{ "id": 4286346, "name": "DARNIECE BAILEY TURNIPSEED et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DOROTHY BROWN, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County in Her Official Capacity, et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Turnipseed v. Brown", "decision_date": "2009-05-04", "docket_number": "No. 1-08-2571", "first_page": "88", "last_page": "101", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "391 Ill. App. 3d 88" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152231 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416, 422", "parenthetical": "acting on behalf of municipalities, the State collected municipal taxes and determined the share to be disbursed to each municipality; the State owed interest on taxes that it segregated and simply held for the municipalities" }, { "page": "416", "parenthetical": "municipal taxes were collected by the State, on the municipalities' behalf" }, { "page": "416", "parenthetical": "municipalities entitled to their full share of municipal taxes, collected by State on their behalf" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444417 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313, 331", "parenthetical": "bank delivered stock, that was presumed abandoned, to State for \"safekeeping\"; the State must return dividends with the stock to stock owner" }, { "page": "331", "parenthetical": "stock was deposited with state for \"safekeeping\" during abandonment proceeding" }, { "page": "313", "parenthetical": "owner disputed abandonment of property" }, { "page": "331", "parenthetical": "where deposited stock was erroneously presumed to be abandoned, owner entitled to its full return" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3074977 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357, 365", "parenthetical": "property owners disputed the amount that the park district paid for their condemned property; during the dispute, the county held the amount and later had to pay interest when the amount was released" }, { "page": "360", "parenthetical": "disputed condemnation award was deposited for safekeeping during suit" }, { "page": "357", "parenthetical": "property owners disputed amount paid for their condemned property" }, { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "property owners entitled to full condemnation award" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3111376 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544, 548", "parenthetical": "taxpayers disputed a tax; during the dispute, the tax was deposited into a protest fund; the State had to pay interest, when the money was found to be erroneously assessed" }, { "page": "545-46", "parenthetical": "disputed tax was deposited for safekeeping during suit" }, { "page": "544", "parenthetical": "taxpayers disputed State's right to assess tax" }, { "page": "548", "parenthetical": "taxpayers entitled to full remission of monies that were erroneously assessed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 Ill. App. 3d 999", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5765270 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1005", "parenthetical": "\"It is well settled that interest is not recoverable absent a statute or agreement providing for it\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/363/0999-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. App. 3d 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2668838 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481", "parenthetical": "\"Because a sovereign does not have to pay interest without its consent, such silence discloses an intent to deny interest\"" }, { "page": "476", "parenthetical": "discussing Gonzalez with approval" }, { "page": "476" }, { "page": "476", "parenthetical": "since interest is \"a creature of statute or contract,\" a citizen cannot recover it from the government without statutory or contractual \"authorization\"" }, { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/187/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228871 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154", "parenthetical": "discussing both Gonzalez and Lakefront with approval" }, { "page": "152" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "152, 154", "parenthetical": "absent a statute, government officials have no \"common law duty\" to deposit funds in an interest-bearing account" }, { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ill. 2d 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2744690 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423", "parenthetical": "\"the silence of our refund statute on the question of interest discloses a legislative intent to deny it\"" }, { "page": "423", "parenthetical": "plaintiff was not entitled to interest on a tax refund because \"interest, being a creature of statute, is recoverable only by statute or contract\"" }, { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3607155 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610786 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4285155 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "for a taking to occur, plaintiff must have a right to the property based on existing law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/389/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451597 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 U.S. 155", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11715631 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" }, { "page": "366" }, { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/449/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092944 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 Ill. App. 3d 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4278118 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/383/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 Ill. App. 3d 807", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4275458 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "821" }, { "page": "821" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/379/0807-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill. App. 3d 992", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2620916 ], "weight": 11, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "996", "parenthetical": "since plaintiff does not have a valid claim for interest on his bail bond, we do not have to consider the propriety of his proposed class action" }, { "page": "994" }, { "page": "993" }, { "page": "993" }, { "page": "993, 994-95", "parenthetical": "plaintiffs case was distinguished from a case in which \"no interest had been accumulated\"" }, { "page": "994" }, { "page": "994" }, { "page": "994" }, { "page": "994" }, { "page": "994" }, { "page": "994" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/30/0992-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5442715 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49", "parenthetical": "remanded to trial court with instructions to determine first \"whether plaintiff's complaint stated a valid cause of action\" and to consider the statutory prerequisites only if it found that a valid cause was stated" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 774", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3429364 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0774-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3828029 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125", "parenthetical": "\"a class may be certified only if the proponent establishes the four prerequisites set forth in the statute\"" }, { "page": "139", "parenthetical": "\" 'It is well settled that a class cannot be certified unless the named plaintiffs have a cause of action' \"" }, { "page": "125-26" }, { "page": "125-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5705711 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" }, { "page": "72" }, { "page": "72" }, { "page": "76-77" }, { "page": "76-77" }, { "page": "57-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/227/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a71983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "545 U.S. 469", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8209431 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the [United States] Constitution\" is \"made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the [United States] Constitution\" is \"made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the [United States] Constitution\" is \"made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/545/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3617152 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" }, { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/231/0062-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1079, "char_count": 31054, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1191950451395038e-07, "percentile": 0.7642742878059686 }, "sha256": "cf2f625f27044d6c99faaaf0b4eb2551cbd1709d53f460d345152914a913f325", "simhash": "1:99bbcde62f0ad4b4", "word_count": 5169 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:50:16.782503+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DARNIECE BAILEY TURNIPSEED et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DOROTHY BROWN, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County in Her Official Capacity, et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs Darniece Bailey Turnipseed, Ramon Turnipseed, and Raymond Thomas seek to recover the interest that accrued on money that they deposited with defendant Dorothy Brown, the clerk of the circuit court of Cook County, in connection with bail bonds that they executed. In addition to suing defendant Brown, plaintiffs sued the county of Cook, a body politic, which, plaintiffs allege, would be liable for any judgement issued against defendant Brown.\nOn August 19, 2008, the circuit court of Cook county granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification and denied defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. On October 16, 2008, the appellate court granted defendants\u2019 petition for leave to appeal the trial court\u2019s grant of class certification. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the orders granting class certification and denying defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss.\nBACKGROUND\nPlaintiffs allege that, on February 2, 2002, plaintiffs Darniece Bailey Turnipseed and Ramon Turnipseed deposited $100 with defendant Brown. The amount was 10% of the $1,000 bail that had been set for plaintiff Darniece Bailey Turnipseed in a criminal matter.\nThe Turnipseeds made their deposit pursuant to the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which provides that a \u201cperson for whom bail has been set\u201d may obtain his or her release by executing a bail bond and depositing with the clerk of the court \u201ca sum of money equal to 10% of the bail,\u201d with a minimum deposit of $25. 725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 7(a) (West 2006).\nPlaintiffs allege that defendant Brown placed the bail bond money in an interest-bearing account. Defendants concede that defendant Brown does place bail bond money in an interest-bearing account, as required by Cook County Ordinance No. 93 \u2014 0\u201445. Section 34 \u2014 4(b) of this ordinance provides that: \u201cAll elected and appointed public officials of Cook County are directed to invest public funds in their possession or for which they are custodians in interest-bearing accounts ***.\u201d Cook County Taxpayers\u2019 Interest Assurance Ordinance No. 93\u2014 O \u2014 45 \u00a734 \u2014 4(b) (November 16, 1993).\nPlaintiffs allege that on April 3, 2002, all criminal charges against plaintiff Darniece Bailey Turnipseed were dropped for want of prosecution; and defendant Brown returned $90 to plaintiff Darniece Bailey Turnipseed. The returned amount ($90) was equal to the deposited amount ($100) minus 10% ($10) allowed by statute for costs. 725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 7(f) (West 2006) (clerk retains \u201cas bail bond costs 10% of the amount deposited\u201d). Plaintiffs allege that Brown did not pay the interest allegedly earned on the deposit. Plaintiffs allege, based upon information and belief, that defendant Brown transferred the interest to defendant Cook County.\nPlaintiffs also allege that on December 17, 2003, plaintiff Raymond Thomas deposited $17,500 as bond for the $175,000 bail set for his brother. Plaintiffs allege that on November 22, 2005, defendant Brown returned $15,750 to \u201cMr. Thomas.\u201d Plaintiffs fail to specify whether \u201cMr. Thomas\u201d in this instance refers to the plaintiff or to his brother. As with the Turnipseeds, the amount returned to Thomas was equal to the deposited amount, minus the 10% retained by defendant Brown for costs, as authorized by statute. 725 ILCS 5/110\u2014 7(f) (West 2006). Again, plaintiffs allege that defendant Brown did not pay the interest earned on the deposit.\nDefendant Dorothy Brown is the clerk of the circuit court of Cook County, and she is sued in her official capacity. Plaintiffs allege that defendant Brown is charged with supervising and administering the collection, management and return of bail bond deposits. Plaintiffs also allege that defendant County of Cook would be required to pay any judgment entered in this case against defendant Brown in her official capacity, since the county funds the clerk\u2019s office.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint is the complaint at issue in this appeal. It alleges that section 110 \u2014 7\u00ae of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 7\u00ae (West 2006)) prohibits defendant Brown from paying interest on bail bond money to the individuals who deposited it.\nSection 110 \u2014 7(f) provides in relevant part:\n\u201cWhen the conditions of the bail bond have been performed and the accused has been discharged from all obligations in the cause the clerk of the court shall return to the accused or to the defendant\u2019s designee by an assignment executed at the time the bail amount is deposited, unless the court orders otherwise, 90% of the sum which had been deposited and shall retain as bail bond costs 10% of the amount deposited. However, in no event shall the amount retained by the clerk as bail bond costs be less than $5.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 7(f) (West 2006).\nSubsection (f), quoted above, requires the clerk to pay 90% of the bail amount to \u201cthe accused or to the defendant\u2019s designee.\u201d The subsection is completely silent about interest. Although subsection (f) is detailed in many respects, it does not use the word \u201cinterest\u201d once. However, defendants admit that defendant Brown does not pay any interest earned on bail bond money.\nSubsection (f) requires the clerk to pay the required amount to either \u201cthe accused or to the defendant\u2019s designee.\u201d Plaintiffs failed to allege in their complaint whether the brother of Raymond Thomas assigned his bail money to plaintiff Raymond Thomas. If no assignment was executed, then plaintiff Raymond Thomas was not owed any money by defendant Brown. The complaint also does not allege whether plaintiff Darniece Bailey Turnipseed assigned her bail money to plaintiff Ramon Turnipseed.\nThe second amended complaint seeks: (1) declaratory relief that subsection (f) is facially unconstitutional; (2) compensation for the alleged taking of plaintiffs\u2019 and the class\u2019s private property, namely, the interest that accrued on the bail bond money while it was held by defendant Brown; and (3) injunctive relief to prevent further constitutional violations.\nCount I alleges that the alleged failure to pay interest is a taking of property in violation of section 15 of article I of the Illinois Constitution, as well as the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Section 15 of article I of the Illinois Constitution provides that: \u201c[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation as provided by law.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a715. Similarly, the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that \u201cprivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.\u201d U.S. Const., amend. V. These clauses are commonly known as the \u201ctakings clauses.\u201d Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Giannoulias, 231 Ill. 2d 62, 81 (2008). The fifth amendment is made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 & n.l, 162 L. Ed. 2d 439, 447 & n.l, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 & n.l (2005) (\u201cthe Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the [United States] Constitution\u201d is \u201cmade applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment\u201d); Empress Casino, 231 Ill. 2d at 80.\nCount II alleges a federal constitutional tort, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. Section 1983 provides that if a person acts \u201cunder color\u201d of state law and thereby deprives another of a right secured by the United States Constitution, he or she \u201cshall be liable to the party injured.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 (2000).\nThe second amended complaint describes the proposed class as follows:\n\u201cAll persons who deposited bail bond funds with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County pursuant to the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure, and whose bail bond funds were returned to them during the period from October 18, 1999 through the date of final judgment in this action.\u201d\nThe proposed class is limited to those persons \u201cwhose bail bond funds were returned to them.\u201d Subsection (f) provides many reasons why bail bond money may not be returned. 725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 7(f) (West 2006). It states in relevant part:\n\u201cBail bond deposited by or on behalf of a defendant in one case may be used, in the court\u2019s discretion, to satisfy financial obligations of that same defendant incurred in a different case due to a fine, court costs, restitution or fees of the defendant\u2019s attorney of record. In counties with a population of 3,000,000 or more, the court shall not order bail bond deposited by or on behalf of a defendant in one case to be used to satisfy financial obligations of that same defendant in a different case until the bail bond is first used to satisfy court costs and attorney\u2019s fees in the case in which the bail bond has been deposited and any other unpaid child support obligations are satisfied. ***\nAt the request of the defendant the court may order such 90% of defendant\u2019s bail deposit, or whatever amount is repayable to defendant from such deposit, to be paid to defendant\u2019s attorney of record.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 7(f) (West 2006).\nThus, bail bond money may be used to pay court costs, attorney fees, child support obligations, and financial obligations of the defendant incurred in a different case. 725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 7(f) (West 2006). Of course, the money will also not be returned if the defendant fails to appear. 725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 7(g) (West 2006). The description of the proposed class, contained in plaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint, excludes those persons whose bail bond money was not returned.\nDefendants moved to dismiss, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2006)), claiming that the complaint was legally insufficient. On August 19, 2008, in a written order, the trial court granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification and denied defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss.\nOn October 16, 2008, the appellate court granted defendants\u2019 petition for leave to appeal the trial court\u2019s grant of class certification. Defendants in their appellate brief to this court state that they intend to assert an affirmative defense based on statute of limitations and that the applicable statutes of limitations are violated by the five-year period certified by the trial court. Since the statute of limitations is a defense that may be waived if not asserted, and since no such defense has yet been asserted in the case at bar, we will not consider this issue on this interlocutory appeal.\nANALYSIS\nOn this appeal, defendants claim that the trial court should not have certified the class, because the complaint failed to state a cause of action. Defendants also claim that, even if the complaint stated a valid claim, the named plaintiffs are not adequate representatives of the class and the class is too broad.\nInterlocutory Appeal\nDefendants\u2019 petition for leave to appeal was granted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(8), which provides:\n\u201c(a) *** A party may petition for leave to appeal to the Appellate Court from the following orders of the trial court:\n* * *\n(8) from an order of the circuit court denying or granting certification of a class action under section 2 \u2014 802 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 I1CS 5/2 \u2014 802).\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(8).\nThe rule, quoted above, refers to section 2 \u2014 802 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 802 (West 2006)), which requires a trial court to determine, \u201cas soon as practicable\u201d after the filing of a class action, whether the suit may be maintained as a class action.\nStatutory Prerequisites\nSection 2 \u2014 801 of the Code of Civil Procedure lists four prerequisites for a class action:\n\u201cAn action may be maintained as a class action in any court of the State and a party may sue or be sued as a representative party of the class only if the court finds:\n(1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.\n(2) There are questions of fact or law common to the class, which common questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.\n(3) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class.\n(4) The class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 801 (West 2006).\nOur supreme court has held that plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that their suit satisfies the four statutory prerequisites. Barbara\u2019s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 227 Ill. 2d 45, 72 (2007); Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100, 125 (2005) (\u201ca class may be certified only if the proponent establishes the four prerequisites set forth in the statute\u201d).\nThreshold Issue\nIn addition to the statutory prerequisites listed above, our supreme court has held that as \u201ca threshold matter,\u201d a trial court must determine whether the claim asserted by plaintiffs is \u201can actionable claim.\u201d Barbara\u2019s Sales, 227 Ill. 2d at 72; Avery, 216 Ill. 2d at 139 (\u201c \u2018It is well settled that a class cannot be certified unless the named plaintiffs have a cause of action\u2019 \u201d), quoting Spring Mill Townhomes Ass\u2019n v. Osla Financial Services, Inc., 124 Ill. App. 3d 774, 779 (1983). If we find that the claim is not actionable, then \u201c[w]e need not determine whether plaintiffs satisfy [the statutory] class requirements\u201d listed in section 2 \u2014 801 (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 801 (West 2006)). Barbara\u2019s Sales, 227 Ill. 2d at 72. For example, in Barbara\u2019s Sales, our supreme court overturned the trial court\u2019s decision regarding class certification, because plaintiffs claim was not actionable. Barbara\u2019s Sales, 227 Ill. 2d at 76-77. Having resolved the certification issue on this basis, the supreme court found that it did not need to consider the four prerequisites listed in the statute. Barbara\u2019s Sales, 227 Ill. 2d at 76-77. See also Landesman v. General Motors Corp., 72 Ill. 2d 44, 49 (1978) (remanded to trial court with instructions to determine first \u201cwhether plaintiff\u2019s complaint stated a valid cause of action\u201d and to consider the statutory prerequisites only if it found that a valid cause was stated); Gonzalez v. Danaher, 30 Ill. App. 3d 992, 996 (1975) (since plaintiff does not have a valid claim for interest on his bail bond, we do not have to consider the propriety of his proposed class action).\nDefendant claims on appeal that the trial court should not have certified the class, because plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of a claim, we regard all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lozman v. Putnam, 379 Ill. App. 3d 807, 821 (2008). We construe the claim liberally and find it insufficient only when it appears that plaintiffs could not recover under any set of facts. Lozman, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 821. At this early stage, plaintiffs need not prove their case, and the trial court should not rule on the factual merits of their claim. Cruz v. Unilock Chicago, Inc., 383 Ill. App. 3d 752, 764-65 (2008).\nStandard of Review\nThe legal sufficiency of a claim is purely a question of law, which we review de novo. Barbara\u2019s Sales, 227 Ill. 2d at 57-58. This standard is different from the standard for reviewing the statutory prerequisites for a class action. A trial court\u2019s decision regarding the four prerequisites is within its sound discretion, and an appellate court will overturn it only if the trial court \u201cabused its discretion or applied impermissible legal criteria.\u201d Avery, 216 Ill. 2d at 125-26. However, as we will explain below, our holding would be the same under either standard.\nValidity of Claim\nDefendants claim that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action because plaintiffs\u2019 bail bond agreement was a contract under Illinois law and the agreement did not provide plaintiffs with a contractual right to interest. Defendants argue that, since plaintiffs had no contractual or statutory right to interest, there was no taking, for the purpose of the takings clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions, as plaintiffs allege. In addition, defendants argue that plaintiffs claims are not valid because economic losses are generally not recoverable in tort actions, such as the constitutional tort action brought by plaintiffs. See generally Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69 (1982).\nPlaintiffs claim that there is a long-standing common law rule that interest follows principal. See, e.g., Webb\u2019s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164, 66 L. Ed. 2d 358, 366, 101 S. Ct. 446, 452 (1980). Plaintiffs claim that, since ownership of the principal never changed hands, the interest belonged to the depositors and defendant Brown\u2019s retention of that interest constituted a taking, for constitutional purposes.\nIn their appellate brief, plaintiffs also claim that, since the applicable statute is silent concerning interest, it does not bar defendant Brown from paying interest. However, this argument is at odds with their complaint, which claimed that the statute barred the return of interest. Their second amended complaint alleged that \u201c725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 7(f) [(West 2006)], in prohibiting the return of interest on the private property held in custody by Defendant Brown, *** is facially unconstitutional. \u2019 \u2019\nSince there can be no taking unless there was a right to the thing allegedly taken, we will consider first whether plaintiffs had a right to the interest. In re Marriage of Crook, 211 Ill. 2d 437, 448 (2004); Cwik v. Topinka, 389 Ill. App. 3d 21 (2009) (for a taking to occur, plaintiff must have a right to the property based on existing law). In addition, it is well established that an appellate court must first consider all nonconstitutional issues before proceeding to rule on a constitutional ground. People v. Melchor, 226 Ill. 2d 24, 34 (2007), citing In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172, 178 (2006). Thus, we will decide first whether plaintiffs had a legal right to the interest before considering whether defendants\u2019 retention of that interest rose to the level of a constitutional violation.\nThere is no statute or contract which gave plaintiffs a right to the interest. As noted above, the statute is silent concerning interest. 725 ILCS 5/110- \u2014 -7(f) (West 2006). To the extent that the statute formed the basis of a contract, then this contract was also silent about interest.\nOver 30 years ago, this court considered the same section at issue in this appeal and ruled that the section\u2019s silence indicated that the legislature did not intend to confer a right to interest. Gonzalez, 30 Ill. App. 3d at 994. The facts of Gonzalez are almost identical with the facts in the case at bar. In Gonzalez, an accused deposited money with the clerk of the circuit court of Cook County to secure a bail bond. Gonzalez, 30 Ill. App. 3d at 993. When the criminal charges against the accused were dismissed, the clerk paid him the amount of his deposit, minus 10% for costs. Gonzalez, 30 Ill. App. 3d at 993. He then brought suit, in order to recover the interest actually earned on the deposit. Gonzalez, 30 Ill. App. 3d at 993, 994-95 (plaintiffs case was distinguished from a case in which \u201cno interest had been accumulated\u201d). This court held that, \u201c[b]y its silence on the subject of interest,\u201d the legislature intended to deny a right to recover it. Gonzalez, 30 Ill. App. 3d at 994, citing Lakefront Realty v. Lorenz, 19 Ill. 2d 415, 423 (1960) (\u201cthe silence of our refund statute on the question of interest discloses a legislative intent to deny it\u201d). See also Madlener v. Finley, 128 Ill. 2d 147, 154 (1989) (discussing both Gonzalez and Lakefront with approval); Mannix v. Donnewald, 187 Ill. App. 3d 472, 481 (1989) (\u201cBecause a sovereign does not have to pay interest without its consent, such silence discloses an intent to deny interest\u201d). Thus, in the case at bar, plaintiffs have no statutory right to interest.\nInstead of a statute or contract, plaintiffs base their claim on, what they argue, is a common law right to interest. However, this court has already ruled on this theory and rejected it. In Gonzalez, this court held that an accused had no common law right to interest that was actually earned on bail bond money. Gonzalez, 30 Ill. App. 3d at 994. This court stated: \u201cIn Illinois, interest cannot be recovered in the absence of a contract or statutory provision.\u201d Gonzalez, 30 Ill. App. 3d at 994.\nTo rule for plaintiffs, we would have to reject Gonzalez. However, we do not see any reason why the passage of time has weakened the validity of the Gonzalez decision. If anything, the passage of time has strengthened it.\nA decade after Gonzalez was decided, the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged the Gonzalez decision and built on its reasoning. In Madlener, our supreme court held that a court clerk had no \u201ccommon law duty\u201d to deposit a litigant\u2019s funds, held pursuant to court order, in an interest-bearing account. Madlener, 128 Ill. 2d at 152. First, our supreme court discussed with approval the'holding in Gonzalez that \u201cpersons are not entitled to interest on funds which have been held by government officials unless a statue so provides.\u201d Madlener, 128 Ill. 2d at 154; see also Mannix, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 476 (discussing Gonzalez with approval). Next, our supreme court built on that holding to find \u201cthe correlative principle\u201d that the \u201ccommon law\u201d does not require these same officials to deposit such funds in interest-bearing accounts. Madlener, 128 Ill. 2d at 154. This approval by our supreme court strengthens the precedential value of the Gonzalez decision.\nIn Mannix, this court explained the logic behind cases like Gonzalez, Madlener, and Lakefront, which rejected the idea that the government had a common law duty to pay interest. In Mannix, we explained that holdings like these are \u201cbased on the rule that the sovereign is not obligated to pay interest unless it gives its consent by act of its legislature or by contract entered into by its officers.\u201d Mannix, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 476.\nIllinois courts have repeatedly affirmed the rule on which Gonzalez is based, that a plaintiff cannot recover interest from the government absent a statute or contract. Madlener, 128 Ill. 2d at 152, 154 (absent a statute, government officials have no \u201ccommon law duty\u201d to deposit funds in an interest-bearing account); Mannix, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 476 (since interest is \u201ca creature of statute or contract,\u201d a citizen cannot recover it from the government without statutory or contractual \u201cauthorization\u201d); Lakefront, 19 Ill. 2d at 423 (plaintiff was not entitled to interest on a tax refund because \u201cinterest, being a creature of statute, is recoverable only by statute or contract\u201d). See also Shields v. State Employees Retirement System, 363 Ill. App. 3d 999, 1005 (2006) (\u201cIt is well settled that interest is not recoverable absent a statute or agreement providing for it\u201d).\nPlaintiffs try to distinguish Gonzalez by arguing, first, that the plaintiff in Gonzalez did not allege a claim under the takings clauses. This is a distinction without a difference. A plaintiff must have a legal right to property before he or she can claim there was a taking, and in Gonzalez, we found that an accused had no legal right to the interest that had accrued on his bail deposit \u2014 no statutory right, no contract right and no common law right. Gonzalez, 30 Ill. App. 3d at 994. Without a legal right, there can be no basis for plaintiffs\u2019 claims under the takings clauses, and thus Gonzalez precludes their claims, even though the word \u201ctaking\u201d was not used in that case.\nPlaintiffs try to distinguish Gonzalez by arguing, second, that the appellate court in Gonzalez did not \u201ctreat\u201d the claim as one for interest that had actually accrued. That is simply not true. The appellate court in Gonzalez noted that the facts before it were different from the facts in Lakeshore because, in Lakeshore, \u201cno interest had been accumulated.\u201d Gonzalez, 30 Ill. App. 3d at 994. Thus, this argument is based on a mistaken premise.\nPlaintiffs also cite a line of cases where citizens disputed the State\u2019s right to take certain property, and the property was deposited with the State for safekeeping pending a determination of property rights; and where the State earned interest on the property and then was ordered to return the interest with the property. Shell Oil Co. v. Department of Revenue, 95 Ill. 2d 541, 544, 548 (1983) (taxpayers disputed a tax; during the dispute, the tax was deposited into a protest fund; the State had to pay interest, when the money was found to be erroneously assessed); Morton Grove Park District v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 78 Ill. 2d 353, 357, 365 (1980) (property owners disputed the amount that the park district paid for their condemned property; during the dispute, the county held the amount and later had to pay interest when the amount was released). See also Canel v. Topinka, 212 Ill. 2d 311, 313, 331 (2004) (bank delivered stock, that was presumed abandoned, to State for \u201csafekeeping\u201d; the State must return dividends with the stock to stock owner). Cf. Village of Pawnee v. Johnson, 103 Ill. 2d 411, 416, 422 (1984) (acting on behalf of municipalities, the State collected municipal taxes and determined the share to be disbursed to each municipality; the State owed interest on taxes that it segregated and simply held for the municipalities).\nThere are a number of difference between this line of cases and the case at bar. First, the underlying dispute in the case at bar was not a property dispute, but a criminal action. Plaintiffs did not hand the property to the State for the purpose of safekeeping, but for the purpose of obtaining release. Compare with Canel, 212 Ill. 2d at 331 (stock was deposited with state for \u201csafekeeping\u201d during abandonment proceeding); with Shell Oil, 95 Ill. 2d at 545-46 (disputed tax was deposited for safekeeping during suit); with Morton Grove Park District, 78 Ill. 2d at 360 (disputed condemnation award was deposited for safekeeping during suit); and with Village of Pawnee, 103 Ill. 2d at 416 (municipal taxes were collected by the State, on the municipalities\u2019 behalf).\nSecond, in the case at bar, plaintiffs are not disputing the State\u2019s right to take the property; in contrast, they are voluntarily handing it over in order to receive a benefit, namely, release on bail. Compare with Shell Oil, 95 Ill. 2d at 544 (taxpayers disputed State\u2019s right to assess tax); with Morton Grove Park District, 78 Ill. 2d at 357 (property owners disputed amount paid for their condemned property); and with Canel, 212 Ill. 2d at 313 (owner disputed abandonment of property).\nThird, in this line of cases, the depositors expected to be restored to their full ownership rights, at the conclusion of the dispute. Canel, 212 Ill. 2d at 331 (where deposited stock was erroneously presumed to be abandoned, owner entitled to its full return); Village of Pawnee, 103 Ill. 2d at 416 (municipalities entitled to their full share of municipal taxes, collected by State on their behalf); Shell Oil, 95 Ill. 2d at 548 (taxpayers entitled to full remission of monies that were erroneously assessed); Morton Grove, 78 Ill. 2d at 365 (property owners entitled to full condemnation award).\nBy contrast, in the case at bar, there are many reasons why the depositors may not receive back all of the bail money. It can be used to pay court costs, attorney fees, child support obligations, and fines. 725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 7(f) (West 2006). The bail bond form provides written notice to depositors that their money \u201cmay be used to pay costs, attorney\u2019s fees, fines, or other purposes authorized by the court.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 7(a) (West 2006). To ensure that nobody will miss the fact that the bail bond money may be used for \u201cother purposes,\u201d the statute requires that \u201c[t]he written notice must be: (1) distinguishable from the surrounding text; (2) in bold type or underscored; and (3) in a type size at least 2 points larger than the surrounding type.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 7(a) (West 2006). Thus, depositors of bail bond money do not necessarily expect to receive their money back, even if the accused appears in court.\nFor these reasons, we do not find this line of cases to be on point.\nApplying a de novo standard of review, we find that plaintiffs have not stated a valid claim for interest. First, the statute is silent, and silence indicates that the legislature did not intend to confer a statutory right to recover interest. Second, plaintiffs have no common law right to recover interest. Since plaintiffs have no right to the interest, there can be no taking of it.\nIn addition, the 15-page written order of the trial court did not mention Gonzalez, Madlener, Mannix or Lakefront. Gonzalez, 30 Ill. App. 3d at 994; Madlener, 128 Ill. 2d at 152; Mannix, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 476; Lakefront, 19 Ill. 2d at 423. Thus, even if we applied an abuse-of-discretion standard of review, we would still reverse, because the trial court failed to consider the relevant legal criteria. Avery, 216 Ill. 2d at 125-26.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court\u2019s orders certifying this suit as a class action and denying defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. We find that plaintiffs failed to state a valid cause of action, and thus their suit must be dismissed. Since plaintiffs\u2019 individual claims must be dismissed, we do not decide whether they would have been adequate class representatives or whether the proposed class was too broad. We also do not reach defendants\u2019 argument based on the Moorman doctrine. Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69 (1982).\nReversed.\nHALL and GARCIA, JJ., concur.\n\u201cEach county *** shall be a body politic and corporate, by the name and style of \u2018The county of....,\u2019 and by that name may sue and be sued, plead and may be impleaded, defend and be defended against in any court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter ***.\u201d 55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1001 (West 2006).\nThe bail bond form includes \u201ca written notice to such person who has provided the defendant with the money for the posting of bail indicating that the bail may be used to pay costs, attorney\u2019s fees, fines, or other purposes authorized by the court and if the defendant fails to comply with the conditions of the bail bond\u201d the money shall be forfeited. 725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 7(a) (West 2006).", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., Paul A. Castiglione, Stephen L. Garcia, and Catherine M. Kelly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellants.", "Arthur T. Susman, Matthew Hurst, and Gina Lamancusa, all of Susman, Heffner & Hurst, John R. Wylie and Charles R. Watkins, both of Futterman Howard Watkins Wylie & Ashley, Chtrd., and Elliot Zinger, of Elliot Zinger & Associates, all of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DARNIECE BAILEY TURNIPSEED et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DOROTHY BROWN, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County in Her Official Capacity, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201408\u20142571\nOpinion filed May 4, 2009.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., Paul A. Castiglione, Stephen L. Garcia, and Catherine M. Kelly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellants.\nArthur T. Susman, Matthew Hurst, and Gina Lamancusa, all of Susman, Heffner & Hurst, John R. Wylie and Charles R. Watkins, both of Futterman Howard Watkins Wylie & Ashley, Chtrd., and Elliot Zinger, of Elliot Zinger & Associates, all of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0088-01", "first_page_order": 102, "last_page_order": 115 }