{
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  "name": "In re SEAN N., a Person Subject to Administration of Psychotropic Medication (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Sean N., Respondent-Appellant)",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Sean N.",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "In re SEAN N., a Person Subject to Administration of Psychotropic Medication (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Sean N., Respondent-Appellant)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing an August 2008 hearing, the trial court found respondent, Sean N., subject to involuntary administration of psychotropic medication (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1 (West 2006)).\nRespondent appeals, arguing only that the trial court erred by denying him his statutory right to continue his August 2008 hearing pursuant to section 2 \u2014 107.l(a\u20145)(2) of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145) (2) (West 2006)). The State responds that because respondent was represented by counsel at that hearing, he did not have the right to pro se request a continuance. We agree with the State and affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn August 19, 2008, respondent\u2019s psychiatrist at the State\u2019s mental health center filed a petition seeking to involuntarily administer treatment to respondent pursuant to section 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1 (West 2006)). That same day, the trial court scheduled an August 22, 2008, hearing and appointed counsel to represent respondent.\nAt the August 22, 2008, hearing, respondent appeared with his appointed counsel. As the hearing commenced, respondent made the following pro se oral motion:\n\u201cTHE RESPONDENT: I make a continuance motion.\nTHE COURT: [Respondent\u2019s counsel], do you need to talk to your client?\n[RESPONDENT\u2019S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I\u2019ve talked to my client on Saturday [(August 20, 2008)]. I tried to talk to [him] today before court. He refused to talk to me, and he said he would like to come straight to the courtroom, so that is what I\u2019ve allowed today.\nTHE COURT: What is your reason for the continuance, [respondent]?\nTHE RESPONDENT: I\u2019ve been locked *** up in the past in facilities and *** in this facility without a phone. I am from California, and I have an ongoing felony case.\nActually, I\u2019m allowed to make a phone call on their phones twice a shift, and that\u2019s if it\u2019s convenient for them.\nTHE COURT: The [m]otion for [c]ontinuance is denied. Move on.\u201d\nFollowing the presentation of evidence and argument, the trial court found respondent subject to involuntary administration of psychotropic medication.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. RESPONDENT\u2019S CLAIM THAT HIS PRO SE MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED\nRespondent argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant his pro se motion for a continuance. The State responds that because respondent was represented by counsel at the August 2008 hearing, he did not have the right to pro se request a continuance. Essentially, the State contends that the court properly disregarded respondent\u2019s pro se motion. We agree with the State.\nThe issue in this case is whether a respondent in a proceeding to involuntarily administer treatment has the right to pro se file a motion for continuance under section 2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145) (2) of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.l(a\u20145)(2) (West 2006)) while he is simultaneously represented by counsel. This issue is purely a question of law. Accordingly, our review is de novo. See In re A.H., 207 Ill. 2d 590, 593, 802 N.E.2d 215, 217 (2003) (reviewing issue de novo because appeal presented only questions of law).\nIn criminal cases, a defendant has the right to represent himself or to have counsel represent him. People v. James, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1202, 1205, 841 N.E.2d 1109, 1113 (2006). In other words, \u201ca defendant possesses \u2018no right to some sort of hybrid representation, whereby he would receive the services of counsel and still be permitted to file pro se motions.\u2019 \u201d James, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1205, 841 N.E.2d at 1113, quoting People v. Handy, 278 Ill. App. 3d 829, 836, 664 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (1996). Accordingly, \u201c[w]hen a defendant is represented by counsel, he generally has no authority to file pro se motions, and the court should not consider them.\u201d People v. Serio, 357 Ill. App. 3d 806, 815, 830 N.E.2d 749, 757 (2005).\nLikewise, we conclude that a respondent is not entitled to hybrid representation in a proceeding to involuntarily administer treatment. A respondent, like a criminal defendant, has the right to choose to represent himself or to have counsel represent him.\nWe find support for our decision in Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. _,_, 173 L. Ed. 2d 231, 240, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1290 (2009), where the United States Supreme Court concluded that, as the defendant\u2019s agent, counsel had authority to delay proceedings on the defendant\u2019s behalf. Here, counsel, as respondent\u2019s agent, had authority to bind respondent to the tactics she decided to employ.\nIn response to respondent\u2019s pro se motion in this case, the trial court asked counsel if she \u201cneedfed] to talk to [her] client.\u201d A better question would have been, \u201cCounsel, are you moving for a continuance?\u201d Notwithstanding the phrasing of the court\u2019s inquiry, we conclude that the court was correct to (1) take counsel\u2019s response to indicate that she was not moving for a continuance and (2) disregard respondent\u2019s pro se motion.\nIn so concluding, we emphasize that we use the term \u201cdisregard\u201d advisedly. Because respondent\u2019s pro se motion for a continuance was not properly before the trial court, there was nothing for the court to \u201cdeny.\u201d Thus, the court\u2019s proper action was simply to \u201cdisregard\u201d respondent\u2019s pro se motion. To \u201cdeny\u201d respondent\u2019s pro se motion would have accorded it a status to which it was not entitled.\nRespondent\u2019s counsel alone had authority to move for a continuance. Her decision not to do so was binding on respondent. Accordingly, his claim that the trial court erred by rejecting his pro se motion is completely without merit.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nKNECHT and APPLETON, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Ann Krasuski and Veronique Baker, both of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Hines, for appellant.",
      "John E Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re SEAN N., a Person Subject to Administration of Psychotropic Medication (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Sean N., Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201408\u20140658\nOpinion filed June 26, 2009.\nRehearing denied July 23, 2009.\nAnn Krasuski and Veronique Baker, both of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Hines, for appellant.\nJohn E Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "1104-01",
  "first_page_order": 1118,
  "last_page_order": 1120
}