{ "id": 4286172, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLNOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JASON M. SHARP, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Sharp", "decision_date": "2009-06-26", "docket_number": "No. 4-02-0913", "first_page": "947", "last_page": "962", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "391 Ill. App. 3d 947" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "870 N.E.2d 333", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5705152 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 879", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Loy. U. Chi. L.J.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "817 N.E.2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186-87" }, { "page": "186-87" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "190" }, { "page": "190" }, { "page": "190-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 776", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5457769 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779-80" }, { "page": "779" }, { "page": "781" }, { "page": "781" }, { "page": "784" }, { "page": "784" }, { "page": "784" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/0776-01" ] }, { "cite": "803 N.E.2d 626", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 945", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3739574 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "953" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0945-01" ] }, { "cite": "870 N.E.2d 403", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704197 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "893 N.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3615113 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/229/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 N.E.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "909-10", "parenthetical": "\"Plain error marked by 'fundamental [unjfairness' occurs only in situations which 'reveal breakdowns in the adversary system,' as distinguished from 'typical trial mistakes.' [Citation.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909174 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17", "parenthetical": "\"Plain error marked by 'fundamental [unjfairness' occurs only in situations which 'reveal breakdowns in the adversary system,' as distinguished from 'typical trial mistakes.' [Citation.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 U.S. 461", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11652245 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466-67" }, { "page": "727" }, { "page": "1549" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "727" }, { "page": "1549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/520/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 U.S. 625", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 353467 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631-32" }, { "page": "868" }, { "page": "1785" }, { "page": "631-32" }, { "page": "868" }, { "page": "1785" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/535/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "788 N.E.2d 1117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1124", "parenthetical": "supplemental opinion upon denial of rehearing" }, { "page": "1124", "parenthetical": "supplemental opinion upon denial of rehearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799372 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348", "parenthetical": "supplemental opinion upon denial of rehearing" }, { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "697 N.E.2d 302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308", "parenthetical": "in which we put the State \"on notice of the risk it takes by not recording interviews\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910213 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678", "parenthetical": "in which we put the State \"on notice of the risk it takes by not recording interviews\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "600 N.E.2d 1169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1173" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3291537 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "727 N.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411576 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "699 N.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209980 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "830 N.E.2d 484", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060428 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "780 N.E.2d 807", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811" }, { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 786", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637105 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791" }, { "page": "791" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0786-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 Ill. App. 3d 1072", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4286623 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1080-83, 1087-1100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/391/1072-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 554", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 601912 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 U.S. 15", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6196542 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/474/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "815 N.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" }, { "page": "44" }, { "page": "44" }, { "page": "45", "parenthetical": "in which this court recommended that interviews of alleged child victims be recorded" }, { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 857", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1083879 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "864" }, { "page": "864" }, { "page": "865" }, { "page": "866" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/351/0857-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 12, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 56", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787607 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66", "parenthetical": "overruled in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004)" }, { "page": "608", "parenthetical": "overruled in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004)" }, { "page": "2539", "parenthetical": "overruled in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 U.S. 805", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6219632 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "816" }, { "page": "653" }, { "page": "3147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/497/0805-01" ] }, { "cite": "739 N.E.2d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963678 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "899 N.E.2d 1076", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "nonprecedential supervisory order on denial of petition for leave to appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "nonprecedential supervisory order on denial of petition for leave to appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "902 N.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" }, { "page": "609" }, { "page": "613" }, { "page": "616-17" }, { "page": "617" }, { "page": "619" }, { "page": "605" }, { "page": "617" }, { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619642 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" }, { "page": "29" }, { "page": "36" }, { "page": "42" }, { "page": "43" }, { "page": "46-47" }, { "page": "22" }, { "page": "43" }, { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "825 N.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "hereinafter Sharp I" }, { "page": "710" }, { "page": "713" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 786", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3600075 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "hereinafter Sharp I" }, { "page": "792" }, { "page": "796" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0786-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1293, "char_count": 37428, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.372201577258991e-08, "percentile": 0.4419246064152775 }, "sha256": "1396f839367a17f91647cc6973ee097e1e5a2c21c095b9b107a525baa413411c", "simhash": "1:a899b93c6f071cf2", "word_count": 6188 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:50:16.782503+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLNOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JASON M. SHARP, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn September 2002, a jury convicted defendant, Jason M. Sharp, of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, finding that he committed an act of sexual penetration upon J.E. when she was under 13 years of age (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1(a)(1) (West Supp. 2001)). The trial court later sentenced him to 20 years in prison.\nDefendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by admitting certain hearsay testimony in violation of (a) the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VI) and (b) section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10 (West 2002)); and (2) he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor made improper statements during the State\u2019s rebuttal argument. In March 2005, this court disagreed with defendant\u2019s arguments and affirmed his conviction. People v. Sharp, 355 Ill. App. 3d 786, 825 N.E.2d 706 (2005) (hereinafter Sharp I).\nDefendant filed a petition for leave to appeal with the Supreme Court of Illinois. In January 2009, that court denied his petition but also entered a nonprecedential supervisory order that reads as follows:\n\u201cIn the exercise of this court\u2019s supervisory authority, the Appellate Court, Fourth District, is directed to vacate its order in [Sharp I, 355 Ill. App. 3d 786, 825 N.E.2d 706]. The appellate court is instructed to reconsider its decision in light of this Court\u2019s opinion in In re Rolandis G., [232 Ill. 2d 13, 902 N.E.2d 600 (2008)], to determine whether a different result is warranted.\u201d People v. Sharp, 231 Ill. 2d 649, 899 N.E.2d 1076 (2009) (nonprecedential supervisory order on denial of petition for leave to appeal) (Sharp II).\nIn accordance with the supreme court\u2019s directive, we vacate our earlier opinion in this case. Further, after reconsidering this case in light of Rolandis G., we conclude that a different result is not warranted. Accordingly, we again disagree with defendant\u2019s arguments and affirm his conviction.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn January 2002, the State charged defendant (who was then 20 years old) with predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, alleging that he committed an act of sexual penetration upon J.E. (who was 11 years old at the time of the offense and 12 years old at defendant\u2019s trial) by placing his penis in her vagina (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1(a)(1) (West Supp. 2001)). In February 2002, the State filed a motion under section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10 (West 2002)), seeking to offer at defendant\u2019s trial statements J.E. made to (1) her mother, Lydia E., (2) Mary Whitaker, the associate director of operations for the McLean County Children\u2019s Advocacy Center, and (3) her then-14year-old friend, Tasha B.\nA. The Section 115 \u2014 10 Hearing\nAt a March 2002 hearing on the State\u2019s section 115 \u2014 10 motion, Lydia testified that on January 2, 2002, she heard from her then 15-year-old son, Jesse E., that defendant had had sexual intercourse with J.E. Later that day, Lydia had a conversation with J.E. Lydia first said, \u201c[J.E.], I heard a rumor today,\u201d to which J.E. responded, \u201cWhat, Mom?\u201d Lydia then said \u201c[I heard that defendant] had sex with my little girl.\u201d J.E. initially denied it, and Lydia said, \u201cOkay, honey, you know it\u2019s one thing for two adults to be having sex, but when a 20[-] some[-]year[-]old man is having sex with an 11 year old, that\u2019s rape, and it\u2019s wrong, and you need to tell me.\u201d At that point, J.E. burst into tears and said, \u201cYes, I told him to stop, but he wouldn\u2019t.\u201d Lydia then asked J.E. if defendant penetrated her, and J.E. responded that she did not know what the term \u201cpenetrated\u201d meant. Lydia explained the term, and J.E. said that defendant had penetrated her. J.E. also told Lydia that defendant had pushed her into a building at the local fairgrounds and sexually assaulted her. Lydia then telephoned the police and reported the incident.\nWhitaker testified that on January 11, 2002, she interviewed J.E. in the DeWitt County sheriff\u2019s department \u2018\u2018victim[-]sensitive interview room.\u201d Whitaker explained that the room had a \u201clivingH room setting\u201d and was set up so that the alleged child victim would not be distracted. She also explained that an Advocacy Center staff member was present during the interview, and the interview was au-diotaped and later transcribed. For the purpose of the section 115 \u2014 10 hearing, the trial court admitted in evidence the transcript and original audiotape of the interview. The transcript and audiotape showed that Whitaker asked J.E. open-ended questions and resorted to leading questions only to clarify details. After initial general questioning, Whitaker showed J.E. a drawing of an anatomically correct female child, and J.E. identified certain body parts, including the vagina (which J.E. referred to as \u201cPeechacho\u201d). J.E. then described the incident. In particular, J.E. stated that after she, Tasha, defendant (whom J.E. did not know), and Billy Joe W. (a 12- or 13-year-old boy whom J.E. knew) walked to the county fairgrounds, defendant and Billy Joe walked up the grandstand stairway. Defendant tried to convince J.E. and Tasha to walk up the stairway, but they initially refused. Following several requests by defendant, J.E. and Tasha agreed. When they reached the stairway landing, defendant pulled J.E. into a room, while Tasha and Billy Joe remained at the top of the stairway. After defendant pulled J.E. into the room, he tripped her, and she fell to the floor. Defendant then pulled down J.E.\u2019s pants and underwear, took off his own pants and underwear, pinned J.E. down by holding her arms, and got on top of her. J.E. put her hands out in front of her and told defendant to \u201cstop now.\u201d She told him to stop \u201cabout [5] to [10] times.\u201d Defendant did not respond to J.E.\u2019s requests and, instead, continued to hold her down.\nWhitaker asked J.E. what happened next, but J.E. did not respond. Then Whitaker showed J.E. a drawing of an anatomically correct male and asked the following questions to which J.E. gave the following answers:\n\u201c[WHITAKER]: Okay[,] use whatever words you want, and you know what you, you don\u2019t even have to use a specific word[,] you can just tell me what happened.\n[J.E.]: He stuck his[,] thing[,] in ***.\n[WHITAKER]: Okay you said he stuck his [\u2018]thing[\u2019] in ***?\n[J.E.]: My Peechacho.\n[WHITAKER]: [Your] Peechac[h]o okay. When you say his [\u2018]thing[,\u2019] what what\u2019s his [\u2018]thing[\u2019]? You know another word for that, or would you like to use the drawing?\n[J.E.]: His pee pee.\u201d\nWhitaker then clarified that J.E. knew the difference between \u201cinside\u201d and \u201coutside.\u201d J.E. told Whitaker that after defendant put his \u201cpee pee\u201d inside her, he put his pants back on and told her to pull up her pants. J.E. then found Tasha and ran down the grandstand stairway. She acknowledged telling Lydia about the incident but denied telling Tasha about it. J.E. also said that when Jesse asked her if it was true that defendant had \u201cscrewed\u201d her, she denied it because she was \u201ctoo embarrassed.\u201d\nTasha testified that after she and J.E. left the fairgrounds, J.E. told her that defendant had had sex with J.E.\nAfter considering the testimony and counsel\u2019s arguments, the trial court took the matter under advisement. Later in March 2002, the court entered a docket entry order in which it (1) granted the State\u2019s motion seeking to offer at defendant\u2019s trial statements J.E. made to Lydia and Whitaker and (2) denied the State\u2019s motion seeking to offer the statements J.E. made to Tasha.\nB. Trial Testimony\nAt defendant\u2019s September 2002 trial, J.E. testified as to the circumstances surrounding how she, defendant, Tasha, and Billy Joe ended up in the grandstand of the fairgrounds on December 1, 2001. J.E. did not know the exact time they walked to the fairgrounds, but it was \u201cturning dark.\u201d After they walked up the grandstand stairs, defendant opened a door, pushed J.E. inside a room, and shut the door. Tasha and Billy Joe remained outside the room on the stairway landing. Once inside the room, defendant tripped J.E. and pushed her to the floor.\nJ.E. did not respond on direct examination to five different questions about what defendant did to her when they were alone inside the room. However, she testified that she told defendant to \u201cstop\u201d about five times. J.E. also testified that everything she told Whitaker during the January 11, 2002, interview was true and accurate.\nOn cross-examination, J.E. answered all of defense counsel\u2019s questions (which were of a general sort) regarding (1) J.E.\u2019s activities on the day in question and (2) a description of the room involved. Defense counsel elected not to ask her any questions as to what happened in the room when defendant and she were in it together.\nTasha testified that after she, J.E., Billy Joe, and defendant walked up the grandstand stairway, defendant took J.E. into the room at the top of the stairs. Tasha and Billy Joe sat on a couch on the stairway landing. Shortly thereafter, Tasha heard J.E. say, \u201cStop it, ouch, that hurts,\u201d and \u201cLeave me alone.\u201d She recalled hearing J.E. say \u201cOuch\u201d more than once. Around 15 to 30 minutes, when it was \u201cabout dark,\u201d J.E. and defendant came out of the room, and Tasha and J.E. walked to Tasha\u2019s residence.\nJesse testified that on December 31, 2001, he heard a rumor about defendant and J.E. That evening, he and two friends, Daniel Taylor and Steven Wisegarver, went to defendant\u2019s residence to confront him about the rumor. Defendant, who was there alone, let them in, and the four of them sat down in defendant\u2019s bedroom. Defendant said he had something to tell Jesse and then left the bedroom for a short time. When defendant returned, he told Jesse that he had \u201cfucked [Jesse\u2019s] sister.\u201d (J.E. is Jesse\u2019s only sister.) Jesse \u201cfreaked out,\u201d pinned defendant down, and they had \u201csome words.\u201d Jesse, Taylor, and Wise-garver then left.\nTaylor testified, corroborating Jesse\u2019s account of the events that took place at defendant\u2019s residence on December 31, 2001.\nWisegarver testified that after he, Jesse, and Taylor arrived at defendant\u2019s residence on the evening of December 31, 2001, the four of them sat down in defendant\u2019s bedroom. They were \u201cjust talking\u201d when Jesse asked defendant if the rumor about defendant and J.E. was true. Defendant replied that it was and then said, \u201cI fucked [Jesse\u2019s] sister.\u201d\nLydia testified substantially the same as she had at the section 115 \u2014 10 hearing regarding the statements J.E. made to her on January 2, 2002, as well. However, she also stated that when she initially told J.E. about the rumor that defendant had had sex with J.E., J.E., who was drinking a soft drink, nodded her head.\nWhitaker testified substantially the same as she had at the section 115 \u2014 10 hearing regarding the statements J.E. made to her on January 11, 2002. The court admitted in evidence the State\u2019s exhibit No. 2, which Whitaker identified as a true and accurate audiotape of the January 11, 2002, interview. The court then allowed the State to play the audiotape for the jury.\nDefendant presented two alibi witnesses regarding the late afternoon of December 1, 2001, but did not testify himself. On this evidence, the jury convicted defendant. The trial court thereafter sentenced defendant to 20 years in prison.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. J.E.\u2019s Hearsay Statements\n1. Admissibility of the Statements Under the Confrontation Clause\nDefendant first argues that because section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code created a hearsay exception that is not \u201cfirmly rooted\u201d in the common law, the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VI) required that J.E.\u2019s statements to Lydia and Whitaker possess \u201c \u2018 \u201cparticularized guarantees of trustworthiness\u201d \u2019 \u201d (People u. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 350, 739 N.E.2d 455, 478 (2000), quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638, 653, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3147 (1990), quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 608, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 (1980) (overruled in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004))). For the following reasons, we conclude that the confrontation clause is not an issue under the circumstances of this case.\nIn People v. Miles, 351 Ill. App. 3d 857, 815 N.E.2d 37 (2004), this court addressed the same argument defendant raises here. We first noted that the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 197 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9, rendered the phrases \u201cindicia of reliability\u201d and \u201cparticularized guarantees of trustworthiness\u201d irrelevant to confrontation-clause analysis. Miles, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 864, 815 N.E.2d at 43. We further noted that the Crawford Court held that when \u201c \u2018the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the [c]onfrontation [c]lause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.\u2019 \u201d Miles, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 864, 815 N.E.2d at 44, quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 197 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9.\nWe adhere to our decision in Miles and to our analysis in Sharp I, which explained how, under the circumstances of this case, J.E., \u201cappear [ed] for cross-examination at trial,\u201d so that the introduction of her hearsay statements to Lydia and Whitaker did not implicate the confrontation clause. The primary cases we discussed in so concluding were Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15, 106 S. Ct. 292 (1985), and United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 98 L. Ed. 2d 951, 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988). We need not restate our Sharp I analysis because in this court\u2019s very recent decision in People v. Bryant, 391 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1080-83, 1087-1100 (2009), we both readopted that analysis and updated it.\nAs mentioned earlier, J.E., who was then 12 years old, testified at defendant\u2019s September 2002 trial at some length regarding what she did and with whom she did it on December 1, 2001. However, at the point in her testimony when she described how defendant pulled her into the room at the top of the grandstand stairway and pushed her down to the floor, she stopped her narrative. When the prosecutor asked her what happened next, the record shows, \u201cNo response by witness.\u201d The prosecutor tried four more times to get J.E. to relate what happened to her, but each time the record shows, \u201cNo response by witness.\u201d However, J.E. later testified on direct examination about her activities after defendant released her from the room, mentioning where she went, with whom, and how long she engaged in those activities the rest of the day.\nOn cross-examination, J.E. answered all of the questions put to her by defense counsel. However, defense counsel made no attempt to cross-examine J.E. regarding what his client did while in the room with her.\nDespite J.E.\u2019s apparent unwillingness or inability to testify on direct examination about what defendant did to her in the room, this record demonstrates that J.E. \u201cappeared\u201d for cross-examination at trial within the meaning of Crawford and the confrontation clause. The key inquiry is whether she was present for cross-examination and answered questions asked of her by defense counsel. Because she was present for cross-examination and answered defense counsel\u2019s questions, the confrontation clause places absolutely no constraints on the use of J.E.\u2019s prior statements to Lydia and Whitaker. (Because J.E. answered defense counsel\u2019s questions on cross-examination, we need not decide what the legal consequences would be, if any, had she instead answered some, but not all, of those questions.) In other words, the question of the admissibility of those prior statements must be measured only by whether they meet the requirements of section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10 (West 2002)), as discussed in the next section of this opinion. For purposes of the confrontation clause, because J.E. \u201cappeared\u201d for cross-examination at trial within the meaning of Crawford, any prior statement of J.E. being offered at trial is a nonevent.\n2. Admissibility of the Statements Under Section 115 \u2014 10\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred by admitting J.E.\u2019s statements to Lydia and Whitaker pursuant to section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10 (West 2002)). Specifically, he contends that J.E.\u2019s statements were not reliable.\nInitially, we note that defendant has forfeited this issue on appeal by failing to object to J.E.\u2019s statements to Lydia and Whitaker at the section 115 \u2014 10 hearing. The record shows that defendant objected only to J.E.\u2019s statements to Tasha. However, even assuming that defendant had not forfeited this issue, we nonetheless reject it on the merits.\nAlthough the \u201creliability\u201d test established in Roberts and Wright is defunct as far as the confrontation clause is concerned, it is reflected in the statutory exception to the hearsay rule set forth in section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10 (West 2002)). Miles, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 865, 815 N.E.2d at 44. Section 115 \u2014 10(b) of the Code provides that certain evidence shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule under the following circumstances:\n\u201c(1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability; and\n(2) The child *** either:\n(A) testifies at the proceeding; or\n(B) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement!)]\u201d 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10(b) (West 2002).\nWhen conducting a section 115 \u2014 10 hearing, a trial court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the hearsay statements. Some factors that are important in making the reliability determination include the following: \u201c(1) the child\u2019s spontaneity and consistent repetition of the incident, (2) the child\u2019s mental state, (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, and (4) the lack of motive to fabricate.\u201d People v. Cookson, 335 Ill. App. 3d 786, 791, 780 N.E.2d 807, 811 (2002), aff\u2019d, 215 Ill. 2d 194, 830 N.E.2d 484 (2005).\nThe State, as the proponent of the out-of-court statements sought to be admitted pursuant to section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code, bears the burden of establishing that the statements were rehable and not the result of adult prompting or manipulation. Cookson, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 791, 780 N.E.2d at 811. A reviewing court will reverse a trial court\u2019s determination pursuant to section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code only when the record demonstrates that the court abused its discretion. People v. Bowen, 183 Ill. 2d 103, 120, 699 N.E.2d 577, 586 (1998). \u201cAn abuse of discretion occurs when the [court\u2019s] ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would take the same view.\u201d People v. Robertson, 312 Ill. App. 3d 467, 469, 727 N.E.2d 404, 406 (2000).\nIn this case, we recognize that (1) a 33-day delay occurred between the December 1, 2001, incident and J.E.\u2019s statement to Lydia, and (2) J.E. initially denied that defendant sexually assaulted her when Lydia asked her. However, a delay in reporting an assault or initial denials of assault will not automatically render a victim\u2019s statements inadmissible under section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code. People v. Zwart, 151 Ill. 2d 37, 46, 600 N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (1992). Thus, as defendant concedes, the timing of J.E.\u2019s statement, standing alone, does not make the statement unreliable. After her initial denial, J.E. began crying and told Lydia that defendant had sexually assaulted her despite her pleas that he stop. Further, Lydia did not coach J.E. as to what she should say. Contrary to defendant\u2019s claim, the fact that Lydia had to explain the term \u201cpenetrated\u201d to J.E. does not render the statement unreliable. Defendant seems to suggest that if J.E. were a victim of sexual assault, she should be better versed in sexual terminology. However, this was not a case in which a child victim had been \u201cgroomed\u201d by a sexual predator and assaulted or abused over a period of time. Instead, J.E. was sexually assaulted on one occasion, and the fact that she did not know the term \u201cpenetrated\u201d suggests (if anything) that she was not coached as to what to say.\nIn addition, the version of events that J.E. shared with Lydia was substantially consistent with the account of the assault she gave to Whitaker. As to Whitaker\u2019s January 11, 2002, interview of J.E., we note that Whitaker audiotaped the interview. See Miles, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 866, 815 N.E.2d at 45 (in which this court recommended that interviews of alleged child victims be recorded); People v. Simpkins, 297 Ill. App. 3d 668, 678, 697 N.E.2d 302, 308 (1998) (in which we put the State \u201con notice of the risk it takes by not recording interviews\u201d). Whitaker did not coach J.E. on what to say, and she asked leading questions only to clarify details. Further, nothing in the record indicates that J.E. had any motive to lie about the assault by defendant.\nReviewing the record under the appropriate standard of review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting J.E.\u2019s statements to Lydia and Whitaker regarding the sexual assault pursuant to section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10 (West 2002)).\nB. The Prosecutor\u2019s Rebuttal Argument\nLast, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor made improper statements during the State\u2019s rebuttal argument. Specifically, he complains that the prosecutor (1) improperly misrepresented that J.E.\u2019s statements to Whitaker were not hearsay, and (2) compounded the misrepresentation by commenting that defense counsel\u2019s closing argument was a \u201csmokescreen\u201d and defense counsel was \u201cmudslinging.\u201d In response to defense counsel\u2019s comment during closing argument that the State\u2019s case rested \u201con hearsay evidence and hearsay evidence alone,\u201d the prosecutor made the following remarks:\n\u201cDefendant wants to characterize this [case] as nothing but a hearsay case. That\u2019s not true at all. Again, that\u2019s twisting the facts. [J.E.\u2019s] testimony in her interview where she tells what happened to her, that *** [she was] pinned to the floor and sexually penetrated[,] is not hearsay. That\u2019s not hearsay at all, ladies and gentlemen. This case does not revolve around hearsay. [J.E.] just told you what happened to her. She was there. That\u2019s not hearsay at all. A [szc] whole case does not revolve [sic] hearsay. Don\u2019t fall for the smokescreen. [Tasha] stated that she was there; she walked out to the fairgrounds, too, and she knows who went into that little room. *** I don\u2019t think there is any reasonable doubt in this particular case, but what [defendant] is doing is simply mudslinging, trying to muddy up the waters, trying to confuse the jurors, throw a bucket of mud on the wall and hope some of it sticks somewhere. [The police officer] wasn\u2019t at fault. This was 32 days later when he found out about it. This wasn\u2019t his fault. It\u2019s not [Jesse\u2019s] fault. It is not [Wisegarver\u2019s] fault. It is not [Taylor\u2019s] fault. It is not [Tasha\u2019s] fault and it\u2019s not [Lydia\u2019s] fault. It\u2019s not [J.E.\u2019s] fault. The person who is at fault, ladies and gentlemen, is [defendant]. Don\u2019t be deceived by the smokescreen.\u201d\nDefendant concedes that by failing to raise a timely objection at trial, he has forfeited this issue on appeal. Nonetheless, he urges us to review it under the plain-error rule.\nOur supreme court has addressed the issue of plain error as follows:\n\u201c \u2018 \u201c[B]efore an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) \u2018error,\u2019 (2) that is \u2018plain,\u2019 and (3) that \u2018affect[s] substantial rights.\u2019 \u201d [Citation.] \u201cIf all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect [s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.\u201d \u2019 \u201d People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 348, 788 N.E.2d 1117, 1124 (2001) (supplemental opinion upon denial of rehearing), quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631-32, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860, 868, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 1785 (2002), quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718, 727, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997).\nSee People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17, 660 N.E.2d 901, 909-10 (1995) (\u201cPlain error marked by \u2018fundamental [unjfairness\u2019 occurs only in situations which \u2018reveal breakdowns in the adversary system,\u2019 as distinguished from \u2018typical trial mistakes.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d).\nThis court will take our supreme court at its word and find plain error only in exceptional circumstances in which \u201c \u2018 \u201cthe error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 348, 788 N.E.2d at 1124 (supplemental opinion upon denial of rehearing), quoting Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631-32, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 868, 122 S. Ct. at 1785, quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 727, 117 S. Ct. at 1549. See also People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 593, 893 N.E.2d 653, 659 (2008), where the supreme court quoted People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565, 870 N.E.2d 403, 410-11 (2007), as follows:\n\u201c \u2018We now reiterate that the plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when (1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.\u2019 \u201d\nEven accepting defendant\u2019s contention that the complained-of remarks were improper, we conclude that \u2014 when viewed in the context of the parties\u2019 closing arguments as a whole \u2014 they did not result in substantial prejudice to defendant or compromise the fairness or integrity of the trial process. In that regard, we note that (1) the trial court instructed the jury that closing arguments were not evidence and arguments not based on the evidence were to be disregarded, and (2) the prosecutor\u2019s allegedly improper comments were not overly extensive. Accordingly, we will not address defendant\u2019s argument under the plain-error doctrine. See People v. Brooks, 345 Ill. App. 3d 945, 953, 803 N.E.2d 626, 632 (2004) (declining to address on the merits the defendant\u2019s claim that the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument denied him a fair trial, upon concluding that no reason existed to excuse the defendant\u2019s procedural default because the complained-of remarks did not prejudice the defendant or compromise the integrity or fairness of the trial).\nIII. FURTHER ANALYSIS AFTER REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT\nThe primary issue we addressed in Sharp I was the admissibility of J.E.\u2019s statements under the confrontation clause as then-recently construed by the United States Supreme Court in Crawford. Citing our earlier opinion in Miles, we noted \u201cthat the Crawford Court held that when \u2018 \u201cthe declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the [c]onfrontation [c]lause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Sharp I, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 792, 825 N.E.2d at 710, quoting Miles, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 864, 815 N.E.2d at 44, quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 197 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9. Thus, our focus in Sharp I was to determine whether J.E. \u201cappeared\u201d for cross-examination at defendant\u2019s trial. We held that she did so within the meaning of Crawford, concluding that, \u201c[f|or purposes of the confrontation clause, because J.E. \u2018appeared\u2019 for cross-examination at trial within the meaning of Crawford, any prior statement of J.E. being offered at trial is a nonevent.\u201d Sharp I, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 796, 825 N.E.2d at 713.\nA. The Decision in Rolandis G.\nIn compliance with the supreme court\u2019s directive, we now analyze its recent decision in Rolandis G. to determine whether a different result in this case is warranted. We begin our analysis with a discussion of the appellate court decision in In re Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d 776, 817 N.E.2d 183 (2004), that the supreme court reviewed.\n1. The Appellate Court Decision\nThe respondent in Rolandis G. was adjudicated delinquent after the trial court found him guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(b) (West Supp. 2001)) of six-year-old Von J. Respondent initially argued to the appellate court that the trial court erred by admitting, pursuant to section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10 (West 2002)), Von\u2019s statements about the sexual assault to (1) his mother, (2) a police officer, and (3) a child-advocacy worker. Respondent asserted that under section 115 \u2014 10, the child victim must either (1) testify at trial (see 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10(b)(2)(A) (West 2002)) or (2) if the child is unavailable as a witness, then there must be corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement (see 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10(b)(2)(B) (West 2002)). Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 779-80, 817 N.E.2d at 186-87. The respondent asserted that although Von gave some basic background information from the witness stand, he was not \u201cavailable to testify\u201d within the meaning of section 115 \u2014 10 because he did not testify about the alleged sexual assault. Accordingly, the respondent contended that the State was obligated to introduce evidence corroborating the out-of-court statements but failed to do so.\nWhile the respondent\u2019s appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Crawford. The respondent then filed a supplemental brief, arguing that under Crawford, testimonial out-of-court statements by an unavailable declarant may not be admitted in a criminal trial unless the declarant was subject to cross-examination when he gave the statements. The respondent also argued that section 115 \u2014 10 was unconstitutional to the extent that it allowed such statements to be admitted. Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 779, 817 N.E.2d at 186-87.\nThe appellate court agreed with the respondent\u2019s arguments that Von\u2019s statements to the officer and the child-advocacy worker were testimonial and, therefore, improperly admitted under Crawford. Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 781, 817 N.E.2d at 188. The court added that \u201c[t]o the extent section 115 \u2014 10 permits the introduction of such statements, it is unconstitutional.\u201d Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 781, 817 N.E.2d at 188.\nAlthough the respondent conceded that Von\u2019s statements to his mother were not testimonial hearsay, he nonetheless argued that they should have been excluded under section 115 \u2014 10 because Von was unavailable within the meaning of that statute and the State did not present corroborating evidence. The appellate court agreed but also concluded that Von\u2019s out-of-court statements to his mother were still admissible if the State introduced corroborating evidence. The court ultimately agreed with the State that it had done so. Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 784, 817 N.E.2d at 190. Accordingly, the court concluded that Von\u2019s \u201cstatements to his mother were properly admitted under section 115 \u2014 10 and do not raise any confrontation[-]clause issues.\u201d Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 784, 817 N.E.2d at 190. The appellate court nonetheless reversed respondent\u2019s adjudication because it concluded that the admission of Von\u2019s statements to the officer and the child-advocacy worker constituted reversible error. Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 784, 817 N.E.2d at 190-91.\n2. The Supreme Court Decision\nThe supreme court granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal in Rolandis G., in which the State maintained its primary concerns were for the supreme court to (1) affirm the constitutionality of section 115 \u2014 10 and (2) consider the proper application of Crawford in situations involving young victims of sexual crimes. Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d at 22, 902 N.E.2d at 606. The State agreed with the appellate court that (1) Von\u2019s statement to his mother was nontestimonial and (2) his statement to the officer was testimonial. However, the State challenged the appellate court\u2019s determination that Von\u2019s statement to the child-advocacy worker was testimonial. Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d at 29, 902 N.E.2d at 609.\nThe supreme court disagreed with the State regarding Von\u2019s statement to the child-advocacy worker and concluded that this statement was testimonial. Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d at 36, 902 N.E.2d at 613. The supreme court also rejected the State\u2019s argument that respondent forfeited the right to challenge the admission of Von\u2019s testimonial hearsay statements on the ground of forfeiture by wrongdoing. Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d at 42, 902 N.E.2d at 616-17.\nThe last matter the supreme court addressed in Rolandis G. was the State\u2019s claim that the Crawford violation was subject to harmless-error review. The supreme court agreed with the State that harmless-error analysis applied to a Crawford violation and concluded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the \u201cproperly admitted evidence *** overwhelmingly support[ed] [respondent\u2019s] conviction.\u201d Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d at 43, 902 N.E.2d at 617.\nThe supreme court did not address the constitutionality of section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code. Instead, the court noted that the State withdrew that portion of its brief because the appellate court held only that it was unconstitutional \u201cas applied.\u201d Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d at 46-47, 902 N.E.2d at 619.\n3. The Application of the Supreme Court\u2019s Decision in Rolandis G. to This Case\nConsistent with the supreme court\u2019s directive that we reconsider our decision in this case in light of its opinion in Rolandis G., we have discussed the earlier decision of the appellate court in that case to ensure we understood the context in which the supreme court rendered its opinion. After reconsidering our decision in this case, we conclude that a different result is not warranted because of Rolandis G.\nAs earlier stated, the primary focus of our initial decision in this case was whether J.E. \u201cappeared\u201d for cross-examination at defendant\u2019s trial within the meaning of Crawford. We concluded in Sharp I that she did. Rolandis G. addressed several important aspects of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Crawford, including testimonial hearsay and forfeiture-by-wrongdoing. (For a comprehensive and well-reasoned analysis of what constitutes testimonial hearsay, including a recent and thoughtful discussion of Rolandis G., see D. Shanes, Confronting Testimonial Hearsay: Understanding the New Confrontation Clause, 40 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 879 (2009).) However, because \u201cthe State conceded that Von was not available to testify at trial\u201d (Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d at 22, 902 N.E.2d at 605), the supreme court did not need to address the issue in this case \u2014 namely, when a declarant appears for cross-examination.\n4. Harmless Error\nIn any event, we conclude that defendant\u2019s conviction should be affirmed because, considering the record before us as a whole, the alleged errors of which defendant complains would constitute nothing more than harmless error. In People v. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d 246, 304, 870 N.E.2d 333, 367 (2007), the supreme court held that \u201cCrawford violations are subject to harmless-error analysis.\u201d In Rolandis G., the supreme court reaffirmed that holding and stated that \u201cthe test is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error at issue did not contribute to the verdict obtained.\u201d Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d at 43, 902 N.E.2d at 617. The court in Rolandis G. added the following:\n\u201cWhen deciding whether error is harmless, a reviewing court may (1) focus on the error to determine whether it might have contributed to the conviction; (2) examine the other properly admitted evidence to determine whether it overwhelmingly supports the conviction; or (3) determine whether the improperly admitted evidence is merely cumulative or duplicates properly admitted evidence. [Citations.] In the case at bar, we find that the properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly supports the conviction and, for that reason, the admission of Von\u2019s testimonial statements *** was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d at 43, 902 N.E.2d at 617.\nJudged in accordance with the foregoing standard, we conclude that the properly admitted evidence on this record overwhelmingly supports defendant\u2019s conviction and, for that reason, the admission of J.E.\u2019s statements pursuant to section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nIV CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment. As part of our judgment, we award the State its $50 statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal.\nAffirmed.\nMYERSCOUGH and TURNER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Gary R. Peterson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Jerry A. Johnson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Clinton (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and James C. Majors, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLNOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JASON M. SHARP, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201402\u20140913\nOpinion filed June 26, 2009.\nRehearing denied July 16, 2009.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Gary R. Peterson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJerry A. Johnson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Clinton (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and James C. Majors, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0947-01", "first_page_order": 961, "last_page_order": 976 }