{ "id": 4287760, "name": "HOT LIGHT BRANDS, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HARRIS REALTY, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees (Forest City Enterprises, Inc., et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Hot Light Brands, L.L.C. v. Harris Realty, Inc.", "decision_date": "2009-06-23", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201407\u20140694", "first_page": "493", "last_page": "503", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "392 Ill. App. 3d 493" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "369 Ill. App. 3d 700", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4266824 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704" }, { "page": "704" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/369/0700-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 Ill. App. 3d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4269559 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421" }, { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/372/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256297 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 Ill. App. 3d 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4269499 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" }, { "page": "275" }, { "page": "275" }, { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/373/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 1029", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3218330 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1036", "parenthetical": "restrictive covenant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/1029-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 Ill. 2d 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2732495 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94", "parenthetical": "restraint on alienation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/21/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 Ill. App. 3d 828", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4277495 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "839" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/383/0828-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 872, "char_count": 25099, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0195151900573068e-07, "percentile": 0.5448717280428318 }, "sha256": "49772dd0143c17e789a12717471ded725e9ca7a0961d5c3f3ec2645d3e591294", "simhash": "1:de9f6587f92efc6b", "word_count": 3993 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:31:50.333780+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "HOT LIGHT BRANDS, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HARRIS REALTY, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees (Forest City Enterprises, Inc., et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Hot Light Brands, L.L.C., appeals from the order of the trial court entering declaratory judgment in favor of defendants Harris Realty, Inc., Harris Seven Bridges, Inc., Forest City Enterprises, Inc., Seven Bridges Development, L.L.C., and LaSalle Bank National Association, as trustee under trust No. 65033. We reverse.\nOn March 28, 2000, Hot Light and defendants entered into an agreement to purchase real property (agreement), in contemplation of Hot Light\u2019s purchase of an outlot in the Seven Bridges Development in Woodridge, Illinois. In July 2000, Hot Light paid defendants $915,000 for the property. The property was conveyed subject to certain covenants, conditions, and restrictions, which were attached to the trustee\u2019s deed (many of which were also contained in the agreement). Development of the property was subject to approval by an architectural review committee (ARC). The \u201ccurrent members\u201d of the ARC, appointed by defendants, were listed in article 8 of the agreement as Tom Beaulieu, Fred Petermans, Bill Wittkamper, Peter Martin (chairman), and Jack Polsky. The members were not listed in the deed. The purpose of the ARC was to ensure that improvements to the property were \u201cconstructed in a first-class manner and in a manner that is functionally and architecturally consistent and compatible with all improvements constructed within the Development.\u201d Hot Light\u2019s \u201cContemplated Improvements\u201d and its development of the property were, \u201cand at all times shall remain, subject to the [ARC\u2019s] ongoing authority and rights.\u201d The ARC\u2019s rights included \u201cthe right to review and approve the specific uses\u201d that Hot Light established for the property, \u201cin furtherance of the Contemplated Use (as hereinafter defined)\u201d; the right to determine that adequate parking was provided for \u201call uses established (or to be established)\u201d; and the right to review and approve \u201call exterior building elevations, building materials, easement plans and plans for landscaping and signage.\u201d In addition, \u201cany subsequent modifications made to, or deviation from, an approved use of land or plan\u201d was subject to \u201cfurther review and approval of\u2019 the ARC. The \u201cContemplated Use\u201d of the property was defined as \u201cthe operation of a Krispy Kreme Doughnut retail store with drive-thru and delivery facilities.\u201d The \u201cContemplated Improvements\u201d were a 4,200-square-foot, one-story building with drive-through facilities, a loading and delivery zone, and related parking, walkways, landscaping, lighting, signage, and other site improvements. Hot Light then developed the property by building and operating a Krispy Kreme Doughnut shop.\nOn June 22, 2004, Forest City-Harris Group (FC-HG), Moser Enterprises, and Hagge Group 7 LLC formed Seven Bridges Development, L.L.C. (Seven Bridges), in order to \u201cacquire a vacant parcel consisting of approximately 25.668 acres of land, located in the Seven Bridges Development,\u201d develop the property \u201cwith a first-class, upscale retail, commercial and/or office development, a hotel and possibly condominiums or townhomes,\u201d and \u201clease, sell, develop or otherwise manage the Property, for investment purposes.\u201d The planned acquisition did not include the Hot Light property. Section 5.24 of the Seven Bridges operating agreement provided that, upon the conveyance of the land to the venture, \u201cthe existing architectural committee shall be disbanded as it relates to the [Seven Bridges] Property, and FC-HG will cause a new architectural review committee (\u2018Committee\u2019) to he established for only the [Seven Bridges] Property\u201d (emphases added). The new ARC was to be comprised of four members: Peter Martin (chairman) and Tom Beaulieu from FC-HG; and John Zediker and Scott Hagge from Moser. If an ARC member from either FC-HG or Moser left the committee, notice of a new appointment was to be given to the other side.\nIn March 2006, Hot Light executed a letter of intent to sell its property to Citibank for $2,765,000. Citibank intended to convert the doughnut shop into a bank, retaining the drive-through window. Negotiations among representatives of Hot Light, Citibank, and defendants ensued. On August 27, a meeting was held involving three of the original ARC members (Martin, Beaulieu, and Wittkamper), two representatives from Hot Light, and three representatives from Citibank. On September 1, Martin sent a letter withholding approval of the proposed changes, stating that such changes would be \u201ca material deviation from what was planned for the Seven Bridges Development.\u201d In addition, the letter noted that the Village of Woodridge did not think that a Citibank branch \u201cwas an appropriate use for this particular location within the Seven Bridges Development.\u201d Hot Light asked for specific reasons for the denial of its request for approval. In a letter dated September 20, 2006, Martin informed Hot Light that, while Hot Light had failed to make a formal request for approval, the September 1 letter \u201cmay be considered the formal action\u201d of the ARC. Citing section la of exhibit C of the trustee\u2019s deed, the ARC found that the use of the property \u201cas a financial services institution is a material departure from the previously granted approval for use as a doughnut store.\u201d The ARC concluded that the requested changes \u201cwill negatively impact the traffic patterns and use of the parking spaces in the vicinity of the Property.\u201d The denial of the request was \u201cbased in part on this belief.\u201d The ARC\u2019s concern was not with Citibank but with \u201ca financial services institution occupying space that was set aside for a food services establishment.\u201d\nHot Light filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that the ARC\u2019s refusal to approve the changes was unreasonable, improper, invalid, and void and that Hot Light had the right to sell the property for use as a bank. The trial court found in favor of defendants. This appeal followed.\nHot Light first contends that the ARC that purported to make the decision was composed of people who lacked authority over the property. Hot Light argues that neither the agreement nor the trustee\u2019s deed with attachments allowed defendants to unilaterally change, without notice to Hot Light, the composition of the ARC. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that the requested changes were properly denied by the ARC. We agree.\nParagraph 8.1(a) of the agreement \u201cinformed\u201d Hot Light that the \u201ccurrent members\u201d of the ARC were Tom Beaulieu, Fred.Peterman, Bill Wittkamper, Peter Martin, and Jack Polsky. Martin\u2019s address and telephone number were also given, as he was ARC chairman. The ARC representatives at the August 27, 2006, meeting'with Hot Light and Citibank were Martin, Beaulieu, and Wittkamper. The September 1 letter denying the requested changes was signed by Martin on behalf of the ARC. Carbon copies of the letter were sent to Beaulieu and Wittkamper, along with John Zediker and Scott Hagge.\nAt trial, Zediker testified that there was only one ARC, which consisted of Martin, Beaulieu, Zediker, and Hagge. B\u00e9aulieu testified regarding an e-mail from Wittkamper to Martin, sent before the August 27 meeting, regarding Hot Light\u2019s requested changes. Hagge testified that he had never seen any document that gave the ARC named in the Seven Bridges operating agreement authority over the Hot Light property.\nParagraph 8.9 of the agreement stated that the provisions contained in article 8 shall survive the closing. Paragraph 9.7 provided that the \u201cAgreement shall not be modified by either Party by oral representations made before or after the execution of this Agreement, and all amendments to this Agreement must be in writing and signed by Buyer and Seller.\u201d Clearly, the composition of the ABC, the \u201ccurrent\u201d version of which was listed in paragraph 8.1(a), was to survive the closing.\nDefendants argue, and the trial court concluded, that the use of the term \u201ccurrent\u201d in the description of the ABC\u2019s membership meant that the membership could change. Furthermore, defendants argue that they had the authority to appoint ABC members under paragraph 1(a) of exhibit C attached to the trustee\u2019s deed, which stated that defendants had appointed the ABC members, and that there are no provisions that restrict them from changing the membership of the ABC.\nNeither the agreement nor the trustee\u2019s deed with its attachments spoke to any specific procedure for changing the composition of the ABC; while there was no specific restriction on changing the membership of the ABC, there was also no provision granting defendants the unilateral authority to change the membership of the ABC with no notice to Hot Light. Furthermore, the agreement contained a general prohibition against unilateral action \u2014 paragraph 9.7 of the agreement required amendments to be in writing and signed by both parties. Clearly, no such written amendment regarding the membership of the ABC was executed here.\n\u20221 The problem inherent in defendants\u2019 argument is manifest. No one appears to know exactly who was on the ABC at the relevant time. Hot Light believed that the ABC membership was the same as that listed in the agreement. Three of those listed in the agreement were present at the August 27, 2006, meeting. However, defendants argue that the members of the Seven Bridges ABC were the ABC members in 2006, in spite of the fact that Seven Bridges was created to purchase and manage property that did not include the Hot Light property. In addition, neither Zediker nor Hagge, members of the Seven Bridges ABC, was present at the August 27, 2006, meeting, and Wittkamper, who was supposedly removed from the ABC in 2004, was present. Zediker, Hagge, and Wittkamper were all sent carbons of the letter from Martin denying Hot Light\u2019s request.\nPursuant to article 8.1(c) of the agreement, the ABC \u201cshall\u201d notify Hot Light of its approval or disapproval of any formal request for approval within 10 days. The failure to respond within that period \u201cshall be conclusively deemed to mean that the [ABC] has approved\u201d the request for approval. While Hot Light did not submit a formal request for approval as required by section 8.1(c) of the agreement and by exhibit C of the trustee\u2019s deed, it and Citibank gave a presentation to the ARC on August 22, 2006. In the ARC\u2019s September 1 letter of denial, ARC chairman Martin noted Hot Light\u2019s lack of a formal request. However, Martin then agreed, on behalf of the ARC, that its September 1 denial, which was dated 10 days after the presentation, \u201cmay be considered the formal action of the Committee.\u201d As Martin notified Hot Light that the ARC considered its action to be a final decision on the plan, even in light of Hot Light\u2019s failure to submit a formal request, defendants cannot now argue that the lack of a formal request makes the resulting improper denial any less of an official action by the ARC. Furthermore, the submission of a formal request would have been a futile gesture after the ARC had formally denied the change.\nHere, it cannot be said that a proper composition of the ARC notified Hot Light of its decision. The ARC as it was composed in the agreement did not meet and make a decision regarding Hot Light\u2019s request. Therefore, by operation of the agreement, the ARC failed to respond, which failure operated as an approval, and the trial court erred in entering judgment in defendants\u2019 favor.\nHot Light argues that, even if this court finds in its favor on its first contention, we should address the additional arguments in its brief because of the \u201clikelihood of repetition of the disputes raised in this lawsuit.\u201d We agree, and we will address some of Hot Light\u2019s other contentions.\nHot Light next contends that the ARC did not have authority to withhold approval of the requested changes based on the merits or substance of the proposed changes; the ARC\u2019s authority extended only to architectural conformity and the adequacy of parking. This contention is based on the interpretation of the transaction documents, including the agreement and the trustee\u2019s deed. We review de novo questions of contract interpretation where there are no questions of fact to be resolved. Geisler v. City of Wood River, Illinois, 383 Ill. App. 3d 828, 839 (2008).\nHot Light first argues that the transaction documents created the ARC through the use of restrictive covenants and not, as the trial court held, restraints on alienation. Hot Light then argues that the restrictive covenants creating the ARC are ambiguous and should be construed against defendants. However, whether the documents contained restrictive covenants or restraints on alienation is irrelevant to the issue of ambiguity. Both types of restrictions are contract terms and must be analyzed under general contract principles regarding ambiguity. See, e.g., Gale v. York Center Community Cooperative, Inc., 21 Ill. 2d 86, 94 (1960) (restraint on alienation); Sadler v. Creekmur, 354 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 1036 (2004) (restrictive covenant).\nA court\u2019s principal objective in construing a contract is to give effect to the intent that the parties possessed when they entered into the agreement. Regency Commercial Associates, LLC v. Lopax, Inc., 373 Ill. App. 3d 270, 275 (2007). An agreement is to be interpreted as a whole; we should give meaning and effect to every provision when possible, and we will not interpret the agreement in a way that would nullify provisions or would render them meaningless. Regency Commercial Associates, LLC, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 275. If the terms of an agreement are unambiguous, we will ascertain the parties\u2019 intent solely from the words of the agreement itself. Regency Commercial Associates, LLC, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 275. Contract terms must be given their ordinary and natural meaning when they are unambiguous. Dam, Snell & Taveirne, Ltd. v. Verchota, 324 Ill. App. 3d 146, 154 (2001). An ambiguous agreement is generally construed against the drafter. Mermelstein v. Menora, 372 Ill. App. 3d 407, 421 (2007). Whether the language of an agreement is ambiguous is a question of law. Regency Commercial Associates, LLC, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 275.\nThe ARC was established in article 8 of the agreement and in exhibit C of the trustee\u2019s deed. Section 1 of exhibit C of the deed states in relevant part:\n\u201c1. Architectural Review Committee.\na. *** Forest City-Harris Group (\u2018Developer\u2019) the beneficiary of Trustee, has appointed an architectural review committee (the \u2018Committee\u2019) which has certain rights and obligations with respect to the Property and the improvements to be constructed thereon in order to ensure that all improvements constructed with the Development are constructed in a first-class manner and in a manner that is functionally and architecturally consistent and compatible with all improvements constructed within the Development; that the ongoing authority and rights of the Committee are of critical value to Developer because of Developer\u2019s residual interests in the Development; and that Grantee\u2019s construction of the Contemplated Improvements (as hereinafter defined) and its development of the Property are and at all times shall remain, subject to the Committee\u2019s ongoing authority and rights. Such rights consist of the right to review and approve the specific uses that Grantee establishes on the Property, in furtherance of the Contemplated Use (as hereinafter defined), the right to determine that adequate parking is being provided and will be provided at all times for all uses established (or to be established) within the Development, and the right to review and approve all exterior building elevations, building materials, easement plans and plans for landscaping and signage for all improvements to be constructed on the Property. *** Grantee further acknowledges and understands that any subsequent modifications made to, or deviation from, an approved use of land or plan shall be subject to the further review and approval of the Committee, provided, however, that such approval shall be granted so long as such modifications or deviations do not materially depart from the previously granted approval.\nb. Without limiting the foregoing, the Committee must approve *** the exterior architectural design of all Contemplated Improvements and the plans for all parking, service facilities, signs and landscaping on the Property before any construction of any kind may commence thereon in order to be assured that the improvements, parking, service facilities signs and landscaping will substantially conform with plans relating to Grantor\u2019s Project ***. * * #\nAs used herein \u2018Contemplated Improvements\u2019 shall mean a one story building (the \u2018Building\u2019) measuring approximately 4200 square feet with drive-thru facilities and a loading and delivery zone proximate to the Building, and related parking, walkways, landscaping, lighting, signage and other site improvements related thereto as required by Grantee to be located on the property, *** and which improvements shall conform in quality and construction to the existing improvements in the Development.\nAs used herein \u2018Contemplated Uses\u2019 shall mean the operation of a Krispy Kreme Doughnut retail store with drive-thru and delivery facilities.\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nHot Light argues that its intent at the time that it signed the transaction documents was to give to the ARC authority over issues related to the construction of improvements on the property, not over future uses of the property. However, Hot Light\u2019s intent is not the issue. A contract is not ambiguous merely because the parties disagree on its meaning. Baxter International, Inc. v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 369 Ill. App. 3d 700, 704 (2006). Ambiguity exists where language is obscure in meaning through indefiniteness of expression. Baxter International, Inc., 369 Ill. App. 3d at 704.\nHere, the deed describes the ARC as created \u201cin order to ensure that all improvements constructed with the Development are constructed in a first-class manner and in a manner that is functionally and architecturally consistent and compatible with all improvements constructed within the Development.\u201d The ARC was also granted:\n\u201cthe right to review and approve the specific uses that Grantee establishes on the Property, in furtherance of the Contemplated Use (as hereinafter defined), the right to determine that adequate parking is being provided and will be provided at all times for all uses established (or to be established) within the Development, and the right to review and approve all exterior building elevations, building materials, easement plans and plans for landscaping and signage for all improvements to be constructed on the Property.\u201d\nWhile the ARC was clearly granted the authority to review and approve the \u201cspecific uses\u201d that Hot Light \u201cestablishes on the Property, in furtherance of the Contemplated Use,\u201d it is not clear that the ARC had the same authority to review and approve the \u201cContemplated Use\u201d of the property itself. The \u201cContemplated Use,\u201d which was defined as \u201cthe operation of a Krispy Kreme Doughnut retail store with drive-thru and delivery facilities,\u201d is distinct from the \u201cuses\u201d over which the ARC was granted authority, and it is separately defined. The ARC\u2019S enumerated rights and authority deal with issues such as parking, service facilities, signs, landscaping, exterior building elevations, building materials, and easement plans. These rights coincide with the expressed purpose of the ARC, which was created \u201cin order to ensure that all improvements constructed with the Development are constructed in a first-class manner and in a manner that is functionally and architecturally consistent and compatible with all improvements constructed within the Development.\u201d Authority over the type of business to be conducted on the property appears to be beyond the purpose of the ARC.\nThe ARC was also expressly given the authority to review and approve \u201cmodifications made to, or deviation from, an approved use of land or plan,\u201d provided that approval \u201cshall be granted so long as such modifications or deviations do not materially depart from the previously granted approval.\u201d If such authority included the right to approve the type of business to be operated, it would be difficult to imagine an immaterial deviation from a \u201cKrispy Kreme Doughnut retail store with drive-thru and delivery facilities.\u201d Any use other than a doughnut shop would appear to be a material deviation from the previously granted approval, and thus this grant of almost automatic approval would appear to be meaningless as it relates to the business to be operated.\nOur conclusion is further bolstered by evidence of another agreement to purchase that defendants placed in the record. In February 2004, MTB Partners LLC purchased property in the Seven Bridges Development with a contemplated use as \u201ca sports-themed restaurant and bar known as Buffalo Wild Wings Grill and Bar.\u201d Article 8 of the agreement to purchase provided for an ARC, the \u201ccurrent members\u201d of which were the same as those listed in the Hot Light agreement. Like the ARC in the case before us, the Buffalo Wild Wings ARC also had the \u201cright to review and approve the specific uses that Buyer establishes on the Property, in furtherance of the Contemplated Use.\u201d However, section 8.8, entitled \u201cUse Restrictions,\u201d proceeded to prohibit no fewer than 15 specific uses, including bowling alley, pool hall, adult bookstore, and popcorn vendor. Other restrictions applied so long as other businesses in Seven Bridges, including certain restaurants and a movie theater, were still operating. MTB could \u201cchange the use of the Property from the Contemplated Use to any other lawful use,\u201d provided that the new use did not violate the use restrictions and did \u201cnot have any greater parking requirements than is required by the Village for the Contemplated Use.\u201d Prior to making the change, MTB was required to notify defendants of its desire to change the use, and defendants had 10 days to notify MTB if the desired use violated the use provisions.\nIt is clear from this agreement to purchase that defendants were well aware of how to limit the potential uses of property in the Seven Bridges development. They chose to place specific use restrictions on the Buffalo Wild Wings property; such restrictions were completely absent from the Hot Light agreement. Further, defendants required that approval of planned changes come through them, not the Buffalo Wild Wings ARC, even though that ARC had the same \u201cright to review and approve the specific uses that Buyer establishes on the Property, in furtherance of the Contemplated Use\u201d that the Hot Light ARC possessed. Despite defendant\u2019s contention, this same language contained in both documents cannot result in such obviously different outcomes.\nIt is not clear from the words of the agreement itself whether the ARC\u2019s authority to review and approve \u201cthe specific uses that Grantee establishes on the Property, in furtherance of the Contemplated Use\u201d includes the right to approve the actual type of business to be conducted on the property. Therefore, as a matter of law, the agreement is ambiguous. An ambiguous agreement is generally construed against the drafter. Mermelstein, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 421. Here, Beaulieu testified that he had represented defendants in some of the negotiations with Hot Light. When asked if Hot Light made any attempt to negotiate the terms of article 8 of the agreement, which contained the provisions regarding the ARC, Beaulieu replied, \u201cI don\u2019t recollect that they had; but if they had, we wouldn\u2019t have agreed to it anyway.\u201d As defendants authored the ambiguous language, we construe it against them. Therefore, we hold that the ARC had no authority to review and approve the type of business conducted on the property and had no authority to deny approval of Hot Light\u2019s proposed sale of the property to Citibank.\nBecause of our disposition of this issue, we need not address Hot Light\u2019s other contention.\nFor these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is reversed.\nReversed.\nBOWMAN and BURKE, JJ., concur.\nHot Light Brands, L.L.C., was formerly known as Sweet Traditions of Illinois, L.L.C. While many of the facts occurred while plaintiff was still known as Sweet Traditions, we will use the name Hot Light throughout this disposition.\nDefendants Forest City Enterprises, Inc., and LaSalle Bank National Association, as trustee under trust No. 65033, did not participate in the trial and are not part of this appeal.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jim J. Shoemake and Eric M. Walter, both of Guilfoil, Petzall & Shoemake LLC, of St. Louis, Missouri, and Michael M. Roth and James B. Durkin, both of Ice Miller LLP, of Lisle, for appellant.", "John A. Lipinsky and George S. Weems, both of Coman & Anderson, P.C., of Lisle, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HOT LIGHT BRANDS, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HARRIS REALTY, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees (Forest City Enterprises, Inc., et al., Defendants).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201407\u20140694\nOpinion filed June 23, 2009.\nJim J. Shoemake and Eric M. Walter, both of Guilfoil, Petzall & Shoemake LLC, of St. Louis, Missouri, and Michael M. Roth and James B. Durkin, both of Ice Miller LLP, of Lisle, for appellant.\nJohn A. Lipinsky and George S. Weems, both of Coman & Anderson, P.C., of Lisle, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0493-01", "first_page_order": 509, "last_page_order": 519 }