{ "id": 4288212, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD D. KITCH, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Kitch", "decision_date": "2009-06-25", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201405\u20140982", "first_page": "108", "last_page": "121", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "392 Ill. App. 3d 108" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "40 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 879", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Loy. U. Chi. L.J.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "817 N.E.2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186-87" }, { "page": "186-87" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "190" }, { "page": "190" }, { "page": "190-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 776", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5457769 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779-80" }, { "page": "779" }, { "page": "781" }, { "page": "781" }, { "page": "784" }, { "page": "784" }, { "page": "784" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/0776-01" ] }, { "cite": "892 N.E.2d 73", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "383 Ill. App. 3d 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4278249 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/383/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "843 N.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" }, { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5735959 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" }, { "page": "167-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "908 N.E.2d 50", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621273 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "909 N.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399-401" }, { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "391 Ill. App. 3d 1072", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4286623 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1080-83" }, { "page": "1092" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/391/1072-01" ] }, { "cite": "863 N.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3607155 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "815 N.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46-48", "parenthetical": "Cook, J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "46" }, { "page": "46", "parenthetical": "Cook, J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "43" }, { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 857", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1083879 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868-70", "parenthetical": "Cook, J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "867" }, { "page": "868" }, { "page": "864" }, { "page": "864" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/351/0857-01" ] }, { "cite": "823 N.E.2d 1029", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1039" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599639 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "858 N.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604994 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "838 N.E.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" }, { "page": "332-35" }, { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 995", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4259187 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1000" }, { "page": "1000-03" }, { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/361/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "790 N.E.2d 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" }, { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "851 N.E.2d 1210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1219" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5703570 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "899 N.E.2d 1077", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "nonprecedential supervisory order on denial of petition for leave to appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "nonprecedential supervisory order on denial of petition for leave to appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "902 N.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" }, { "page": "609" }, { "page": "613" }, { "page": "616-17" }, { "page": "617" }, { "page": "619" }, { "page": "605" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619642 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" }, { "page": "29" }, { "page": "36" }, { "page": "42" }, { "page": "43" }, { "page": "47" }, { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 12, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "1371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1111, "char_count": 33550, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.95504809789556e-08, "percentile": 0.5014896621386035 }, "sha256": "de04f65f4c080f1c7303ebeb87110223ede0f2b95a18f9f36b3d7a07130e66e2", "simhash": "1:8fb0bc8a3ac79c76", "word_count": 5391 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:31:50.333780+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD D. KITCH, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing an October 2005 trial, a jury convicted defendant, Richard D. Kitch, of nine counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1(a)(1) (West 2000)) and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 16(c)(1)(i) (West 2002)). The trial court later sentenced him to (1) 9 consecutive natural-life prison terms for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and (2) a concurrent 14-year extended-term sentence for aggravated criminal sexual abuse.\nDefendant appealed, arguing that (1) the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), renders section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10 (West 2004)) unconstitutional in that it violates the confrontation clause of both the United States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a78), and (2) the trial court erred by imposing (a) consecutive natural-life prison terms for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and (b) an extended prison term for aggravated criminal sexual abuse.\nIn April 2007, this court affirmed defendant\u2019s convictions but modified his natural-life prison sentences from consecutive to concurrent terms. People v. Kitch, No. 4\u201405\u20140982 (April 7, 2008) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nDefendant filed a petition for leave to appeal with the Supreme Court of Illinois. In January 2009, that court denied his petition but also entered the following nonprecedential supervisory order:\n\u201cIn the exercise of this court\u2019s supervisory authority, the Appellate Court, Fourth District, is directed to vacate its order in People v. Kitch, No. 4 \u2014 05\u20140982 (April 7, 2008). The appellate court is instructed to reconsider its decision in light of this Court\u2019s opinion in In re Rolandis G., [232 Ill. 2d 13, 902 N.E.2d 600 (2008)], to determine whether a different result is warranted.\u201d People v. Kitch, 231 Ill. 2d 643, 899 N.E.2d 1077 (2009) (nonprecedential supervisory order on denial of petition for leave to appeal).\nIn accordance with the supreme court\u2019s directive, we vacate our earlier decision in this case. Further, after reconsidering this case in light of Rolandis G., we conclude that a different result is not warranted. Accordingly, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction as modified and remand with directions.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn February 2005, the State charged defendant with multiple counts of criminal sexual assault and abuse perpetrated against his stepdaughter, K.J.K. (born January 8, 1991), and his stepson, M.J.B. (born May 5, 1994). Specifically, the State charged defendant with (1) predatory criminal sexual assault of a child in that between March 2000 and March 2003, he (a) placed his penis in the mouth of K.J.K. (counts I and II); (b) allowed his penis to have contact with KJ.K\u2019s vaginal area (count III); (c) placed his penis in K.J.K.\u2019s vagina (counts IY y and VI); (d) placed his penis in the mouth of M.J.B. (counts IX, X, and XI) and (2) aggravated criminal sexual abuse in that in November 2002, he knowingly touched M.J.B.\u2019s penis with his fingers for the purpose of sexual arousal (counts VII and VIII). (The State dismissed count VIII prior to defendant\u2019s trial.)\nA. The State\u2019s Motion To Admit Testimony Pursuant to Section 115 \u2014 10\nIn August 2005, the State moved to admit hearsay evidence of statements K.J.K. and M.J.B. made under section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10 (West 2004)). At an October 2005 hearing on the State\u2019s motion, a forensic interviewer testified that she interviewed then 11-year-old K.J.K., which she conducted by handwriting (1) the questions she asked K.J.K. and (2) KJ.K.\u2019s corresponding answers. Immediately after the interview, K.J.K. and her mother, Susan Kitch (who was not present during the interview), reviewed and signed the handwritten transcript. The forensic interviewer stated that K.J.K. did not hesitate in answering her questions and opined that her word-for-word transcription of her interview with K.J.K. was 99% accurate.\nThe Schuyler County sheriff testified that in March 2003, he interviewed then eight-year-old M.J.B., which he conducted by handwriting (1) the questions he asked M.J.B. and (2) M.J.B.\u2019s corresponding answers. During the interview, M.J.B. told the sheriff that defendant (1) rubbed M.J.B.\u2019s penis in a back and forth motion, (2) made him touch defendant\u2019s penis, and (3) made him put defendant\u2019s penis in his mouth on at least three different occasions. Immediately after the interview, M.J.B. and Susan (who was present during the interview) reviewed and signed the handwritten transcript.\nThe sheriff also testified about an April 2003 statement K.J.K. provided regarding the circumstances surrounding how defendant\u2019s ejaculate was on her comforter, which he transcribed verbatim. K.J.K. explained that in December 2002, defendant was on top of her and attempted several times to force his penis inside her vagina, but it would not \u201cfit.\u201d Defendant then stopped trying, and as he stood up, he ejaculated onto her comforter.\nAfter the State represented to the trial court that K.J.K. and M.J.B. would be testifying at trial, the court reviewed all three statements and found that (1) the statutory requirements for the admission of (a) K.J.K.\u2019s March and April 2003 hearsay statements and (b) M.J.B.\u2019s March 2003 hearsay statements under section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code had been met and (2) the forensic interviewer and the sheriff would be permitted to testify to those statements at trial.\nB. The Testimony Presented at Trial\nThe evidence presented at defendant\u2019s October 2005 jury trial, which consisted, in part, of testimony from (1) a gynecologist, (2) Susan, (3) the forensic interviewer, (4) the sheriff, (5) State forensic scientists, (6) M.J.B., and (7) K.J.K. showed the following.\nIn July 2003, a gynecologist performed a physical examination of K.J.K. and concluded that based on defects found on the hymenal ring of K.J.K\u2019s vaginal area, it was \u201cvery likely\u201d that K.J.K. had been sexually abused. The gynecologist explained that a normal hymenal ring\u2019s tissue is \u201ctight\u201d all the way around the ring, smooth, and with no defects. However, K.J.K.\u2019s hymenal ring exhibited tension only in the lower portion, which she opined could have been caused by some external object penetrating through K.J.K.\u2019s vaginal area. However, the gynecologist acknowledged that she could not specifically identify the object that caused the damage to KJ.K\u2019s hymenal ring.\nSusan testified that in 1999 she began dating defendant. As their relationship progressed, Susan introduced defendant to K.J.K. and M.J.B. and observed that, initially, defendant had a normal adult-child relationship with them. In December 1999, Susan, K.J.K., and M.J.B. moved into defendant\u2019s mobile home. About two months later, Susan married defendant. Thereafter, Susan noticed that defendant favored K.J.K. and was not as friendly as he had been with M.J.B. In addition, Susan stated that she saw defendant (1) grab K.J.K.\u2019s butt and breasts, (2) tattoo K.J.K.\u2019s buttock when she was 11 years old, and (3) rub lotion on K.J.K.\u2019s breasts when she was 12 years old. On one occasion, Susan saw that defendant had been in the shower with K.J.K. After Susan confronted defendant, he explained that he had been helping K.J.K. wash her hair.\nIn March 2003, Susan left the home she shared with defendant because she had \u201cjust had enough\u201d of defendant\u2019s demanding demeanor. As Susan drove away, she told K.J.K. and M.J.B. that they were not returning. K.J.K. and M.J.B. then told Susan that defendant had been sexually abusing them. Susan (1) reported the allegations K.J.K. and M.J.B. had made to the sheriff and (2) provided the sheriff the comforter that K.J.K. had on her bed when they lived with defendant. At the State\u2019s request and without objection, the trial court admitted into evidence the comforter that Susan identified as the one she had provided to the sheriff. Susan added that she did not engage in any sexual activity with defendant on K.J.K.\u2019s comforter.\nThe forensic interviewer testified about the statements K.J.K. made during the March 2003 interview, as follows. In March 2000, K.J.K. was home alone with defendant when he came into her room. K.J.K. tried to leave, but defendant blocked the doorway and forced his penis into her mouth. Later that morning, defendant returned to K.J.K.\u2019s room and again forced his penis into her mouth. When he was finished, defendant told K.J.K. that if she told anyone, he would kill her. After that day, defendant forced K.J.K. to put his penis into her mouth whenever Susan was out of the house, asleep, or in the shower.\nIn the summer of 2001, K.J.K. was home alone with defendant. Although K.J.K. had blocked the entrance to her bedroom door, defendant forced his way into her room and held her down. Defendant then put his penis between KJ.K.\u2019s legs, rubbing his penis on her vaginal area. Defendant performed this act almost every time she was home alone with him until June 2002, when defendant began inserting his penis inside her vagina. After June 2002, defendant had sexual intercourse with K.J.K. about once a week. At the start of 2002, defendant began getting into the shower with K.J.K. On one occasion, defendant rubbed cocoa butter on her breasts despite K.J.K.\u2019s insistence that she could apply the lotion herself.\nK.J.K. testified consistent with her March 2003 interview statements regarding defendant\u2019s conduct forcing his penis (1) into her mouth, (2) between her legs, and (3) into her vagina. K.J.K. also explained that a couple of months after defendant began rubbing his penis on her vaginal area, he also put his fingers in her vagina, telling her that he was doing it so that his penis would eventually \u201cfit.\u201d On one occasion defendant\u2019s ejaculate dripped onto K.J.K.\u2019s comforter, and defendant told her to wipe it up with some paper towels. K.J.K. identified the comforter that the trial court had previously admitted into evidence as the comforter she used when she lived with defendant. K.J.K. also testified regarding defendant (1) rubbing cocoa butter on her breasts, (2) showering with her, and (3) tattooing her on her right buttock.\nThe sheriff testified about the three incidents that M.J.B. described during the March 2003 interview, as follows. In November 2002, defendant came into M.J.B.\u2019s room, grabbed his penis, and began rubbing it for about 30 seconds. In January 2003, defendant took M.J.B. into the bathroom, put M.J.B.\u2019s hand on defendant\u2019s penis, and made M.J.B. move his hand up and down for about one minute until he ejaculated. Later that same month, defendant took M.J.B. into the bathroom, made M.J.B. put defendant\u2019s penis into his mouth, and told him to suck on his penis. M.J.B. told the sheriff that defendant made him perform this same oral act an additional three or four times. The sheriff also testified consistent with the testimony he had previously provided at the October 2005 hearing on the State\u2019s motion to admit hearsay evidence, concerning KJ.K\u2019s hearsay statements about how defendant\u2019s ejaculate was on her comforter.\nM.J.B. testified consistent with his March 2003 interview statements regarding the three incidences he described in which defendant (1) rubbed his penis and (2) forced him to (a) rub defendant\u2019s penis and (b) place defendant\u2019s penis in his mouth.\nForensic scientists at the Illinois State Police Forensic Science Laboratory testified that the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile identified in a semen stain on K.J.K.\u2019s comforter matched defendant\u2019s DNA profile.\nFollowing the presentation of evidence and argument, the jury convicted defendant on all 10 counts. The trial court later sentenced him to (1) 9 consecutive natural-life prison terms for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and (2) a concurrent 14-year extended-term sentence for aggravated criminal sexual abuse.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Defendant\u2019s Claim That Section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code Violates the Confrontation Clause\nDefendant argues that the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Crawford renders section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10 (West 2004)) unconstitutional in that it violates the confrontation clause of both the United States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a78). Specifically, defendant contends that (1) section 115 \u2014 10 is facially unconstitutional in light of the Crawford Court\u2019s interpretation of the confrontation clause and (2) his convictions on counts IV and V should be reversed because K.J.K.\u2019s testimony \u201cwas quite vague on the times, order[,] and actions for [cjounts IV and V\u201d and direct testimony to that effect was presented at trial only through K.J.K.\u2019s hearsay statements testified to by the forensic interviewer and sheriff. We address defendant\u2019s contentions in turn.\n1. The Constitutionality of Section 115 \u2014 10\nDefendant first contends that section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10 (West 2004)) is facially unconstitutional in light of the Crawford Court\u2019s interpretation of the confrontation clause. We disagree.\nIn considering a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, we begin with the presumption that all statutes are constitutional. People v. Waid, 221 Ill. 2d 464, 480, 851 N.E.2d 1210, 1219 (2006). \u201c[T]he burden of rebutting that presumption is on the party challenging the validity of the statute to demonstrate clearly a constitutional violation.\u201d People v. Greco, 204 III. 2d 400, 406, 790 N.E.2d 846, 851 (2003). \u201cIf reasonably possible, a statute must be construed so as to affirm its constitutionality and validity.\u201d Greco, 204 Ill. 2d at 406, 790 N.E.2d at 851. \u201cA statute is facially unconstitutional (in contrast to unconstitutional as applied to [a] defendant) only if one can think of no circumstance in which the statute would be constitutional.\u201d People v. Reed, 361 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1000, 838 N.E.2d 328, 333 (2005). The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 135, 858 N.E.2d 15, 32 (2006).\nIn support of his contention, defendant relies on In re E.H., 355 Ill. App. 3d 564, 823 N.E.2d 1029 (2005), and Justice Cook\u2019s special concurrence in People v. Miles, 351 Ill. App. 3d 857, 868-70, 815 N.E.2d 37, 46-48 (2004) (Cook, J., specially concurring).\nIn In re E.H., 355 Ill. App. 3d at 577, 823 N.E.2d at 1039, the First District held, in pertinent part, that based on the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Crawford, section 115\u201410 of the Code was unconstitutional in that it violated the confrontation clause. In Miles, this court reversed the defendant\u2019s conviction, concluding that the trial court erred by finding that a child victim\u2019s hearsay statements to her mother and a detective were sufficiently reliable to be admissible under section 115\u201410 of the Code. Miles, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 867, 815 N.E.2d at 46. In his specially concurring opinion, Justice Cook agreed that the court had erred but disagreed that section 115 \u2014 10 had \u201cany continuing validity\u201d because \u201cCrawford was certainly critical of \u2018sufficient safeguards of reliability\u2019 hearings\u201d under section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code. Miles, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 868, 815 N.E.2d at 46 (Cook, J., specially concurring), quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 200, 124 S. Ct. at 1371.\nHowever, in Reed, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 1000-03, 838 N.E.2d at 332-35, this court explicitly rejected the same argument that defendant now makes \u2014 namely, that section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code is facially unconstitutional in that it violates the confrontation clause. In so doing, we declined to follow the First District\u2019s decision in In re E.H. Reed, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 1002, 838 N.E.2d at 334. We further note that the First District Appellate Court\u2019s holding in In re E.H. has since been ordered vacated by the Supreme Court of Illinois. In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172, 863 N.E.2d 231 (2006). Thus, we adhere to our holding in Reed and reject defendant\u2019s contention that section 115\u201410 is facially unconstitutional in that it violates the confrontation clause of the United States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a78).\n2. The Admissibility of K.J.K.\u2019s Hearsay Statements Pursuant to Section 115\u201410\nDefendant also contends that his convictions on counts IV and V should be reversed because K.J.K.\u2019s testimony \u201cwas quite vague on the times, order[,] and actions for [c]ounts IV and V\u201d and direct testimony to that effect was presented at trial only through K.J.K.\u2019s hearsay statements testified to by the forensic interviewer and sheriff. Essentially, defendant asserts that the trial court\u2019s admission of KJ.K\u2019s hearsay statements under section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code violated the confrontation clause of the United States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a78). We disagree.\nIn Miles, 351 Ill. App. 3d 857, 815 N.E.2d 37, this court addressed a similar argument to that which defendant raises here. We first noted that the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 197 n.9,124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9, rendered the phrases \u201cindicia of reliability\u201d and \u201cparticularized guarantees of trustworthiness\u201d irrelevant to confrontation-clause analysis. Miles, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 864, 815 N.E.2d at 43. We further noted that the Crawford Court held that when \u201c \u2018the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the [cjonfrontation [c]lause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.\u2019 \u201d Miles, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 864, 815 N.E.2d at 44, quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 197 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9.\nIn People v. Bryant, 391 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1080-83, 909 N.E.2d 391, 399-401 (2009), this court further considered what the Crawford Court meant when it wrote about the hearsay declarant appearing for cross-examination at trial. In answering that question, we quoted from the recent Supreme Court of Illinois decision in People v. Sutton, 233 Ill. 2d 89, 110, 908 N.E.2d 50, 70 (2009), as follows:\n\u201c \u2018The [United States Supreme] Court explained that the confrontation clause gives an accused the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, which has been read as securing an adequate opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. [Citation.] ***\nThe Court additionally held that its analysis was not altered by the fact that the testimony at issue involved an out-of-court statement that would traditionally be characterized as hearsay, and declined to require the testimony be examined for indicia of reliability, concluding that such an inquiry was not required when the hearsay declarant is present at trial and subject to unrestricted cross-examination. [Citation.] In that case, \u201cthe traditional protections of the oath, cross-examination, and opportunity for the jury to observe the witness\u2019 demeanor satisfy the constitutional requirements.\u201d [Citation.]\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Bryant, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 1092, 909 N.E.2d at 408.\nIn this case, K.J.K., who was then 11 years old, testified at defendant\u2019s October 2005 trial consistent with her hearsay statements regarding defendant\u2019s conduct forcing his penis (1) into her mouth, (2) between her legs, and (3) into her vagina.\nThe record shows that on cross-examination, K.J.K. answered all of the questions put to her by defense counsel. However, defense counsel only asked three questions that were tangentially related to the sexual charges alleged by the State. Specifically, defense counsel asked (1) whether K.J.K. ever used her comforter to watch television in the living room, (2) whether K.J.K. possessed her comforter on the day she left the home she shared with her mother and defendant, and (3) how many times defendant supposedly showered with her (to which K.J.K. responded numerous times).\nThus, despite defendant\u2019s contention that KJ.K\u2019s testimony \u201cwas quite vague on the times, order[,] and actions for [c]ounts IV and V\u201d this record demonstrates that K.J.K. \u201cappeared\u201d for cross-examination at trial within the meaning of Crawford and the confrontation clause. The key inquiry is whether she was present for cross-examination and answered questions asked of her by defense counsel. Because she was present for cross-examination and answered defense counsel\u2019s questions, the confrontation clause places absolutely no constraints on the use of K.J.K.\u2019s prior statements. (Because K.J.K. answered defense counsel\u2019s questions on cross-examination, we need not decide what the legal consequences would be, if any, had she instead answered some, but not all, of those questions.)\nIn other words, the question of the admissibility of those prior statements must be measured only by whether they meet the requirements of section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10 (West 2004)). For purposes of the confrontation clause, because K.J.K. \u201cappeared\u201d for cross-examination at trial within the meaning of Crawford, any of her prior statements offered at trial is a nonevent. Thus, we reject defendant\u2019s assertion that the trial court\u2019s admission of K.J.K.\u2019s hearsay statements under section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code violated the confrontation clause of the United States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a78).\nB. The Sentences Imposed by the Trial Court\n1. The Trial Court\u2019s Imposition of Consecutive Natural-Life Prison Terms\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive natural-life prison terms for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. We agree.\nSubsection 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a)(ii) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) provides \u201c[t]he court shall enter sentences to run consecutively\u201d if \u201cthe defendant was convicted of a violation of [selection *** 12 \u2014 14.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u2014 4(a)(ii) (West 2000). Section 12 \u2014 14.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) defines predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and provides that \u201c[a] person convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child committed against [two] or more persons regardless of whether the offenses occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated acts shall be sentenced to a term of natural[-]life imprisonment.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1(a)(1), (b)(1.2) (West 2000).\nAlthough the Unified Code and the Criminal Code appear to authorize the imposition of consecutive life sentences for predatory criminal sexual assault, our supreme court has held that a defendant can only serve multiple life sentences concurrently. People v. Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d 148, 169, 843 N.E.2d 292, 304 (2006). The court reasoned:\n\u201cIt belabors the obvious to state that at the conclusion of a defendant\u2019s first natural-life sentence, his life is over. *** Defendant cannot serve two natural-life sentences in sequence, nor will the total amount of two or more natural-life sentences ever be more than defendant\u2019s one life. *** Therefore, the sentences may not be consecutive, but must be concurrent because concurrent sentences are sentences which operate simultaneously.\u201d Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d at 167-68, 843 N.E.2d at 304.\nTherefore, we modify the trial court\u2019s imposition of nine consecutive natural-life sentences to nine concurrent natural-life sentences. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4) (on appeal the reviewing court may reduce the punishment imposed by the trial court).\n2. The Trial Court\u2019s Imposition of an Extended Prison Term\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred by imposing an extended prison term for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Specifically, defendant contends that the court erred when it considered the age of the victim, a factor inherent in the offense, as an aggravating factor to impose an extended-term sentence of 14 years in prison for the aggravated criminal sexual abuse. We decline to address defendant\u2019s argument because he has forfeited this issue.\nA defendant forfeits the appeal of a sentencing issue when he fails to (1) timely object during the sentencing hearing and (2) has failed to raise the issue in a postsentencing motion. People v. McNulty, 383 Ill. App. 3d 553, 556, 892 N.E.2d 73, 76 (2008).\nHere, the record shows that defendant failed to (1) object at his November 2005 sentencing hearing to the issue about which he now complains and (2) raise the issue in his posttrial motion. Thus, because this issue was not raised to the trial court, defendant has forfeited the issue on appeal. Further, we note that because we earlier affirmed the imposition of nine concurrent natural-life sentences upon defendant, this is essentially a nonissue.\nIII. FURTHER ANALYSIS AFTER REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT\nAs we previously discussed, the primary issue in this case is the admissibility of the statements of K.J.K. and M.J.B. under the confrontation clause in light of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Crawford. Thus, our initial focus was to determine whether K.J.K. and M.J.B. \u201cappeared\u201d for cross-examination at defendant\u2019s trial. We earlier held that for purposes of the confrontation clause, because they both \u201cappeared\u201d for cross-examination at trial within the meaning of Crawford, their prior statements being offered at trial was a nonevent.\nIn compliance with the supreme court\u2019s directive, we now analyze its recent decision in Rolandis G. to determine whether a different result in this case is warranted. We begin our analysis with a discussion of the appellate court decision that the supreme court reviewed (In re Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d 776, 817 N.E.2d 183 (2004)).\nA. The Appellate Court Decision in Rolandis G.\nThe respondent in Rolandis G. was adjudicated delinquent after the trial court found him guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(b) (West Supp. 2001)) of six-year-old Von J. Respondent initially argued to the appellate court that the trial court erred by admitting, pursuant to section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10 (West 2002)), Von\u2019s statements about the sexual assault to (1) his mother, (2) a police officer, and (3) a child-advocacy worker. Respondent asserted that under section 115 \u2014 10, the child victim must either (1) testify at trial (see 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10(b)(2)(A) (West 2002)) or, if the child is unavailable as a witness, (2) present through counsel corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement (see 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10(b)(2)(B) (West 2002)). Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 779-80, 817 N.E.2d at 186-87. The respondent asserted that although Von gave some basic background information from the witness stand, he was not \u201cavailable to testify\u201d within the meaning of section 115 \u2014 10 because he did not testify about the alleged sexual assault. Accordingly, the respondent contended that the State was obligated to introduce evidence corroborating the out-of-court statements but failed to do so.\nWhile the respondent\u2019s appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Crawford. The respondent then filed a supplemental brief, arguing that under Crawford, testimonial out-of-court statements by an unavailable declarant may not be admitted in a criminal trial unless the declarant was subject to cross-examination when he gave the statements. The respondent also argued that section 115\u201410 was unconstitutional to the extent that it allowed such statements to be admitted. Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 779, 817 N.E.2d at 186-87.\nThe appellate court agreed with the respondent\u2019s arguments that Von\u2019s statements to the officer and the child-advocacy worker were testimonial and, therefore, improperly admitted under Crawford. Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 781, 817 N.E.2d at 188. The court added that \u201c[t]o the extent section 115\u201410 permits the introduction of such statements, it is unconstitutional.\u201d Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 781, 817 N.E.2d at 188.\nAlthough the respondent conceded that Von\u2019s statements to his mother were not testimonial hearsay, he nonetheless argued that they should have been excluded under section 115\u201410 because Von was unavailable within the meaning of that statute and the State did not present corroborating evidence. The appellate court agreed but also concluded that Von\u2019s out-of-court statements to his mother were still admissible if the State introduced corroborating evidence. The court ultimately agreed with the State that it had done so. Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 784, 817 N.E.2d at 190. Accordingly, the court concluded that Von\u2019s \u201cstatements to his mother were properly admitted under section 115\u201410 and do not raise any confrontation clause issues.\u201d Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 784, 817 N.E.2d at 190. The appellate court nonetheless reversed the respondent\u2019s adjudication because it concluded that Von\u2019s statements to the officer and the child-advocacy worker were improperly admitted into evidence. Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 784, 817 N.E.2d at 190-91.\nB. The Supreme Court Decision in Rolandis G.\nThe supreme court granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal in Rolandis G., in which the State maintained its primary concerns were for the supreme court to (1) affirm the constitutionality of section 115 \u2014 10 and (2) consider the proper application of Crawford in situations involving young victims of sexual crimes. Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d at 22, 902 N.E.2d at 606. The State agreed with the appellate court that (1) Von\u2019s statement to his mother was nontestimonial and (2) his statement to the officer was testimonial. However, the State challenged the appellate court\u2019s determination that Von\u2019s statement to the child-advocacy worker was testimonial. Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d at 29, 902 N.E.2d at 609.\nThe supreme court disagreed with the State regarding Von\u2019s statement to the child-advocacy worker and concluded that this statement was testimonial. Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d at 36, 902 N.E.2d at 613. The supreme court also rejected the State\u2019s argument that the respondent forfeited the right to challenge the admission of Von\u2019s testimonial hearsay statements on the ground of forfeiture by wrongdoing. Rolandis G, 232 Ill. 2d at 42, 902 N.E.2d at 616-17.\nThe last matter the supreme court addressed in Rolandis G. was the State\u2019s claim that the Crawford violation was subject to harmless-error review. The supreme court agreed with the State that harmless-error analysis applied to a Crawford violation and concluded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because \u201cthe properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly supports [the respondent\u2019s] conviction.\u201d Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d at 43, 902 N.E.2d at 617.\nThe supreme court did not address the constitutionality of section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code. Instead, the court noted that the State withdrew that portion of its brief because the appellate court held only that it was unconstitutional \u201cas applied.\u201d Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d at 47, 902 N.E.2d at 619.\nC. The Application of the Supreme Court\u2019s Decision in Rolandis G. to This Case\nConsistent with the supreme court\u2019s directive that we reconsider our decision in this case in light of its opinion in Rolandis G, we have discussed the earlier decision of the appellate court in that case to demonstrate that we understood the context in which the supreme court rendered its opinion. After reconsidering our decision in this case, we conclude that Rolandis G. does not warrant a different result.\nAs earlier stated, the primary focus of our decision in this case was whether K.J.K. and M.J.B. \u201cappeared\u201d for cross-examination at defendant\u2019s trial within the meaning of Crawford. Rolandis G. addressed several important aspects of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Crawford, including testimonial hearsay and forfeiture-by-wrongdoing. (For a comprehensive and well-reasoned analysis of what constitutes testimonial hearsay, including a recent and thoughtful discussion of Rolandis G., see D. Shanes, Confronting Testimonial Hearsay: Understanding the New Confrontation Clause, 40 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 879 (2009).) However, because \u201cthe State conceded that Von was not available to testify at trial\u201d (Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d at 22, 902 N.E.2d at 605), the supreme court did not need to address the issue in this case \u2014 namely, when a declarant appears for cross-examination.\nIV CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm defendant\u2019s convictions and sentences as modified and remand with directions that the trial court amend its sentencing order to reflect concurrent natural-life sentences for defendant\u2019s nine predatory-criminal-sexual-assault-of-a-child convictions. Because the State has in part successfully defended a portion of the criminal judgment, we grant the State its statutory assessment of $50 against defendant as costs of this appeal.\nAffirmed as modified; cause remanded with directions.\nMYERSCOUGH and TURNER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Nancy L. Vincent, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Teena M. Griffin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rushville (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Anastacia R. Brooks, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD D. KITCH, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201405\u20140982\nOpinion filed June 25, 2009.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Nancy L. Vincent, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nTeena M. Griffin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rushville (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Anastacia R. Brooks, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0108-01", "first_page_order": 124, "last_page_order": 137 }