{ "id": 4288343, "name": "PATRICIA JELINEK et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Jelinek v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund", "decision_date": "2009-06-19", "docket_number": "Nos. 1\u201407\u20141141, 1\u201407\u20141142 cons.", "first_page": "372", "last_page": "380", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "392 Ill. App. 3d 372" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "86 Ill. 2d 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5468706 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304-05" }, { "page": "304-06" }, { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/86/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1033922 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542-43" }, { "page": "543" }, { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 258484 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153-54", "parenthetical": "accord" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/273/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 692", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2592055 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/0692-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 Ill. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2621039 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" }, { "page": "414-15" }, { "page": "414-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/403/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3114045 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" }, { "page": "249" }, { "page": "249" }, { "page": "250", "parenthetical": "court order remanding a case to the agency for a new hearing was not a final decision because the rights of the parties had yet to be fully and finally adjudicated" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. App. 3d 839", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3314073 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "843" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/67/0839-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 793", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3562015 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3543845 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" }, { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/157/0608-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3127069 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3216257 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 1065", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4283851 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/389/1065-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 Ill. App. 3d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4286307 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/391/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 Ill. App. 3d 749", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4135214 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/357/0749-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1083969 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372-73" }, { "page": "374-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/351/0368-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 745, "char_count": 20819, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.666970501906556e-08, "percentile": 0.29290626596376856 }, "sha256": "cb067724428d50c7c58e1e77eda31fed50eed3884373a9916794a8837cfaf04c", "simhash": "1:db6f55feaa65d492", "word_count": 3332 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:31:50.333780+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PATRICIA JELINEK et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN\u2019S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MARA FROSSARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs Patricia Jelinek and Jamie O\u2019Callaghan filed claims for a widow\u2019s annuity with defendant, the Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago (Board). The Board initially awarded them the regular annuity; however, after administrative review of their consolidated cases by the circuit court and appeal to and remand by this court, the Board ultimately awarded them the duty disability widow\u2019s annuity paid prospectively from the date this court issued the opinion Bertucci v. Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 351 Ill. App. 3d 368 (2004). Bertucci concerned the eligibility of firefighters\u2019 widows to receive duty-related annuity benefits if the deceased firefighters were permanently disabled in the course of duty.\nPlaintiffs filed a motion with the circuit court to enforce the appellate court\u2019s remand decision, seeking payment of their annuities retroactively to the dates of their husbands\u2019 deaths, prejudgment and postjudgment interest, and costs. The circuit court denied plaintiffs\u2019 motion for lack of jurisdiction, and plaintiffs appealed.\nFor the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand this cause to the circuit court to consider plaintiffs\u2019 motion to enforce.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe Board awarded annuities to firefighters\u2019 widows based upon its interpretation of the different benefits available to widows under sections 6 \u2014 140 and 6 \u2014 141.1 of the Illinois Pension Code (Pension Code) (40 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 140, 6 \u2014 141.1 (West 2006)). According to the Board, under section 6 \u2014 140, a widow was entitled to 75% of the current annual salary of a fireman who either was killed in the performance of duty or was receiving duty disability benefits and died as a direct result of injuries suffered in the line of duty. Otherwise, according to the Board, section 6 \u2014 141.1 provided for a regular widow\u2019s annuity benefit of 50% of the retirement annuity the deceased fireman either was receiving or would have been eligible to receive on the date of his death.\nPlaintiff Patricia Jelinek is the widow of Chicago firefighter Ronald Jelinek. In 1990, Mr. Jelinek suffered a heart attack while on duty and was awarded duty disability benefits. He remained on duty disability until December 24, 1999, when he died of congestive heart failure. In 2000, the Board granted Mrs. Jelinek an annuity of $2,001.38 per month pursuant to section 6 \u2014 141.1 of the Pension Code. Approximately 14 months after the Board\u2019s decision, Mrs. Jelinek filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court alleging the Board improperly failed to grant her the greater annuity benefit under section 6 \u2014 140.\nPlaintiff Jamie O\u2019Callaghan is the widow of Chicago firefighter Emmett O\u2019Callaghan. In 1995, Mr. O\u2019Callaghan suffered a knee injury while on duty and was awarded duty disability benefits. He remained on duty disability until July 17, 2000, when he died as a result of cardiac arrhythmia. In 2000, the Board granted Mrs. O\u2019Callaghan an annuity of $1,251.30 per month pursuant to section 6 \u2014 141.1 of the Pension Code. Mrs. O\u2019Callaghan timely filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court alleging the Board improperly failed to grant her the greater annuity benefit under section 6 \u2014 140.\nThe circuit court consolidated plaintiffs\u2019 complaints with those of widows Iris Nutter and Kathleen Barry and a hearing was held. In July 2002, the court reversed the Board\u2019s decision as to Mrs. O\u2019Callaghan, remanded the case, and directed the Board to grant her section 6 \u2014 140 benefits retroactive to the date of her husband\u2019s death. Concerning Mrs. Jelinek, the court ruled in August 2002 that it had jurisdiction to consider her complaint because the Board\u2019s notice of its administrative decision violated due process. The court reversed the Board\u2019s decision as to Mrs. Jelinek, remanded the case, and directed the Board to grant her section 6 \u2014 140 benefits retroactive to the date of her husband\u2019s death. In September 2002, the court also granted plaintiffs prejudgment and postjudgment interest. The Board then appealed.\nMeanwhile, on June 29, 2004, this court in Bertucci, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 372-73, held that the widows of firefighters who died while in receipt of duty disability benefits and whose duty-related injuries, although not directly the cause of their death, were of such a nature that the firefighters were permanently prevented from subsequently resuming active service, were entitled to receive the higher duty death annuity benefits available under section 6 \u2014 140 of the Pension Code. The Bertucci court rejected the Board\u2019s argument that section 6 \u2014 140 was meant to apply only in the limited situation where a firefighter died directly from or as a result of injuries suffered in the line of duty. Bertucci, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 374-75.\nConcerning the instant case, on April 29, 2005, this court in Barry v. Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 357 Ill. App. 3d 749 (2005), affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the circuit court. Specifically, this court vacated both the circuit court\u2019s reversal of the Board\u2019s denial of plaintiffs\u2019 section 6 \u2014 140 benefits and the Board\u2019s denial of plaintiffs\u2019 section 6 \u2014 140 benefits. This court remanded the cause to the Board to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether plaintiffs\u2019 husbands\u2019 duty-related disabilities permanently prevented them from returning to active duty with the fire department.\nThe Board filed a petition for leave to appeal with our supreme court, which was denied on September 29, 2005. On October 28, 2005, the appellate court mandate was filed in the circuit court. The Board issued hearing notices for several widows including plaintiffs in November 2005. Meanwhile, plaintiffs filed a motion in the circuit court on December 13, 2005, to transfer their consolidated case to another circuit court judge who was handling like cases of other widows seeking section 6 \u2014 140 benefits. The Board conducted the plaintiffs\u2019 remand hearings in December 2005, and the circuit court approved the parties\u2019 agreed order to transfer the consolidated case on December 22, 2005.\nOn January 26, 2006, the Board granted Mrs. O\u2019Callaghan section 6 \u2014 140 benefits payable prospectively from the date of the Bertucci decision rather than retroactively to the date of her husband\u2019s death. Furthermore, on March 30, 2006, the Board granted Mrs. Jelinek section 6 \u2014 140 benefits payable prospectively from the date of the Bertucci decision rather than retroactively to the date of her husband\u2019s death. The Board claimed that payment was properly calculated from the date Bertucci was issued on June 29, 2004, because Bertucci established a new principle of law concerning the burden of proof for widows seeking section 6 \u2014 140 benefits.\nOn May 3, 2006, plaintiffs O\u2019Callaghan and Jelinek, and widows Nutter and Barry filed a motion in the circuit court to enforce the Barry decision, recalculate their annuities from the dates of their husbands\u2019 deaths, and grant prejudgment and postjudgment interest and costs.\nOn May 4, 2007, the circuit court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to decide plaintiffs\u2019 motion to enforce because the appellate court remanded the cause to the Board for a hearing and therefore did not revest the circuit court with jurisdiction. The circuit court stated that plaintiffs needed to timely file new complaints for administrative review of the Board\u2019s remand decisions in order for the circuit court to have jurisdiction to entertain the issue of whether the Board acted outside the appellate court\u2019s mandate by setting an arbitrary date for the payment of benefits. The circuit court concluded that it could not review plaintiffs\u2019 motion to enforce because they failed to file any complaint for administrative review within 35 days of the Board\u2019s decisions of January 26, 2006, and March 30, 2006.\nPlaintiffs O\u2019Callaghan and Jelinek timely appealed.\nMeanwhile, on April 23, 2009, this court issued decisions in similar cases of other widows seeking section 6 \u2014 140 benefits and rejected the Board\u2019s argument that the benefits were payable prospectively from the date of the Bertucci decision. See Hooker v. Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 391 Ill. App. 3d 129 (2009); Cunningham v. Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 389 Ill. App. 3d 1065 (2009).\nII. ANALYSIS\nThe issue before this court is whether the circuit court erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs\u2019 motion to enforce. This jurisdictional question presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Vogue Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Office of the State Fire Marshal, 354 Ill. App. 3d 20, 23 (2004).\nPlaintiffs argue that the circuit court had jurisdiction to review their motion to enforce because this court\u2019s April 2005 remand order to the Board for additional fact finding did not constitute a final decision and plaintiffs were not required to file new complaints for administrative review following the remand hearing. Plaintiffs contend a remand from an appellate court directly to an agency may be subsequently reviewed by the circuit court because, pursuant to section 3 \u2014 104 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 104 (West 2006)), which is codified as article III of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2006)), the court that first acquires jurisdiction of a complaint for administrative review retains jurisdiction of the action until final disposition. Furthermore, Supreme Court Rule 369 (134 Ill. 2d R. 369) provides that the case is reinstated in the circuit court when the reviewing court remands the case for a new trial or hearing and the mandate is filed in the circuit court. Plaintiffs also complain that the Board failed to comply with this court\u2019s 2005 remand order and mandate because, after determining that plaintiffs were entitled to section 6 \u2014 140 benefits, the Board arbitrarily decided to pay those benefits prospectively from that date of Bertucci rather than retroactively to the dates of the husbands\u2019 deaths, despite having forfeited any argument concerning prospective-only application of Bertucci by failing to raise it on appeal.\nThe Board argues that the circuit court properly found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs\u2019 motion to enforce because, when the Board timely appealed the circuit court\u2019s reversal of the Board\u2019s initial administrative decisions, the circuit court was divested of jurisdiction over plaintiffs\u2019 cases and the appellate court instantly obtained jurisdiction over all matters being appealed. Furthermore, the circuit court did not expressly retain jurisdiction over the matter. According to the Board, this court\u2019s 2005 remand decision constituted a final disposition where it reached the merits of the Board\u2019s appeal. The Board contends the 2005 remand decision impliedly conferred jurisdiction over plaintiffs\u2019 actions in the Board alone because the remand and mandate provided instructions only to the Board, and not the circuit court. The Board argues that only a direct remand by the appellate court to the circuit court could revest jurisdiction in the circuit court. The Board concludes that, because plaintiffs failed to file new complaints for administrative review within 35 days of the Board\u2019s remand decisions, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review any of plaintiffs\u2019 purported claims.\nSection 3 \u2014 103 of the Code provides that \u201c[e]very action to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected by the decision.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103 (West 2006). The 35-day time limit required by the Administrative Review Law is an essential element of one\u2019s statutory right to seek judicial review and therefore is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived. Fred-man Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 212 (1985).\nFurthermore, section 3 \u2014 104 of the Code provides, in relevant part, that \u201c jurisdiction to review final administrative decisions is vested in the Circuit Courts,\u201d and the \u201ccourt first acquiring jurisdiction of any action to review a final administrative decision shall have and retain jurisdiction of the action until final disposition of the action.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 104 (West 2006). The parties do not dispute that the circuit court was vested with jurisdiction in 2001 to review plaintiffs\u2019 consolidated complaints for administrative review.\nWhen the agency has held a hearing, the circuit court has the power, inter alia, to reverse and remand the agency\u2019s decision in whole or in part, to state the questions requiring further hearing or proceedings, to give such other instructions as may be proper, and to remand for the purpose of taking additional evidence. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 111(a)(6), (7) (West 2006). \u201cA remand by the circuit court to the agency for a fact determination de novo divests the court of all jurisdiction over the matter [citation]; although a remand to the agency for limited fact finding does not necessarily divest the circuit court of jurisdiction in the matter [citations].\u201d Rosecky v. Department of Public Aid, 157 Ill. App. 3d 608, 614 (1987).\nThe circuit court\u2019s final decision, order, or judgment is reviewable by appeal as in other civil cases. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 112 (West 2006). Accordingly, the circuit court\u2019s final judgment is appealable as of right and initiated by filing a notice of appeal; no other step is jurisdictional, and the appeal is a continuation of the proceeding. 155 Ill. 2d R. 301. \u201cOnce an appeal has been perfected, jurisdiction over the matter vests in the appellate court; the circuit court may maintain jurisdiction to further supervise or enforce the appealed order, but it cannot maintain jurisdiction to substantively alter or vacate the order.\u201d Rosecky, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 613. \u201cWhen the reviewing court remands the case for a new trial or hearing and the mandate is filed in the circuit court, the case shall be reinstated therein upon 10 days\u2019 notice to the adverse party.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 134 Ill. 2d R. 369(c). This court has previously noted that a \u201c \u2018 \u201creviewing court is divested of jurisdiction in a cause before it when its mandate issues to a lower court (thereby restoring jurisdiction in that court).\u201d \u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) Jones v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 127 Ill. App. 3d 793, 797 (1984), quoting Ulinois State Chamber of Commerce v. Pollution Control Board, 67 Ill. App. 3d 839, 843 (1978).\nThe Board\u2019s argument on appeal erroneously focuses on the finality of the circuit court\u2019s 2002 orders. Although the Board correctly notes that the circuit court\u2019s 2002 orders constituted final orders and the Board\u2019s timely appeal divested the circuit court of jurisdiction, the Board ignores the jurisdictional effect of this court\u2019s subsequent order that reversed the 2002 circuit court orders and remanded the cause to the Board for an evidentiary hearing. Moreover, when this court filed the mandate in the circuit court, the case was reinstated in the circuit court and jurisdiction was restored therein pending the outcome of the Board\u2019s fact-finding remand hearing. Furthermore, the Board erroneously argues that this court\u2019s 2005 remand order constituted a final order.\nThe finality of an order which remands an action to the agency turns on the substance of the instructions. \u201c \u2018[I]f, upon remandment, the trial court has only to enter a judgment or decree in accordance with the directions of the reviewing court, or to conduct further proceedings on uncontroverted incidental matters, then, irrespective of the remanding clause in the judgment order, the judgment of the Appellate Court is final and reviewable.\u2019 \u201d Wilkey v. Illinois Racing Board, 96 Ill. 2d 245, 249 (1983), quoting Cory Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 403 Ill. 409, 414 (1949). However, if the \u201c \u2018cause is remanded for a new trial or other further proceedings involving disputed questions of law or fact, the judgment of the Appellate Court is not of a final character.\u2019 \u201d Wilkey, 96 Ill. 2d at 249, quoting Cory Corp., 403 Ill. at 414-15. \u201c \u2018The ultimate question to be decided in each case is whether the judgment fully and finally disposes of the rights of the parties to the cause so that no material controverted issue remains to be determined.\u2019 \u201d Wilkey, 96 Ill. 2d at 249, quoting Cory Corp., 403 Ill. at 414-15.\nThis court\u2019s 2005 remand order did not constitute a final order because it did not finally dispose of plaintiffs\u2019 rights where it instructed the Board to hold an evidentiary hearing to afford plaintiffs the opportunity to prove that their husbands\u2019 injuries permanently prevented them from returning to active duty with the fire department. See Wilkey, 96 Ill. 2d at 250 (court order remanding a case to the agency for a new hearing was not a final decision because the rights of the parties had yet to be fully and finally adjudicated); Kelly v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 201 Ill. App. 3d 692, 698 (1990) (where the circuit court\u2019s jurisdiction was properly established by the plaintiff\u2019s initial complaint for administrative review, she was not required to file a new complaint for review of the agency\u2019s decision following remand because the circuit court retained jurisdiction over the matter since there had been no final disposition of the cause); Lippert v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 273 Ill. App. 3d 150, 153-54 (1995) (accord). Because the issue on remand involved fact finding, this court\u2019s instructions concerning the remand hearing were properly directed to the Board rather than the circuit court. We reject the Board\u2019s assertion that there is some qualitative difference between a reviewing court\u2019s remand order \u2014 like the one issued here \u2014 that directly instructs the agency to hold an evidentiary hearing versus a reviewing court\u2019s remand order that directs the circuit court to instruct the agency to hold an evidentiary hearing.\nContrary to the Board\u2019s assertion on appeal, our 2005 remand order did not impliedly confer jurisdiction over plaintiffs\u2019 actions in the Board alone. Rather, consistent with the Administrative Review Law and supreme court rules, we instructed the Board to take additional evidence and, on October 28, 2005, issued the mandate that reinstated the case in the circuit court \u2014 the court that first acquired jurisdiction of the case and, thus, retains jurisdiction of the action until final disposition. See 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 104 (West 2006). Accordingly, plaintiffs were not required to file new complaints for administrative review within 35 days of the Board\u2019s 2006 remand decisions because the appeal and remand hearing were a continuation of plaintiffs\u2019 original consolidated complaint for administrative review.\nFinally, the Board cites Hickey v. Riera, 332 Ill. App. 3d 532, 542-43 (2001), and PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co., 86 Ill. 2d 291, 304-05 (1981), to support the proposition that only a remand by the appellate court directly to the circuit court rather than to the administrative agency serves to revest jurisdiction in the circuit court. Neither Hickey nor PSL Realty Co., however, supports that proposition. Rather, the issue addressed in those cases concerned whether the effective date of the appellate court\u2019s judgment was the date the judgment was filed or the date the mandate was issued. See Hickey, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 543; PSL Realty Co., 86 Ill. 2d at 304-06. That issue is not relevant in the instant appeal before us. Nevertheless, we note that both Hickey and PSL Realty Co. acknowledged that \u201cthe filing of the mandate from the appellate court in the circuit court *** revests jurisdiction in the circuit court.\u201d Hickey, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 543; see also PSL Realty Co., 86 Ill. 2d at 304.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court concerning the lack of jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs\u2019 motion to enforce. We remand this case to the circuit court to consider plaintiffs\u2019 motion to enforce.\nReversed and remanded.\nFITZGERALD SMITH, P.J, and TOOMIN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MARA FROSSARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Martin O. Holland, of Evergreen Park, for appellants.", "Burke Burns & Pinelli, Ltd., of Chicago (Mary Patricia Burns, Vincent D. Pinelli, and Blanca R. Dominguez, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PATRICIA JELINEK et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN\u2019S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNos. 1\u201407\u20141141, 1\u201407\u20141142 cons.\nOpinion filed June 19, 2009.\nMartin O. Holland, of Evergreen Park, for appellants.\nBurke Burns & Pinelli, Ltd., of Chicago (Mary Patricia Burns, Vincent D. Pinelli, and Blanca R. Dominguez, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0372-01", "first_page_order": 388, "last_page_order": 396 }