on the mortgage loans.\u201d On March 24, 2004, the lender sent an agreed repayment order to \u201cAntoine Tillman\u201d at the Farm Trace home. The parties also stipulated that the mortgages on the Farm Trace home went into foreclosure.\nDetective Gerlach identified several documents seized in the search of the Farm Trace home, including a mortgage statement from the Farm Trace lender and commented that \u201csomebody wrote down the victim\u2019s social security number and his age.\u201d\n3. Defense evidence regarding the South Prospect home\nDefendant testified that he had been a real estate appraiser since 1999, and that he had also rehabilitated two properties in Chicago and sold them for profit, while working as a Chicago public school teacher.\nDefendant purchased the South Prospect home for approximately $65,000 at a Housing and Urban Development (HUD) auction. The property had \u201cthree feet of water in the basement and everything basically needed to be replaced.\u201d Defendant did a \u201cgut rehab,\u201d removing walls, plumbing, and some electrical systems and installing new sinks, a new kitchen, bathroom fixtures, and tile. The remodeling took about a year and defendant lived in the property during that period.\nDefendant testified that he decided to sell the South Prospect home. At the time he sold the home, it was in foreclosure. He testified that Express Mortgage found a buyer named \u201cAntoine Tillman,\u201d who Darryl Rogers from Express Mortgage informed him was an investor. Defendant had not known codefendant Tillman before the closing. When asked whether he listed the home on the Multiple Listing Service (MLS), defendant testified that he did not. Defendant, codefendant Tillman, and Rogers all attended the closing. At the closing on September 30, 2002, the prior mortgages were paid off, and defendant was given two checks, one for $93,000 and one for $8,600. He endorsed the $8,600 check over to Rogers, who told him it was for closing costs. After the sale, a judgment of foreclosure was dismissed.\nDefendant testified that he had worked with Eric Glenn. Glenn trained him on appraising multi-unit residential properties and he trained Glenn on appraising single-family residential properties. He identified the credentials on both his and Glenn\u2019s r\u00e9sum\u00e9s as his own, and he testified he did not know how Glenn\u2019s name appeared on his r\u00e9sum\u00e9. Defendant had received the r\u00e9sum\u00e9 from a closing packet and one of the r\u00e9sum\u00e9s indicated it was faxed to St. Francis Mortgage, the lender in the South Prospect closing. He did not know who performed the appraisal for the South Prospect home.\nAt trial, defendant also addressed Carolyn Jones\u2019s testimony regarding the South Prospect home. He testified he installed a new electric furnace because the Jones family could not obtain credit from the gas company. When defendant lived in the home, he had no problems with the previous gas furnace. The back stairs were \u201crickety\u201d at some point because the Jones family hit one of the posts on the steps with a moving truck. Defendant had installed a new roof, but the snow would build up in the gutters, and, when it melted, would leak into the house. He installed electrical heaters on the edge of the roof line. He testified that there were some problems with the electricity but that they were corrected. On cross-examination defendant stated he did not bring receipts for any repairs he made to the South Prospect home.\nDefendant testified he told Jones that he was not the owner of the property. Defendant collected rent from the Jones family for Express Mortgage because he was obtaining appraisal work from them, and they requested him to collect the rent. He explained that the checks from the Jones family payable to him were reimbursements for payments he made on their behalf. Express Mortgage threatened to evict the Jones family if they did not pay the full amount of the rent and defendant made their payments when the Jones family were unable to do so.\n4. Defense evidence regarding the Farm Trace home\nDefendant testified that Darryl Rogers told him about the Farm Trace home. They agreed to a deal whereby \u201cAntoine Tillman\u201d would buy the property \u201con paper\u201d and, after 6 to 12 months, would quitclaim the property to defendant, who would refinance the loan. The buyer would be the same man who bought the South Prospect home. Defendant did not attend the Farm Trace home closing, but was in the lobby of the building where it took place. He brought a $3,000 personal check that Rogers told him was for overage fees. He also drew two $5,000 checks to A&E Construction, which Rogers told him were for closing costs. Although the quitclaim deed was to have been signed at the closing, it was not. After the closing, Rogers gave defendant the closing packet and keys to the Farm Trace home. Defendant and his fianc\u00e9e moved into the home.\nDefendant applied for a building permit to build a brick mailbox for the Farm Trace home and had contractors install mirrors on walls and marble and tile on the floors. He estimated that he spent $10,000 on these improvements. Defendant testified that Rogers represented to him that the monthly mortgage payment would be around $2,000, but it turned out to be about $2,500. Defendant testified that he sent eight or nine mortgage payments to First NEC Financial Services, which were deposited. He testified that one payment was returned. Defendant testified that he asked Express Mortgage many times why it was returned, but did not receive an explanation. Defendant testified that he attempted to make further payments, but was not successful. Defendant testified that he called the lender and identified himself as a representative of the borrower and gave a social security number which matched Florida Tillman\u2019s. He testified that he attempted to obtain a payoff letter, so he could refinance the loan. During his testimony defendant never explained why he was unable to make further payments or unable to obtain the payoff letter.\nDefendant testified that he telephoned Rogers numerous times and asked for the deed, which needed to be signed by the buyer Tillman. Eight or nine months after the closing, he received the deed, which he recorded with the Cook County recorder of deeds. He believed that filing the deed was necessary to refinance the property in his name. Defendant testified that he did not sign Tillman\u2019s name on the deed.\nTanshinik Harris testified she has been a notary public for eight or nine years. She was visiting her sister on March 12, 2003, who worked at Express Mortgage when someone asked if there was a notary in the office. She volunteered and notarized a quitclaim deed signed by \u201cAntoine Tillman.\u201d She could not recall whose signature she notarized, but testified he must have shown her identification.\nDefendant identified a copy of a land trust agreement which listed him and his fianc\u00e9e as beneficiaries, and he testified that he believed it was a living trust, which he believed was a way to avoid probate. On cross-examination, defendant testified that he knew that the Farm Trace property was in foreclosure.\nDefendant testified to voluntarily accompanying police officers to the police station in April 2004 and giving them permission to search the Farm Trace home. He testified that he signed the statement because the officer said he would be released if he did. Detective Gerlach did not allow him to write out his own statement, except for the last paragraph attesting to the truth of the statement. Defendant testified he did not know Express Mortgage was dishonest until the police told him they were.\nOn cross-examination, defendant identified several real estate tax forms seized from the Farm Trace home listing different social security numbers. He then identified a mortgage statement for the South Prospect home, which listed his personal social security number.\nEugene Bennett testified that he was the attorney for the buyer \u201cAntoine Tillman\u201d at the Farm Trace closing on October 7, 2002. Darryl Rogers of Express Mortgage had asked him to represent the buyer. Bennett testified that he did not see the buyer in the courtroom.\nD. Closing Argument, Verdict and Sentence\nThe State\u2019s closing arguments focused on accountability, charging that defendant was accountable for the actions of codefendant Tillman and Express Mortgage. The defense argued that defendant was the primary victim in this case and that defendant had no knowledge of codefendant Tillman\u2019s use of Florida Tillman\u2019s personal information. In rebuttal the State argued that defendant not only knew about codefendant\u2019s use of Florida Tillman\u2019s personal information but facilitated the crimes. The State also argued that Jones and Florida Tillman were the victims in the case at bar, not defendant. Defense counsel objected to arguments that Carolyn Jones was the \u201creal victim,\u201d that mortgage fraud was a societal problem and that the jury needed to put a stop to it.\nThe jury convicted defendant on all counts. At the sentencing hearing conducted on September 14, 2006, defendant stated that he took \u201cfull responsibility\u201d for his actions and was \u201ctruly sorry for [his] actions and associations.\u201d After finding that the counts for theft by deception and two of the counts for forgery merged as previously noted, the court sentenced defendant to five years\u2019 imprisonment on two counts of financial identity theft and one count of forgery, with the sentences to run concurrently.\nII. ANALYSIS\nOn appeal, defendant argues that (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence including a signed written confession, and (4) the State made improper closing arguments. We address each of defendant\u2019s arguments in turn.\nA. Sufficiency of the Evidence\nOn appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of financial identity theft and forgery. Specifically, defendant argues that the State failed to prove that he possessed the requisite intent to promote or facilitate a crime. Defendant claims that he did not share the criminal intent of codefendant Tillman and that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty of financial identity theft. Likewise, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty of forgery beyond a reasonable doubt.\nThe critical inquiry on review of a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278 (2004). Once defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the fact finder\u2019s role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that, upon judicial review, all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. People v. Migliore, 170 Ill. App. 3d 581 (1988). The trier of fact determines witnesses\u2019 credibility. People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259 (2001). We will not set aside a conviction unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt as to defendant\u2019s guilt. People v. Cox, 195 Ill. 2d 378, 387 (2001).\nAs noted, defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of both financial identity theft and forgery.\nAs noted, defendant was convicted on all counts by accountability under section 5 \u2014 2(c) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 2(c) (West 2000)), which states:\n\u201cA person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when:\n* * *\n(c) Either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.\u201d\n\u201cAccountability is not a crime in and of itself but, rather, a mechanism through which a criminal conviction may result.\u201d People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 210 (2002), citing People v. Hicks, 181 Ill. 2d 541, 547 (1998).\nViewing the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.\nThe evidence in the case at bar established that codefendant Tillman utilized the name and social security number of Florida Tillman to first purchase the South Prospect home from defendant and then procure the Farm Trace home from Andre Norris, a home in which defendant resided after the purchase. The evidence also demonstrated that defendant remained intimately involved in the functioning of the South Prospect home after its sale. As noted, it was defendant who negotiated the terms of the lease with Jones and defendant who collected the Jones family\u2019s monthly rental payments after the home\u2019s purchase.\nA search of the Farm Trace home revealed many documents pertaining to the residential property transactions at issue in the case at bar, including a r\u00e9sum\u00e9 including defendant\u2019s credentials bearing Glenn\u2019s name. As noted, it was this r\u00e9sum\u00e9 that was included with the appraisal for the two homes.\nThe evidence also showed that defendant delivered payments drawn from his personal checking account to the closing of the Farm Trace home, although he was not a party to the closing. One of those payments was made to codefendant Tillman, for what defendant described as the use of \u201csomeone[\u2019]s\u201d credit to purchase the Farm Trace home.\nThe evidence also demonstrated that defendant recorded the aforementioned quitclaim deed. As noted, the quitclaim deed purported to transfer all interest in the Farm Trace home from \u201cAntoine Tillman\u201d in trust to LaSalle Bank for the benefit of defendant and his fi-anc\u00e9e, Blue.\nDefendant testified that he was not aware that codefendant Tillman used another\u2019s personal identifying information to purchase both the South Prospect home and the Farm Trace home. He also testified that he had an arrangement with codefendant Tillman to use Florida Tillman\u2019s credit to procure the Farm Trace home and had an arrangement to procure a quitclaim deed a few months after the closing in order to refinance the mortgage and assume ownership.\nThe jury heard the testimony presented at trial including defendant\u2019s testimony and rejected it. Based upon the permissible inferences to be drawn from the evidence presented at trial, we find that a reasonable trier of fact could have found that defendant knew that codefendant Tillman used the personal information of Florida Tillman to purchase both homes and procure mortgage loans to that end. Likewise, we find that a reasonable trier of fact could have found that defendant knew that the quitclaim deed which he recorded was a forgery.\nB. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\nDefendant next argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, defendant contends that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to object to the admission of other crimes evidence or evidence of other bad acts which demonstrated his propensity to commit the charged crimes. In the alternative, defendant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to offer a limiting instruction regarding the introduction of other crimes evidence. Defendant argues that trial counsel\u2019s failures resulted in prejudice.\nWe begin our analysis of defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance of counsel claims by reiterating the oft-cited rules pertaining to a review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that, to determine whether a defendant was denied his or her right to effective assistance of counsel, an appellate court must apply the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 135 (2007), citing People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (1984) (adopting Strickland). Under Strickland, a defendant must prove both (1) his attorney\u2019s actions constituted errors so serious, as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) absent these errors, there was a reasonable probability that his trial would have resulted in a different outcome. People v. Ward, 371 Ill. App. 3d 382, 434 (2007), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-94, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693-98, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-68.\nUnder the first prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must prove that his counsel\u2019s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness \u201cunder prevailing professional norms.\u201d Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 135; People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 220 (2004). Under the second prong, the defendant must show that, \u201cbut for\u201d counsel\u2019s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 135; Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 220. \u201c[A] reasonable probability that the result would have been different is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome \u2014 or put another way, that counsel\u2019s deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or fundamentally unfair.\u201d Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 220; Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 135.\nTo prevail, the defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 135; Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 220. \u201cThat is, if in an effective-assistance claim can be disposed of because the defendant suffered no prejudice, we need not determine whether counsel\u2019s performance was deficient.\u201d People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (2003). We do not need to consider the first prong of the Strickland test, when the second prong cannot be satisfied. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d at 476.\nDefendant first argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony elicited from him during cross-examination that he made a practice of using other people\u2019s personal identifying information. On cross-examination, defendant was asked to identify various documents recovered from the Farm Trace home which identified him by name and utilized a social security number that belonged to another.\nFirst, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony elicited from him during cross-examination that he made a practice of using other people\u2019s social security numbers in various real estate transactions. A review of defendant\u2019s direct examination demonstrates that the cross-examination was proper and that, even assuming it was not, any potential prejudice was cured when the trial court sustained defense counsel\u2019s objection to the State\u2019s line of questioning.\nOn direct examination, defendant testified that, prior to the arrival of police at his home in April 2004, he did not know \u201canything about any documents being phonied up by anybody.\u201d In response to this claim, defendant was asked on cross-examination about several real estate tax forms recovered during the search of the Farm Trace home. All of these forms listed defendant as the filer and all contained social security numbers, but only one of the forms listed defendant\u2019s actual social security number. These forms shed light on defendant\u2019s credibility when he claimed to have no knowledge of any \u201cphonied up\u201d documents before his arrest.\nDefendant first identified a 2003 real estate tax form labeled \u201cProceeds From Real Estate Transactions\u201d which listed his address as 10114 South Mella (actually Malta), Chicago, and pertained to a lot located at 509 LaMoille Road, Sublette, Illinois. The form identified defendant as the transferor and listed defendant\u2019s social security number as 318-**-****. Defendant originally testified that he did not know to whom the social security number belonged, but later stated that it probably belonged to his mother, as she owned a vacant lot in that area. Defendant also identified a 2003 Request for Taxpayer Identification form related to a property on Homewood Avenue in Chicago which was signed by defendant and listed his social security number as 320-**-****. Defendant testified that he did know to whom the listed social security number belonged, but stated that the property was \u201c[p]robably a rental property at some point [he] had owned.\u201d Defendant identified another Request for Taxpayer Identification form listing defendant\u2019s name, a Chicago address, and a social security number of 333-**-****. Defendant admitted that he previously owned the property. While defendant initially disputed whether the nine-digit number listed in the social security number box was a social security number, he later denied knowing whose number was listed. Finally, defendant identified a mortgage interest statement pertaining to the South Prospect property which listed his name and his social security number.\nGiven his testimony on direct examination, the State was entitled to rebut defendant\u2019s claims of innocence and ignorance with contradictory evidence, recovered from the Farm Trace home, that showed he personally \u201cphonied up\u201d such documents. See People v. Johnson, 368 Ill. App. 3d 1073 (2006). A trial is an adversarial proceeding. People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill. 2d 176, 189 (1983). Accordingly, a defendant who takes the stand on his own behalf not only offers himself as a witness, but also subjects himself to legitimate cross-examination. People v. Burris, 49 Ill. 2d 98, 104 (1971). The determination as to the proper scope of that cross-examination, including whether to allow the use of evidence of prior crimes, rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. McKibbins, 96 Ill. 2d at 189; People v. Breton, 237 Ill. App. 3d 355, 363 (1992). Subject to that discretion, the prosecution is entitled and obligated to use all of the impeaching evidence it possesses in order to impact the credibility of the defendant if he chooses to testify. McKibbins, 96 Ill. 2d at 189.\nFurthermore, the reoccurrence of acts of the same sort are admissible to rebut or impeach a defendant\u2019s claims of accident, justification, or innocent intent and to provide evidence of necessary criminal intent. See People v. Sutton, 316 Ill. App. 3d 874, 892 (2000); McKibbins, 96 Ill. 2d at 185-86. In the present case, defendant\u2019s use of the other social security numbers occurred during the same time period as the charged crimes and therefore was admissible to rebut defendant\u2019s claims of lack of knowledge and demonstrate his intent to fraudulently use Florida Tillman\u2019s social security number and financial information.\nMoreover, even if the questioning was improper, any error was cured when the trial court sustained defense counsel\u2019s objection. In a concluding question the assistant state\u2019s attorney asked, \u201cSo one out of four [social security numbers] is yours?\u201d Defense counsel objected, arguing, \u201cwe don\u2019t know that the other ones are social security numbers, it\u2019s improper,\u201d and the trial court sustained the objection. The trial court\u2019s ruling on this objection, along with its later instruction to the jury to disregard questions to which objections were sustained, served to obviate any error. People v. Wood, 341 Ill. App. 3d 599, 610 (2003).\nDefendant\u2019s next ineffective assistance claim regards defense counsel\u2019s failure to object to the testimony of Jones which, defendant claims, improperly suggested that he failed to maintain the South Prospect home and fraudulently rented the property. However, Jones\u2019s testimony was not intended to directly establish fraud, as defendant suggests, but rather was introduced to demonstrate that home\u2019s purchase price was not related to the condition of the home and to demonstrate defendant\u2019s continued involvement with the South Prospect home and codefendant Tillman.\nIn order to prove defendant guilty of financial identity theft regarding the South Prospect property, it was necessary for the State to establish that defendant was a knowing participant in the plan to defraud the bank who held the mortgage on the property by obtaining the loan through the use of Florida Tillman\u2019s personal information. First, Jones\u2019s testimony regarding the home\u2019s dilapidated condition demonstrated that the home was not worth the amount listed in the appraisal. As it was the State\u2019s theory at trial that defendant performed the appraisal himself, this goes to demonstrate his participation in defrauding the bank. Additionally, defendant\u2019s interaction with Jones after he was no longer an owner demonstrated that he was an active participant in the South Prospect home even after its sale. Jones\u2019s testimony established that defendant continued to be involved with codefendant Tillman. Moreover, Jones\u2019s testimony was part of the continuing narrative of the events surrounding the charge of financial identity theft and was therefore proper. People v. Evans, 373 Ill. App. 3d 948, 958 (2007). Because this evidence was proper, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to it.\nDefendant claims that the State failed to offer proof that these uncharged crimes occurred or that he in fact committed these other bad acts. However, while the State\u2019s proof must be more than mere suspicion, the State is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed an uncharged crime. People v. Hansen, 313 Ill. App. 3d 491, 500 (2000).\nDefendant then claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to evidence suggesting that he committed other acts of fraud, specifically evidence that defendant forged a r\u00e9sum\u00e9 used in both closings and that he used the personal information of Florida Tillman to renegotiate a loan. However, such evidence was part of the continuing narrative of the crime and, as such, was properly admitted to demonstrate defendant\u2019s intent and knowledge. Therefore, defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to such evidence.\nLastly, defendant claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a limiting instruction. Defense counsel\u2019s choice not to seek a limiting instruction regarding other crimes evidence was purely a strategic decision made so as not to emphasize the evidence which, while proper, portrayed defendant in a bad light. Therefore, defense counsel\u2019s tactical decision cannot be the subject of a claim of ineffective assistance. See Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 221. Furthermore, no such instruction was necessary where the evidence complained-of arose from the very same transaction or set of circumstances as the charged crime. People v. Figueroa, 341 Ill. App. 3d 665 (2003).\nFor the foregoing reasons, defendant cannot establish that defense counsel\u2019s performance was deficient. His Strickland claims necessarily fail.\nC. Defendant\u2019s Motion to Suppress\nDefendant then argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence including a signed written confession. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion in light of testimony adduced at trial. Specifically, defendant argues that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him.\nIn the case at bar, the trial court found that defendant was not under arrest and was not involuntarily seized. Further, the trial court found that even if defendant were involuntarily seized prior to providing the inculpatory statements, the police had probable cause to arrest defendant. We agree.\nIn order to determine whether an arrest occurred, the court must decide whether \u201ca reasonable, innocent person [would] consider herself arrested or *** conclude that she was not free to leave.\u201d People v. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1994). Courts look to a number of factors in deciding whether a defendant has been arrested, including the time and place of the encounter, the use of restraints, the beliefs of the officers and defendant, whether the defendant was transported in a police vehicle, and what the defendant was told by the officers. People v. Washington, 363 Ill. App. 3d 13, 24 (2006).\nIn finding that defendant was not involuntarily seized at the Farm Trace property, the trial court noted that there were factors which would support a finding of an arrest, including that a detective sat in the rear of the police vehicle with defendant, that defendant was immediately placed into an interview room and given Miranda warnings, as well as the detective\u2019s testimony that defendant was not free to leave when they arrived at the station. However, the trial court found more compelling the factors indicating that defendant was not arrested until after he made his initial oral admission 50 minutes into the first interview. Those factors included the fact that \u201cthere [were] no handcuffs, no display of handguns or any other weaponry, no indication of any force or more importantly no indication that the defendant did not himself feel he was not free not to go to the station or that he was not free to leave at any time. That was not communicated to him.\u201d\nWe also find that defendant was not involuntarily seized until after making his initial oral admissions. Detective Gerlach and his partner went to the Farm Trace home where defendant answered the door. He was asked to accompany the police to the station and agreed to do so. Defendant was never handcuffed and no weaponry was displayed by the police. Based upon the foregoing and defendant\u2019s own testimony at trial that he voluntarily accompanied the police to the police station and did not feel that he was required to do so, we find that defendant was not involuntarily seized prior to making his initial oral inculpatory statements.\nWe also agree with the trial court\u2019s finding that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant, even if defendant was involuntarily seized prior to making his initial oral admissions.\nA warrantless arrest will be deemed lawful only when probable cause to arrest has been proven. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 397, 405 (1995), citing People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 237 (1984). \u201cProbable cause to arrest exists when facts exist that would lead a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the police officers to conclude that a crime has been committed and the defendant was the person who committed the crime.\u201d Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 405, citing People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 83 (1987). \u201cMere suspicion is inadequate to establish probable cause, but the evidence relied upon by the arresting officer need not be sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or even be admissible at trial. Technical rules do not govern the assessment of whether probable cause existed; rather, practical, commonsense considerations guide that determination.\u201d People v. Wilson, 260 Ill. App. 3d 364, 368-69 (1994), citing People v. Jones, 196 Ill. App. 3d 937, 954 (1990), appeal denied, 133 Ill. 2d 565 (1990); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983) (adopting a \u201ctotality of the circumstances\u201d test for determining probable cause). \u201c[PJrobable cause is a fluid concept \u2014 turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts \u2014 not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.\u201d Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 544, 103 S. Ct. at 2329.\nDefendant argues that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him because the only direct evidence that the police had for probable cause to arrest him was provided by Detective Gerlach, who testified that Norris, the builder of the Farm Trace home had positively identified defendant as the buyer of the Farm Trace home and had described him as identifying himself as \u201cAntoine Tillman.\u201d Defendant argues that Detective Gerlach\u2019s testimony was contradicted at trial, when Norris testified that defendant had identified himself as \u201cWalter Jackson.\u201d\nViewing the totality of the circumstances in the case at bar, the police had probable cause to arrest defendant even without Norris\u2019s identification of defendant as impersonating \u201cAntoine Tillman.\u201d When Detective Gerlach went to the Farm Trace home he knew that someone had purchased the home utilizing Florida Tillman\u2019s name and social security number and that the person was not Florida Tillman. Even without Norris\u2019s characterization of defendant as impersonating \u201cAntoine Tillman,\u201d Detective Gerlach knew that it was defendant who met with the builder of the home several times, selected all the finishes on the home, and purchased appliances for the home. Accordingly, we find that there was probable cause to support defendant\u2019s arrest.\nD. Improper Closing Arguments\nFinally, defendant argues that certain statements made by the prosecution during closing arguments deprived him of a fair trial. Defendant provides a myriad of arguments with regard to the prosecution\u2019s closing argument and argues alternatively that the errors collectively deprived him of a fair trial. We will address each of defendant\u2019s arguments in turn.\nIn reviewing defendant\u2019s allegations of error here, we first note that a prosecutor is allowed great latitude in closing argument (People v. Stock, 56 Ill. 2d 461, 467 (1974); People v. Neumann, 148 Ill. App. 3d 362, 373-74 (1986)), and the trial court\u2019s determination of the propriety of the argument will generally be followed absent a clear abuse of discretion (People v. Smothers, 55 Ill. 2d 172, 175 (1973)). \u201cTo constitute reversible error, the complained-of remarks must have resulted in substantial prejudice to the accused, such that absent those remarks the verdict would have been different.\u201d People v. Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d 163, 175 (1987), citing People v. Morgan, 112 Ill. 2d 111, 132 (1986). \u201cIn reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, the closing arguments of both the State and the defendant must be examined in their entirety and the complained-of comments must be placed in their proper context.\u201d Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d at 175-76, citing People v. Nemke, 46 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (1970).\nAs a threshold matter, it should be noted that defendant has forfeited all but one of the four alleged areas of prosecutorial error raised on appeal. It is well established that in order to preserve an issue regarding closing argument for review, a defendant must object to the offending comments both at trial and in a written posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988); People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92 (2007). The purpose of this two-fold requirement is to allow the trial court the opportunity to address and correct errors if necessary. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186. To abandon this requirement would allow appellate counsel to comb the record for every semblance of error and raise issues on appeal whether or not trial counsel considered them of any importance. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186.\nHere, defendant failed to object to several specific remarks made during closing argument and failed to object to the alleged cumulative effect of the complained of remarks. Defendant also failed to include in his posttrial motion reference to all but one of the four alleged areas of error now complained of on appeal. Although defendant generally objected to the prosecutor\u2019s \u201cimproper and inflammatory closing argument\u201d in his motion for a new trial, references in a posttrial motion to prejudicial and inflammatory remarks without factual detail is not sufficient to preserve the issue for review. People v. Flax, 255 Ill. App. 3d 103, 108 (1993).\nDefendant acknowledges that certain comments were not objected to. He does not ask this court to review these remarks under a plain error analysis. Rather, defendant argues that the comments which might otherwise be subject to forfeiture must be considered as a part of the entirety of a prosecutor\u2019s closing argument for purposes of determining prosecutorial misconduct.\nDefendant misstates the law. While closing arguments must be viewed in their entirety, statements which are not properly objected to are forfeited and thus, their use is limited merely to \u201cadd to the context of a remark properly objected to.\u201d Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 122-23.\nIn defendant\u2019s only claim not subject to forfeiture, he argues that the prosecutor in rebuttal closing argument improperly focused the jury\u2019s attention on the growing trend of mortgage fraud. However, a review of the entire closing argument reveals that the prosecutor\u2019s comments were proper as they focused on the facts in evidence rather than on general notions of deterrence and were invited by defense counsel\u2019s argument.\nDefendant identifies three comments made by the prosecution in rebuttal closing argument which he claims were improper. First, defendant argues that the prosecution\u2019s comment, \u201cthat\u2019s what they are doing on these mortgage fraud scam cases. That\u2019s what they are doing on identity theft these days. That\u2019s how sophisticated it is, and that\u2019s why we are asking you to help us stop it.\u201d Defendant does not consider the paragraph immediately preceding the remark which, when read in conjunction with the complained-of comment, clearly demonstrates that the prosecution was referring specifically to defendant and codefendant Tillman. Although this comment was objected to, it was not improper as defendant would suggest. Preceding the comment, the prosecution argued:\n\u201c[Defendant] is working with Express Mortgage. They have access to people\u2019s credit. They choose people with the same names. The codefendant is Antwon Tillman. His name is [Antoine] Tillman. What easier way to try to wiggle out of this when you\u2019re profiting this kind of money than to pick a victim who has the same name as you? And say, oh, it\u2019s all a mistake, or I didn\u2019t know. How was I supposed to know? That\u2019s what they are doing on these mortgage fraud scam cases. That\u2019s what they are doing on identity theft these days. That\u2019s how sophisticated it is, and that\u2019s why we are asking you to help us stop it.\u201d\nFrom the foregoing, it is clear that the complained-of comment pertained to defendant and codefendant Tillman and not \u201cunspecified criminals\u201d as defendant suggests. The prosecution argued that defendant and Express Mortgage used a local straw man, codefendant Tillman, with similar names as Florida Tillman whose financial identity was stolen to perpetuate the aforementioned residential real estate transactions.\nDefendant then argues that the prosecutor\u2019s use of the term \u201cscam artist\u201d to describe defendant deprived him of a fair trial. This term was utilized to describe the defendant as what the prosecution hoped the evidence would demonstrate. The Illinois Supreme Court recently upheld the use of such terms when the evidence presented at trial supports it. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 350 (2007). In Perry the court rejected an improper closing argument claim where the prosecutor described the defendant therein as a \u201ccon man,\u201d a \u201cfraud\u201d and a \u201cfake.\u201d Perry, 224 Ill. 2d at 350. In so doing, the court noted that \u201c[d] escribing a defendant who is charged with theft by deception as a con man, fraud, or fake is similar to describing a defendant who is charged with murder as a killer or a murderer.\u201d Perry, 224 Ill. 2d at 350.\nDefendant then argues that the prosecutor\u2019s comment stating that \u201cidentity theft and mortgage fraud identity theft is the fastest growing crime in our country *** we hear about it more and more\u201d deprived him of a fair trial. Defendant objected to the comment but his objection was overruled. However, when defendant objected to prosecution\u2019s next comment that \u201cyou hear more about it these days,\u201d his objection was sustained curing any possible error. People v. Miller, 363 Ill. App. 3d 67, 78 (2005).\nDefendant\u2019s reliance on People v. Johnson in support of his argument is misplaced. People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 53 (2003). In Johnson, the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jury to \u201csend a message\u201d of support to law enforcement and to society in general, likened the defendants to animals, cast the prosecution in terms of \u201cgood versus evil,\u201d mischaracterized evidence and the law, and suggested that defense counsel engaged in deceptive tactics. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 78-80. The court reversed the defendants\u2019 convictions based on the cumulative effect of the improper comments and the pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 79.\nThe complained-of comments in the instant case find no comparison to the objectionable comments in Johnson. The remarks in the present case were not an \u201cextended and general denunciation of society\u2019s ills\u201d but rather isolated remarks relating to the jury\u2019s ability to effect specific and general deterrence based on defendant\u2019s culpability.\nDefendant then argues that the prosecutors inflamed the passion of the jury by arguing an uncharged crime against Carolyn Jones. Specifically, defendant points to three comments which he argues were improper. Namely, the prosecution\u2019s comment that Jones was a victim, that defendant \u201cripped Jones off,\u201d and that defendant was greedy.\nDefendant first claims that the prosecution focused much of its closing argument on portraying Jones as a victim. However, a review of the record demonstrates that this is not true. Jones was mentioned at the opening of the prosecution\u2019s opening portion of their closing argument. The prosecution began its closing argument by stating, \u201c[a] victim? Do you know who the real victim is? He\u2019s sitting right out there. It\u2019s the banks, Carolyn Jones. Those are the real victims.\u201d This comment was properly made to rebut defendant\u2019s theory at trial that he was the true victim in this case.\nJones was mentioned shortly thereafter but only in regards to the fact that defendant was not a victim, but was in court because of the intentional way he had chosen to commit the crimes with which he was charged. The prosecution argued, \u201c[defendant] made the choice to go to Express Mortgage. He made the choice to be partners with them. He made the choice to be partners of Antwon Tillman, the codefendant. He made the choice to get the sales land contract signed with Carolyn Jones. He made the choice to tell her everything is ok. Don\u2019t worry.\u201d Defendant objected claiming that he was not charged with a crime against Jones. However, the prosecution did not argue that defendant committed a crime but that defendant was involved with Jones despite the fact that he no longer owned the South Prospect home.\nJones is not mentioned again in the transcript from closing argument until eight pages later where the prosecution urged the jury to consider her testimony and use it to assess defendant\u2019s credibility. Specifically, the prosecutor asked the jury to recall Jones\u2019s testimony regarding the problems she experienced with the South Prospect home and compare it with defendant\u2019s testimony regarding the alleged improvements to the home. The prosecutor\u2019s comment was proper as the credibility of a witness is a proper subject for closing argument if it is based on the evidence or inferences drawn from it. People v. Gorosteata, 374 Ill. App. 3d 203, 223 (2007). Jones was not mentioned again during opening closing argument. In all, only three brief references to Jones were made during an argument that spans 35 pages of transcript.\nDuring defendant\u2019s closing argument, Jones was discussed several times. Defense counsel argued that if defendant was a \u201cthief, a forger, a swiper of identities\u201d he would not have collected rents from Jones in his own name. Defense counsel also argued that the State bolstered the import of the evidence that defendant fronted some of his own money to help Jones when she could not pay all of the rent. Defense counsel argued that defendant was \u201cgood-hearted by fronting some of her rent money to Express Mortgage who\u2019s putting the squeeze on her\u201d and now the prosecution was \u201ctaking advantage\u201d of defendant for helping Jones and trying to use that against him.\nIn rebuttal, the prosecutor referred to the testimony of Jones first as it related to defendant\u2019s credibility regarding the alleged improvements to the South Prospect home. The prosecutor asked the jury, \u201c[w]ho are you going to believe?\u201d The prosecutor\u2019s comment that Jones \u201cput a lot of money into that house, and [defendant] ripped them off\u201d was also directed to the credibility of the witnesses, not with any uncharged crimes committed by defendant against Jones. It was intended to highlight Jones\u2019s testimony that the condition of the South Prospect home did not warrant the high rent and that defendant\u2019s testimony that he made improvements to the home was not credible.\nJones was again mentioned with regard to defendant\u2019s claim that some of the problems with the condition of the South Prospect home were attributed to the Jones family and not to him. Contrary to defendant\u2019s claim, the prosecutor did not discuss defendant\u2019s crimes against Jones. Rather, the prosecutor argued that defendant blamed everyone else and perceived himself as the victim. The prosecutor\u2019s assessment was proper as it went to defendant\u2019s credibility. See Gorosteata, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 203.\nJones was later mentioned to corroborate the State\u2019s claim that defendant knew that the true Antoine Tillman lived in Florida, based on codefendant Tillman\u2019s license presented at both closings which indicated a Chicago address. The reference to Jones also rebutted defense counsel\u2019s argument during closing that defendant collected rent for codefendant Tillman because he lived out of state.\nThe only part of the prosecutor\u2019s rebuttal closing which arguably deals with crimes against Jones is the comment that, \u201c[d]efendant is so greedy on Prospect that he signs a contract with Jones to lease it with an option to purchase\u201d and \u201c[s]he ends up losing all of that money.\u201d The prosecution was rebutting defendant\u2019s closing argument by showing how the facts demonstrated that defendant was a willing participant in these crimes, not an innocent victim that was \u201cduped.\u201d\nDefendant then argues that certain remarks made by the prosecution were not supported by facts and that the prosecution effectively created circumstantial evidence of intent where none existed. Specifically, defendant takes issue with the prosecution\u2019s comments regarding the lack of attorneys at the South Prospect closing or at the filing of the quitclaim deed, defendant\u2019s failure to list the home on a MLS, and the comment that most houses do not sell in seven days. Again, defendant has forfeited review of this claim by failing to object at the trial level. Nonetheless, defendant\u2019s claim fails. All of these comments were legitimate inferences to be drawn from the evidence.\nDefendant argues that the State improperly drew negative inferences based on the absence of attorneys at the South Prospect closing where the State failed to introduce \u201cevidence regarding the significance of parties appearing unrepresented at a closing.\u201d Contrary to defendant\u2019s argument, the State was not required to introduce evidence regarding the significance of parties being unrepresented at closings before it was permitted to comment on the reasons why defendant would choose not to use an attorney.\nThe same is true regarding defendant\u2019s filing of the quitclaim deed without the assistance of attorney. Based on the circumstances regarding that transaction, the State properly argued the legitimate inference that defendant chose not to involve an attorney in that transaction so as to avoid the discovery of the forged deed.\nDefendant also asserts that the State improperly commented on defendant\u2019s failure to list the South Prospect home on a MLS where no testimony was introduced regarding listing services. In opening closing argument, the prosecutor asked the jury whether defendant ever listed the South Prospect home on a MLS, which defendant admitted that he did not at trial. In rebuttal argument, the prosecutor argued, \u201cWouldn\u2019t you like to do that? Wouldn\u2019t it be nice to be in foreclosure and seven days later sell your house and make a hundred thousand dollars profit? Without even putting it on the MLS?\u201d The prosecution\u2019s argument was based upon common sense and life experience, factors which the jury was instructed to keep in mind when considering the evidence. See People v. Beard, 356 Ill. App. 3d 236, 241 (2005) (found no error in the prosecution\u2019s argument that a particular individual \u201c \u2018simply would not have the strength to have caused\u2019 \u201d the victims injuries and noted that the prosecution is permitted to discuss subjects of general knowledge, common experience, or common sense).\nDefendant then argues that the State\u2019s comment regarding defendant\u2019s ability to sell the home in a relatively short time was improper because no testimony was introduced regarding real estate practices. Again, defendant isolates the complained-of comment out of its proper context. During rebuttal argument, the prosecutor argued, \u201c[m]ost houses take longer than seven days to sell, ladies and gentleman of the jury, especially [one in] the condition that Carolyn Jones said it was in, not as fast as seven days. And the only reason it happened that way is because [defendant] went to *** Express Mortgage because he knew that they were dishonest.\u201d The State\u2019s argument regarding the speed of the sale was a matter of common experience which the prosecution was entitled to address. As such, the State was not required to introduce specific testimony on this point before making this argument.\nDefendant then argues that prosecutors improperly assessed his credibility and the credibility of defense counsel by interjecting their personal opinions. Defendant has forfeited this claim on review. Nonetheless, a review of the State\u2019s closing argument reveals that the complained-of comments were proper.\nFor a prosecutor\u2019s closing argument to be improper, he must \u201cexplicitly state that he is asserting his personal views.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Pope, 284 Ill. App. 3d 695, 707 (1996). Appellate courts are unwilling to infer that a prosecutor is injecting his personal opinion into an argument where the record does not unambiguously say so. Pope, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 707. Furthermore, a witness\u2019s credibility is the proper subject of closing argument if it is based on the evidence or reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. People v. Dresher, 364 Ill. App. 3d 847, 859 (2006).\nDefendant argues that the prosecutor \u201cridiculed\u201d defendant\u2019s understanding of land trusts to avoid probate when he argued, \u201c[obviously, [defendant] doesn\u2019t know what a quitclaim deed is because he\u2019s up on the stand hemming and hawing about land trust survivorship and blah-blah-blah.\u201d Contrary to defendant\u2019s claim, the complained-of comment was not a personal opinion but rather a permissible comment regarding defendant\u2019s credibility. Dresher, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 859. The prosecutor\u2019s comment challenged defendant\u2019s testimony that, despite his extensive experience in real estate, he did not understand the implications of a land trust.\nNext, defendant argues that the State\u2019s argument in rebuttal that Eric Glenn\u2019s r\u00e9sum\u00e9 was found in defendant\u2019s home was not a copy as defendant testified but was the original as evidenced by the fact that the r\u00e9sum\u00e9 had correction fluid on it. This argument was proper to rebut defense counsel\u2019s argument that Express Mortgage, not defendant, created the fake r\u00e9sum\u00e9.\nFurthermore, the State\u2019s comment properly challenged the credibility of defendant\u2019s testimony that the r\u00e9sum\u00e9 was a copy given to him after the closing. Because defendant\u2019s testimony conflicted with other evidence presented at trial, the State properly challenged his credibility during closing argument.\nDefendant also claims that the prosecutor injected her personal opinion and again takes the complained-of comment out of context. The prosecutor argued, \u201c[defendant] created that r\u00e9sum\u00e9, and it was found in his house as part of the loan packets that were sent to lenders. He participated in this crime. He\u2019s an appraiser. He made fake appraisals. That\u2019s what this man did. And right now he is looking at me like that because he can\u2019t stand the truth.\u201d Contrary to defendant\u2019s claim, the prosecutor\u2019s comment regarding defendant\u2019s physical appearance was not a personal opinion and was completely proper. Faced with a cold record, it is unknown what, if any, facial expressions and physical gestures defendant performed for the jury or what body language defendant exhibited. The prosecutor\u2019s comment may have been a reaction to defendant\u2019s attempt to sway the jury with his body language. Commenting on a defendant\u2019s appearance during closing argument is implicitly recognized as falling within the bounds of legitimate argument. People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 296-97 (1995) (comment made during closing argument that the defendant, when facing trial for murder, grew a beard, put on glasses, and \u201c \u2018[l]ooks like the county jail librarian because that\u2019s not what a murderer is suppose[d] to look like,\u2019 \u201d did not substantially prejudice the defendant warranting reversal).\nDefendant then claims that the prosecution\u2019s statement that attorney Eugene Bennett was \u201cparaded\u201d to the stand was an improper personal opinion directed at defense counsel. During opening closing argument, the prosecution argued that defendant called Eugene Bennett as a witness in an attempt to add credence and a sense of legitimacy to the Farm Trace transaction. The prosecution went on to argue, that \u201c[defense counsel] is trying to say [defendant\u2019s] so clean. My guy didn\u2019t do anything. Look, there was a lawyer at the second closing. Could my client know anything was wrong?\u201d The prosecution further argued that no attorney was present at the South Prospect closing or at the quitclaim deed transaction \u201c[b]ut [defense counsel] will parade one attorney up for you on the second closing to say that [defendant] didn\u2019t know anything.\u201d\nThese comments did not constitute personal opinion or disparage defense counsel. Rather, the complained-of comments were responses to the defense\u2019s theory and had nothing to do with defense counsel. See People v. Ligon, 365 Ill. App. 3d 109, 124 (2006) (court held that calling defense counsel\u2019s argument \u201cridiculous,\u201d \u201csad,\u201d and \u201cpathetic\u201d was a comment on defendant\u2019s credibility and his theory of defense rather than an impermissible attack on defense counsel).\nFinally, defendant claims that the cumulative effect of the improper closing arguments deprived him of a fair trial. However, having found defendant\u2019s individual arguments with respect to the closing arguments unpersuasive, we also find defendant\u2019s argument as to the cumulative effect of the closing argument unpersuasive.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.\nAffirmed.\nWOLFSON and HALL, JJ., concur.\nBecause we find the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt in this case sufficient with regard to defendant\u2019s convictions for financial identity theft, we need not address the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to defendant\u2019s convictions for theft by deception and forgery, which were merged with defendant\u2019s convictions for financial identity theft.\nWe note that defendant did not argue at the trial level, and does not argue on appeal, that his inculpatory statements including a signed written confession were made involuntarily in violation of the fifth amendment.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Jonathan Krieger, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Anita Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, Michele Grimaldi Stein, and Karisa E Flores, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WALTER JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201406\u20142787\nOpinion filed March 30, 2009.\nRehearing denied June 17, 2009.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Jonathan Krieger, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nAnita Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, Michele Grimaldi Stein, and Karisa E Flores, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0011-01", "first_page_order": 25, "last_page_order": 59 }